4458 lines
230 KiB
Plaintext
4458 lines
230 KiB
Plaintext
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Three, Issue 29, File #1 of 12
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Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXIX Index
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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November 17, 1989
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Greetings and welcome to Issue 29 of Phrack Inc. For those of you who
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have been with us from the beginning, the date on this issue may hold some
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historical significance:
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Happy Fourth Anniversary Phrack Inc.!
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This issue we feature two files dealing with electronic fund transfer
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written by a member of the Legion of Doom who wishes to remain anonymous.
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The second article tells a story detailing how an actual electronic fund
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transfer might take place -- Is it true or is it fiction? We decided to let
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you, the reader, decide that for yourself.
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The Future Transcendent Saga continues as usual in this issue with part
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two of "Introduction to the Internet Protocols." We also present to you the
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second edition of Network Miscellany which focuses largely on Public Access
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Unix systems around the country. Last, but not least, concerning the wide area
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networks, we have Covert Paths -- a file about hacking on the Internet and how
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to make sure you cannot be tracked down.
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On a lighter note, it appears that Teleconnect Magazine liked The Mentor's
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"Hacker's Manifesto" so much that they decided to print a portion of it in
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their November 1989 issue. If you receive this magazine you will find it on
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page 55, but only the last 4 paragraphs (they apparently did not like the
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beginning of the file). The interesting thing is that Teleconnect claims that
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they were given the article by MCI Security who recently discovered it on a
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bulletin board. If you are a long time reader of Phrack Inc., you might
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remember that this article was dated for January 8, 1986 and originally
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appeared in Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue VII (file 3 of 10) and again in issue
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XXIV (file 3 of 9).
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As always, we ask that anyone with network access drop us a line to either
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our Bitnet or Internet addresses...
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Taran King Knight Lightning
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C488869@UMCVMB.BITNET C483307@UMCVMB.BITNET
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C488869@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU C483307@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU
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And we can also be reached via our new mail forwarding addresses (for those
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that cannot mail to our Bitnet or Internet addresses):
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...!netsys!phrack or phrack@netsys.COM
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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Table of Contents:
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1. Phrack Inc. XXIX Index by Taran King and Knight Lightning
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2. Phrack Pro-Phile XXIX on Emmanuel Goldstein
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3. Introduction to the Internet Protocols II: Chapter Nine of the FTS by KL
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4. Network Miscellany II by Taran King
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5. Covert Paths by Cyber Neuron Limited and Synthecide
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6. Bank Information compiled by Legion of Doom!
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7. How We Got Rich Through Electronic Fund Transfer by Legion of Doom!
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8. The Myth and Reality About Eavesdropping by Phone Phanatic
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9. Blocking of Long-Distance Calls... Revisited by Jim Schmickley
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10-12 Phrack World News XXIX/Parts 1-3 by Knight Lightning
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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>--------=====END=====--------<
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Three, Issue 29, File #2 of 12
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==Phrack Pro-Phile XXIX==
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Created and Presented by Taran King
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Done on November 12, 1989
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Welcome to Phrack Pro-Phile XXIX. Phrack Pro-Phile was created to
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bring information to you, the community, about retired or highly important/
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controversial people. This edition of the Phrack Pro-Phile starts a different
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format as I'm sure you will notice. The skeleton of the Pro-Phile is a form
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in which the people fill in the blanks. Starting now, using their words (and a
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little editing), the Pro-Phile will be presented in first person format. This
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month, we present to you the editor of one of the most prominent printed
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phreak/hack newsletters of all times...
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Emmanuel Goldstein
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Handle: Emmanuel Goldstein
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Call Him: Call me anything. Just look me in the eye.
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Past Handles: Howard Tripod, Sidney Schreiber, Bob Hardy, Gary Wilson,
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Clint Eastwood, 110. There are others that I keep quiet
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about.
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Handle Origin: I prefer using regular names rather than descriptive
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boastful titles (i.e., "The Hacker King," who,
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incidentally, I don't wish to offend if he/she even exists;
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this is just an example). The names I use are either
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people I've "become" or names that bestow a certain image.
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Emmanuel Goldstein, for instance, led the resistance in
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"1984." But then, there was talk that he never really
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existed and was just created by the government in order to
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capture the real subversives. I don't think that's the
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case with me.
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Computers: I use PC compatibles for the most part. I also play around
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with Macs but they're not REAL computers to me. My
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favorite machine of all time is the Zenith Z-100, a
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dual-processor computer that can emulate an old fashioned
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H8 or an IBM PC. It runs lots of operating systems and has
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a great keyboard. Too bad it was discontinued four years
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ago....
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Sysop/Co-Sysop Of: The old Plovernet on Long Island (1984), Private Sector in
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New Jersey (1985, 1986), and the present and future 2600
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boards.
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Origins in Phreak/Hack World
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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I've been playing with phones all of my life and I started playing with
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computers the first time I saw one. I always seemed to get in trouble for
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doing things I wasn't supposed to... crashing the PDP-10 in high school...
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flashing the switchhook on my phone 95 times and getting an angry switchman who
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wouldn't release the line, claiming I broke it (I was 10). As computers and
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phones started to become integrated, I realized what hacking really was -- just
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asking a lot of questions and being really persistent. A lot of people don't
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like that, whether it's computers or real life, but how else are you going to
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learn what's REALLY happening and not just what others WANT you to know?
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Origins in Phreak/Hack BBSes
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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I don't really have a BBS reputation to speak of. They tend to disappear
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rather quickly and that tends to dampen my enthusiasm towards them quite a bit,
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but I do want to see more and more of them come up and begin to reach out and
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be creative. They also have to challenge the system some more. 2600 has a
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very strong opinion on BBS privacy, namely that the same rights afforded to any
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publication should be extended to a bulletin board, but every BBS owner should
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know the importance of this and should be willing to fight for it. If you
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didn't believe in preserving the First Amendment, you probably wouldn't go out
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and buy a newspaper, would you? A BBS is the same thing and anyone who runs a
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system should see this connection. Hackers tend to bring this issue to the
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forefront a bit more, but this is something that applies to all bulletin
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boards.
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Encounters With Phreakers and Hackers
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Meeting Captain Crunch in Amsterdam this past summer was a real trip. Finding
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out who Cable Pair really was certainly resulted in some highlights. I've met
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a lot of "famous" phreaks and hackers and now I know a lot of foreign ones, but
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I'm always amazed at the number of people I meet (mostly in New York) who say
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they've been hacking since the sixties. There's an awful lot of people out
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there who are into this kind of stuff, which is something I never knew before I
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started being open about these particular interests.
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Experience Gained In The Following Ways
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Social engineering, of course. I like hacking computers when I'm not feeling
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social because you don't have to adjust your attitude to get a reply, but
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people hacking is so much more satisfying. No matter how many security codes
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and precautions are taken, as long as one person without knowledge is able to
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talk to another with knowledge, it will always be possible to get things out of
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them. Most of the really important bits of information I've been able to get
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are through people, not computers.
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Knowledge Attributed To...
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Ignorance. I built up my knowledge by wandering around in places others
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thought unimportant. Hacking can be like trashing. It looks like garbage or a
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waste of time to most, but if you keep your mind open, you can learn a lot. If
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more people felt this way, hackers would stand out less because everyone would
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be a bit more adventurous, but ignorance prevails and we learn what nobody else
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cares about...that is until it affects them.
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Work/Schooling
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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I got an English degree at Stony Brook (it's currently gathering dust in a
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closet). I should note that I've never taken a computer course, nor do I
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intend to. I've worked as a limo driver, a Good Humor man, and a typesetter,
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and more recently, as a freelance writer, a reporter for Pacifica Radio, and a
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radio engineer/producer and talk show host.
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Busted For...
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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I used to make free phone calls all the time. Now, obviously, I can't do that,
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since I'm in the public eye, but that's not a drawback to me because I can
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still experiment all I want. Nothing can change that. For the most part I was
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careful while I was doing these things, but there was one time when my luck ran
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out. I had been using Telemail to communicate with some other people and they,
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unknown to us, had been looking for hackers on their system. They found us,
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the members of PHALSE (Phreakers, Hackers, and Laundromat Service Employees
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[I'm told the feds spent a lot of time investigating the laundry connection,
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even though we only used it to spell out the word PHALSE!]). I believe four
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people got indicted in that adventure. I was one of them. Bill Landreth was
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another. They thought I was the ringleader so they gave me a 10 count
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indictment, more than twice what anyone else got. Without hiring an expensive
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lawyer, I talked to a roomful of feds about the system and what was wrong with
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it. I made it clear that I wasn't turning anybody in -- even if I wanted to I
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still didn't know who or where they were. I think I was dealt with fairly. I
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told them what I did and paid for the time I used. Nothing more. That was in
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1984 when 2600 was just getting off the ground. A couple of years ago, one of
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the feds who had questioned me tried to get me to work for them. Not to entrap
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hackers, but Soviet spies. And so it goes.
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Interests
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~~~~~~~~~
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I guess I'm an explorer because everything I like doing involves exploration of
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some sort. Obviously, hacking contains a good amount of that. I like
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traveling quite a bit, particularly when I'm free to do whatever the hell I
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want. Traveling with people is fun but it can also be a drag because something
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you want to do puts them off and then you either wind up not doing it or doing
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it and pissing them off. I like to ride subways to weird places and walk
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through bad neighborhoods. It's all a part of exploring and seeing the world
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through different eyes. A couple of years ago I went to Baffin Island and hung
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out for a week with Eskimos. Everyone thought I was crazy but I had a great
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time. I'm also into astronomy, but not the classroom kind. I took a course
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in astronomy once and it was the biggest mistake of my life. All we did was
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talk about equations. I like to look at the sky and read about what's being
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discovered up there. When the space telescope goes up next year, interest in
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space will rise again. Then there's free-lance writing, which I have to devote
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more time to. I'm working on a couple of plays, some short stories, a
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screenplay for a movie, and a screenplay for TV. I'll probably focus on the
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plays only because there's so much bullshit involved in TV and movies. And
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finally, there's radio. I've been in radio for just over 10 years, doing
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whatever comes to mind on WUSB-FM in Stony Brook, NY, a small, noncommercial
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radio station at the State University. Now I also work at WBAI-FM, a much
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larger station in New York City with the same kind of free-form attitude.
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There's so much you can do with radio, but so few stations want to take a
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chance any more. That's why they all sound the same. Unfortunately, when you
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sell commercials, you also sell your freedom. I've seen it enough times to
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know it's true and that's the reason I've stayed out of commercial radio.
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Right now I do a weekly talk show on WUSB called "Brain Damage" where I take
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calls, play with the phones, and air tapes from Radio Moscow. On WBAI I'm
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doing two shows: "News of the World" which is a compilation of foreign news
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reports and "Off The Hook," a program about, you guessed it, phone phreaks.
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Favorite Things
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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I like hanging out with fun people who are open-minded, non-judgmental, and
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preferably insane to a degree. I enjoy talking on the phone with friends and
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strangers alike. Strangers are different because you can be whoever you want
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to be with them. They tend to believe almost anything you say. Music is
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really important. Right now I like rappers and toasters the most, with soca
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and hardcore close behind. Ska's real good too, but there's not much coming
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out. The record I put on when I wake up sets my mood for the day. I like
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music with lyrics that mean something. There's a time and a place for mindless
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droning but there's too much of it around. Music should have meaning. In
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Jamaica, people don't buy newspapers. They buy records and that's how they
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learn what's going on and what the latest catch phrases are. Some of my
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favorite rock bands include The Clash, Big Audio Dynamite, Dead Kennedys,
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Donner Party, Public Enemy, Camper Van Beethoven, Pink Floyd, Fun Boy Three, De
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La Soul, and Anti-Nowhere League. Some of my favorite solo artists are Tracy
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Chapman, John Lennon, Elvis Costello, and Patsy Cline. I realize I'm very
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lucky because I work in an environment (noncommercial radio station) that gets
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over 100 new albums a week. I don't know how I would have ever found some of
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the stuff I like if I didn't have that kind of access.
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Inside Jokes
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~~~~~~~~~~~~
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"OK, if we can't have a tour, can we at least have a look around?"
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"I'm not allowed to talk to you any more."
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"This is the Sprint operator. I have a collect call from AT&T."
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"There aren't any more supervisors, sir. You've spoken to all of them."
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"Iran, will you hang up! Sir, do you speak what he speaks?"
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"I said, DON'T hit return!"
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"But we didn't know it was the foreign minister!"
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"Repair serv-- damn! There it goes again. What the hell's wrong with
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these phones?"
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"Just tell me how much money you lost and I'll arrange for a trial date."
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Serious Section
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Being a part of the hack/phreak community, you get to experience unique little
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adventures that the "average" person has no conception of. We talk to people
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over the phone and have no idea what they look like, often no idea what they
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even sound like (BBSes). We play with technology and are thought of as
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geniuses merely because the rest of the world doesn't understand what we're
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doing. I think that goes to our heads sometimes, which is bad for everyone.
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We should apply our knowledge and skills not only to help ourselves by getting
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a high-paying job somewhere but to help others as well. Look what happened in
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China. Using FAX machines, modems, and redial functions, people forced
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information into the country and tied up the government's snitch lines which
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probably saved a few lives. The "average" person would never think of applying
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technology in this way, but we do and we know how to do it efficiently,
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quickly, and without spending money. It's because of that last one that we've
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got freedom. Most people don't do things because of the cost. Without having
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to worry about that, you can be a lot more imaginative. Of course, that also
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makes it illegal, which is enough to stifle some of us. What we do and how we
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do it is a decision we each have to make, but we should stop wasting time
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boasting and get on with the exploring and the learning and the new
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applications. Another thing that really gets me is the person who says,
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"hacking and phreaking isn't what it used to be." First off, if nothing
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changes, life gets pretty dull. Second, that statement is usually a precursor
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to something like, "what kids do today isn't real hacking. What I did 5, 10,
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20 years ago was REAL hacking." Generalizations like that are worthless. It's
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just like yuppies going on about the Beatles, calling that real music, and
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saying the sounds of today are crap (by the way, I like the Beatles a lot). At
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the same time, too many hackers are just starting out and thinking they know it
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all, dismissing everything that happened before they were around. The spirit
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of today's hacker is often the same as that of a phone phreak of the sixties.
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And there were people like us around 100 years ago but we're even more far
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removed from what they could have possibly been doing. The point is that
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there's a bond that ties a lot of us together -- it cuts through time and
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backgrounds. Like anything else, there's too much hypocrisy and judging going
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on in the hack/phreak world. I think it's a real waste of time.
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Are Phreaks/Hackers You've Met Generally Computer Geeks?
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Not in the least. Those people that I've come to know have turned out to be
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just about everything you can imagine. White/Black, Jew/Gentile, straight/gay,
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male/female, opened/closed, you name it. Everyone's got different sides to
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them, stuff they don't always want others to know. Sometimes we try to squash
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those other sides of us, but they still exist. I've met hackers who have
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geekish qualities but once you get to know them, you realize there's more to
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them. Of course, there are lots of hackers I would never want to know in a
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million years; that's just the way I am with a lot of people. I think it was
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Linus Van Pelt who said, "I love mankind. It's people I can't stand."
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>--------=====END=====--------<
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Three, Issue 29, File #3 of 12
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<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
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<> <>
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<> Introduction to the Internet Protocols <>
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<> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ <>
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<> Chapter Nine Of The Future Transcendent Saga <>
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<> <>
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<> Part Two of Two Files <>
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<> <>
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<> Presented by Knight Lightning <>
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<> September 27, 1989 <>
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<> <>
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<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
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Prologue - Part Two
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~~~~~~~~
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A great deal of the material in this file comes from "Introduction to the
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Internet Protocols" by Charles L. Hedrick of Rutgers University. That material
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is copyrighted and is used in this file by permission. Time differention and
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changes in the wide area networks have made it neccessary for some details of
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the file to updated and in some cases reworded for better understanding by our
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readers. Also, Unix is a trademark of AT&T Technologies, Inc. -- Again, just
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thought I'd let you know.
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Table of Contents - Part Two
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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* Introduction - Part Two
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* Well Known Sockets And The Applications Layer
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* Protocols Other Than TCP: UDP and ICMP
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* Keeping Track Of Names And Information: The Domain System
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* Routing
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* Details About The Internet Addresses: Subnets And Broadcasting
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* Datagram Fragmentation And Reassembly
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* Ethernet Encapsulation: ARP
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* Getting More Information
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Introduction - Part Two
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~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This article is a brief introduction to TCP/IP, followed by suggestions on
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what to read for more information. This is not intended to be a complete
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description, but it can give you a reasonable idea of the capabilities of the
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protocols. However, if you need to know any details of the technology, you
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will want to read the standards yourself.
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Throughout this file, you will find references to the standards, in the form of
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"RFC" (Request For Comments) or "IEN" (Internet Engineering Notes) numbers --
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these are document numbers. The final section (Getting More Information)
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explains how you can get copies of those standards.
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Well-Known Sockets And The Applications Layer
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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In part one of this series, I described how a stream of data is broken up into
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datagrams, sent to another computer, and put back together. However something
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more is needed in order to accomplish anything useful. There has to be a way
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for you to open a connection to a specified computer, log into it, tell it what
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file you want, and control the transmission of the file. (If you have a
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different application in mind, e.g. computer mail, some analogous protocol is
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needed.) This is done by "application protocols." The application protocols
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run "on top" of TCP/IP. That is, when they want to send a message, they give
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the message to TCP. TCP makes sure it gets delivered to the other end.
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Because TCP and IP take care of all the networking details, the applications
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protocols can treat a network connection as if it were a simple byte stream,
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like a terminal or phone line.
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Before going into more details about applications programs, we have to describe
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how you find an application. Suppose you want to send a file to a computer
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whose Internet address is 128.6.4.7. To start the process, you need more than
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just the Internet address. You have to connect to the FTP server at the other
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end. In general, network programs are specialized for a specific set of tasks.
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Most systems have separate programs to handle file transfers, remote terminal
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logins, mail, etc. When you connect to 128.6.4.7, you have to specify that you
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want to talk to the FTP server. This is done by having "well-known sockets"
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for each server. Recall that TCP uses port numbers to keep track of individual
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conversations. User programs normally use more or less random port numbers.
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However specific port numbers are assigned to the programs that sit waiting for
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requests. For example, if you want to send a file, you will start a program
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called "ftp." It will open a connection using some random number, say 1234,
|
|
for the port number on its end. However it will specify port number 21 for the
|
|
other end. This is the official port number for the FTP server. Note that
|
|
there are two different programs involved. You run ftp on your side. This is
|
|
a program designed to accept commands from your terminal and pass them on to
|
|
the other end. The program that you talk to on the other machine is the FTP
|
|
server. It is designed to accept commands from the network connection, rather
|
|
than an interactive terminal. There is no need for your program to use a
|
|
well-known socket number for itself. Nobody is trying to find it. However the
|
|
servers have to have well-known numbers, so that people can open connections to
|
|
them and start sending them commands. The official port numbers for each
|
|
program are given in "Assigned Numbers."
|
|
|
|
Note that a connection is actually described by a set of 4 numbers: The
|
|
Internet address at each end, and the TCP port number at each end. Every
|
|
datagram has all four of those numbers in it. (The Internet addresses are in
|
|
the IP header, and the TCP port numbers are in the TCP header.) In order to
|
|
keep things straight, no two connections can have the same set of numbers.
|
|
However it is enough for any one number to be different. For example, it is
|
|
perfectly possible for two different users on a machine to be sending files to
|
|
the same other machine. This could result in connections with the following
|
|
parameters:
|
|
|
|
Internet addresses TCP ports
|
|
connection 1 128.6.4.194, 128.6.4.7 1234, 21
|
|
connection 2 128.6.4.194, 128.6.4.7 1235, 21
|
|
|
|
Since the same machines are involved, the Internet addresses are the same.
|
|
Since they are both doing file transfers, one end of the connection involves
|
|
the well-known port number for FTP. The only thing that differs is the port
|
|
number for the program that the users are running. That's enough of a
|
|
difference. Generally, at least one end of the connection asks the network
|
|
software to assign it a port number that is guaranteed to be unique. Normally,
|
|
it's the user's end, since the server has to use a well-known number.
|
|
|
|
Now that we know how to open connections, let's get back to the applications
|
|
programs. As mentioned earlier, once TCP has opened a connection, we have
|
|
something that might as well be a simple wire. All the hard parts are handled
|
|
by TCP and IP. However we still need some agreement as to what we send over
|
|
this connection. In effect this is simply an agreement on what set of commands
|
|
the application will understand, and the format in which they are to be sent.
|
|
Generally, what is sent is a combination of commands and data. They use
|
|
context to differentiate. For example, the mail protocol works like this:
|
|
Your mail program opens a connection to the mail server at the other end. Your
|
|
program gives it your machine's name, the sender of the message, and the
|
|
recipients you want it sent to. It then sends a command saying that it is
|
|
starting the message. At that point, the other end stops treating what it sees
|
|
as commands, and starts accepting the message. Your end then starts sending
|
|
the text of the message. At the end of the message, a special mark is sent (a
|
|
dot in the first column). After that, both ends understand that your program
|
|
is again sending commands. This is the simplest way to do things, and the one
|
|
that most applications use.
|
|
|
|
File transfer is somewhat more complex. The file transfer protocol involves
|
|
two different connections. It starts out just like mail. The user's program
|
|
sends commands like "log me in as this user," "here is my password," "send me
|
|
the file with this name." However once the command to send data is sent, a
|
|
second connection is opened for the data itself. It would certainly be
|
|
possible to send the data on the same connection, as mail does. However file
|
|
transfers often take a long time. The designers of the file transfer protocol
|
|
wanted to allow the user to continue issuing commands while the transfer is
|
|
going on. For example, the user might make an inquiry, or he might abort the
|
|
transfer. Thus the designers felt it was best to use a separate connection for
|
|
the data and leave the original command connection for commands. (It is also
|
|
possible to open command connections to two different computers, and tell them
|
|
to send a file from one to the other. In that case, the data couldn't go over
|
|
the command connection.)
|
|
|
|
Remote terminal connections use another mechanism still. For remote logins,
|
|
there is just one connection. It normally sends data. When it is necessary to
|
|
send a command (e.g. to set the terminal type or to change some mode), a
|
|
special character is used to indicate that the next character is a command. If
|
|
the user happens to type that special character as data, two of them are sent.
|
|
|
|
I am not going to describe the application protocols in detail in this file.
|
|
It is better to read the RFCs yourself. However there are a couple of common
|
|
conventions used by applications that will be described here. First, the
|
|
common network representation: TCP/IP is intended to be usable on any
|
|
computer. Unfortunately, not all computers agree on how data is represented.
|
|
|
|
There are differences in character codes (ASCII vs. EBCDIC), in end of line
|
|
conventions (carriage return, line feed, or a representation using counts), and
|
|
in whether terminals expect characters to be sent individually or a line at a
|
|
time. In order to allow computers of different kinds to communicate, each
|
|
applications protocol defines a standard representation. Note that TCP and IP
|
|
do not care about the representation. TCP simply sends octets. However the
|
|
programs at both ends have to agree on how the octets are to be interpreted.
|
|
|
|
The RFC for each application specifies the standard representation for that
|
|
application. Normally it is "net ASCII." This uses ASCII characters, with end
|
|
of line denoted by a carriage return followed by a line feed. For remote
|
|
login, there is also a definition of a "standard terminal," which turns out to
|
|
be a half-duplex terminal with echoing happening on the local machine. Most
|
|
applications also make provisions for the two computers to agree on other
|
|
representations that they may find more convenient. For example, PDP-10's have
|
|
36-bit words. There is a way that two PDP-10's can agree to send a 36-bit
|
|
binary file. Similarly, two systems that prefer full-duplex terminal
|
|
conversations can agree on that. However each application has a standard
|
|
representation, which every machine must support.
|
|
|
|
So that you might get a better idea of what is involved in the application
|
|
protocols, here is an imaginary example of SMTP (the simple mail transfer
|
|
protocol.) Assume that a computer called FTS.PHRACK.EDU wants to send the
|
|
following message.
|
|
|
|
Date: Fri, 17 Nov 89 15:42:06 EDT
|
|
From: knight@fts.phrack.edu
|
|
To: taran@msp.phrack.edu
|
|
Subject: Anniversary
|
|
|
|
Four years is quite a long time to be around. Happy Anniversary!
|
|
|
|
Note that the format of the message itself is described by an Internet standard
|
|
(RFC 822). The standard specifies the fact that the message must be
|
|
transmitted as net ASCII (i.e. it must be ASCII, with carriage return/linefeed
|
|
to delimit lines). It also describes the general structure, as a group of
|
|
header lines, then a blank line, and then the body of the message. Finally, it
|
|
describes the syntax of the header lines in detail. Generally they consist of
|
|
a keyword and then a value.
|
|
|
|
Note that the addressee is indicated as TARAN@MSP.PHRACK.EDU. Initially,
|
|
addresses were simply "person at machine." Today's standards are much more
|
|
flexible. There are now provisions for systems to handle other systems' mail.
|
|
This can allow automatic forwarding on behalf of computers not connected to the
|
|
Internet. It can be used to direct mail for a number of systems to one central
|
|
mail server. Indeed there is no requirement that an actual computer by the
|
|
name of FTS.PHRACK.EDU even exist (and it doesn't). The name servers could be
|
|
set up so that you mail to department names, and each department's mail is
|
|
routed automatically to an appropriate computer. It is also possible that the
|
|
part before the @ is something other than a user name. It is possible for
|
|
programs to be set up to process mail. There are also provisions to handle
|
|
mailing lists, and generic names such as "postmaster" or "operator."
|
|
|
|
The way the message is to be sent to another system is described by RFCs 821
|
|
and 974. The program that is going to be doing the sending asks the name
|
|
server several queries to determine where to route the message. The first
|
|
query is to find out which machines handle mail for the name FTS.PHRACK.EDU.
|
|
In this case, the server replies that FTS.PHRACK.EDU handles its own mail. The
|
|
program then asks for the address of FTS.PHRACK.EDU, which for the sake of this
|
|
example is is 269.517.724.5. Then the the mail program opens a TCP connection
|
|
to port 25 on 269.517.724.5. Port 25 is the well-known socket used for
|
|
receiving mail. Once this connection is established, the mail program starts
|
|
sending commands. Here is a typical conversation. Each line is labelled as to
|
|
whether it is from FTS or MSP. Note that FTS initiated the connection:
|
|
|
|
MSP 220 MSP.PHRACK.EDU SMTP Service at 17 Nov 89 09:35:24 EDT
|
|
FTS HELO fts.phrack.edu
|
|
MSP 250 MSP.PHRACK.EDU - Hello, FTS.PHRACK.EDU
|
|
FTS MAIL From:<knight@fts.phrack.edu>
|
|
MSP 250 MAIL accepted
|
|
FTS RCPT To:<taran@msp.phrack.edu>
|
|
MSP 250 Recipient accepted
|
|
FTS DATA
|
|
MSP 354 Start mail input; end with <CRLF>.<CRLF>
|
|
FTS Date: Fri, 17 Nov 89 15:42:06 EDT
|
|
FTS From: knight@fts.phrack.edu
|
|
FTS To: taran@msp.phrack.edu
|
|
FTS Subject: Anniversary
|
|
FTS
|
|
FTS Four years is quite a long time to be around. Happy Anniversary!
|
|
FTS .
|
|
MSP 250 OK
|
|
FTS QUIT
|
|
MSP 221 MSP.PHRACK.EDU Service closing transmission channel
|
|
|
|
The commands all use normal text. This is typical of the Internet standards.
|
|
Many of the protocols use standard ASCII commands. This makes it easy to watch
|
|
what is going on and to diagnose problems. The mail program keeps a log of
|
|
each conversation so if something goes wrong, the log file can simply be mailed
|
|
to the postmaster. Since it is normal text, he can see what was going on. It
|
|
also allows a human to interact directly with the mail server, for testing.
|
|
|
|
The responses all begin with numbers. This is also typical of Internet
|
|
protocols. The allowable responses are defined in the protocol. The numbers
|
|
allow the user program to respond unambiguously. The rest of the response is
|
|
text, which is normally for use by any human who may be watching or looking at
|
|
a log. It has no effect on the operation of the programs. The commands
|
|
themselves simply allow the mail program on one end to tell the mail server the
|
|
information it needs to know in order to deliver the message. In this case,
|
|
the mail server could get the information by looking at the message itself.
|
|
|
|
Every session must begin with a HELO, which gives the name of the system that
|
|
initiated the connection. Then the sender and recipients are specified. There
|
|
can be more than one RCPT command, if there are several recipients. Finally
|
|
the data itself is sent. Note that the text of the message is terminated by a
|
|
line containing just a period, but if such a line appears in the message, the
|
|
period is doubled. After the message is accepted, the sender can send another
|
|
message, or terminate the session as in the example above.
|
|
|
|
Generally, there is a pattern to the response numbers. The protocol defines
|
|
the specific set of responses that can be sent as answers to any given command.
|
|
However programs that don't want to analyze them in detail can just look at the
|
|
first digit. In general, responses that begin with a 2 indicate success.
|
|
Those that begin with 3 indicate that some further action is needed, as shown
|
|
above. 4 and 5 indicate errors. 4 is a "temporary" error, such as a disk
|
|
filling. The message should be saved, and tried again later. 5 is a permanent
|
|
error, such as a non-existent recipient. The message should be returned to the
|
|
sender with an error message.
|
|
|
|
For more details about the protocols mentioned in this section, see RFCs
|
|
821/822 for mail, RFC 959 for file transfer, and RFCs 854/855 for remote
|
|
logins. For the well-known port numbers, see the current edition of Assigned
|
|
Numbers, and possibly RFC 814.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Protocols Other Than TCP: UDP and ICMP
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Thus far only connections that use TCP have been described. Remember that TCP
|
|
is responsible for breaking up messages into datagrams, and reassembling them
|
|
properly. However in many applications, there are messages that will always
|
|
fit in a single datagram. An example is name lookup. When a user attempts to
|
|
make a connection to another system, he will generally specify the system by
|
|
name, rather than Internet address. His system has to translate that name to
|
|
an address before it can do anything. Generally, only a few systems have the
|
|
database used to translate names to addresses. So the user's system will want
|
|
to send a query to one of the systems that has the database.
|
|
|
|
This query is going to be very short. It will certainly fit in one datagram.
|
|
So will the answer. Thus it seems silly to use TCP. Of course TCP does more
|
|
than just break things up into datagrams. It also makes sure that the data
|
|
arrives, resending datagrams where necessary. But for a question that fits in
|
|
a single datagram, all of the complexity of TCP is not needed. If there is not
|
|
an answer after a few seconds, you can just ask again. For applications like
|
|
this, there are alternatives to TCP.
|
|
|
|
The most common alternative is UDP ("user datagram protocol"). UDP is designed
|
|
for applications where you don't need to put sequences of datagrams together.
|
|
It fits into the system much like TCP. There is a UDP header. The network
|
|
software puts the UDP header on the front of your data, just as it would put a
|
|
TCP header on the front of your data. Then UDP sends the data to IP, which
|
|
adds the IP header, putting UDP's protocol number in the protocol field instead
|
|
of TCP's protocol number.
|
|
|
|
UDP doesn't do as much as TCP does. It does not split data into multiple
|
|
datagrams and it does not keep track of what it has sent so it can resend if
|
|
necessary. About all that UDP provides is port numbers so that several
|
|
programs can use UDP at once. UDP port numbers are used just like TCP port
|
|
numbers. There are well-known port numbers for servers that use UDP.
|
|
|
|
The UDP header is shorter than a TCP header. It still has source and
|
|
destination port numbers, and a checksum, but that's about it. UDP is used by
|
|
the protocols that handle name lookups (see IEN 116, RFC 882, and RFC 883) and
|
|
a number of similar protocols.
|
|
|
|
Another alternative protocol is ICMP ("Internet control message protocol").
|
|
ICMP is used for error messages, and other messages intended for the TCP/IP
|
|
software itself, rather than any particular user program. For example, if you
|
|
attempt to connect to a host, your system may get back an ICMP message saying
|
|
"host unreachable." ICMP can also be used to find out some information about
|
|
the network. See RFC 792 for details of ICMP.
|
|
|
|
ICMP is similar to UDP, in that it handles messages that fit in one datagram.
|
|
However it is even simpler than UDP. It does not even have port numbers in its
|
|
header. Since all ICMP messages are interpreted by the network software
|
|
itself, no port numbers are needed to say where an ICMP message is supposed to
|
|
go.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Keeping Track Of Names And Information: The Domain System
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
As we indicated earlier, the network software generally needs a 32-bit Internet
|
|
address in order to open a connection or send a datagram. However users prefer
|
|
to deal with computer names rather than numbers. Thus there is a database that
|
|
allows the software to look up a name and find the corresponding number.
|
|
|
|
When the Internet was small, this was easy. Each system would have a file that
|
|
listed all of the other systems, giving both their name and number. There are
|
|
now too many computers for this approach to be practical. Thus these files
|
|
have been replaced by a set of name servers that keep track of host names and
|
|
the corresponding Internet addresses. (In fact these servers are somewhat more
|
|
general than that. This is just one kind of information stored in the domain
|
|
system.) A set of interlocking servers are used rather than a single central
|
|
one.
|
|
|
|
There are now so many different institutions connected to the Internet that it
|
|
would be impractical for them to notify a central authority whenever they
|
|
installed or moved a computer. Thus naming authority is delegated to
|
|
individual institutions. The name servers form a tree, corresponding to
|
|
institutional structure. The names themselves follow a similar structure. A
|
|
typical example is the name BORAX.LCS.MIT.EDU. This is a computer at the
|
|
Laboratory for Computer Science (LCS) at MIT. In order to find its Internet
|
|
address, you might potentially have to consult 4 different servers.
|
|
|
|
First, you would ask a central server (called the root) where the EDU server
|
|
is. EDU is a server that keeps track of educational institutions. The root
|
|
server would give you the names and Internet addresses of several servers for
|
|
EDU. You would then ask EDU where the server for MIT is. It would give you
|
|
names and Internet addresses of several servers for MIT. Then you would ask
|
|
MIT where the server for LCS is, and finally you would ask one of the LCS
|
|
servers about BORAX. The final result would be the Internet address for
|
|
BORAX.LCS.MIT.EDU. Each of these levels is referred to as a "domain." The
|
|
entire name, BORAX.LCS.MIT.EDU, is called a "domain name." (So are the names
|
|
of the higher-level domains, such as LCS.MIT.EDU, MIT.EDU, and EDU.)
|
|
|
|
Fortunately, you don't really have to go through all of this most of the time.
|
|
First of all, the root name servers also happen to be the name servers for the
|
|
top-level domains such as EDU. Thus a single query to a root server will get
|
|
you to MIT. Second, software generally remembers answers that it got before.
|
|
So once we look up a name at LCS.MIT.EDU, our software remembers where to find
|
|
servers for LCS.MIT.EDU, MIT.EDU, and EDU. It also remembers the translation
|
|
of BORAX.LCS.MIT.EDU. Each of these pieces of information has a "time to live"
|
|
associated with it. Typically this is a few days. After that, the information
|
|
expires and has to be looked up again. This allows institutions to change
|
|
things.
|
|
|
|
The domain system is not limited to finding out Internet addresses. Each
|
|
domain name is a node in a database. The node can have records that define a
|
|
number of different properties. Examples are Internet address, computer type,
|
|
and a list of services provided by a computer. A program can ask for a
|
|
specific piece of information, or all information about a given name. It is
|
|
possible for a node in the database to be marked as an "alias" (or nickname)
|
|
for another node. It is also possible to use the domain system to store
|
|
information about users, mailing lists, or other objects.
|
|
|
|
There is an Internet standard defining the operation of these databases as well
|
|
as the protocols used to make queries of them. Every network utility has to be
|
|
able to make such queries since this is now the official way to evaluate host
|
|
names. Generally utilities will talk to a server on their own system. This
|
|
server will take care of contacting the other servers for them. This keeps
|
|
down the amount of code that has to be in each application program.
|
|
|
|
The domain system is particularly important for handling computer mail. There
|
|
are entry types to define what computer handles mail for a given name to
|
|
specify where an individual is to receive mail and to define mailing lists.
|
|
|
|
See RFCs 882, 883, and 973 for specifications of the domain system. RFC 974
|
|
defines the use of the domain system in sending mail.
|
|
|
|
Routing
|
|
~~~~~~~
|
|
The task of finding how to get a datagram to its destination is referred to as
|
|
"routing." Many of the details depend upon the particular implementation.
|
|
However some general things can be said.
|
|
|
|
It is necessary to understand the model on which IP is based. IP assumes that
|
|
a system is attached to some local network. It is assumed that the system can
|
|
send datagrams to any other system on its own network. (In the case of
|
|
Ethernet, it simply finds the Ethernet address of the destination system, and
|
|
puts the datagram out on the Ethernet.) The problem comes when a system is
|
|
asked to send a datagram to a system on a different network. This problem is
|
|
handled by gateways.
|
|
|
|
A gateway is a system that connects a network with one or more other networks.
|
|
Gateways are often normal computers that happen to have more than one network
|
|
interface. The software on a machine must be set up so that it will forward
|
|
datagrams from one network to the other. That is, if a machine on network
|
|
128.6.4 sends a datagram to the gateway, and the datagram is addressed to a
|
|
machine on network 128.6.3, the gateway will forward the datagram to the
|
|
destination. Major communications centers often have gateways that connect a
|
|
number of different networks.
|
|
|
|
Routing in IP is based entirely upon the network number of the destination
|
|
address. Each computer has a table of network numbers. For each network
|
|
number, a gateway is listed. This is the gateway to be used to get to that
|
|
network. The gateway does not have to connect directly to the network, it just
|
|
has to be the best place to go to get there.
|
|
|
|
When a computer wants to send a datagram, it first checks to see if the
|
|
destination address is on the system's own local network. If so, the datagram
|
|
can be sent directly. Otherwise, the system expects to find an entry for the
|
|
network that the destination address is on. The datagram is sent to the
|
|
gateway listed in that entry. This table can get quite big. For example, the
|
|
Internet now includes several hundred individual networks. Thus various
|
|
strategies have been developed to reduce the size of the routing table. One
|
|
strategy is to depend upon "default routes." There is often only one gateway
|
|
out of a network.
|
|
|
|
This gateway might connect a local Ethernet to a campus-wide backbone network.
|
|
In that case, it is not neccessary to have a separate entry for every network
|
|
in the world. That gateway is simply defined as a "default." When no specific
|
|
route is found for a datagram, the datagram is sent to the default gateway. A
|
|
default gateway can even be used when there are several gateways on a network.
|
|
There are provisions for gateways to send a message saying "I'm not the best
|
|
gateway -- use this one instead." (The message is sent via ICMP. See RFC
|
|
792.) Most network software is designed to use these messages to add entries
|
|
to their routing tables. Suppose network 128.6.4 has two gateways, 128.6.4.59
|
|
and 128.6.4.1. 128.6.4.59 leads to several other internal Rutgers networks.
|
|
128.6.4.1 leads indirectly to the NSFnet. Suppose 128.6.4.59 is set as a
|
|
default gateway, and there are no other routing table entries. Now what
|
|
happens when you need to send a datagram to MIT? MIT is network 18. Since
|
|
there is no entry for network 18, the datagram will be sent to the default,
|
|
128.6.4.59. This gateway is the wrong one. So it will forward the datagram to
|
|
128.6.4.1. It will also send back an error saying in effect: "to get to
|
|
network 18, use 128.6.4.1." The software will then add an entry to the routing
|
|
table. Any future datagrams to MIT will then go directly to 128.6.4.1. (The
|
|
error message is sent using the ICMP protocol. The message type is called
|
|
"ICMP redirect.")
|
|
|
|
Most IP experts recommend that individual computers should not try to keep
|
|
track of the entire network. Instead, they should start with default gateways
|
|
and let the gateways tell them the routes as just described. However this
|
|
doesn't say how the gateways should find out about the routes. The gateways
|
|
can't depend upon this strategy. They have to have fairly complete routing
|
|
tables. For this, some sort of routing protocol is needed. A routing protocol
|
|
is simply a technique for the gateways to find each other and keep up to date
|
|
about the best way to get to every network. RFC 1009 contains a review of
|
|
gateway design and routing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Details About Internet Addresses: Subnets And Broadcasting
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Internet addresses are 32-bit numbers, normally written as 4 octets (in
|
|
decimal), e.g. 128.6.4.7. There are actually 3 different types of address.
|
|
The problem is that the address has to indicate both the network and the host
|
|
within the network. It was felt that eventually there would be lots of
|
|
networks. Many of them would be small, but probably 24 bits would be needed to
|
|
represent all the IP networks. It was also felt that some very big networks
|
|
might need 24 bits to represent all of their hosts. This would seem to lead to
|
|
48 bit addresses. But the designers really wanted to use 32 bit addresses. So
|
|
they adopted a kludge. The assumption is that most of the networks will be
|
|
small. So they set up three different ranges of address.
|
|
|
|
Addresses beginning with 1 to 126 use only the first octet for the network
|
|
number. The other three octets are available for the host number. Thus 24
|
|
bits are available for hosts. These numbers are used for large networks, but
|
|
there can only be 126 of these. The ARPAnet is one and there are a few large
|
|
commercial networks. But few normal organizations get one of these "class A"
|
|
addresses.
|
|
|
|
For normal large organizations, "class B" addresses are used. Class B
|
|
addresses use the first two octets for the network number. Thus network
|
|
numbers are 128.1 through 191.254. (0 and 255 are avoided for reasons to be
|
|
explained below. Addresses beginning with 127 are also avoided because they
|
|
are used by some systems for special purposes.) The last two octets are
|
|
available for host addesses, giving 16 bits of host address. This allows for
|
|
64516 computers, which should be enough for most organizations. Finally, class
|
|
C addresses use three octets in the range 192.1.1 to 223.254.254. These allow
|
|
only 254 hosts on each network, but there can be lots of these networks.
|
|
Addresses above 223 are reserved for future use as class D and E (which are
|
|
currently not defined).
|
|
|
|
0 and 255 have special meanings. 0 is reserved for machines that do not know
|
|
their address. In certain circumstances it is possible for a machine not to
|
|
know the number of the network it is on, or even its own host address. For
|
|
example, 0.0.0.23 would be a machine that knew it was host number 23, but
|
|
didn't know on what network.
|
|
|
|
255 is used for "broadcast." A broadcast is a message that you want every
|
|
system on the network to see. Broadcasts are used in some situations where you
|
|
don't know who to talk to. For example, suppose you need to look up a host
|
|
name and get its Internet address. Sometimes you don't know the address of the
|
|
nearest name server. In that case, you might send the request as a broadcast.
|
|
There are also cases where a number of systems are interested in information.
|
|
It is then less expensive to send a single broadcast than to send datagrams
|
|
individually to each host that is interested in the information. In order to
|
|
send a broadcast, you use an address that is made by using your network
|
|
address, with all ones in the part of the address where the host number goes.
|
|
For example, if you are on network 128.6.4, you would use 128.6.4.255 for
|
|
broadcasts. How this is actually implemented depends upon the medium. It is
|
|
not possible to send broadcasts on the ARPAnet, or on point to point lines, but
|
|
it is possible on an Ethernet. If you use an Ethernet address with all its
|
|
bits on (all ones), every machine on the Ethernet is supposed to look at that
|
|
datagram.
|
|
|
|
Because 0 and 255 are used for unknown and broadcast addresses, normal hosts
|
|
should never be given addresses containing 0 or 255. Addresses should never
|
|
begin with 0, 127, or any number above 223.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Datagram Fragmentation And Reassembly
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
TCP/IP is designed for use with many different kinds of networks.
|
|
Unfortunately, network designers do not agree about how big packets can be.
|
|
Ethernet packets can be 1500 octets long. ARPAnet packets have a maximum of
|
|
around 1000 octets. Some very fast networks have much larger packet sizes.
|
|
You might think that IP should simply settle on the smallest possible size, but
|
|
this would cause serious performance problems. When transferring large files,
|
|
big packets are far more efficient than small ones. So it is best to be able
|
|
to use the largest packet size possible, but it is also necessary to be able to
|
|
handle networks with small limits. There are two provisions for this.
|
|
|
|
TCP has the ability to "negotiate" about datagram size. When a TCP connection
|
|
first opens, both ends can send the maximum datagram size they can handle. The
|
|
smaller of these numbers is used for the rest of the connection. This allows
|
|
two implementations that can handle big datagrams to use them, but also lets
|
|
them talk to implementations that cannot handle them. This does not completely
|
|
solve the problem. The most serious problem is that the two ends do not
|
|
necessarily know about all of the steps in between. For this reason, there are
|
|
provisions to split datagrams up into pieces. This is referred to as
|
|
"fragmentation."
|
|
|
|
The IP header contains fields indicating that a datagram has been split and
|
|
enough information to let the pieces be put back together. If a gateway
|
|
connects an Ethernet to the Arpanet, it must be prepared to take 1500-octet
|
|
Ethernet packets and split them into pieces that will fit on the Arpanet.
|
|
Furthermore, every host implementation of TCP/IP must be prepared to accept
|
|
pieces and put them back together. This is referred to as "reassembly."
|
|
|
|
TCP/IP implementations differ in the approach they take to deciding on datagram
|
|
size. It is fairly common for implementations to use 576-byte datagrams
|
|
whenever they can't verify that the entire path is able to handle larger
|
|
packets. This rather conservative strategy is used because of the number of
|
|
implementations with bugs in the code to reassemble fragments. Implementors
|
|
often try to avoid ever having fragmentation occur. Different implementors
|
|
take different approaches to deciding when it is safe to use large datagrams.
|
|
Some use them only for the local network. Others will use them for any network
|
|
on the same campus. 576 bytes is a "safe" size which every implementation must
|
|
support.
|
|
|
|
Ethernet Encapsulation: ARP
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
In Part One of Introduction to the Internet Protocols (Phrack Inc., Volume
|
|
Three, Issue 28, File #3 of 12) there was a brief description about what IP
|
|
datagrams look like on an Ethernet. The discription showed the Ethernet header
|
|
and checksum, but it left one hole: It did not say how to figure out what
|
|
Ethernet address to use when you want to talk to a given Internet address.
|
|
There is a separate protocol for this called ARP ("address resolution
|
|
protocol") and it is not an IP protocal as ARP datagrams do not have IP
|
|
headers.
|
|
|
|
Suppose you are on system 128.6.4.194 and you want to connect to system
|
|
128.6.4.7. Your system will first verify that 128.6.4.7 is on the same
|
|
network, so it can talk directly via Ethernet. Then it will look up 128.6.4.7
|
|
in its ARP table to see if it already knows the Ethernet address. If so, it
|
|
will stick on an Ethernet header and send the packet. Now suppose this system
|
|
is not in the ARP table. There is no way to send the packet because you need
|
|
the Ethernet address. So it uses the ARP protocol to send an ARP request.
|
|
Essentially an ARP request says "I need the Ethernet address for 128.6.4.7".
|
|
Every system listens to ARP requests. When a system sees an ARP request for
|
|
itself, it is required to respond. So 128.6.4.7 will see the request and will
|
|
respond with an ARP reply saying in effect "128.6.4.7 is 8:0:20:1:56:34". Your
|
|
system will save this information in its ARP table so future packets will go
|
|
directly.
|
|
|
|
ARP requests must be sent as "broadcasts." There is no way that an ARP request
|
|
can be sent directly to the right system because the whole reason for sending
|
|
an ARP request is that you do not know the Ethernet address. So an Ethernet
|
|
address of all ones is used, i.e. ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff. By convention, every
|
|
machine on the Ethernet is required to pay attention to packets with this as an
|
|
address. So every system sees every ARP requests. They all look to see
|
|
whether the request is for their own address. If so, they respond. If not,
|
|
they could just ignore it, although some hosts will use ARP requests to update
|
|
their knowledge about other hosts on the network, even if the request is not
|
|
for them. Packets whose IP address indicates broadcast (e.g. 255.255.255.255
|
|
or 128.6.4.255) are also sent with an Ethernet address that is all ones.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Getting More Information
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
This directory contains documents describing the major protocols. There are
|
|
hundreds of documents, so I have chosen the ones that seem most important.
|
|
Internet standards are called RFCs (Request for Comments). A proposed standard
|
|
is initially issued as a proposal, and given an RFC number. When it is finally
|
|
accepted, it is added to Official Internet Protocols, but it is still referred
|
|
to by the RFC number. I have also included two IENs (Internet Engineering
|
|
Notes). IENs used to be a separate classification for more informal
|
|
documents, but this classification no longer exists and RFCs are now used for
|
|
all official Internet documents with a mailing list being used for more
|
|
informal reports.
|
|
|
|
The convention is that whenever an RFC is revised, the revised version gets a
|
|
new number. This is fine for most purposes, but it causes problems with two
|
|
documents: Assigned Numbers and Official Internet Protocols. These documents
|
|
are being revised all the time and the RFC number keeps changing. You will
|
|
have to look in rfc-index.txt to find the number of the latest edition. Anyone
|
|
who is seriously interested in TCP/IP should read the RFC describing IP (791).
|
|
RFC 1009 is also useful as it is a specification for gateways to be used by
|
|
NSFnet and it contains an overview of a lot of the TCP/IP technology.
|
|
|
|
Here is a list of the documents you might want:
|
|
|
|
rfc-index List of all RFCs
|
|
rfc1012 Somewhat fuller list of all RFCs
|
|
rfc1011 Official Protocols. It's useful to scan this to see what tasks
|
|
protocols have been built for. This defines which RFCs are
|
|
actual standards, as opposed to requests for comments.
|
|
rfc1010 Assigned Numbers. If you are working with TCP/IP, you will
|
|
probably want a hardcopy of this as a reference. It lists all
|
|
the offically defined well-known ports and lots of other
|
|
things.
|
|
rfc1009 NSFnet gateway specifications. A good overview of IP routing
|
|
and gateway technology.
|
|
rfc1001/2 NetBIOS: Networking for PCs
|
|
rfc973 Update on domains
|
|
rfc959 FTP (file transfer)
|
|
rfc950 Subnets
|
|
rfc937 POP2: Protocol for reading mail on PCs
|
|
rfc894 How IP is to be put on Ethernet, see also rfc825
|
|
rfc882/3 Domains (the database used to go from host names to Internet
|
|
address and back -- also used to handle UUCP these days). See
|
|
also rfc973
|
|
rfc854/5 Telnet - Protocol for remote logins
|
|
rfc826 ARP - Protocol for finding out Ethernet addresses
|
|
rfc821/2 Mail
|
|
rfc814 Names and ports - General concepts behind well-known ports
|
|
rfc793 TCP
|
|
rfc792 ICMP
|
|
rfc791 IP
|
|
rfc768 UDP
|
|
rip.doc Details of the most commonly-used routing protocol
|
|
ien-116 Old name server (still needed by several kinds of systems)
|
|
ien-48 The Catenet model, general description of the philosophy behind
|
|
TCP/IP
|
|
|
|
The following documents are somewhat more specialized.
|
|
|
|
rfc813 Window and acknowledgement strategies in TCP
|
|
rfc815 Datagram reassembly techniques
|
|
rfc816 Fault isolation and resolution techniques
|
|
rfc817 Modularity and efficiency in implementation
|
|
rfc879 The maximum segment size option in TCP
|
|
rfc896 Congestion control
|
|
rfc827,888,904,975,985 EGP and related issues
|
|
|
|
The most important RFCs have been collected into a three-volume set, the DDN
|
|
Protocol Handbook. It is available from the DDN Network Information Center at
|
|
SRI International. You should be able to get them via anonymous FTP from
|
|
SRI-NIC.ARPA. The file names are:
|
|
|
|
RFCs:
|
|
rfc:rfc-index.txt
|
|
rfc:rfcxxx.txt
|
|
IENs:
|
|
ien:ien-index.txt
|
|
ien:ien-xxx.txt
|
|
|
|
Sites with access to UUCP, but not FTP may be able to retreive them via
|
|
UUCP from UUCP host rutgers. The file names would be
|
|
|
|
RFCs:
|
|
/topaz/pub/pub/tcp-ip-docs/rfc-index.txt
|
|
/topaz/pub/pub/tcp-ip-docs/rfcxxx.txt
|
|
IENs:
|
|
/topaz/pub/pub/tcp-ip-docs/ien-index.txt
|
|
/topaz/pub/pub/tcp-ip-docs/ien-xxx.txt
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #4 of 12
|
|
|
|
Network Miscellany II
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Taran King
|
|
|
|
November 17, 1989
|
|
|
|
|
|
BROADCASTING NETWORKS
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Although these articles discuss things about communicating through computer
|
|
networks, there are ways to contact broadcasting networks via the nets. The
|
|
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) has their own UUCP node:
|
|
|
|
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)
|
|
UUCP Node name: pbs
|
|
Node contact: pbs!postmaster (Senton R. Droppers)
|
|
Telephone number: (703) 739-5089
|
|
|
|
There are also a number of radio stations that can be contacted via Fidonet:
|
|
|
|
KFCF
|
|
Fresno, CA
|
|
Contact: Randy.Stover@f42.n205.z1.fidonet.org
|
|
|
|
KKSF
|
|
San Fransisco, CA
|
|
Contact: Tim.Pozar@fidogate.fidonet.org
|
|
|
|
KKDA
|
|
Dallas, TX
|
|
Contact: Gerry.Dalton@f1213.n124.z1.fidonet.org
|
|
|
|
|
|
ECNCDC (BITNET)
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Western Illinois University, Eastern Illinois University as well as the
|
|
University of Northeastern Illinois, Chicago State University and Governors
|
|
State University are part of the Educational Computing Network. The
|
|
Educational Computing Network is a service of the Board of Governors of State
|
|
Colleges and Universities operating as a cooperative to supply mainframe
|
|
academic computing resources to each of its members (ECN is strictly for
|
|
academic use and does no administrative computing). The cooperative effort of
|
|
the members of the Educational Computing Network allows for more academic
|
|
computing resources to be made available to the members than they could supply
|
|
on their own.
|
|
|
|
Each member institution of the Educational Computing Network has a unique
|
|
letter for the first letter in all their user names. The letters are:
|
|
|
|
Chicago State University - B
|
|
Eastern Illinois University - C
|
|
Governors State University - G
|
|
Western Illinois University - M
|
|
University of Northeastern Illinois - U
|
|
|
|
Each member of ECN also has a person which is the interface between ECN and the
|
|
university called their User Coordinator. The User Coordinator's username
|
|
consists of their school letter followed by UCM000 (the User Coordinator for
|
|
WIU is MUCM000).
|
|
|
|
For more information about the Educational Computing Network, contact
|
|
XJJGUDE@ECNCDC.BITNET
|
|
|
|
|
|
MCI MAIL
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
If you read the first Network Miscellany article which appeared in Phrack 28,
|
|
you may remember my mentioning CMR, the Commercial Mail Relay. Unfortunately,
|
|
due to its restrictions about who can use it (supposedly), it has potential to
|
|
become a sticky situation if the user you are sending to no longer has his MCI
|
|
Mail account or if you accidentally mistype the MCI Mail address. But to save
|
|
us from this potential problem, MCI Mail now has their own domain on the
|
|
Internet, MCIMAIL.COM so mailing to userid@MCIMAIL.COM should work just as well
|
|
as CMR without the risks of being yelled at (and possibly billed).
|
|
|
|
|
|
PUBLIC ACCESS UNIXES
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Part of the problem with the whole idea of using the Wide Area Networks is
|
|
access. For those who are not enrolled in a university or cannot pull strings
|
|
at their local business or college, the concept of communicating through the
|
|
networks is useless besides thinking that it would be neat. Thanks to Phil
|
|
Eschallier, phil@lgnp1.UUCP or phil@LS.COM, you should now be able to get
|
|
access to the Wide Area Networks via UUCP. The following is a list of Public
|
|
Access Unix systems taken from the Usenet Newsgroup pub.nixpub which Phil keeps
|
|
up and there are two versions, both of which contain the same basic information
|
|
but each has important information which the other does not necessarily have.
|
|
I urge you to attempt to get on one of these systems and drop us a line over
|
|
the networks.
|
|
|
|
nixpub long listing
|
|
Open Access UNIX (*NIX) Sites [Fee / No Fee] for mapped sites only
|
|
[ November 12, 1989 ]
|
|
|
|
Systems listed (73):
|
|
[ agora, alphacm, althea, amazing, anet, attctc, bigtex, bucket, chariot ]
|
|
[ chinet, cinnet, conexch, cpro, cruzio, dasys1, ddsw1, dhw68k, disk ]
|
|
[ eklektik, esfenn, gensis, grebyn, i-core, igloo, jdyx, jolnet, lgnp1 ]
|
|
[ lilink, loft386, lunapark, m-net, madnix, magpie, marob, ncoast, netcom ]
|
|
[ nstar, nuchat, nucleus, oncoast, ozdaltx, pallas, pnet01, pnet02 ]
|
|
[ pnet51, point, polari, portal, raider, rpp386, rtmvax, sactoh0, sharks ]
|
|
[ sir-alan, sixhub, stanton, stb, sugar, telly, tmsoft, tnl, turnkey ]
|
|
[ ubbs-nh, usource, uuwest, vpnet, well, wet, wolves, world, wybbs ]
|
|
[ xroads, ziebmef ]
|
|
|
|
Last
|
|
Contact
|
|
Date Telephone # Sys-name Location Baud Hours
|
|
----- ------------ -------- ----------- ------- -----
|
|
|
|
08/89 201-846-2460^ althea New Brunswick NJ 3/12/24 24
|
|
AT&T 3B2/310 - Unix SVR3.1, no fee. USENET, email, C development,
|
|
games. Single line.
|
|
Contact: rjd@althea.UUCP (Robert Diamond)
|
|
|
|
10/89 206-328-4944 polari Seatle WA 3/12 24
|
|
Equip ???; 8-lines, Trailblazer on 206-328-1468; $30/year (flat rate);
|
|
Multi-user games, chat, full USENET.
|
|
Contact: uunet!microsoft!happym!polari!bruceki
|
|
|
|
10/89 212-420-0527 magpie NYC NY 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
? - UNIX SYSV - 2, Magpie BBS, no fee, Authors: Magpie/UNIX,/MSDOS
|
|
two lines plus anonymous uucp: 212-677-9487 (9600 bps Telebit modem)
|
|
NOTE: 9487 reserved for registered Magpie sysops & anon uucp
|
|
Contact: Steve Manes, {rutgers|cmcl2|uunet}!hombre!magpie!manes
|
|
|
|
10/89 212-675-7059 marob NYC NY 3/12/24 24
|
|
386 SCO-XENIX 2.2, XBBS, magpie bbs, no fee, limit 60 min
|
|
Telebit Trailblazer (9600 PEP) only 212-675-8438
|
|
Contact: {philabs|rutgers|cmcl2}!{phri|hombre}!marob!clifford
|
|
|
|
05/89 212-879-9031^ dasys1 NYC NY 12/24 24
|
|
Unistride - SYS V, multiple lines, fee $5/mo AKA Big Electric Cat
|
|
USENET, games, multi-user chat, email, login: new, passwd: new
|
|
Contact: ...!rutgers!cmcl2!rsweeney or rsweeney@dasys1.UUCP
|
|
|
|
09/89 213-376-5714^ pnet02 Redondo Bch CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
XENIX (also 213-374-7404) no fee, 90 min limit, login: pnet id: new
|
|
some USENET, net-work e-mail, multi-threaded conferencing
|
|
|
|
09/89 213-397-3137^ stb Santa Monica CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
AT&T 3b1; BBS and shell access; uucp-anon: ogin: uucp NO PASSWD
|
|
3 line on rotory -3137 2400 baud.
|
|
|
|
03/88 213-459-5891 amazing Pacific Palisades CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
AMT 286 - Microport David's Amazing BBS Fee $7.50/month;$35/6;$60/year
|
|
5 lines on rotary; Unique original software with conferencing, electronic
|
|
bar, matchmaking, no file up/downloading
|
|
|
|
07/88 214-247-2367 ozdaltx Dallas TX 3/12/24 24
|
|
INTEC/SCO XENIX 2.2.1, OZ BBS, Membership only adult BBS, fee $40
|
|
year. Multiple lines. Closed system, carries limited USENET
|
|
newsgroups. Login: guest (no PW). Voice verification on all new users.
|
|
|
|
07/89 214-824-7881 attctc Dallas TX 3/12/24 24
|
|
3b2/522 - UNIX, no fee, various time limits, 8 lines 2.8 GB online
|
|
uucp-anon --> 214-741-2130 ogin: uupdsrc word: Public
|
|
uucp-anon info in: /bbsys4/README (Formerly node name killer)
|
|
|
|
11/89 215-348-9727 lgnp1 Doylestown PA 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
SCO-XENIX -- Telebit access. Shell accounts by appointment only; Fee;
|
|
Services include E-mail, USENET News; --Home of the Nixpub lists--
|
|
Contact: phil@ls.com.
|
|
anon-uucp: nuucp NO PWD (download /usr/spool/uucppublic/nixpub
|
|
or /usr/spool/uucppublic/nixpub.short)
|
|
|
|
09/89 216-582-2441 ncoast Cleveland OH 12/24/96 24
|
|
80386 Mylex, SCO Xenix; 600 meg. storage; XBBS and Shell; USENET
|
|
(newsfeeds available), E-Mail; donations requested; login as "bbs"
|
|
for BBS and "makeuser" for new users.
|
|
Telebit used on 216-237-5486.
|
|
|
|
08/88 217-529-3223 pallas Springfield IL 3/12/24 24
|
|
Convrgnt Minifrme, multiple lines, 200 meg Minnie bbs $25 donation
|
|
|
|
10/89 219-289-0286 nstar South Bend IN 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
Equip ???, UNIX 3.2; 300 Meg On-line; 4 lines at 9600 baud --
|
|
(listed) - Hayes V-Series, (287-9020) - HST, (289-3745) - PEP;
|
|
Full USENET, AKCS Software; Contact ..!iuvax!ndcheg!ndmath!nstar!larry
|
|
|
|
08/88 312-283-0559^ chinet Chicago IL 3/12/24 24
|
|
3b2/300 - SYS V 3.1, multiple lines, Picospan BBS, system & BBS free
|
|
Extra phone lines and usenet, $50/yr.
|
|
|
|
10/89 312-338-0632^ point Chicago IL 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
North Shore / Rogers Park area of Chicago. 386 - ISC 2.01 (SysV3.2),
|
|
multiple lines, Telebit PEP on 338-3261, USRobotics HST on 338-1036,
|
|
AKCS bbs, some usenet conferences available. 200+ MB online storage.
|
|
Downloads, full usenet & shell access in the works.
|
|
|
|
04/89 313-623-6309 nucleus Clarkston MI 12/24 24
|
|
286 - Unix System V, no fee. Shell access, full usenet access, online games,
|
|
AKCS conferencing system, some public domain sources online, extensive tape
|
|
library of public domain source code
|
|
|
|
02/88 313-994-6333 m-net Ann Arbor MI 3/12 24
|
|
Altos 68020 - SYS III, limits unstated, fee for extended service
|
|
Picospan conference system, multiple lines, 160 meg, packet radio
|
|
|
|
08/89 313-996-4644^ anet Ann Arbor MI 3/12 24
|
|
Altos 68000 - Sys III, no limits, 1st month free, fees range up to $20/
|
|
month (negotiable), accepts equipment/software in lieu of fees, Picospan
|
|
conferencing, 120M, non-profit, user-supported, community-based, ideal
|
|
autodidact educational system. Tax-deductible donations okay.
|
|
|
|
08/89 314-474-4581 gensis Columbia MO 3/12/24/48/96 24
|
|
Gateway 386 system w/ SCO Xenix V/386, DataFlex, Oracle, CHARM, & VP/ix.
|
|
No fee. Online gaming, game design, and (oddly enough) data base design
|
|
are the main focus. Modem is Microcom MNP 6.
|
|
|
|
10/89 404-321-5020^ jdyx Atlanta GA 12/24/96 24
|
|
386/ix 2.0.2. XBBS. Usenet (alt, gnu, most comp and a few others) and
|
|
shell access. Second line (2400 below) (404) 325-1719. 200+ meg current
|
|
Usenet and GNU sources. Specializing in graphics and ray-tracing under
|
|
386/ix (with/with out X11). Yearly fee for shell and/or downloads.
|
|
Telebit access. Contact: ...gatech!emory!jdyx!tpf (Tom Friedel)
|
|
|
|
05/88 407-380-6228 rtmvax Orlando FL 3/12/24 24
|
|
mVAX-I - Ultrix-32 V1.2 USENET & UUCP Email Gateway. XBBS front end for
|
|
new user subscribing. No Fees. Primary function is Technical exchange.
|
|
Contact: { cbosgd!codas, hoptoad!peora }!rtmvax!rob
|
|
|
|
09/89 408-245-7726^ uuwest Sunnyvale CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
SCO-XENIX, Waffle. No fee, USENET news (news.*, music, comics, telecom, etc)
|
|
The Dark Side of the Moon BBS. This system has been in operation since 1985.
|
|
Login: new Contact: (UUCP) ames!uuwest!request (Domain) request@darkside.com
|
|
|
|
04/88 408-247-4810 sharks Santa Clara CA 3/12 24
|
|
Altos 886/80/80 - XENIX 3.2f AKA: Shark's Head BBS, BBCS Network
|
|
Multiple lines,no fee for non-members,members $25 year
|
|
Restricted sh access and UUCP/Usenet access for advanced members
|
|
|
|
11/89 408-423-9995 cruzio Santa Cruz CA 12/24 24
|
|
Tandy 4000, Xenix 2.3.*, Caucus 3.*; focus on Santa Cruz activity
|
|
(ie directory of community and goverment organizations, events, ...);
|
|
Multiple lines; no shell; fee: $18/quarter.
|
|
Contact: ...!uunet!cruzio!chris
|
|
|
|
10/89 408-725-0561^ portal Cupertino CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
Networked Suns (SunOS), multiple lines, Telenet access, no shell access
|
|
fees: $10/month + Telenet charges (if used) @ various rates/times
|
|
conferencing, multi user chats, usenet
|
|
|
|
02/89 408-997-9119^ netcom San Jose CA 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
Unix System V -- Shell Access [Bourne, Korn, C-Shell], BBS, USENET,
|
|
Languages: C, Lisp, Prolog, Clips, (Ada soon), $10 / month, login as
|
|
'guest' no password. Contact netcom!bobr.
|
|
|
|
10/89 412-431-8649 eklektik Pittsburgh PA 3/12/24 24
|
|
UNIX PC- SYSV - UNaXcess BBS, new system - donation requested for shell,
|
|
login: bbs for BBS, uucp-mail, limited Usenet news feeds. Gaming SIGS.
|
|
Contact: ...!gatech!emoryu1!eklektik!anthony
|
|
|
|
11/89 415-332-6106^ well Sausalito CA 12/24 24
|
|
6-processor Sequent Balance (32032); UUCP and USENET access; multiple
|
|
lines; access via CPN; PICOSPAN BBS; $3/hour. Contact (415) 332-4335
|
|
|
|
06/88 415-582-7691 cpro Hayward CA 12/24 24
|
|
Microport SYSV 2, UNaXcess bbs, no fee, 60 min limit, shell access
|
|
|
|
07/89 415-753-5265^ wet San Francisco CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
386 SYS V.3. Wetware Diversions. $15 registration, $0.01/minute.
|
|
Public Access UNIX System: uucp, PicoSpan bbs, full Usenet News,
|
|
multiple lines, shell access. Newusers get initial credit!
|
|
contact:{ucsfcca|claris|hoptoad}!wet!cc (Christopher Cilley)
|
|
|
|
05/89 415-783-2543 esfenn Hayward CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
System ????; USENET news; E-mail; No charges; Contact esfenn!william.
|
|
|
|
01/89 416-452-0926 telly Brampton ON 12/24/96 24
|
|
286 Xenix; proprietary menu-based BBS includes Usenet site searching.
|
|
News (all groups, incl biz, pubnet, gnu), mail (including to/from Internet),
|
|
some archives. Feeds available. Fee: $75(Cdn)/year.
|
|
Contact: Evan Leibovitch, evan@telly.on.ca, {uunet!attcan,utzoo}!telly!evan
|
|
|
|
12/88 416-461-2608 tmsoft Toronto ON 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
NS32016, Sys5r2, shell; news+mail $30/mo, general-timesharing $60/mo
|
|
All newsgroups. Willing to setup mail/news connections.
|
|
Archives:comp.sources.{unix,games,x,misc}
|
|
Contact: Dave Mason <mason@tmsoft> / Login: newuser
|
|
|
|
07/89 416-654-8854 ziebmef Toronto ON 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
AT&T 3B1, Sys V, shell, news, mail, no fee (donations accepted)
|
|
Carries most newsgroups (willing to add extra ones on request)
|
|
Telebit access, willing to give mail feeds
|
|
Contact: Chris Siebenmann, {utzoo!telly,ncrcan}!ziebmef!cks
|
|
|
|
08/89 502-968-5401 disk Louisville KY 3/12 24
|
|
386 clone, Microport System V, 600 meg. 6 lines 5401 thru 5406.
|
|
rarrying most USENET groups, Shell access, games, downloads,
|
|
multi-user chat, and more. Rate info available via a free trial
|
|
account.
|
|
|
|
12/88 503-254-0458 bucket Portland OR 3/12/24 24
|
|
Tektronix 6130, UTek 2.3(4.2BSD-derived). Bit Bucket BBS publically
|
|
available; login as 'bbs'. BBS is message only. Users intereseted in
|
|
access to Unix should contact SYSOP via the BBS or send EMail to
|
|
..tektronix!tessi!bucket!rickb. Unix services include USENET News,
|
|
EMail, and all tools/games/utility access. Alternate dial-in lines
|
|
available for Unix users.
|
|
|
|
05/89 503-640-4262^ agora PDX OR 3/12/24 24
|
|
Intel Xenix-286, $2/mo or $20/yr, news, mail, games, programming
|
|
two lines with trunk-hunt, 4380 supports MNP level 3.
|
|
Contact: Alan Batie, tektronix!tessi!agora!batie
|
|
|
|
10/89 512-346-2339 bigtex Austin TX 96 24
|
|
Equip unknown, no shell, no fee, anonymous uucp ONLY, Telebit 9600/PEP
|
|
mail & newsfeeds (limited) available. Carries GNU software.
|
|
anon login: nuucp NO PASSWD, file list /usr3/index
|
|
Contact: ...!uunet!utastro!bigtex!james
|
|
|
|
07/89 512-832-8835 rpp386 Austin TX 12/24 24
|
|
386 SYSV, no shell, no bbs, anonymous uucp file transfer site only, no fee
|
|
uucp and kermit server available, login uucp or kermit NO PASSWD
|
|
|
|
10/89 513-779-8209 cinnet Cincinnati OH 12/24/96 24
|
|
80386, ISC 386/ix 2.02, Telebit access, 1 line; $7.50/Month; shell
|
|
access, Usenet access; news feeds available;
|
|
login: newact password: new user to register for shell access
|
|
|
|
05/89 516-872-2137 lilink Long Island NY 12/24 24
|
|
80386/20 Mhz. , three lines, News/Mail/Shell access. Online games,
|
|
conferencing, full program development system, full text processing.
|
|
We carry ALL Usenet groups. Dues are $10/month (unlimited access).
|
|
Accounts are filled by application/phone verification. Login: new
|
|
Alternate numbers: 516-872-2138 & 516-872-2349
|
|
|
|
07/89 517-487-3356 lunapark E. Lansing MI 12/24 24
|
|
Compaq 386/20 SCO-XENIX 2.3.1, lunabbs bulletin board & conferencing
|
|
system, no fee, login: bbs no password. Primarily UNIX software
|
|
with focus on TeX and Postscript, also some ATARI-ST and IBM-PC stuff
|
|
2400/1200 --> 8 N 1
|
|
Contact: ...!uunet!frith!lunapark!larry
|
|
|
|
12/88 518-346-8033 sixhub upstate NY 3/12/24 24
|
|
PC Designs GV386. hub machine of the upstate NY UNIX users group (*IX)
|
|
two line reserved for incoming, bbs no fee, news & email fee $15/year
|
|
Smorgasboard of BBS systems, UNaXcess and XBBS online,
|
|
Citadel BBS now in production. Contact: davidsen@sixhub.uucp.
|
|
|
|
09/88 602-941-2005 xroads Phoenix AZ 12/24 24
|
|
Motorola VME1121, UNIX 5.2, Crossroads BBS, Fee $30/yr + $.50/.25 (call)
|
|
prime (evenings)/non-prime, USENET news, multi-chat, online games,
|
|
movie reviews, adventure games, dos unix/xenix files for dload, multi lines
|
|
|
|
08/89 603-880-8120 ubbs-nh Nashua NH 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
New England Unix Archive Site. Multiple lines. Services include E-Mail,
|
|
full or partial news feeds. XBBS access $25/year, User Accounts or News
|
|
Feeds available $60/year (1 hour/day) or $120/year (2 hours/day).
|
|
Contact: noel@ubbs-nh or {decvax}!ubbs-nh!noel or leave message on the
|
|
bbs. Voice: 603 595-2947
|
|
|
|
08/89 605-348-2738 loft386 Rapid City SD 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
80386 SYS V/386 Rel 3.2, Usenet mail/news via UUNET, UUNET archive access.
|
|
NO BBS! News feeds avaliable. 400 meg hd. Fees: $10/month or $25/quarter.
|
|
Call (605) 343-8760 and talk to Doug Ingraham to arrange an account or email
|
|
uunet!loft386!dpi
|
|
|
|
08/88 608-273-2657 madnix Madison WI 3/12/24 24
|
|
286 SCO-XENIX, shell, no fee, USENET news, mail, login: newuser
|
|
Contact: ray@madnix
|
|
|
|
08/89 612-473-2295 pnet51 Minneapolis MN 3/12/24 24
|
|
Equip ?, Xenix, multi-line, no fee, some Usenet news, email, multi-threaded
|
|
conferencing, login: pnet id: new, PC Pursuitable
|
|
UUCP: {rosevax, crash}!orbit!pnet51!admin
|
|
|
|
08/89 615-896-8716 raider Murfreesboro TN 12/24 24
|
|
Tandy 4000 XENIX, XBBS, shell accounts, news and mail, newsfeeds
|
|
available. Two line system; second dialup is 615-896-7905.
|
|
Contact: root@raider.MFEE.TN.US (Bob Reineri); NO CHARGE.
|
|
|
|
07/89 616-457-1964 wybbs Jenison MI 3/12/24 24
|
|
286 - SCO-XENIX 2.2.1, no fees, two lines, shell access, usenet news,
|
|
150 meg storage, XBBS, interests: ham radio, xenix
|
|
AKA: Consultants Connection Contact: danielw@wybbs.UUCP
|
|
Alternate phone #: 616-457-9909 (max 1200 baud)
|
|
|
|
11/89 617-739-9753 world Brookline MA 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
Sun 4/280, SunOS 4.03; Shell, USENET, E-Mail, UUCP and home of the
|
|
Open Book Initiative (text project); fees: 8a-6p $8/hr, 6p-12a $5/hr,
|
|
12a-8a $2.50/hr; Multiple lines: 2400 MNP used on listed number,
|
|
Telebits used on others; login as "new"; Contact: geb@world.std.com
|
|
|
|
07/88 619-444-7006^ pnet01 El Cajon CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
BSD Unix, 3 lines, login: pnet id: new, some USENET, email, conferencing
|
|
Home of P-Net software, mail to crash!bblue or pnet01!bblue for info.
|
|
Contributions requested
|
|
Unix accounts available for regulars, PC Pursuit access 2/88.
|
|
|
|
10/88 703-281-7997^ grebyn Vienna VA 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
Vax/Ultrix. $25/month. GNU EMACS, USENET, PC/BLUE archives, Telebit on 7998
|
|
and 7999, archives, Ada repository, comp.sources.(misc,unix,games) archives,
|
|
net.sources archives, 3 C compilers, Ada compiler, 500MB disk, multiple
|
|
lines
|
|
|
|
11/89 708-272-5912^ igloo Northbrook IL 12/24/96 24
|
|
3B2-300; accounts by invitation only, no limit/no fee; full usenet;
|
|
132megs HD; 2 lines rotary, 9600 telebit on 272-5917
|
|
Contact: igloo!postmaster
|
|
|
|
11/89 708-301-2100^ jolnet Joliet IL 3/12/24 24
|
|
3b2/400 - Unix, public access and contributions, No fee for postnews.
|
|
5 lines AKCS bbs. Free Newsfeeds available. >450 MB online storage.
|
|
Free Shell and Usenet access. Telebit Trailblazer access (2104).
|
|
Telenet access.
|
|
|
|
11/89 708-566-8911^ ddsw1 Mundelein IL 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
Televideo 386 -SCO XENIX 386, guest usr 1 hr daily, fee extends use
|
|
AKCS bbs, fee $30/6 months $50/year, Authors of AKCS bbs
|
|
multiple lines, 9600 bps available, anonymous uucp, >/README for info
|
|
Contact: Karl Denninger (...!ddsw1!karl) Voice: (312) 566-8910
|
|
|
|
11/89 708-833-8126^ vpnet Villa Park IL 12/24/96 24
|
|
386 Clone - Interactive 386/ix R2.0 (3.2), no fee. Akcs linked bbs
|
|
including several Usenet conf's. No charge for shells. Trailblazer.
|
|
Mail lisbon@vpnet.UUCP
|
|
|
|
07/89 713-438-5018 sugar Houston TX 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
386/AT (2) networked - Bell Technologies V/386, usenet, news, downloads
|
|
Homegrown BBS software, Trailblazer+ access, currently no charges
|
|
|
|
10/89 713-668-7176^ nuchat Houston TX 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
i386; USENET, Mail, Shell Access; 300M On-line; Trailbazer Used;
|
|
No fee.
|
|
|
|
12/88 714-635-2863 dhw68k Anaheim CA 12/24 24
|
|
Unistride 2.1, no fee, also 714-385-1915, Trailblazer on both lines,
|
|
USENET News, /bin/sh or /bin/csh available
|
|
|
|
05/89 714-662-7450 turnkey Inglewood CA 12/24 24
|
|
286 - Xenix SYSV, XBBS
|
|
|
|
11/89 714-821-9671 alphacm Cypress CA 12/24/96 24
|
|
386 - SCO-XENIX, no fee, Home of XBBS, 90 minute per login, 4 lines,
|
|
9600 baud via MicroComm/Hayes (v.29)
|
|
uucp-anon: ogin: nuucp NO PASSWD
|
|
|
|
05/89 714-842-5851 conexch Santa Ana CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
386 - SCO Xenix - Free Unix guest login and PC-DOS bbs login, one
|
|
hour inital time limit, USENET news, shell access granted on request &
|
|
$25/quarter donation. Anon uucp: ogin: nuucp NO PASSWD. List of
|
|
available Unix files resides in /usr3/public/FILES.
|
|
|
|
08/88 714-894-2246 stanton Irvine CA 3/12/24 24
|
|
286 - SCO Xenix - donation requested, limit 240 min, XBBS, USENET news
|
|
UNIX access granted on request through BBS, 20$/year, access includes
|
|
C development system (XENIX/MSDOS), PROCALC 1-2-3 clone, FOXBASE+
|
|
anon uucp: ogin: nuucp, no word, 2400/1200/300 MNP supported
|
|
|
|
05/88 719-632-4111 chariot Colo Sprgs CO 3/12 24
|
|
Convrgnt Minifrme - SYS V, multiple lines, fee $12/mo Picospan
|
|
|
|
08/89 801-943-7947^ i-core Salt Lake City UT 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
286 SYS V, Unidel BBS, a.k.a. Bitsko's Bar & Grill, no limit, no fee,
|
|
UseNet and Citadel feeds available, home of Unidel BBS, Telebit 19200 used
|
|
Contact: ken@i-core.UUCP or uunet!iconsys!caeco!i-core!ken
|
|
|
|
12/88 802-865-3614 tnl Burlington VT 3/12/24 24
|
|
80386 w/ SCO XENIX. No Fee. 2 hr session limit. XBBS/USENET, shell.
|
|
Login as 'new' for a shell account, no validation. AKA: Northern Lights.
|
|
|
|
08/88 813-952-1981 usource Sarasota FL 12/24 -24
|
|
386 - SCO-XENIX, fee depends on services provided, no fee for bbs. New users
|
|
subscribe by logging in as 'help' or 'newuser' (no password). Primary
|
|
purpose is technical forum. 6pm-8am M-Th, 24 hrs weeekends (6pm Fri-8am Mon)
|
|
uucp-anon: 1200/2400 bps --> ogin: auucp word: gateway
|
|
uucp-anon directory: /usr/spool/uucppublic; contact: frank@usource.UUCP
|
|
|
|
08/88 814-333-6728 sir-alan Meadville PA 3/12/24 24
|
|
Tandy XENIX/68000 03.01.02, Allegheny College, UNaXcess BBS
|
|
uucp-anon: ogin: pdsrc NO PASSWD
|
|
uucp-anon directory: /usr/spool/pdsrc/all.subjects
|
|
Telebit TB+ available at 814 337 0894, now operating.
|
|
Contact: sir-alan!mikes
|
|
|
|
05/88 814-337-3159 oncoast Meadville PA 3/12/24/96 24
|
|
Tandy 12/6000, no fee, no bbs, archive site, USR HST 9600, cycle 24/96/12
|
|
vols 1 - 13 of mod.sources/comp.sources.unix, comp.sources.misc
|
|
New stuff on sir-alan, older on oncoast. 2 uucp logins "uucp" and "pdsrc"
|
|
files list = /usr/spool/uucppublic/my.directory or /usr/spool/pdsrc/
|
|
all.subjects.Z
|
|
|
|
09/89 916-649-0161 sactoh0 Sacramento CA 12/24/96 24
|
|
3B2/310 SYSV.2, SAC_UNIX; $2/month, limit 90 min, 2 lines, TB on line,
|
|
2400/1200 baud on 916-722-6519; USENET, E-Mail, Games; login: new
|
|
Contact: ..pacbell!sactoh0!sysop
|
|
|
|
089 919-493-7111^ wolves Durham NC 3/12/24 24
|
|
AMS 386/25 - UNIX SysVr3.2, XBBS, no fee for bbs. Rates for UNIX access
|
|
and USENET are being determined. Developing yet another UNIX bbs (ideas
|
|
welcome!) Single line, telebit coming soon.
|
|
Contact: wolves!ggw or wolves!sysop [...duke!dukcds!wolves!...]
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
NOTE: ^ means the site is reachable using PC Pursuit.
|
|
===============================================================================
|
|
This list is maintained by Phil Eschallier on lgnp1. Any additions, deletions,
|
|
or corrections should be sent to one of the addresses below. The nixpub
|
|
listings are kept as current as possible. However, you use this data at your
|
|
own risk and cost -- all standard disclaimers apply!!!
|
|
------
|
|
Lists available from lgnp1 via anonomous uucp.
|
|
+1 215 348 9727 [Telebit access]
|
|
login: nuucp NO PWD [no rmail permitted]
|
|
this list: /usr/spool/uucppublic/nixpub
|
|
short list: /usr/spool/uucppublic/nixpub.short
|
|
or from news groups pubnet.nixpub, comp.misc or alt.bbs.
|
|
------
|
|
E-MAIL ...
|
|
uucp: ..!uunet!lgnp1!$ phil | nixpub $
|
|
or: $ phil | nixpub $@LS.COM
|
|
CIS: 71076,1576
|
|
===============================================================================
|
|
COMPAQ, IBM, PC Pursuit, [SCO] XENIX, UNIX, etc. are trademarks of the
|
|
respective companies.
|
|
===============================================================================
|
|
|
|
nixpub short listing
|
|
Open Access UNIX (*NIX) Sites [Fee / No Fee] for mapped sites only
|
|
[ November 12, 1989 ]
|
|
|
|
|
|
Systems listed (73)
|
|
Legend: fee/contribution ($), no fee (-$), hours (24), not (-24)
|
|
shell (S), USENET news (N), email (M), multiple lines (T)
|
|
Telebit 9600 bps on main number (+P), Telebit on other line[s] (P)
|
|
Courier 9600 bps on main number (+H), Courier on other line[s] (H)
|
|
anonymous uucp (A), archive site ONLY - see long form list (@)
|
|
@> = anonymous uucp archive site listed in ANONIX (mike@cpmain)
|
|
Dialable thru PC Pursuit (^)
|
|
|
|
Last
|
|
Contact
|
|
Date Telephone # Sys-name Location Baud Legend
|
|
----- ------------ -------- ----------- ------- ---------
|
|
08/89 201-846-2460^ althea New Brunswic NJ 3/12/24 24 -$ M N S
|
|
10/89 206-328-4944 polari Seatle WA 3/12 24 $ M N P S T
|
|
10/89 212-420-0527 magpie NYC NY 3/12/24/96 24 -$ T P
|
|
10/89 212-675-7059 marob NYC NY 12/24 24 -$ A
|
|
05/89 212-879-9031^ dasys1 NYC NY 12/24 24 $ S N M T
|
|
09/89 213-376-5714^ pnet02 Redondo Bch CA 3/12/24 24 -$ M N T
|
|
09/89 213-397-3137^ stb Santa Monica CA 3/12/24 24 -$ S A
|
|
11/88 213-459-5891 amazing Pac Palisade CA 3/12/24 24 $ T
|
|
07/88 214-247-2367 ozdaltx Dallas TX 3/12/24 24 $ N T
|
|
07/89 214-741-2130 attctc Dallas TX 3/12/24 24 -$ N M S T A
|
|
11/89 215-348-9727 lgnp1 Doylestown PA 3/12/24/96 24 $ A M N +P S
|
|
09/89 216-582-2441 ncoast Cleveland OH 12/24/96 24 $ S N M P T
|
|
08/88 217-529-3223 pallas Springfield IL 3/12/24 24 $ T
|
|
10/89 219-289-0286 nstar South Bend IN 3/12/24/96 24 -$ H M N P S T
|
|
08/88 312-283-0559^ chinet Chicago IL 3/12/24 24 $ N T
|
|
10/89 312-338-0632^ point Chicago IL 3/12/24/96 24 -$ N P S T
|
|
04/89 313-623-6309 nucleus Clarkston MI 12/24 24 $ S N M
|
|
11/88 313-994-6333 m-net Ann Arbor MI 3/12 24 $ T
|
|
08/89 313-996-4644^ anet Ann Arbor MI 3/12 24 $ T
|
|
08/89 314-474-4581 gensis Columbia MO 3/12/24/96 24 -$ M S
|
|
10/89 404-321-5020^ jdyx Atlanta GA 12/24 24 $ M N +P S T
|
|
05/88 407-380-6228 rtmvax Orlando FL 3/12/24 24 -$ N M
|
|
09/89 408-245-7726^ uuwest Sunnyvale CA 3/12/24 24 -$ N
|
|
04/88 408-247-4810 sharks Santa Clara CA 3/12 24 $ S N M T
|
|
11/89 408-423-9995 cruzio Santa Cruz CA 12/24 24 $ M T
|
|
10/89 408-725-0561^ portal Cupertino CA 3/12/24 24 $ -S N M T
|
|
02/89 408-997-9119^ netcom San Jose CA 3/12/24/96 24 $ M N S
|
|
10/89 412-431-8649 eklektik Pittsburgh PA 3/12/24 24 $ S N M
|
|
11/89 415-332-6106^ well Sausalito CA 12/24 24 $ M N S T
|
|
06/88 415-582-7691 cpro Hayward CA 12/24 24 -$ S
|
|
07/89 415-753-5265^ wet San Francisc CA 3/12/24 24 $ M N S T
|
|
05/89 415-783-2543 esfenn Hayward CA 3/12/24 24 -$ M N S
|
|
01/89 416-452-0926 telly Brampton ON 12/24/96 +P 24 $ M N
|
|
12/88 416-461-2608 tmsoft Toronto ON 3/12/24/96 24 $ S M N
|
|
07/89 416-654-8854 ziebmef Toronto ON 3/12/24/96 24 +P M N S T
|
|
08/89 502-968-5401 disk Louisville KY 3/12 24 $ M N S T
|
|
12/88 503-254-0458 bucket Portland OR 3/12/24 24 -$ N M T
|
|
05/89 503-640-4262^ agora PDX OR 3/12/24 24 $ M N S T
|
|
10/88 512-346-2339 bigtex Austin TX 96 +P 24 -S -$ A @>
|
|
07/89 512-832-8835 rpp386 Austin TX 12/24 24 @ -$ -S A T
|
|
10/89 513-779-8209 cinnet Cincinnati OH 12/24/96 24 $ M N +P S
|
|
05/89 516-872-2137 lilink Long Island NY 12/24 24 $ M N S T
|
|
07/89 517-487-3356 lunapark E. Lansing MI 12/24 24 -$
|
|
12/88 518-346-8033 sixhub upstate NY 3/12/24 24 $ S N M T
|
|
09/88 602-941-2005 xroads Phoenix AZ 3/12/24 24 $ N T
|
|
08/89 603-880-8120 ubbs-nh Nashua NH 3/12/24/96 24 -$ M N +P S T
|
|
08/89 605-348-2738 loft386 Rapid City SD 3/12/24/96 24 $ M N +P S
|
|
08/88 608-273-2657 madnix Madison WI 3/12/24 24 -$ S N M
|
|
08/89 612-473-2295 pnet51 Minneapolis MN 3/12/24 24 -$ N M T
|
|
08/89 615-896-8716 raider Murfreesboro TN 12/24 24 -$ S N M T
|
|
07/89 616-457-1964 wybbs Jenison MI 3/12/24 24 -$ S N T
|
|
11/89 617-739-9753 world Brookline MA 3/12/24/96 24 $ M N P S T
|
|
07/88 619-444-7006^ pnet01 El Cajon CA 3/12/24 24 $ N M S T
|
|
10/88 703-281-7997^ grebyn Vienna VA 3/12/24/96 24 $ N M T P
|
|
11/89 708-272-5912^ igloo Northbrook IL 12/24/96 24 -$ S N T P
|
|
11/89 708-301-2100^ jolnet Joliet IL 3/12/24 24 -$ +P M N S T
|
|
08/88 312-566-8911^ ddsw1 Mundelein IL 3/12/24/96 24 $ S N M T A P
|
|
11/89 708-833-8126^ vpnet Villa Park IL 12/24/96 24 -$ +P M N S
|
|
07/89 713-438-5018 sugar Houston TX 3/12/24/96 24 -$ N +P
|
|
10/89 713-668-7176^ nuchat Houston TX 3/12/24/96 24 -$ M N +P S
|
|
12/88 714-635-2863 dhw68k Anaheim CA 12/24 24 -$ T
|
|
05/89 714-662-7450 turnkey Inglewood CA 12/24 24 -$
|
|
11/89 714-821-9671 alphacm Cypress CA 12/24/96 24 -$ T H A
|
|
05/89 714-842-5851 conexch Santa Ana CA 3/12/24 24 $ A M N S
|
|
08/88 714-894-2246 stanton Irvine CA 3/12/24 24 $ S N
|
|
05/88 719-632-4111 chariot Colo Sprgs CO 3/12 24 $ T
|
|
08/89 801-943-7947^ i-core Salt Lake Ci UT 3/12/24/96 +P 24 -$ A N
|
|
06/88 802-865-3614 tnl Burlington VT 3/12/24 24 -$ S N M
|
|
08/88 813-952-1981 usource Sarasota FL 12/24 -24 -$ A
|
|
08/88 814-333-6728 sir-alan Meadville PA 3/12/24 24 -$ A P
|
|
05/88 814-337-3159 oncoast Meadville PA 3/12/24/96 +H 24 @ -$ -S A
|
|
09/89 916-649-0161 sactoh0 Sacramento CA 12/24/96 24 $ M N +P S T
|
|
08/89 919-493-7111^ wolves Durham NC 3/12/24 24 $ M N S
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
NOTE: ^ means the site is reachable using PC Pursuit.
|
|
===============================================================================
|
|
This list is maintained by Phil Eschallier on lgnp1. Any additions, deletions,
|
|
or corrections should be sent to one of the addresses below. The nixpub
|
|
listings are kept as current as possible. However, you use this data at your
|
|
own risk and cost -- all standard disclaimers apply!!!
|
|
------
|
|
Lists available from lgnp1 via anonomous uucp.
|
|
+1 215 348 9727 [Telebit access]
|
|
login: nuucp NO PWD [no rmail permitted]
|
|
this list: /usr/spool/uucppublic/nixpub.short
|
|
long list: /usr/spool/uucppublic/nixpub
|
|
or from news groups pubnet.nixpub, comp.misc or alt.bbs
|
|
------
|
|
E-MAIL ...
|
|
uucp: ..!uunet!lgnp1!{ phil | nixpub }
|
|
or: { phil | nixpub }@LS.COM
|
|
===============================================================================
|
|
COMPAQ, IBM, PC Pursuit, [SCO] XENIX, UNIX, etc. are trademarks of the
|
|
respective companies.
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #5 of 12
|
|
|
|
[-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-]
|
|
[-] [-]
|
|
[-] Covert Paths [-]
|
|
[-] [-]
|
|
[-] by [-]
|
|
[-] [-]
|
|
[-] Cyber Neuron Limited and Synthecide [-]
|
|
[-] [-]
|
|
[-] November 1, 1989 [-]
|
|
[-] [-]
|
|
[-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-] [-][-]
|
|
|
|
|
|
When cracking a system, it is important for you to use a path to the system
|
|
that will not lead the authorities to your door step.
|
|
|
|
There are several methods for doing this and all of them will depend on your
|
|
destination, available time, goal and the phase of the moon. This article
|
|
deals mostly with cover attacks via a connected network.
|
|
|
|
If attacking via a phone link:
|
|
|
|
o Tap in to your local payphone line and red box or "sprint" the call.
|
|
|
|
o Using a long haul service (like Sprint or MCI) to dial into systems in
|
|
remote cities. [This should hinder a track by a good order of
|
|
magnitude.]
|
|
|
|
o Use a midnight packet switching network (eg: PC-Pursuit, Tymnet, et. al.)
|
|
|
|
o All the above.
|
|
|
|
|
|
If attacking from a network (eg: the Internet) there are ways of spoofing the
|
|
packet headers, but this requires superuser privileges on the system you are
|
|
attacking from and a fair amount of 'C' programming expertise. Therefore, this
|
|
will not be discussed here in any more detail.
|
|
|
|
Another obvious trick is to use network routers and gateways along with guest
|
|
accounts to "route" your data path. This will cause the person tracking you to
|
|
have to go though more red tape and hassle to track you. This gives you more
|
|
time to cover your tracks.
|
|
|
|
Some useful paths I know of are:
|
|
|
|
accuvax.nwu.edu
|
|
cory.berkeley.edu
|
|
violet.berkeley.edu
|
|
headcrash.berkeley.edu
|
|
|
|
|
|
host: violet.berkeley.edu host: headcrash.berkeley.edu
|
|
account: nobody account: netgate
|
|
net address:128.32.136.22 net address: 128.32.234.31
|
|
|
|
|
|
host: cory.berkeley.edu host accuvax.nwu.edu
|
|
account: terminal account: telnet
|
|
net address: 128.32.134.6 net address: 129.105.49.1
|
|
|
|
|
|
host: lightning.berkeley.edu host: score.stanford.edu
|
|
port: 8033 account: guest
|
|
net address: 128.32.234.10 net address: 36.8.0.46
|
|
|
|
|
|
The accounts nobody, netgate, and terminal at Berkeley are accounts that were
|
|
installed so that people can use the system to rlogin or telnet to an account
|
|
elsewhere without a local login (or so I am told by the local hackers [Hi
|
|
Audrey...]). The lightning path/method can be accessed by the command:
|
|
"telnet lightning.berkeley.edu 8033".
|
|
|
|
I am interested in hearing about other Internet access accounts that are
|
|
available out there. If you know of any please send them in.
|
|
|
|
Tymnet is also a useful method of gaining access to systems. From Tymnet, you
|
|
can hook up to just about any computer and use the other methods to go one step
|
|
further. It's not until you are traced back to the computer you linked to from
|
|
Tymnet that they can even begin to follow you back. My understanding is that
|
|
for a systen to find your Tymnet node, they must contact Tymnet personally and
|
|
ask them to put a trap on their connection.
|
|
|
|
For more infomation concerning Tymnet see the article "Hacking & Tymnet" by
|
|
Synthecide in Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXX.
|
|
|
|
**********************************
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #6 of 12
|
|
|
|
+ BANK INFORMATION +
|
|
\ /
|
|
\ /
|
|
___Compiled By___
|
|
/ \
|
|
Legion Of Doom!
|
|
EFT Division
|
|
------------
|
|
|
|
In order to exact any type of bank associated transaction by computer, one must
|
|
have a working knowledge of the various routing codes involved in the banking
|
|
processes. The following is an informational guide to the coding used in
|
|
American banking transactions.
|
|
|
|
ABA (American Bankers Association) Transit Numbers
|
|
|
|
Numbers 1 to 49 inclusive are Prefixes for Cities
|
|
Numbers 50 to 99 inclusive are Prefixes for States
|
|
|
|
Prefix Numbers 50 to 58 are Eastern States
|
|
Prefix Number 59 is for Alaska, Hawaii, and US Territories
|
|
Prefix Numbers 60 to 69 are Southeastern States
|
|
Prefix Numbers 70 to 79 are Central States
|
|
Prefix Numbers 80 to 88 are Southwestern States
|
|
Prefix Numbers 90 to 99 are Western States
|
|
|
|
1 New York, NY
|
|
2 Chicago, IL
|
|
3 Philadelphia, PA
|
|
4 St. Louis, MO
|
|
5 Boston, MA
|
|
6 Cleveland, OH
|
|
7 Baltimore, MD
|
|
8 Pittsburgh, PA
|
|
9 Detroit, MI
|
|
10 Buffalo, NY
|
|
11 San Francisco, CA
|
|
12 Milwaukee, WI
|
|
13 Cincinnati, OH
|
|
14 New Orleans, LA
|
|
15 Washington D.C.
|
|
16 Los Angeles, CA
|
|
18 Kansas City, MO
|
|
19 Seattle, WA
|
|
20 Indianapolis, IN
|
|
21 Louisville, KY
|
|
22 St. Paul, MN
|
|
23 Denver, CO
|
|
24 Portland, OR
|
|
25 Columbus, OH
|
|
26 Memphis, TN
|
|
27 Omaha, NE
|
|
28 Spokane, WA
|
|
29 Albany, NY
|
|
30 San Antonio, TX
|
|
31 Salt Lake City, UT
|
|
32 Dallas, TX
|
|
33 Des Moines, IA
|
|
34 Tacoma, WA
|
|
35 Houston, TX
|
|
36 St. Joseph, MO
|
|
37 Fort Worth, TX
|
|
38 Savannah, GA
|
|
39 Oklahoma City, OK
|
|
40 Wichita, KS
|
|
41 Sioux City, IA
|
|
42 Pueblo, CO
|
|
43 Lincoln, NE
|
|
44 Topeka, KS
|
|
45 Dubuque, IA
|
|
46 Galveston, TX
|
|
47 Cedar Rapids, IA
|
|
48 Waco, TX
|
|
49 Muskogee, OK
|
|
50 New York
|
|
51 Connecticut
|
|
52 Maine
|
|
53 Massachusetts
|
|
54 New Hampshire
|
|
55 New Jersey
|
|
56 Ohio
|
|
57 Rhode Island
|
|
58 Vermont
|
|
59 Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands
|
|
60 Pennsylvania
|
|
61 Alabama
|
|
62 Delaware
|
|
63 Florida
|
|
64 Georgia
|
|
65 Maryland
|
|
66 North Carolina
|
|
67 South Carolina
|
|
68 Virginia
|
|
69 West Virginia
|
|
70 Illinois
|
|
71 Indiana
|
|
72 Iowa
|
|
73 Kentucky
|
|
74 Michigan
|
|
75 Minnesota
|
|
76 Nebraska
|
|
77 North Dakota
|
|
78 South Dakota
|
|
79 Wisconsin
|
|
80 Missouri
|
|
81 Arkansas
|
|
83 Kansas
|
|
84 Louisiana
|
|
85 Mississippi
|
|
86 Oklahoma
|
|
87 Tennessee
|
|
88 Texas
|
|
90 California
|
|
91 Arizona
|
|
92 Idaho
|
|
93 Montana
|
|
94 Nevada
|
|
95 New Mexico
|
|
96 Oregon
|
|
97 Utah
|
|
98 Washington
|
|
99 Wyoming
|
|
|
|
|
|
Federal Reserve Routing Symbols
|
|
|
|
* All banks in an area served by a FR bank or branch bank
|
|
carry the routing symbol of the FR bank or branch
|
|
|
|
1 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Head 5-1
|
|
Office 110
|
|
|
|
2 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Head 1-120
|
|
Office 210
|
|
|
|
Buffalo Branch 10-26
|
|
220
|
|
|
|
3 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 3-4
|
|
Head Office 310
|
|
|
|
4 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Head 0-1
|
|
Office 410
|
|
|
|
Cincinnati Branch 13-43
|
|
420
|
|
|
|
Pittsburgh Branch 8-30
|
|
430
|
|
|
|
5 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Head 68-3
|
|
Office 510
|
|
|
|
Baltimore Branch 7-27
|
|
520
|
|
|
|
Charlotte Branch 66-20
|
|
530
|
|
|
|
6 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Head 64-14
|
|
Office 610
|
|
|
|
Birmingham Branch 61-19
|
|
620
|
|
|
|
Jacksonville Branch 63-19
|
|
630
|
|
|
|
Nashville Branch 87-10
|
|
640
|
|
|
|
New Orleans Branch 14-21
|
|
650
|
|
|
|
7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Head 2-30
|
|
Office 710
|
|
|
|
Detroit Branch 9-29
|
|
720
|
|
|
|
8 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Head 4-4
|
|
Office 810
|
|
|
|
Little Rock Branch 81-13
|
|
110
|
|
|
|
Louisville Branch 21-59
|
|
830
|
|
|
|
Memphis Branch 26-3
|
|
840
|
|
|
|
9 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 17-8
|
|
Head Office 910
|
|
|
|
Helena Branch 92-26
|
|
920
|
|
|
|
10 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 18-4
|
|
Head Office 1010
|
|
|
|
Denver Branch 23-19
|
|
1020
|
|
|
|
Oklahoma City Branch 39-24
|
|
1030
|
|
|
|
Omaha Branch 27-12
|
|
1040
|
|
|
|
11 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Head 32-3
|
|
Office 1110
|
|
|
|
El Paso Branch 88-1
|
|
1120
|
|
|
|
Houston Branch 35-4
|
|
1130
|
|
|
|
San Antonio Branch 30-72
|
|
1140
|
|
|
|
12 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 11-37
|
|
Head Office 1210
|
|
|
|
Los Angeles Branch 16-16
|
|
1220
|
|
|
|
Portland Branch 24-1
|
|
1230
|
|
|
|
Salt Lake City Branch 31-31
|
|
1240
|
|
|
|
Seattle Branch 19-1
|
|
1250
|
|
|
|
|
|
BANK IDENTIFICATION CODES
|
|
|
|
|
|
XX-YYY WHERE: XX = City or State
|
|
ZZZZ YYY = Bank of Origin
|
|
|
|
ZZZZ = Federal Reserve Routing Code
|
|
|
|
If three digits: The first digit identifies the Federal Reserve District
|
|
|
|
The second digit, if 1, stands for the Head Office of the
|
|
Federal Reserve District; 2-5 stand for the Branch Office of
|
|
the Federal Reserve District
|
|
|
|
The third digit signifies: 0-available for immediate credit;
|
|
others have deferred credit and the digits mean the
|
|
following: 1-5 designates the state in which the drawee bank
|
|
is located; 6-9 special collection arrangements.
|
|
|
|
If four digits: The first two digits stand for the Federal Reserve District
|
|
10-12.
|
|
|
|
The following digits are as above
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXAMPLE:
|
|
|
|
68-424 68-State of Virginia
|
|
514 424-Arlington Trust Co., Arlington, VA
|
|
5-Fifth Federal Reserve District
|
|
1-Head Office in Richmond, Virginia
|
|
4-Deferred credit and the state of Virginia
|
|
|
|
*NOTE -- For further your familiarity with the coding process, on checks, these
|
|
numbers appear at the bottom of the check according to the MICR Check
|
|
Coding System. The check number, the account number, and the ABA
|
|
Transit Number will all be encoded in magnetic ink. The ABA Number
|
|
will be enclosed in symbols like: |: ABANUMBER |: The grouping of
|
|
the ABA and Federal Reserve Codes will also usually appear at the
|
|
upper right-hand corner of the check.
|
|
|
|
Keep in mind that there are a great many checks involved in any
|
|
banking procedure, and almost any transaction evoked improperly will
|
|
draw attention. Furthermore, the documents generated in a legitimate
|
|
wire-transfer situation are quite extensive. Should a transaction be
|
|
noticed, and these documents are not available for scrutiny, again
|
|
attention will be drawn to the situation.
|
|
|
|
* BANK DOCUMENTS *
|
|
* WIRE TRANSFER *
|
|
|
|
INTERNAL CUSTOMER RECORD
|
|
|
|
Teller Tape & Proof Sheets Copy of Wire Transfer Ticket
|
|
Wire Transfer Ticket Cancelled Check (if used to
|
|
Microfilm copy of check purchase)
|
|
used to purchase wire Bank Statement (if funds came
|
|
transfer out of the account)
|
|
Microfilm copies of account
|
|
records (if fund came out
|
|
of existing account)
|
|
Cash In/Out Ticket
|
|
Vault Book Entry
|
|
Bank Security Film
|
|
Copy of CTR
|
|
|
|
Bank transactions must be swift and precise. Amounts should be kept under the
|
|
$10,000 range in order not to immediately arouse suspicion. Attacks must
|
|
executed correctly the first time, as there will be no possibilities for a
|
|
second chance. Monies must be gathered rapidly and dispersed into various
|
|
outlets to avoid additional attention. Transfers to banking systems whose
|
|
countries keep strict right to privacy laws, such as Panama, Switzerland,
|
|
et.al. are not recommended as the transactions are much more involved and there
|
|
exists a greater potential for error in international wire-transfers.
|
|
|
|
The preferred method of transfer of funds would involve one or more false
|
|
identities, complete with state approved identification or passport and social
|
|
security cards. Bank Security Film is kept on file, so it would be preferred
|
|
that some semblance of disguise be implemented, ranging from hair bleaching,
|
|
sun-tanning, makeup, false accents, facial hair, etc. Various accounts in the
|
|
assumed name would be opened in several cities with the minimum initial
|
|
balance. Within approximately two weeks, funds of no more than $7500 would be
|
|
diverted to each account. The funds would then be withdrawn in cash with no
|
|
more than $5000 from each account, the balance being left in the account. Once
|
|
the funds have been made cash, they would then be distributed to foreign banks,
|
|
or invested in foreign markets to avoid detection by the Internal Revenue
|
|
Service.
|
|
|
|
Conviction for Illegal Transference of Funds is not recommended.
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #7 of 12
|
|
|
|
The Legion of Doom!
|
|
EFT Division
|
|
|
|
Presents
|
|
|
|
HOW WE GOT RICH THROUGH ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS
|
|
|
|
(OR: GEE! NO, GTE!)
|
|
|
|
|
|
A certain number of financial institutions that reside within the
|
|
packet-switched confines of the various X.25 networks use their connections to
|
|
transfer funds from one account to another, one mutual fund to another, one
|
|
stock to another, one bank to another, etc... It is conceivable that if one
|
|
could intercept these transactions and divert them into another account, they
|
|
would be transferred (and could be withdrawn) before the computer error was
|
|
noticed. Thus, with greed in our hearts, an associate and I set forth to test
|
|
this theory and conquer the international banking world.
|
|
|
|
We chose CitiCorp as our victim. This multinational had two address
|
|
prefixes of its own on Telenet (223 & 224). Starting with those two prefixes,
|
|
my associate and I began to sequentially try every possible address. We
|
|
continued through 1000 in increments of one, then A-Z, then 1000-10000 by 10's,
|
|
and finally 10000-99999 by 100's. Needless to say, many addresses were
|
|
probably skipped over in our haste to find valid ones, but many we passed over
|
|
were most likely duplicate terminals that we had already encountered.
|
|
|
|
For the next few days my associate and I went over the addresses we had
|
|
found, comparing and exchanging information, and going back to the addresses
|
|
that had shown 'NOT OPERATING,' 'REMOTE PROCEDURE ERROR,' and 'REJECTING.' We
|
|
had discovered many of the same types of systems, mostly VAX/VMS's and Primes.
|
|
We managed to get into eight of the VAXen and then went forth on the CitiCorp
|
|
DECNET, discovering many more. We entered several GS1 gateways and Decservers
|
|
and found that there were also links leading to systems belonging to other
|
|
financial institutions such as Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank New York and Chase
|
|
Manhattan. We also found hundreds of addresses to TWX machines and many
|
|
in-house bank terminals (most of which were 'BUSY' during banking hours, and
|
|
'NOT OPERATING' during off hours). In fact, the only way we knew that these
|
|
were bank terminals was that an operator happened to be idle just as I
|
|
connected with her terminal (almost like the Whoopie Goldberg movie, "Jumpin'
|
|
Jack Flash," not quite as glamorous ...yet.)
|
|
|
|
Many of the computers we eventually did penetrate kept alluding to the
|
|
electronic fund transfer in scripts, files, and personal mail. One of the
|
|
TOPS-20 machines we found even had an account EFTMKTG.EFT, (password EFTEFT)!
|
|
All the traces pointed to a terminal (or series of terminals) that did nothing
|
|
but transfer funds. We decided that this was the case and decided to
|
|
concentrate our efforts on addresses that allowed us to CONNECT periodically
|
|
but did not respond. After another week of concentrated effort, we managed to
|
|
sort through these. Many were just terminals that had been down or
|
|
malfunctioning, but there were five left that we still had no idea of their
|
|
function. My associate said that we might be able to monitor data
|
|
transmissions on the addresses if we could get into the debug port. With this
|
|
idea in mind, we set out trying sub-addresses from .00 to .99 on the mystery
|
|
addresses. Four of the five had their debug ports at the default location
|
|
(.99). The fifth was located 23 away from the default. That intrigued us, so
|
|
we put the others aside and concentrated on the fifth. Although its location
|
|
was moved, a default password was still intact, and we entered surreptitiously.
|
|
|
|
The system was menu driven with several options available. One option,
|
|
Administrative Functions, put us into a UNIX shell with root privilege. After
|
|
an hour or so of nosing around, we found a directory that held the Telenet
|
|
Debug Tools package (which I had previously thought existed solely for Prime
|
|
computers). Using TDT, we were able to divert all data (incoming and outgoing)
|
|
into a file so we could later read and analyze it. We named the file ".trans"
|
|
and placed it in a directory named ".. ", (dot, dot, space, space) so it would
|
|
remain hidden. This was accomplished fairly late on a Sunday night. After
|
|
logging off, we opened a case of Coors Light and spent the rest of the night
|
|
(and part of the morning!) theorizing about what we might see tomorrow night
|
|
(and getting rather drunk).
|
|
|
|
At approximately 9:00 p.m. the following evening, we met again and logged
|
|
onto the system to view the capture file, hoping to find something useful. We
|
|
didn't have to look very far! The first transmission was just what we had been
|
|
dreaming about all along. The computer we were monitoring initiated by
|
|
connecting with a similar computer at another institution, waited for a
|
|
particular control sequence to be sent, and then transferred a long sequence of
|
|
numbers and letters. We captured about 170 different transactions on the first
|
|
day and several hundred more in the following week. After one business week,
|
|
we removed the file and directory, killed the TDT routine, and went through the
|
|
system removing all traces that we had been there.
|
|
|
|
We felt that we had enough to start piecing together what it all meant, so
|
|
we uploaded our findings to the LOD HP-3000 (ARMA) in Turkey. This way we
|
|
could both have access to the data, but keep it off our home systems. We
|
|
didn't bother to tell any of the other LOD members about our doings, as most
|
|
had retired, been busted, or were suspected of turning information over to the
|
|
Secret Service. Using this as a base, we analyzed the findings, sorted them,
|
|
looked for strings being sent, etc.
|
|
|
|
We came to the conclusion that the transmissions were being sent in the
|
|
following way:
|
|
|
|
|
|
XXXXXXXXXXXXTCxxxxxxxxxxxx/NNNNNNNNNNNNCnnnnnnnnnnnnAMzzzzzzz.zzOP#
|
|
X=Originating Bank ID
|
|
T=Transfer (Also could be R(ecieve), I(nquire))
|
|
C=Type of account (Checking--Also S(avings) I(RA) M(oney Market)
|
|
T(rust) W(Other wire transfer ie. Credit Transfer, etc.))
|
|
x=Originating Account Number
|
|
/=Slash to divide string
|
|
N=Destination Bank ID
|
|
C=Type of account (See above)
|
|
n=Destination Account Number
|
|
AMzzzzzzz.zz=Amount followed by dollar and cents amount
|
|
OP#=operator number supervising transaction
|
|
|
|
After this string of information was sent, the destination bank would then
|
|
echo back the transaction and, in ten seconds, unless a CONTROL-X was sent,
|
|
would send "TRANSACTION COMPLETED" followed by the Destination Bank ID.
|
|
|
|
We now needed to check out our theory about the Bank ID's, which I figured
|
|
were the Federal Reserve number for the Bank. Every bank in America that deals
|
|
with the Federal Reserve System has such a number assigned to it (as do several
|
|
European Banks). I called up CitiBank and inquired about their Federal Reserve
|
|
Number. It was the number being sent by the computer. With this information,
|
|
we were ready to start.
|
|
|
|
I consulted an accountant friend of mine for information on Swiss or
|
|
Bahamanian bank accounts. He laughed and said that a $50,000 initial deposit
|
|
was required to get a numbered account at most major Swiss banks. I told him
|
|
to obtain the forms necessary to start the ball rolling and I'd wire the money
|
|
over to the bank as soon as I was told my account number. This shook him up
|
|
considerably, but he knew me well enough not to ask for details. He did,
|
|
however, remind me of his $1000 consulting fee. A few days later he showed up
|
|
at my townhouse with an account number, several transaction slips and
|
|
paperwork. Knowing that I was up to something shady, he had used one of his
|
|
own false identities to set up the account. He also raised his "fee" to $6500
|
|
(which was, amazingly enough, the amount he owed on his wife's BMW).
|
|
|
|
My associate and I then flew to Oklahoma City to visit the hall of records
|
|
to get new birth certificates. With these, we obtained new State ID's and
|
|
Social Security Numbers. The next step was to set up bank accounts of our own.
|
|
My associate took off to Houston and I went to Dallas. We each opened new
|
|
commercial accounts at three different banks as LOD Inc. with $1000 cash.
|
|
|
|
Early the next day, armed with one Swiss and six American accounts, we
|
|
began our attack. We rigged the CitiCorp computer to direct all of its data
|
|
flow to a local Telenet node, high up in the hunt series. Amazingly, it still
|
|
allowed for connections from non-909/910 nodes. We took turns sitting on the
|
|
node, collecting the transmissions and returning the correct acknowledgments.
|
|
By 12:30 we had $184,300 in electronic funds in "Limbo." Next we turned off
|
|
the data "forwarding" on the CitiCorp computer and took control of the host
|
|
computer itself through the debug port to distribute the funds. Using its data
|
|
lines, we sent all the transactions, altering the intended bank destinations,
|
|
to our Swiss account.
|
|
|
|
After I got the confirmation from the Swiss bank I immediately filled out
|
|
six withdrawal forms and faxed them to the New York branch of the Swiss bank
|
|
along with instructions on where the funds should be distributed. I told the
|
|
bank to send $7333 to each of our six accounts (this amount being small enough
|
|
not to set off Federal alarms). I did this for three consecutive days, leaving
|
|
our Swiss account with $52,000. I signed a final withdrawal slip and gave it
|
|
to my accountant friend.
|
|
|
|
Over the next week we withdrew the $22,000 from each of our Dallas and
|
|
Houston banks in lots of $5000 per day, leaving $1000 in each account when we
|
|
were through. We were now $66,000 apiece richer.
|
|
|
|
It will be interesting to see how the CitiCorp Internal Fraud Auditors and
|
|
the Treasury Department sort this out. There are no traces of the diversion,
|
|
it just seems to have happened. CitiBank has printed proof that the funds were
|
|
sent to the correct banks, and the correct banks acknowledgment on the same
|
|
printout. The correct destination banks, however, have no record of the
|
|
transaction. There is record of CitiBank sending funds to our Swiss account,
|
|
but only the Swiss have those records. Since we were controlling the host when
|
|
the transactions were sent, there were no printouts on the sending side. Since
|
|
we were not actually at a terminal connected to one of their line printers, no
|
|
one should figure out to start contacting Swiss banks, and since CitiBank does
|
|
this sort of thing daily with large European banks, they will be all twisted
|
|
and confused by the time they find ours. Should they even get to our bank,
|
|
they will then have to start the long and tedious process of extracting
|
|
information from the Swiss. Then if they get the Swiss to cooperate, they will
|
|
have a dead-end with the account, since it was set up under the guise of a
|
|
non-entity. The accounts in Dallas and Houston were also in fake names with
|
|
fake Social Security Numbers; we even changed our appearances and handwriting
|
|
styles at each bank.
|
|
|
|
I'm glad I'm not the one who will have the job of tracking me down, or
|
|
even trying to muster up proof of what happened. Now we won't have to worry
|
|
about disposable income for awhile. I can finish college without working and
|
|
still live in relative luxury. It's kind of weird having over six-hundred $100
|
|
bills in a drawer, though. Too bad we can't earn any interest on it!
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Since the events described transpired, CitiBank has made their Banking
|
|
Transaction Ports all refuse collect connections. Even by connecting
|
|
with an NUI they now respond "<<ENTER PASSWORD>>". C'est La Vie.
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #8 of 12
|
|
|
|
...........................................
|
|
||||||!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!||||||
|
|
|||!!! !!!|||
|
|
||| The Myth and Reality About |||
|
|
||| Eavesdropping |||
|
|
||| |||
|
|
||| by Phone Phanatic |||
|
|
||| |||
|
|
|||... October 8, 1989 ...|||
|
|
||||||...............................||||||
|
|
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
|
|
|
|
|
|
Most Central Office (CO) eavesdropping intercepts in a Bell Operating Company
|
|
(BOC) CO are today performed using a modified Metallic Facility Termination
|
|
(MFT) circuit pack which places about a 100,000 ohm isolated bridging impedance
|
|
across the subscriber line. Supervisory signaling is detected on the
|
|
subscriber loop using a high-impedance electronic circuit, and the signaling is
|
|
repeated in an isolated fashion using the A and B leads of the repeating coil
|
|
in the MFT to "reconstruct" a CO line for the benefit of monitoring apparatus.
|
|
|
|
The entire purpose of the above effort is to prevent any trouble or noise on
|
|
the intercept line or monitoring apparatus from causing any trouble, noise or
|
|
transmission impairment on the subject line.
|
|
|
|
Some BOCs may elect to use service observing apparatus to provide the necessary
|
|
isolation and repeated loop supervisory signaling. Less common are locally
|
|
engineered variations which merely use an isolation amplifier from an MFT or
|
|
other 4-wire repeater, and which provide no repeated supervisory signaling
|
|
(which is not all that necessary, since voice-activated recorders and DTMF
|
|
signaling detectors can be used, and since dial pulses can be counted by
|
|
playing a tape at slow speed).
|
|
|
|
Today, the use of a "bridge lifter" retardation coil for the purpose of
|
|
connecting an eavesdropping intercept line is virtually non-existent since they
|
|
do not provide sufficient isolation and since they provide a fair amount of
|
|
insertion loss without loop current on the "observing" side. Bridge lifter
|
|
coils are primarily intended for answering service intercept lines, and consist
|
|
of a dual-winding inductor which passes 20 Hz ringing and whose windings easily
|
|
saturate when DC current flows. Bridge lifter coils are used to minimize the
|
|
loading effect (and consequent transmission impairment) of two subscriber loops
|
|
on one CO line. Bridge lifter coils provide a significant insertion loss at
|
|
voice frequencies toward the idle loop; i.e., the loop in use will have DC
|
|
current flow, saturating the inductor, and reducing its insertion loss to
|
|
1.0 dB or less.
|
|
|
|
Despite gadget advertised in magazines like The Sharper Image, the simple truth
|
|
of the matter is that there is NO WAY for any person using ANY type of
|
|
apparatus at the telephone set location to ascertain whether there is a
|
|
properly installed eavesdropping device connected across their line in the CO.
|
|
The only way such a determination can be made is through the cooperation of the
|
|
telephone company.
|
|
|
|
For that matter, there is virtually no way for any person using any type of
|
|
apparatus in their premises to ascertain if there is ANY type of eavesdropping
|
|
apparatus installed ANYWHERE on their telephone line outside their premises,
|
|
unless the eavesdropping apparatus was designed or installed in an
|
|
exceptionally crude manner (not likely today). Some types of eavesdropping
|
|
apparatus may be located, but only with the full cooperation of the telephone
|
|
company.
|
|
|
|
The sole capability of these nonsense gadgets is to ascertain if an extension
|
|
telephone is picked up during a telephone call, which is hardly a likely
|
|
scenario for serious eavesdropping!
|
|
|
|
These screw-in-the-handset gadgets work by sensing the voltage across the
|
|
carbon transmitter circuit, and using a control to null this voltage using a
|
|
comparator circuit. When a person makes a telephone call, the control is
|
|
adjusted until the light just goes out. If an extension telephone at the
|
|
user's end is picked up during the call, the increased current drain of a
|
|
second telephone set will decrease the voltage across the carbon transmitter
|
|
circuit, unbalancing the voltage comparator circuit, and thereby causing the
|
|
LED to light.
|
|
|
|
These voltage comparator "tap detectors" cannot even be left with their
|
|
setpoint control in the same position, because the effective voltage across a
|
|
subscriber loop will vary depending upon the nature of the call (except in the
|
|
case of an all digital CO), and upon other conditions in the CO.
|
|
Electromechanical and analog ESS CO's may present different characteristics to
|
|
the telephone line, depending upon whether it is used at the time of: An
|
|
originated intraoffice call (calling side of intraoffice trunk), an answered
|
|
intraoffice call (called side of intraoffice trunk), an originated tandem call
|
|
(interoffice tandem trunk), an originated toll call (toll trunk), or an
|
|
answered tandem/toll call (incoming tandem or toll trunk). There is usually
|
|
enough variation in battery feed resistance due to design and component
|
|
tolerance changes on these different trunks to cause a variation of up to
|
|
several volts measured at the subscriber end for a given loop and given
|
|
telephone instrument.
|
|
|
|
Even more significant are variations in CO battery voltage, which can vary
|
|
(within "normal limits") from 48 volts to slightly over 52 volts, depending
|
|
upon CO load conditions. 50 to 51 volts in most CO's is a typical daily
|
|
variation. If anyone is curious, connect an isolated voltage recorder or data
|
|
logger to a CO loop and watch the on-hook voltage variations; in many CO's the
|
|
resultant voltage vs 24-hour time curve will look just like the inverse of a
|
|
busy-hour graph from a telephone traffic engineering text!
|
|
|
|
In some all-digital CO apparatus, the subscriber loop signaling is performed by
|
|
a solid-state circuit which functions as a constant-current (or
|
|
current-limiting) device. With such a solid-state circuit controlling loop
|
|
current, there is no longer ANY meaningful reference to CO battery voltage;
|
|
i.e., one cannot even use short-circuit loop current at the subscriber location
|
|
to even estimate outside cable plant resistance.
|
|
|
|
To explode this myth even further, let's do a little Ohm's Law:
|
|
|
|
1. Assume a CO loop with battery fed from a dual-winding A-relay (or
|
|
line relay, ESS ferrod line scanner element, or whatever) having 200
|
|
ohms to CO battery and 200 ohms to ground.
|
|
|
|
2. Assume a CO loop of 500 ohms (a pretty typical loop).
|
|
|
|
3. Assume an eavesdropping device with a DC resistance of 100,000 ohms
|
|
(this is still pretty crude, but I'm being generous with my example).
|
|
|
|
4. Using some simple Ohm's law, the presence or absence of this
|
|
hypothetical eavesdropping device at the SUBSCRIBER PREMISES will
|
|
result in a voltage change of less than 0.5 volt when measured in the
|
|
on-hook state. This voltage change is much less than normal
|
|
variations of CO battery voltage.
|
|
|
|
5. Using some simple Ohm's law, the presence or absence of this
|
|
hypothetical eavesdropping device at the CENTRAL OFFICE LOCATION will
|
|
result in a voltage change of less than 0.2 volt when measured in the
|
|
on-hook state. This voltage change is an order of magnitude less than
|
|
the expected normal variation of CO battery voltage!
|
|
|
|
Measuring voltage variations on a subscriber loop in an effort to detect a
|
|
state-of-the-art eavesdropping device is meaningless, regardless of resolution
|
|
of a voltage measuring device, since the "signal" is in effect buried in the
|
|
"noise".
|
|
|
|
Moving on to the subject of subscriber line impedance...
|
|
|
|
There is simply no way for any device located on the subscriber's premises to
|
|
obtain any MEANINGFUL information concerning the impedance characteristics of
|
|
the subscriber loop and whether or not anything "unusual" is connected at the
|
|
CO (or for that matter, anywhere else on the subscriber loop). There are a
|
|
number of reasons why this is the case, which include but are not limited to:
|
|
|
|
1. The impedance of a typical telephone cable pair results from
|
|
distributed impedance elements, and not lumped elements. Non-loaded
|
|
exchange area cable (22 to 26 AWG @ 0.083 uF/mile capacitance) is
|
|
generally considered to have a characteristic impedance of 600 ohms
|
|
(it actually varies, but this is a good compromise figure). Loaded
|
|
exchange area cable, such as H88 loading which are 88 mH coils spaced
|
|
at 6 kft intervals, is generally considered to have a a characteristic
|
|
impedance of 900 ohms (it actually varies between 800 and 1,200 ohms,
|
|
but 900 ohms is generally regarded as a good compromise figure for the
|
|
voice frequency range of 300 to 3,000 Hz). What this means is that a
|
|
bridged impedance of 100,000 ohms located in the CO on a typical
|
|
subscriber loop will result in an impedance change measured at the
|
|
SUBSCRIBER LOCATION of 0.1% or less. That's IF you could measure the
|
|
impedance change at the subscriber location.
|
|
|
|
2. As a general rule of thumb, the impedance of an exchange area
|
|
telephone cable pair changes ONE PERCENT for every TEN DEGREES
|
|
Fahrenheit temperature change. Actual impedance changes are a
|
|
function of the frequency at which the impedance is measured, but the
|
|
above rule is pretty close for the purposes of this discussion.
|
|
|
|
3. Moisture in the telephone cable causes dramatic changes in its
|
|
impedance characteristics. While this may appear obvious in the case
|
|
of pulp (i.e., paper) insulated conductors, it is also characteristic
|
|
of polyethylene (PIC) insulated conductors. Only gel-filled cable
|
|
(icky-PIC), which still represents only a small percentage of
|
|
installed cable plant, is relatively immune from the effects of
|
|
moisture.
|
|
|
|
4. From a practical standpoint, it is extremely difficult to measure
|
|
impedance in the presence of the DC potential which is ALWAYS found on
|
|
a telephone line. The subscriber has no means to remove the telephone
|
|
pair from the switching apparatus in the CO to eliminate this
|
|
potential.
|
|
|
|
Therefore, any attempt at impedance measurement will be subject to DC
|
|
current saturation error of any inductive elements found in an
|
|
impedance bridge. The telephone company can, of course, isolate the
|
|
subscriber cable pair from the switching apparatus for the purpose of
|
|
taking a measurement -- but the subscriber cannot. In addition to the
|
|
DC current problem, there is also the problem of impulse and other
|
|
types of noise pickup on a connected loop which will impress errors in
|
|
the impedance bridge detector circuit. Such noise primarily results
|
|
from the on-hook battery feed, and is present even in ESS offices,
|
|
with ferrod scanner pulses being a good source of such noise. While
|
|
one could possibly dial a telephone company "balance termination" test
|
|
line to get a quieter battery feed, this still leaves something to be
|
|
desired for any actual impedance measurements.
|
|
|
|
5. Devices which connect to a telephone pair and use a 2-wire/4-wire
|
|
hybrid with either a white noise source or a swept oscillator on one
|
|
side and a frequency-selective voltmeter on the other side to make a
|
|
frequency vs return loss plot provide impressive, but meaningless
|
|
data. Such a plot may be alleged to show "changes" in telephone line
|
|
impedance characteristics. There is actual test equipment used by
|
|
telephone companies which functions in this manner to measure 2-wire
|
|
Echo Return Loss (ERL), but the ERL measurement is meaningless for
|
|
localization of eavesdropping devices.
|
|
|
|
6. It is not uncommon for the routing of a subscriber line cable pair to
|
|
change one or more times during its lifetime due to construction and
|
|
modification of outside cable plant. Outside cable plant bridge taps
|
|
(not of the eavesdropping variety) can come and go, along with back
|
|
taps in the CO to provide uninterrupted service during new cable plant
|
|
additions. Not only can the "active" length of an existing cable pair
|
|
change by several percent due to construction, but lumped elements of
|
|
impedance can come and go due to temporary or permanent bridge taps.
|
|
|
|
The bottom line of the above is that one cannot accurately measure the
|
|
impedance of a telephone pair while it is connected to the CO switching
|
|
apparatus, and even if one could, the impedance changes caused by the
|
|
installation of an eavesdropping device will be dwarfed by changes in cable
|
|
pair impedance caused by temperature, moisture, and cable plant construction
|
|
unknown to the subscriber.
|
|
|
|
About a year ago on a bulletin board I remember some discussions in which there
|
|
was mention of the use of a time domain reflectometer (TDR) for localization of
|
|
bridge taps and other anomalies. While a TDR will provide a rather detailed
|
|
"signature" of a cable pair, it has serious limitations which include, but are
|
|
not limited to:
|
|
|
|
1. A TDR, in general, cannot be operated on a cable pair upon which there
|
|
is a foreign potential; i.e., a TDR cannot be used on a subscriber
|
|
cable pair which is connected to the CO switching apparatus.
|
|
|
|
2. A TDR contains some rather sensitive circuitry used to detect the
|
|
reflected pulse energy, and such circuitry is extremely susceptible to
|
|
noise found in twisted pair telephone cable. A TDR is works well with
|
|
coaxial cable and waveguide, which are in effect shielded transmission
|
|
lines. The use of a TDR with a twisted cable pair is a reasonable
|
|
compromise provided it is a _single_ cable pair within one shield.
|
|
The use of a TDR with a twisted cable pair sharing a common shield
|
|
with working cable pairs is an invitation to interference by virtue of
|
|
inductive and capacitive coupling of noise from the working pairs.
|
|
|
|
3. Noise susceptibility issues notwithstanding, most TDR's cannot be used
|
|
beyond the first loading coil on a subscriber loop since the loading
|
|
coil inductance presents far too much reactance to the short pulses
|
|
transmitted by the TDR. There are one or two TDR's on the market
|
|
which claim to function to beyond ONE loading coil, but their
|
|
sensitivity is poor.
|
|
|
|
There is simply no device available to a telephone subscriber that without the
|
|
cooperation of the telephone company which can confirm or deny the presence of
|
|
any eavesdropping device at any point beyond the immediate premises of the
|
|
subscriber. I say "immediate premises of the subscriber" because one presumes
|
|
that the subscriber has the ability to isolate the premises wiring from the
|
|
outside cable plant, and therefore has complete inspection control over the
|
|
premises wiring.
|
|
|
|
I have used the phrase "without the cooperation of the telephone company"
|
|
several times in this article. No voltage, impedance or TDR data is meaningful
|
|
without knowing the actual circuit layout of the subscriber loop in question.
|
|
Circuit layout information includes such data as exact length and guages of
|
|
loop sections, detailed description of loading (if present), presence and
|
|
location of multiples and bridge taps, calculated and measured resistance of
|
|
the loop, loop transmission loss, etc. There is NO way that a telephone
|
|
company is going to furnish that information to a subscriber! Sometimes it's
|
|
even difficult for a government agency to get this information without judicial
|
|
intervention.
|
|
|
|
Despite what I have stated in this article, you will see claims made by third
|
|
parties as to the existence of devices which will detect the presence of
|
|
telephone line eavesdropping beyond the subscriber's immediate premises. With
|
|
the exception of the trivial cases of serious DC current draw by an extension
|
|
telephone or the detection of RF energy emitted by a transmitter, this just
|
|
ain't so. Companies like Communication Control Corporation (which advertises
|
|
in various "executive" business publications) get rich by selling devices which
|
|
claim to measure minute voltage and impedance changes on a telephone line --
|
|
but consider those claims in view of the voltage changes due to CO battery
|
|
variations and due to temperature changes in outside cable plant -- and you
|
|
should get the true picture.
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #9 of 12
|
|
|
|
\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\
|
|
\`\ \`\
|
|
\`\ BLOCKING OF LONG-DISTANCE CALLS... REVISITED \`\
|
|
\`\ by Jim Schmickley \`\
|
|
\`\ \`\
|
|
\`\ Hawkeye PC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa \`\
|
|
\`\ \`\
|
|
\`\ Previosly Seen in Pirate Magazine \`\
|
|
\`\ \`\
|
|
\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\
|
|
|
|
|
|
This file is a continuation of "Block Of Long-Distance Calls" that was seen in
|
|
Phrack Inc. Issue 21, file 8. Although the material has already been released
|
|
(perhaps on a limited basis) in Pirate Magazine, we felt the information was
|
|
important enough to re-present (on a larger scale), especially considering it
|
|
was an issue that we had previously detailed. -- Phrack Inc. Staff
|
|
|
|
The following article begins where the previous article left off:
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
November 17, 1988
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Customer Service
|
|
Teleconnect
|
|
P.O. Box 3013
|
|
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-9101
|
|
|
|
Dear Persons:
|
|
|
|
I am writing in response to my October Teleconnect bill, due November 13, for
|
|
$120.76. As you can see, it has not yet been paid, and I would hope to delay
|
|
payment until we can come to some equitable table resolution of what appears to
|
|
be a dispute. The records should show that I have paid previous bills
|
|
responsibly. Hence, this is neither an attempt to delay nor avoid payment. My
|
|
account number is: 01-xxxx-xxxxxx. My user phone is: 815-xxx-xxxx. The phone
|
|
of record (under which the account is registered) is: 815-xxx-xxxx.
|
|
|
|
If possible, you might "flag" my bill so I will not begin receiving dunning
|
|
notices until we resolve the problem. I have several complaints. One is the
|
|
bill itself, the other is the service. I feel my bill has been inflated
|
|
because of the poor quality of the service you provide to certain areas of the
|
|
country. These lines are computer lines, and those over which the dispute
|
|
occurs are 2400 baud lines. Dropping down to 1200 baud does not help much. As
|
|
you can see from my bill, there are numerous repeat calls made to the same
|
|
location within a short period of time. The primary problems occured to the
|
|
following locations:
|
|
|
|
1. Highland, CA 714-864-4592
|
|
2. Montgomery, AL 205-279-6549
|
|
3. Fairbanks, AK 907-479-7215
|
|
4. Lubbock, TX 806-794-4362
|
|
5. Perrine, FL 305-235-1645
|
|
6. Jacksonville, FL 904-721-1166
|
|
7. San Marcos, TX 512-754-8182
|
|
8. Birmingham, AL 205-979-8409
|
|
9. N. Phoenix, AZ 602-789-9269 <-- (The Dark Side BBS by The Dictator)
|
|
|
|
The problem is simply that, to these destinations, Teleconnect can simply not
|
|
hold a line. AT&T can. Although some of these destinations were held for a
|
|
few minutes, generally, I cannot depend on TC service, and have more recently
|
|
begun using AT&T instead. Even though it may appear from the records that I
|
|
maintained some contact for several minutes, this time was useless, because I
|
|
cold not complete my business, and the time was wasted. An equitable
|
|
resolution would be to strike these charges from my bill.
|
|
|
|
I would also hope that the calls I place through AT&T to these destinations
|
|
will be discounted, rather than pay the full cost. I have enclosed my latest
|
|
AT&T bill, which includes calls that I made through them because of either
|
|
blocking or lack of quality service. If I read it correctly, no discount was
|
|
taken off. Is this correct?
|
|
|
|
As you can see from the above list of numbers, there is a pattern in the poor
|
|
quality service: The problem seems to lie in Western states and in the deep
|
|
south. I have no problem with the midwest or with numbers in the east.
|
|
|
|
I have been told that I should call a service representative when I have
|
|
problems. This, however, is not an answer for several reasons. First, I have
|
|
no time to continue to call for service in the middle of a project. The calls
|
|
tend to be late at night, and time is precious. Second, on those times I have
|
|
called, I either could not get through, or was put on hold for an
|
|
indeterminable time. Fourth, judging from comments I have received in several
|
|
calls to Teleconnect's service representatives, these seem to be problems for
|
|
which there is no immediate solution, thus making repeated calls simply a waste
|
|
of time. Finally, the number of calls on which I would be required to seek
|
|
assistance would be excessive. The inability to hold a line does not seem to
|
|
be an occasional anomaly, but a systematic pattern that suggests that the
|
|
service to these areas is, indeed, inadequate.
|
|
|
|
A second problem concerns the Teleconnect policy of blocking certain numbers.
|
|
Blocking is unacceptable. When calling a blocked number, all one receives is a
|
|
recorded message that "this is a local call." Although I have complained about
|
|
this once I learned of the intentional blocking, the message remained the same.
|
|
I was told that one number (301-843-5052) would be unblocked, and for several
|
|
hours it was. Then the blocking resumed.
|
|
|
|
A public utility simply does not have the right to determine who its customers
|
|
may or may not call. This constitutes a form of censorship. You should
|
|
candidly tell your customers that you must approve of their calls or you will
|
|
not place them. You also have the obligation to provide your customers with a
|
|
list of those numbers you will not service so that they will not waste their
|
|
time attempting to call. You might also change the message that indicates a
|
|
blocked call by saying something "we don't approve of who you're calling, and
|
|
won't let you call."
|
|
|
|
I appreciate the need to protect your customers. However, blocking numbers is
|
|
not appropriate. It is not clear how blocking aids your investigation, or how
|
|
blocking will eliminate whatever problems impelled the action. I request the
|
|
following:
|
|
|
|
1. Unblock the numbers currently blocked.
|
|
2. Provide me with a complete list of the numbers you are blocking.
|
|
3. End the policy of blocking.
|
|
|
|
I feel Teleconnect has been less than honest with its customers, and is a bit
|
|
precipitous in trampling on rights, even in a worthy attempt to protect them
|
|
from abuses of telephone cheats. However, the poor quality of line service,
|
|
combined with the apparrent violation of Constitutional rights, cannot be
|
|
tolerated. Those with whom I have spoken about this matter are polite, but the
|
|
bottom line is that they do not respond to the problem. I would prefer to pay
|
|
my bill only after we resolve this.
|
|
|
|
Cheerfully,
|
|
|
|
(Name removed by request)
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
/*/ ST*ZMAG SPECIAL REPORT - by Jerry Cross /*/
|
|
(reprinted from Vol. #28, 7 July, 1989)
|
|
===============================================
|
|
TELECONNECT CALL BLOCKING UPDATE
|
|
Ctsy (Genesee Atari Group)
|
|
|
|
Background
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
At the beginning of last year one of my bbs users uploaded a file he found on
|
|
another bbs that he thought I would be interested in. It detailed the story of
|
|
an Iowa bbs operator who discovered that Teleconnect, a long distance carrier,
|
|
was blocking incoming calls to his bbs without his or the callers knowledge.
|
|
|
|
As an employee of Michigan Bell I was very interested. I could not understand
|
|
how a company could interfere with the transmissions of telephone calls,
|
|
something that was completely unheard of with either AT&T or Michigan Bell in
|
|
the past. The calls were being blocked, according to Teleconnect public
|
|
relations officials, because large amounts of fraudulent calls were being
|
|
placed through their system. Rather than attempting to discover who was
|
|
placing these calls, Teleconnect decided to take the easy (and cheap) way out
|
|
by simply block access to the number they were calling. But the main point was
|
|
that a long distance company was intercepting phone calls. I was very
|
|
concerned.
|
|
|
|
I did some investigating around the Michigan area to see what the long distance
|
|
carriers were doing, and if they, too, were intercepting or blocking phone
|
|
calls. I also discovered that Teleconnect was just in the process of setting
|
|
up shop to serve Michigan. Remember, too, that many of the former AT&T
|
|
customers who did not specify which long distance carrier they wanted at the
|
|
time of the AT&T breakup were placed into a pool, and divided up by the
|
|
competing long distance companies. There are a number of Michigan users who
|
|
are using certain long distance carriers not of their choice.
|
|
|
|
My investigation discovered that Michigan Bell and AT&T have a solid, computer
|
|
backed security system that makes it unnecessary for them to block calls. MCI,
|
|
Sprint, and a few other companies would not comment or kept passing me around
|
|
to other departments, or refused to comment about security measures.
|
|
|
|
I also discussed this with Michigan Bell Security and was informed that any
|
|
long distance company that needed help investigating call fraud would not only
|
|
receive help, but MBT would actually prepare the case and appear in court for
|
|
prosecution!
|
|
|
|
My calls to Teleconnect were simply ignored. Letters to the public service
|
|
commission, FCC, and other government departments were also ignored. I did,
|
|
however, get some cooperation from our U.S. Representative Dale Kildee, who
|
|
filed a complaint in my name to the FCC and the Interstate Commerce Commission.
|
|
What follows is their summary of an FCC investigation to Mr. Kildee's office.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Dear Congressman Kildee:
|
|
|
|
This is in further response to your October 18, 1988 memorandum enclosing
|
|
correspondence from Mr. Gerald R. Cross, President of the Genesee Atari Group
|
|
in Flint, Michigan concerning a reported incidence of blocking calls from
|
|
access to Curt Kyhl's Stock Exchange Bulletin Board System in Waterloo, Iowa by
|
|
Teleconnect, a long distance carrier. Mr. Cross, who also operates a bulletin
|
|
board system (bbs), attaches information indicating that Teleconnect blocked
|
|
callers from access via its network to Mr. Kyhl's BBS number in an effort to
|
|
prevent unauthorized use of its customers' long distance calling authorization
|
|
codes by computer "hackers." Mr. Cross is concerned that this type of blocking
|
|
may be occurring in Michigan and that such practice could easily spread
|
|
nationwide, thereby preventing access to BBSs by legitimate computer users.
|
|
|
|
On November 7, 1988, the Informal Complaints Branch of the Common Carrier
|
|
Bureau directed Teleconnect to investigate Mr. Cross' concerns and report the
|
|
results of its investigation to this Commission. Enclosed, for your
|
|
information, is a copy of Teleconnect's December 7, 1988 report and its
|
|
response to a similar complaint filed with this Commission by Mr. James
|
|
Schmickley. In accordance with the commission's rules, the carrier should have
|
|
forwarded a copy of its December 7, 1988 report to Mr. Cross at the same time
|
|
this report was filed with the Commission. I apologize for the delay in
|
|
reporting the results of our investigation to your office.
|
|
|
|
Teleconnect's report states that it is subject to fraudulent use of its network
|
|
by individuals who use BBSs in order to unlawfully obtain personal
|
|
authorization codes of consumers. Teleconnect also states that computer
|
|
"hackers" employ a series of calling patterns to access a carrier's network in
|
|
order to steal long distance services. The report further states that
|
|
Teleconnect monitors calling patterns on a 24 hour basis in an effort to
|
|
control, and eliminate when possible, code abuse. As a result of this
|
|
monitoring, Teleconnect advises that its internal security staff detected
|
|
repeated attempts to access the BBS numbers in question using multiple
|
|
seven-digit access codes of legitimate Teleconnect customers. These calling
|
|
patterns, according to Teleconnect, clearly indicated that theft of
|
|
telecommunications services was occurring.
|
|
|
|
The report states that Teleconnect makes a decision to block calls when the
|
|
estimated loss of revenue reaches at least $500. Teleconnect notes that
|
|
blocking is only initiated when signs of "hacking" and other unauthorized usage
|
|
are present, when local calls are attempted over its long distance network or
|
|
when a customer or other carrier has requested blocking of a certain number.
|
|
Teleconnect maintains that blocking is in compliance with the provisions of
|
|
Section A.20.a.04 of Teleconnect's Tariff FCC No. #3 which provides that
|
|
service may be refused or disconnected without prior notice by Teleconnect for
|
|
fraudulent unauthorized use. The report also states that Teleconnect customers
|
|
whose authorizations codes have been fraudulently used are immediately notified
|
|
of such unauthorized use and are issued new access codes. Teleconnect further
|
|
states that while an investigation is pending, customers are given instructions
|
|
on how to utilize an alternative carrier's network by using "10XXX" carrier
|
|
codes to access interstate or intrastate communications until blocking can be
|
|
safely lifted.
|
|
|
|
Teleconnect maintains that although its tariff does not require prior notice to
|
|
the number targeted to be blocked, it does, in the case of a BBS, attempt to
|
|
identify and contact the Systems Operator (SysOp), since the SysOp will often
|
|
be able to assist in the apprehension of an unauthorized user. The report
|
|
states that with regard to Mr. Kyle's Iowa BBS, Teleconnect was unable to
|
|
identify Mr. Kyle as the owner of the targeted number because the number was
|
|
unlisted and Mr. Kyhl's local carrier was not authorized to and did not release
|
|
any information to Teleconnect by which identification could be made. The
|
|
report also states that Teleconnect attempted to directly access the BBS to
|
|
determine the identity of the owner but was unable to do so because its
|
|
software was incompatible with the BBS.
|
|
|
|
Teleconnect states that its actions are not discriminatory to BBSs and states
|
|
that it currently provides access to literally hundreds of BBSs around the
|
|
country. The report also states that Teleconnect's policy to block when
|
|
unauthorized use is detected is employed whether or not such use involves a
|
|
BBS. Teleconnect advises that when an investigation is concluded or when a
|
|
complaint is received concerning the blocking, the blocking will be lifted, as
|
|
in the case of the Iowa BBS. However, Teleconnect notes that blocking will be
|
|
reinstated if illegal "hacking" recurs.
|
|
|
|
Teleconnect advises that it currently has no ongoing investigations within the
|
|
State of Michigan and therefore, is not presently blocking any BBSs in
|
|
Michigan. However, Teleconnect states that it is honoring the request of other
|
|
carriers and customers to block access to certain numbers.
|
|
|
|
The Branch has reviewed the file on this case. In accordance with the
|
|
Commission's rules for informal complaints it appears that the carrier's report
|
|
is responsive to our Notice. Therefore, the Branch, on its own motion, is not
|
|
prepared to recommend that the Commission take further action regarding this
|
|
matter.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
This letter leaves me with a ton of questions. First, let's be fair to
|
|
Teleconnect. Long distance carriers are being robbed of hundreds of thousands
|
|
of dollars annually by "hackers" and must do something to prevent it. However,
|
|
call blocking is NOT going to stop it. The "hacker" still has access to the
|
|
carrier network and will simply start calling other numbers until that number,
|
|
too, is blocked, then go on to the next. The answer is to identify the
|
|
"hacker" and put him out of business. Teleconnect is taking a cheap, quick fix
|
|
approach that does nothing to solve the problem, and hurts the phone users as a
|
|
whole.
|
|
|
|
They claim that their customers are able to use other networks to complete
|
|
their calls if the number is being blocked. What if other networks decide to
|
|
use Teleconnect's approach? You would be forced to not only keep an index of
|
|
those numbers you call, but also the long distance carrier that will let you
|
|
call it! Maybe everyone will block that number, then what will you do? What
|
|
if AT&T decided to block calls? Do they have this right too?
|
|
|
|
And how do you find out if the number is being blocked? In the case of Mr.
|
|
Kyhl's BBS, callers were given a recording that stated the number was not in
|
|
service. It made NO mention that the call was blocked, and the caller would
|
|
assume the service was disconnect. While trying to investigate why his calls
|
|
were not going through, Mr. James Schmickley placed several calls to
|
|
Teleconnect before they finally admitted the calls were being blocked! Only
|
|
after repeated calls to Teleconnect was the blocking lifted. It should also be
|
|
noted that Mr. Kyhl's bbs is not a pirate bbs, and has been listed in a major
|
|
computer magazine as one of the best bbs's in the country.
|
|
|
|
As mentioned before, MBT will work with the long distance carriers to find
|
|
these "hackers." I assume that the other local carriers would do the same. I
|
|
do not understand why Teleconnect could not get help in obtaining Mr. Kyhl's
|
|
address. It is true the phone company will not give out this information, but
|
|
WILL contact the customer to inform him that someone needs to contact him about
|
|
possible fraud involving his phone line. If this policy is not being used,
|
|
maybe the FCC should look into it.
|
|
|
|
Call blocking is not restricted to BBSs, according to Teleconnect. They will
|
|
block any number that reaches a $500 fraud loss. Let's say you ran a computer
|
|
mail order business and didn't want to invest in a WATS line. Why should an
|
|
honest businessman be penalized because someone else is breaking the law? It
|
|
could cost him far more the $500 from loss of sales because of Teleconnect's
|
|
blocking policy.
|
|
|
|
Teleconnect also claims that "they are honoring the request of other carriers
|
|
and customers to block access to certain numbers." Again, MBT also has these
|
|
rules. But they pertain to blocking numbers to "certain numbers" such as
|
|
dial-a-porn services, and many 900-numbers. What customer would ever request
|
|
that Teleconnect block incoming calls to his phone?
|
|
|
|
And it is an insult to my intelligence for Teleconnect to claim they could not
|
|
log on to Mr. Kyhl's BBS. Do they mean to say that with hundreds of thousands
|
|
of dollars in computer equipment, well trained technicians, and easy access to
|
|
phone lines, that they can't log on to a simple IBM bbs? Meanwhile, here I sit
|
|
with a $50 Atari 800xl and $30 Atari modem and I have no problem at all
|
|
accessing Mr. Kyhl's bbs! What's worse, the FCC (the agency in charge of
|
|
regulating data transmission equipment), bought this line too! Incredible!!!
|
|
|
|
And finally, I must admit I don't have the faintest idea what Section A.20.a.04
|
|
of Teleconnect's Tariff FCC No. 3 states, walk into your local library and ask
|
|
for this information and you get a blank look from the librarian. I know, I
|
|
tried! However, MBT also has similar rules in their tariffs. Teleconnect
|
|
claims that the FCC tariff claims that "service may be refused or disconnected
|
|
without prior notice by Teleconnect for fraudulent, unauthorized use". This
|
|
rule, as applied to MBT, pertains ONLY to the subscriber. If an MBT customer
|
|
were caught illegally using their phone system then MBT has the right to
|
|
disconnect their service. If a Teleconnect user wishes to call a blocked
|
|
number, and does so legally, how can Teleconnect refuse use to give them
|
|
service? This appears to violate the very same tarriff they claim gives them
|
|
the right to block calls!
|
|
|
|
I have a few simple answers to these questions. I plan, once again, to send
|
|
out letters to the appropriate agencies and government representatives, but I
|
|
doubt they will go anywhere without a mass letter writing campaign from all of
|
|
you. First, order that long distance companies may not block calls without the
|
|
consent of the customer being blocked. Every chance should be given to him to
|
|
assist in identifying the "hacker," and he should not be penalized for other
|
|
people's crimes. There should also be an agency designated to handle appeals
|
|
if call blocking is set up on their line. Currently, there is no agency,
|
|
public service commission, or government office (except the FCC) that you can
|
|
complain to, and from my experience trying to get information on call blocking
|
|
I seriously doubt that they will assist the customer.
|
|
|
|
Next, order the local phone carriers to fully assist and give information to
|
|
the long distance companies that will help identify illegal users of their
|
|
systems. Finally, order the Secret Service to investigate illegal use of long
|
|
distance access codes in the same manner that they investigate credit card
|
|
theft. These two crimes go hand in hand. Stiff fines and penalties should be
|
|
made mandatory for those caught stealing long distance services.
|
|
|
|
If you would like further information, or just want to discuss this, I am
|
|
available on Genie (G.Cross) and CompuServe (75046,267). Also, you can reach
|
|
me on my bbs (FACTS, 313-736-4544). Only with your help can we put a stop to
|
|
call blocking before it gets too far out of hand.
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #10 of 12
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
|
|
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXIX/Part 1 PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN November 17, 1989 PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
|
|
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
Welcome to Issue XXIX of Phrack World News!
|
|
|
|
Although Phrack Inc. is officially four years old, Phrack World News is not.
|
|
PWN originally in its first issue (which was in Phrack Inc. II... its a long
|
|
story) was known as "Phreak World News," but quickly changed and starting with
|
|
Phrack Inc. Issue III became Phrack World News as you see it today.
|
|
|
|
This issue of Phrack World News contains stories and articles detailing events
|
|
and other information concerning AT&T, Clifford Stoll, Kent O'Brien, Kevin
|
|
David Mitnick, Datacrime, DEC, FAX, FCC, Galactic Hackers Party, IBM, Lawrence
|
|
Livermore National Laboratory, Leonard Mitchell DiCicco, MCI, NASA, Robert
|
|
Morris, Shockwave Rider, SummerCon '89, The "NEW" TAP Magazine, 2600 Magazine,
|
|
Viruses, Worms Against Nuclear Killers, and much more so keep reading and
|
|
enjoy.
|
|
|
|
:Knight Lightning
|
|
|
|
"The Real Future Is Behind You... And It's Only The Beginning!"
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Judge Proposes Community Service For Hacker's Accomplice October 13, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Kathy McDonald (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
LOS ANGELES -- A federal judge says she is inclined to sentence a man who
|
|
pleaded guilty to helping computer hacker Kevin Mitnick steal a computer
|
|
security program to community service and asked him to submit a proposal on
|
|
such a sentence.
|
|
|
|
U.S. District Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer said Leonard Mitchell DiCicco, of
|
|
unincorporated suburban Calabasas, had been helpful in the case, in which he
|
|
reported Mitnick to officers at Digital Equipment Corporation in Massachusetts.
|
|
|
|
Mitnick has admitted he stole a DEC computer security program and
|
|
electronically brought it to California.
|
|
|
|
Pfaelzer gave DiCicco, age 23, until November 1 to come up with a detailed
|
|
proposal for his community service.
|
|
|
|
"I favor the handicapped, older people, something which is out in the
|
|
community," Pfaelzer said.
|
|
|
|
DiCicco pleaded guilty in July to one count of aiding and abetting the
|
|
interstate transportation of stolen property. He admitted that in 1987 he let
|
|
Mitnick, age 25, of suburban Panorama City, use his office computer at
|
|
Voluntary Plan Administrators in Calabasas to break into the DEC system.
|
|
|
|
Mitnick pleaded guilty and was sentenced in July to one year in prison and six
|
|
months in a community treatment program aimed at breaking his "addiction" to
|
|
computer hacking.
|
|
|
|
Under a plea agreement with the government, DiCicco pleaded guilty in exchange
|
|
for a promise that he would not be prosecuted for any of the other instances of
|
|
computer hacking he and Mitnick carried out.
|
|
|
|
He said after Thursday's (October 12) court appearance that he would like to
|
|
put his computer talents to use to help others.
|
|
|
|
Assistant U.S. Attorney James Asperger did not object to giving DiCicco
|
|
community service rather than a prison term, saying: "I think Mr. DiCicco's
|
|
cooperation in this case was essential to the prosecution of both Mr. Mitnick
|
|
and himself. He is certainly lower in culpability than Mr. Mitnick."
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
If you are looking for other articles related to Leonard Mitchell DiCicco and
|
|
the famous Kevin David Mitnick please refer to;
|
|
|
|
"Pacific Bell Means Business" (10/06/88) PWN XXI....Part 1
|
|
"Dangerous Hacker Is Captured" (No Date ) PWN XXII...Part 1
|
|
"Ex-Computer Whiz Kid Held On New Fraud Counts" (12/16/88) PWN XXII...Part 1
|
|
"Dangerous Keyboard Artist" (12/20/88) PWN XXII...Part 1
|
|
"Armed With A Keyboard And Considered Dangerous" (12/28/88) PWN XXIII..Part 1
|
|
"Dark Side Hacker Seen As Electronic Terrorist" (01/08/89) PWN XXIII..Part 1
|
|
"Mitnick Plea Bargains" (03/16/89) PWN XXV....Part 1
|
|
"Mitnick Plea Bargain Rejected As Too Lenient" (04/25/89) PWN XXVII..Part 1
|
|
"Computer Hacker Working On Another Plea Bargain" (05/06/89) PWN XXVII..Part 1
|
|
"Mitnick Update" (05/10/89) PWN XXVII..Part 1
|
|
"Kenneth Siani Speaks Out About Kevin Mitnick" (05/23/89) PWN XXVII..Part 1
|
|
"Judge Suggests Computer Hacker Undergo Counseling"(07/17/89) PWN XXVIII.Part 1
|
|
"Authorities Backed Away From Original Allegations"(07/23/89) PWN XXVIII.Part 1
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
How Hacker Jammed 911 Police Lines October 4, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Benny Evangelista
|
|
|
|
He is a brilliant, but lonely teenage computer hacker with too much time on his
|
|
hands.
|
|
|
|
And the police said the 16-year-old San Gabriel boy used that time to put a
|
|
sophisticated high-tech spin on age-old teenage telephone pranks by tying up
|
|
police emergency lines from Hayward, California to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and
|
|
harassing other people, all from what he thought was the safety of his home
|
|
Commodore 64 computer.
|
|
|
|
The calls that jammed Hayward police and Alameda County sheriff's lines were
|
|
potentially dangerous, but officials said that no emergency was neglected
|
|
because of them.
|
|
|
|
This is the way he got his kicks, but he had most of us just absolutely
|
|
crazed," said Connie Bullock, security director for one of the long-distance
|
|
companies that suffered thousands of dollars of losses.
|
|
|
|
The boy, who police would not identify because of his age, is <was> scheduled
|
|
to be arraigned October 16th in Los Angeles County Juvenile Court for making
|
|
telephone bomb threats, fraudulently obtaining long-distance telephone service,
|
|
interfering with a police officer and making harassing phone calls.
|
|
|
|
"Our goal is to get him on probation so we can doctor him for the next couple
|
|
of years," said Sgt. Bernie Kammer, of the Los Angeles County sheriff's
|
|
computer crime detail.
|
|
|
|
"Hopefully, he may be one of the guys who sends the next space capsule up,"
|
|
Kammer said.
|
|
|
|
The hacker, who has used handles like "Kent O'Brien," surfaced sometime last
|
|
October, said Bullock, director of network security for ComSystems
|
|
Incorporated, a Van Nuys-based long distance company.
|
|
|
|
Bullock learned that someone had tapped into the electronic phone mail system
|
|
of a Cedar Rapids-based long-distance company using ComSystems lines.
|
|
|
|
A security officer for the Iowa company began receiving harassing and
|
|
threatening calls, some at home in the middle of the night, she said.
|
|
|
|
The hacker became good at cracking home answering-machine codes in the Southern
|
|
California area and possibly elsewhere, and changed several outgoing messages,
|
|
she said.
|
|
|
|
He also broke into the phone mail system at Sears administrative office in
|
|
Hayward, California and called workers there, she said. He even commandeered
|
|
one phone mail box and had other people leave messages.
|
|
|
|
He would also make anonymous calls or just let the phone ring in the middle of
|
|
the night and hang up. He phoned in bomb threats to his old high school and a
|
|
fast-food restaurant, Kammer said.
|
|
|
|
In all cases, he used a computer synthesizer to disguise his voice, Kammer
|
|
said. And he routed the calls in ways to make tracing impossible.
|
|
|
|
Then he started calling Cedar Rapids police emergency 911 lines, bombarding
|
|
dispatchers in the middle of the night with a series of computer-assisted calls
|
|
that would tie up the lines for hours. He would make small talk and ask about
|
|
the weather, said Cedar Rapids Detective Stan McCurg.
|
|
|
|
The boy could call up five or six other people, hold their lines captive and
|
|
route the calls to police, McCurg said.
|
|
|
|
"The scary thing is he had the capability to screw you over and you couldn't do
|
|
anything about it," McCurg said.
|
|
|
|
Police say the boy pulled the same trick on the Alameda County Sheriff's
|
|
office, San Francisco police and the Los Angeles County sheriff's office in
|
|
Crescrenta Valley.
|
|
|
|
The calls did not cause any safety problems, but there was always that
|
|
potential, Kammer said.
|
|
|
|
The big break came after the boy started calling Hayward police dispatchers in
|
|
late February. At first, the dispatchers played along, trying to find out who
|
|
and where the boy was while the boy gave false clues to throw them off.
|
|
|
|
"It was like, 'Catch me if you can,'" said Hayward Detective Dennis Kutsuris.
|
|
|
|
On March 2, dispatchers kept him talking from 8:10 a.m. to 1:20 p.m., long
|
|
enough to trace the call to his San Gabriel home. That night, police served a
|
|
search warrant and found the boy in bed talking on the phone using his
|
|
synthesizer.
|
|
|
|
The hacker was a lonely boy who dropped out of high school because it didn't
|
|
challenge him, but had passed his general education equivalency exam and was
|
|
taking courses from a community college, according to Kammer and Bullock.
|
|
|
|
Police seized the computer equipment, but formal charges were not filed until
|
|
last month because of the complex followup investigation, Kammer said.
|
|
|
|
Bullock said her company lost about $71,000 worth of calls, plus four angered
|
|
customers. Kammer said although police believe the loss could be "hundreds of
|
|
thousands" of dollars, they can only prove the loss of $2000 in court.
|
|
|
|
In the meantime, Hayward police received another call September 6th from a
|
|
computer-synthesized voice that they feel came from the boy. Kammer said a
|
|
relative had given the boy another computer, but they have no proof that he was
|
|
back to his old tricks.
|
|
|
|
Still, that incident, along with Cedar Rapids police reports will be used for a
|
|
probation report, Kammer said.
|
|
|
|
Bullock said the case was intriguing at first, but became frustrating as her
|
|
file grew to 2 feet thick.
|
|
|
|
"He had me by the guts," she said. "I was obsessed with finding him. He's a
|
|
typical 16-year old, but a little more menacing. He is pretty smart, but he
|
|
had absolutely nothing to do, but sit in his room with his computer equipment
|
|
and all he had to do was talk on the phone."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Just The FAX, Please November 6, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Noam Cohen (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
Teachers in rural Minnesota are ready to hear the most up-to-date version of
|
|
the oldest excuse in the book: "Honest, teach, the fax ate my homework."
|
|
|
|
Yes, the facsimile machine has gone to school in Sibley County, an agricultural
|
|
area 60 miles southwest of Minneapolis-St. Paul.
|
|
|
|
It is the last component to be installed in a four-year-old interactive
|
|
television system, or ITV, that brings advanced classroom instruction to small,
|
|
isolated areas through closed-circuit cable television.
|
|
|
|
In an education system where students adjust the contrast knobs to get a better
|
|
look at their calculus teacher, it is hardly surprising that these students are
|
|
the first in the country to use the fax to receive or hand in homework.
|
|
|
|
David Czech, the telecommunications director for the school district who is
|
|
responsible for its cable system education program, said that now, televised
|
|
teachers can even give surprise quizzes.
|
|
|
|
"The fax makes the classroom truly self-contained," said Kelly Smith, an
|
|
assistant principal at Gibbon-Fairfax-Winthrop High School, in Sibley County,
|
|
who taught mathematics for the ITV program before fax machines were introduced.
|
|
He said that when he taught he "had to rely on transportation in the district
|
|
and assignments always stacked up."
|
|
|
|
The fax machines, part of a special line made by Ricoh Corporation, transmit on
|
|
the same wiring that carries the television image to students. By using cable
|
|
instead of telephones, the district saves money on telephone costs and receives
|
|
quicker, cleaner copies.
|
|
|
|
The machines have a built-in copier, allowing one student to retrieve the
|
|
assignment and hand copies to classmates (usually no more than eight).
|
|
Students then use the machine to hand back work.
|
|
|
|
The Sibley County school district purchased and installed the fax machines with
|
|
the remaining $22,000 of a $150,000 state grant for ITV, according to Czech.
|
|
|
|
The machines, which school officials and a Ricoh spokeswoman say are the first
|
|
to be used in high school education, have generated interest elsewhere. Czech
|
|
says he has received calls from education officials in Hawaii, Wisconsin, Ohio
|
|
and other parts of Minnesota.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
MCI Sues AT&T -- Charges Deceptive Advertising October 12, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
"We Welcome The Opportunity To Discuss Who Is Misleading Whom..."
|
|
|
|
AT&T is using false and malicious advertising to protect its long-distance
|
|
business, MCI Communications Corporation charges in a lawsuit filed Tuesday,
|
|
October 10.
|
|
|
|
MCI, whose 10 percent market share makes it a distant number two to AT&T's 75
|
|
percent, says its giant rival is resorting to false claims in the hope of
|
|
stemming the loss of 100,000 customers to MCI each week.
|
|
|
|
AT&T, however, says it will defend itself with a countersuit. According to
|
|
AT&T spokesman Herb Linnen: "We welcome the opportunity to discuss who is
|
|
misleading whom... we have been quite concerned for some time now about MCI's
|
|
misleading print and broadcast advertising. We have taken our complaints
|
|
directly to MCI without success."
|
|
|
|
He added, "AT&T stands behind its advertising."
|
|
|
|
This latest litigation is simply the latest chapter in MCI's long and very
|
|
bitter battle with AT&T, which began in the 1970's when MCI successfully broke
|
|
AT&T's long-distance monopoly by offering "Execunet," the first long-distance
|
|
service bypassing AT&T offered to the public. The two companies have battled
|
|
each other at the Federal Communications Commission, which authorizes the rates
|
|
for each, ever since. This is the first time since AT&T's divestiture that the
|
|
arguments have been taken into a courtroom.
|
|
|
|
In an interview, MCI Chairman William McGowan said that "AT&T ads are sleazy,"
|
|
and he noted that the nine month old campaign grew increasingly negative,
|
|
forcing MCI into the courts.
|
|
|
|
AT&T responded saying that MCI is resorting to the courts since "...they just
|
|
can't hack it in the marketplace..."
|
|
|
|
McGowan responded that he believes a lawsuit is the only way to fight a company
|
|
which is spending two million dollars a day on advertising. He said, "Our
|
|
budget is big -- $51 million -- but how do you compete with someone who is nine
|
|
or ten times your size in advertising?"
|
|
|
|
MCI is still studying the impact of the latest round of AT&T ads, but McGowan
|
|
said he is sure MCI should have gained "a lot more" than 100,000 customers per
|
|
week if not for the advertising. The advertising has not affected professional
|
|
telecommunications managers, but does have an impact on individual and small
|
|
business customers, he said.
|
|
|
|
The MCI suit, filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, DC, alleges that
|
|
AT&T's advertising campaign "maliciously attacked MCI's honesty and the value
|
|
of MCI's products and service by falsely and deceptively representing that it
|
|
is superior to its competitors in general, and MCI in particular, in terms of
|
|
trustworthiness, quality and price.
|
|
|
|
MCI's suit cites AT&T ads that assert MCI's rates are cheaper than AT&T's only
|
|
when calls are made over 900 miles away and after 7 p.m. MCI's suit also takes
|
|
umbrage at AT&T's advertisement which states that MCI customers "might have
|
|
better luck calling Mars than trying to reach MCI representatives for an
|
|
explanation of their bills."
|
|
|
|
The ads, the suit charges, also claim non-AT&T companies provide slow telephone
|
|
connections; that other companies do not operate worldwide like AT&T; and that
|
|
competing 800, facsimile and WATS services are inferior.
|
|
|
|
The suit says AT&T "has wrongfully profited and MCI has been damaged by being
|
|
wrongfully thwarted from maximizing its sales potential."
|
|
|
|
The suit asks the court to order AT&T to discontinue advertising its services
|
|
for a period of one year and that advertisements after that time be approved by
|
|
the court and carry a notice to that effect in the advertisement itself.
|
|
Additionally, it asks for profits "wrongfully amassed" by AT&T on the sale of
|
|
its products and services during the past year, plus interest and legal fees.
|
|
|
|
McGowan was particularly irked by a claim that MCI's fax service has 57 percent
|
|
more problems than AT&T faxes. He said that number was arrived at by figuring
|
|
the difference between AT&T service -- with 4.9 percent errors -- and MCI, with
|
|
7.7 percent errors. Rather than reporting the 2.8 percent difference, the ad
|
|
claims a 57 percent higher rate -- the percentage increase between 4.9 percent
|
|
and 7.7 percent.
|
|
|
|
"Talk about misleading," McGowan said.
|
|
|
|
"Yes, talk about misleading," said Herb Linnen. "They've survived this long in
|
|
part based on the deceptions they've used on a public not well educated on the
|
|
technical aspects of telephony... we'll clear this up once and for all in court
|
|
with a countersuit."
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Unleashing Ma Bell October 24, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Peter Passell (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
Could AT&T's rivals in long-distance phone
|
|
service survive no-holds-barred competition?
|
|
|
|
Since the breakup of the telephone monopoly in 1984, the Federal Communications
|
|
Commission has kept AT&T on a short leash to prevent the giant company from
|
|
chewing up the "small fry."
|
|
|
|
But now two of those small fry have grown into profitable multibillion-dollar
|
|
corporations, and AT&T is asking the regulators for the freedom to fight for
|
|
market share. If the FCC agrees -- a crucial decision could come as early as
|
|
Thursday -- high-volume telephone users are likely to reap a bonanza from lower
|
|
prices.
|
|
|
|
When the Bell System was dismembered, analysts generally agreed that rivals
|
|
would need a lot of help from Washington to gain a secure foothold in the
|
|
long-distance market dominated by the ultimate name-brand company.
|
|
|
|
The analysts were right: After AT&T's competitors lost their discounts on
|
|
regulated charges for hookups to local telephone exchanges, all of them took a
|
|
financial bath and some went broke.
|
|
|
|
But in the ensuing consolidation, a few companies emerged with both the
|
|
technical capacity to match AT&T's service and the marketing savvy to sell
|
|
themselves to once-skeptical consumers.
|
|
|
|
MCI Communications now has 12 percent of the long-distance market and in the
|
|
last year has grown four times as fast as AT&T.
|
|
|
|
US Sprint Communications, with its much-ballyhooed all-fiber-optic system, has
|
|
an 8 percent share and is the principal carrier for 117 of America's 800
|
|
largest companies.
|
|
|
|
Joel Gross, a communications analyst at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, believes
|
|
a fourth network, assembled from a half-dozen smaller companies, will soon
|
|
emerge.
|
|
|
|
One reason AT&T's rivals have managed to do so well in the last few years is
|
|
continuing regulatory discrimination.
|
|
|
|
Last summer, the FCC switched AT&T from traditional fair-rate-of-return
|
|
regulation to a more flexible "price-cap" system that gives the company
|
|
discretion to adjust individual rates within a narrow price band.
|
|
|
|
But neither the old price regulations nor the new ones apply to MCI, US Sprint
|
|
and other smaller long-distance companies. And they have taken advantage of
|
|
AT&T's inability to cut prices, offering volume discounts where AT&T is most
|
|
vulnerable to customer defections.
|
|
|
|
AT&T has fought back, convincing the FCC to allow it fast-track approval for
|
|
rate concessions needed to hang onto its biggest customers.
|
|
|
|
And it is now asking the commission for broad discretion to cut rates by more
|
|
than the 5 percent permitted under the price-cap rule. If the FCC agrees, it
|
|
is a sure bet that AT&T will price aggressively, accepting sharp reductions in
|
|
its fat profit margins to check its loss of market share.
|
|
|
|
It is obvious why MCI and US Sprint are unhappy at the prospect of an AT&T
|
|
unleashed. But it is not so easy to see how the public would lose from the
|
|
ensuing donnybrook.
|
|
|
|
One worry is that AT&T would slash prices by enough to drive rivals out of
|
|
business, and then be free to price-gouge.
|
|
|
|
But as Peter Pitsch, a former FCC staff member who now consults for AT&T points
|
|
out, such "predatory" pricing is only a plausible option if the predator can
|
|
hope to make up the inevitable short-term losses with long-term monopoly gains.
|
|
And two considerations make such a calculation unlikely.
|
|
|
|
Once the cables have been laid and the switches installed, it costs very little
|
|
to operate a long-distance phone system. Thus even if AT&T were able to drive
|
|
MCI and US Sprint into bankruptcy, their creditors would find it advantageous
|
|
to continue to sell long-distance services.
|
|
|
|
And if AT&T somehow did manage to shut down its rivals, the FCC would hardly be
|
|
likely to reward it with permission to charge monopoly prices.
|
|
|
|
Another concern is that price-cutting would make long-distance service
|
|
unprofitable for all, discouraging further investment.
|
|
|
|
That, however, might not be such a bad thing. Losses are capitalism's way of
|
|
telling businesses to slow down: There is enormous overcapacity in
|
|
long-distance communications and more investment anytime soon is unlikely to be
|
|
productive.
|
|
|
|
Does all this mean the commission will hang tough and permit AT&T to flex its
|
|
competitive muscles? A year ago, when the FCC was dominated by Reagan-appointed
|
|
free marketers, the answer would have been easy.
|
|
|
|
Today, with a Bush-appointed majority led by a chairman, Alfred Sikes, of less
|
|
certain ideological bent, it is hard to say.
|
|
|
|
MCI and US Sprint have managed to squeeze a lot of regulatory mileage out of
|
|
their underdog status, and certainly will not give up the privileges that go
|
|
along without a fight.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
AT&T Strikes Back: Countersues MCI October 27, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
AT&T struck back on Thursday, October 27 at advertising claims made by MCI
|
|
Communications Corporation and received two rulings from the Federal
|
|
Communications Commission affecting regulation of its long distance services.
|
|
|
|
AT&T said in a countersuit against MCI filed in Washington, DC that MCI was
|
|
misleading consumers through false and deceptive advertising in its business
|
|
and residential long distance service. AT&T's filing denied similar
|
|
allegations made by MCI in a suit filed October 10.
|
|
|
|
Victor Pelson, AT&T group executive, said MCI unfairly compared its discount
|
|
service with AT&T's regular long distance service rather than its discount
|
|
service. Pelson also denied claims that the quality of MCI voice service was
|
|
superior to AT&T's, or that its facsimile service featured fewer garbled
|
|
transmissions than AT&T's.
|
|
|
|
"We intend to clarify any misconceptions in the market," said Merrill Tutton,
|
|
AT&T Vice President for consumer marketing.
|
|
|
|
MCI spokeswoman Kathleen Keegan Thursday responded that, "our ad claims are
|
|
accurate... We will soon be filing a motion for a preliminary injunction to
|
|
cause AT&T to cease its advertising campaign."
|
|
|
|
Also on Thursday, the Federal Communications Commission upheld a decision
|
|
giving AT&T greater freedom to compete for big corporate customers but rejected
|
|
another pricing plan by AT&T.
|
|
|
|
The FCC voted unanimously to uphold a pricing plan known as Tariff 12, which
|
|
lets AT&T offer corporate customers a package of communications services. AT&T
|
|
contends it is at a disadvantage because MCI does not have to submit detailed
|
|
filings to the FCC before they can serve customers. MCI had challenged Tariff
|
|
12, asking the FCC to overrule it and prohibit AT&T from offering full service
|
|
communications packages to its customers.
|
|
|
|
In the second item, the FCC declared unlawful a pricing plan known as Tariff
|
|
15, that AT&T had applied solely to a single customer, the Holiday Corporation,
|
|
owner of the largest hotel chain in the United States. The FCC said AT&T could
|
|
no longer justify the special rates to a single customer to meet competition
|
|
when MCI was making the same service available to customers generally.
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #11 of 12
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
|
|
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXIX/Part 2 PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN November 17, 1989 PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
|
|
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
Offensive Message Flashes At Busy City Corner October 25, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Linda Wheeler (Washington Post)
|
|
|
|
An offensive message that mystified the owners of an electronic information
|
|
board was flashed Monday, October 23 at Connecticut Avenue and L Street NW, one
|
|
of the city's (Washington DC) busiest intersections.
|
|
|
|
A Georgetown University law student, Craig Dean, said he saw the message;
|
|
|
|
"HELP STAMP OUT A.I.D.S. NOW: KILL ALL QUEERS AND JUNKIES"
|
|
|
|
It flashed five times in 25 minutes. Minutes after seeing the message, he
|
|
called the city Human Rights Office and the Washington Blade, a gay community
|
|
newspaper.
|
|
|
|
Doug Hinckle, a staff photographer for the Blade, saw the message flash once
|
|
and photographed it.
|
|
|
|
Judith Miller, president of Miller Companies, which own the building at 1101
|
|
Connecticut Avenue NW and the message board, said she did not know how the
|
|
statement got onto the board. She refused to believe it had appeared until she
|
|
was shown of the photographs.
|
|
|
|
Her company has complete control of the board and does not accept any paid
|
|
messages or advertisements, Miller said. "I would never do anything like
|
|
that," she said. "There is no way I would allow such a statement to appear."
|
|
|
|
Yesterday, Keller, a five-year employee of the Miller Companies, said he did
|
|
not write the statement and does now know how it became part of the normal flow
|
|
of headline news.
|
|
|
|
Miller said she believes her computer system may have a "virus" and will have
|
|
experts search to find where the unauthorized statement originated. "How
|
|
absolutely awful," she said of the message.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
"WANK" Worm On SPAN Network October 17, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
>From The Computer Emergency Response Team
|
|
|
|
On October 16, the CERT received word from SPAN network control that a worm was
|
|
attacking SPAN VAX/VMS systems. This worm affects only DEC VMS systems and is
|
|
propagated via DECnet protocols, not TCP/IP protocols. If a VMS system had
|
|
other network connections, the worm was not programmed to take advantage of
|
|
those connections. The worm is very similar to last year's HI.COM (or Father
|
|
Christmas) worm.
|
|
|
|
This is NOT A PRANK. Serious security holes are left open by this worm. The
|
|
worm takes advantage of poor password management, modifies .com files, creates
|
|
a new account, and spreads to other systems via DECnet.
|
|
|
|
It is also important to understand that someone in the future could launch this
|
|
worm on any DECnet based network. Many copies of the virus have been mailed
|
|
around. Anyone running a DECnet network should be warned.
|
|
|
|
R. Kevin Oberman from Lawrence Livermore National Labs reports:
|
|
|
|
"This is a mean bug to kill and could have done a lot of damage.
|
|
Since it notifies (by mail) someone of each successful penetration
|
|
and leaves a trapdoor (the FIELD account), just killing the bug is
|
|
not adequate. You must go in an make sure all accounts have
|
|
passwords and that the passwords are not the same as the account
|
|
name."
|
|
|
|
The CERT/CC also suggests checking every .com file on the system. The worm
|
|
appends code to .com files which will reopen a security hole everytime the
|
|
program is executed.
|
|
|
|
An analysis of the worm appears below and is provided by R. Kevin Oberman of
|
|
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Included with the analysis is a DCL
|
|
program that will block the current version of the worm. At least two versions
|
|
of this worm exist and more may be created. This program should give you
|
|
enough time to close up obvious security holes.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Report on the W.COM worm.
|
|
R. Kevin Oberman
|
|
Engineering Department
|
|
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
|
|
October 16, 1989
|
|
|
|
The following describes the action of the W.COM worm (currently based on the
|
|
examination of the first two incarnations). The replication technique causes
|
|
the code to be modified slightly which indicates the source of the attack and
|
|
learned information.
|
|
|
|
All analysis was done with more haste than I care for, but I believe I have all
|
|
of the basic facts correct.
|
|
|
|
Here is a description of the program:
|
|
|
|
1. The program assures that it is working in a directory to which the owner
|
|
(itself) has full access (Read, Write,Execute, and Delete).
|
|
|
|
2. The program checks to see if another copy is still running. It looks for a
|
|
process with the first 5 characters of "NETW_". If such is found, it
|
|
deletes itself (the file) and stops its process.
|
|
|
|
Note: A quick check for infection is to look for a process name starting
|
|
with "NETW_". This may be done with a SHOW PROCESS command.
|
|
|
|
3. The program then changes the default DECNET account password to a random
|
|
string of at least 12 characters.
|
|
|
|
4. Information on the password used to access the system is mailed to the user
|
|
GEMPAK on SPAN node 6.59. Some versions may have a different address.
|
|
|
|
5. The process changes its name to "NETW_" followed by a random number.
|
|
|
|
6. It then checks to see if it has SYSNAM priv. If so, it defines the system
|
|
announcement message to be the banner in the program:
|
|
|
|
W O R M S A G A I N S T N U C L E A R K I L L E R S
|
|
_______________________________________________________________
|
|
\__ ____________ _____ ________ ____ ____ __ _____/
|
|
\ \ \ /\ / / / /\ \ | \ \ | | | | / / /
|
|
\ \ \ / \ / / / /__\ \ | |\ \ | | | |/ / /
|
|
\ \ \/ /\ \/ / / ______ \ | | \ \| | | |\ \ /
|
|
\_\ /__\ /____/ /______\ \____| |__\ | |____| |_\ \_/
|
|
\___________________________________________________/
|
|
\ /
|
|
\ Your System Has Been Officically WANKed /
|
|
\_____________________________________________/
|
|
|
|
You talk of times of peace for all, and then prepare for war.
|
|
|
|
7. If it has SYSPRV, it disables mail to the SYSTEM account.
|
|
|
|
8. If it has SYSPRV, it modifies the system login command procedure to
|
|
APPEAR to delete all of a user's file. (It really does nothing.)
|
|
|
|
9. The program then scans the accounts logical name table for command
|
|
procedures and tries to modify the FIELD account to a known password with
|
|
login form any source and all privs. This is a primitive virus, but very
|
|
effective IF it should get into a privileged account.
|
|
|
|
10. It proceeds to attempt to access other systems by picking node numbers at
|
|
random. It then used PHONE to get a list of active users on the remote
|
|
system. It proceeds to irritate them by using PHONE to ring them.
|
|
|
|
11. The program then tries to access the RIGHTSLIST file and attempts to access
|
|
some remote system using the users found and a list of "standard" users
|
|
included with the worm. It looks for passwords which are the same as that
|
|
of the account or are blank. It records all such accounts.
|
|
|
|
12. It looks for an account that has access to SYSUAF.DAT.
|
|
|
|
13. If a priv. account is found, the program is copied to that account and
|
|
started. If no priv account was found, it is copied to other accounts
|
|
found on the random system.
|
|
|
|
14. As soon as it finishes with a system, it picks another random system and
|
|
repeats (forever).
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Computer Network At NASA Attacked By Rogue Program October 18, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by John Markoff (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
A rogue computer program attacked a worldwide network of the National
|
|
Aeronautics and Space Administration on Monday, October 16, inflicting no
|
|
damage but forcing officials to disconnect the network from sensitive military
|
|
and space systems.
|
|
|
|
Security experts speculated that the program was written by someone who opposed
|
|
Tuesday's (October 17) scheduled launching of the space shuttle Atlantis, which
|
|
was to carry a nuclear-powered satellite into orbit. The launching was
|
|
postponed because of bad weather.
|
|
|
|
NASA officials said the rogue program attacked an academic and research
|
|
network, the Space Physics Analysis Network, which is not used for space
|
|
shuttle mission control.
|
|
|
|
But a NASA official said the agency felt compelled to disconnect several links
|
|
between the network and an operational space shuttle network as a precaution.
|
|
|
|
Computer security experts at several national laboratories said the Department
|
|
of Defense had also severed the connection between commercial and research
|
|
networks and nonclassified network that connects United States military
|
|
installations and contractors around the world.
|
|
|
|
The program was designed to copy itself secretly and send unwanted, sometimes
|
|
vulgar messages to users of the NASA network. It also tricks users into
|
|
thinking that data have been destroyed, although no data are damaged.
|
|
|
|
Like similar programs that have been sent into computer networks by pranksters
|
|
and saboteurs, it exploited a flaw in the security system designed to protect
|
|
the computers on the network.
|
|
|
|
Computer security experts said Tuesday that they knew of about 60 computers
|
|
that had been affected by the program. A NASA spokesman said the program was
|
|
still spreading.
|
|
|
|
While the network is widely available to academic researchers with personal
|
|
computers, the rogue program was designed to attack only 6,000 computers
|
|
manufactured by the Digital Equipment Corporation.
|
|
|
|
The flaw in the security of the Digital Equipment computers had been widely
|
|
publicized over a year ago even before a similar rogue program jammed a group
|
|
of interconnected international networks known as the Internet. NASA officials
|
|
said the program was only able to attack computers in which the necessary steps
|
|
had not been taken to correct the flaw.
|
|
|
|
Among the messages the program displayed on all infected computers was one that
|
|
read: "Worms Against Nuclear Killers. You talk of times of peace for all, and
|
|
then prepare for war."
|
|
|
|
Computer scientists call this kind of program a worm, a reference to a program
|
|
first described in the novel "Shockwave Rider" by a science fiction writer,
|
|
John Brunner.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Virus Controversies Again October 6, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by John Markoff (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
"The issue has also sparked interest among computer scientists."
|
|
|
|
Harold Highland, editor of Computers & Security, a professional journal, said
|
|
he had received two research papers describing how to create such anti-virus
|
|
programs.
|
|
|
|
He has not decided whether to publish them.
|
|
|
|
"No one has raised the obvious ethical questions," he added. "I would hate to
|
|
see a virus released to fight viruses. Until it's tested you don't know
|
|
whether it's going to do more damage than the program it is designed to fight."
|
|
|
|
A number of these programs have already been written, computer researchers
|
|
said.
|
|
|
|
The one that destroyed the data on business and governmental personal computers
|
|
in the United States was reportedly designed by a Venezuelan programmer. How
|
|
many computers were affected and where they were is unclear.
|
|
|
|
That program is called Den Zuk, or Search. It was intended to attack a
|
|
destructive program known as the Brain Virus that was distributed in 1986 by
|
|
two brothers who owned a small computer store in Pakistan.
|
|
|
|
Errors in the design of the program illustrate the potential danger of such
|
|
viruses, critics say. Fridrik Skulason, a microcomputer specialist at the
|
|
University of Iceland in Reykjavik, who has disassembled the program, said the
|
|
author of Den Zuk had failed to take into account the different capacities of
|
|
disks available for IBM and IBM-compatible machines.
|
|
|
|
Because of that simple error, when the program infects a higher-capacity disk
|
|
it destroys data.
|
|
|
|
"They probably wrote with good intention," he said. "The only problem is that
|
|
the programmers were not able to do their job correctly."
|
|
|
|
At least two other anti-viral viruses have already been devised, said Russell
|
|
Brand, a computer security researcher at Lawrence Livermore.
|
|
|
|
He said programmers at one company, which he would not identify, had written
|
|
the programs to combat the Scores virus, a program that infected Macintosh
|
|
computers last year.
|
|
|
|
He added that even though the programs were designed so they could not go
|
|
beyond the company's own computers, there had been a heated debate over whether
|
|
to deploy the programs. He said he did not know how it was decided.
|
|
|
|
Brand said a group of computer researchers he works with at Lawrence Livermore
|
|
had written several self-replicating programs after the appearance of the rogue
|
|
program that Morris of Cornell is accused of writing. But he added that the
|
|
group had never given permission to release the programs.
|
|
|
|
The debate over vigilante viruses is part of a broader discussion now taking
|
|
place among some computer researchers and programmers over what is being termed
|
|
"forbidden knowledge."
|
|
|
|
"There are ethical questions any time you send something out there that may
|
|
find itself invited on to somebody else's computer," said Pamela Kane, author
|
|
of a book on computer virus protection.
|
|
|
|
In California this month a group of computer hackers plans to hold a forum on
|
|
"forbidden knowledge in a technological society."
|
|
|
|
While the role of the computer hacker has been viewed as mischievous in a
|
|
negative way, hackers have consistently played a role as innovators, said Lee
|
|
Felsenstein, a Berkeley, California, computer expert who designed several early
|
|
personal computers.
|
|
|
|
"Computer hacking was originally a response to the perception of a priesthood's
|
|
control over immensely powerful technological resources," he said. "Informed
|
|
individuals were able to break the power of this priesthood through gaining and
|
|
spreading the body of forbidden knowledge."
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Dreaded Personal Computer Virus May Be Only A Cold October 6, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by Don Clark (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
It won't be much of a plague. But the hysteria anticipating it has been
|
|
world-class.
|
|
|
|
Those observations come from computer-security experts as they await Datacrime,
|
|
a virus program set to attack IBM-compatible personal computers starting
|
|
Thursday, October 12, 1989.
|
|
|
|
Analyses of the program, also called the Columbus Day Virus, show that it is
|
|
indeed destructive. It just hasn't spread very far.
|
|
|
|
"It's going to be the week of the non-event," predicted John McAfee, a Santa
|
|
Clara, California, consultant who serves as chairman of the Computer Virus
|
|
Industry Association. "You have more chance of being hit by a meteor than
|
|
getting this virus."
|
|
|
|
McAfee Associates, which acts as a clearinghouse for virus information, has
|
|
received just seven confirmed reports of Datacrime in six months -- compared
|
|
with three to 50 reports per day about another virus that originated in Israel
|
|
in 1987. He thinks only 50 copies of Datacrime exist, and 40 of those are in
|
|
the hands of researchers.
|
|
|
|
"It's gotten more publicity than it deserves," agreed Russell Brand, another
|
|
virus expert, who advises Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
|
|
|
|
Brand expects to find just 20 copies among the 75,000 computers he monitors at
|
|
1,000 sites.
|
|
|
|
Such projections are disputed by some. They are based on how often Datacrime
|
|
has been detected by computer users using special software that scans their
|
|
systems for the virus.
|
|
|
|
The virus could have infected many users who have not bothered to scan their
|
|
systems, McAfee concedes.
|
|
|
|
Fears have been whipped up by the news media and computer managers at companies
|
|
and government agencies. Companies promoting products to eradicate viruses
|
|
also have played a role -- understandably.
|
|
|
|
Staid IBM Corporation this week took the unusual step of offering a program
|
|
that checks systems for viruses. The company hasn't detected the virus in its
|
|
own operations, but concedes that many customers are worried. "They are asking
|
|
us how we protect our software-development operations from viruses," said Bill
|
|
Vance, who was appointed a year ago as IBM's director of secure systems.
|
|
|
|
Bank of America, a huge IBM customer with 15,000 PCs, recently put out a
|
|
company-wide notice advising users to make backup copies of their computer data
|
|
by Wednesday, the day before the virus is programmed to strike.
|
|
|
|
Three different government agencies have panicked and sent out multiple
|
|
versions of incorrect advice," Brand said.
|
|
|
|
Worried calls have deluged McAfee's office, which has just three lines for
|
|
computer communications and three for voice.
|
|
|
|
"We put the phone down and it's 30 seconds before it rings again," he said.
|
|
|
|
Computer sleuths detected Datacrime -- and have detected other viruses -- by
|
|
looking for changes in the size of data files and in the way programs operate.
|
|
The underlying code used to write the program, once disassembled by experts,
|
|
indicates when the program will activate itself.
|
|
|
|
The identity of Datacrime's author isn't known, although some reports have
|
|
linked the virus to an anonymous hacker in Austria. It first began showing up
|
|
in March, McAfee said, and gained notoriety after it was discussed at the
|
|
midsummer Galactic Hackers Conference in Amsterdam.
|
|
|
|
It appears to be relatively prevalent in the Netherlands and other European
|
|
countries. Dutch computer users have reportedly bought hundreds of programs
|
|
that are said to detect and destroy the program.
|
|
|
|
Like other viruses, Datacrime rides along with innocuous programs when they are
|
|
exchanged over a computer network or computer bulletin board or through
|
|
exchange of infected disks. Unlike many viruses, it has been designed to later
|
|
insert itself in data files that users don't often examine.
|
|
|
|
If one of the programs is executed after the target date, Datacrime proceeds
|
|
with its dirty work -- destroying the directory used to keep track of files on
|
|
a computer's hard disk. The crime is analogous to destroying a card file in
|
|
the library.
|
|
|
|
"By destroying this one table you can't find where any of your data is," said
|
|
Brand.
|
|
|
|
But no one should really be in a fix if he makes backup copies of data, experts
|
|
say. The data, once safely stored on another disk drive or on magnetic tape,
|
|
can be restored by computer professionals even if the virus has infected the
|
|
backup files.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
"Vaccines" To Hunt Down Rogue Programs October 6, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by John Markoff (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
Ever since a rogue program created by a graduate student jammed a nationwide
|
|
computer network last year, the rapid spread of such disruptive software, often
|
|
known as viruses, has caused growing alarm among computer users.
|
|
|
|
Now, to fight fire with fire, some companies, individuals and even a government
|
|
research laboratory are crafting a new breed of what have been called
|
|
anti-viruses to hunt down intruders.
|
|
|
|
The trouble is, some computer security experts say, the problem of viruses may
|
|
be exaggerated -- and the new crime fighter may do even more damage than the
|
|
criminal.
|
|
|
|
Much like an infection, a well-intended but badly designed program to stop
|
|
viruses can run amok, knocking out thousands of computers or destroying vast
|
|
amounts of data.
|
|
|
|
Indeed, one of the anti-virus programs intended to defeat a known virus has
|
|
already destroyed data on business and governmental personal computers in the
|
|
United States.
|
|
|
|
The issue has touched off a heated debate over whether the creation of these
|
|
high-technology vigilantes is a responsible action. "The risks are just
|
|
enormous," said Peter Neumann, a computer security expert at SRI International,
|
|
a technology research center in Menlo Park, California. "It's an unbelievably
|
|
unsafe thing to do."
|
|
|
|
But Chris Traynor, a programmer at Divine Axis, a software development company
|
|
in Yonkers, New York, argues that anti-virus programs can be contained so that
|
|
they do not spread out of control, reaching and possibly damaging data in other
|
|
computers. His company is now trying to design such a program.
|
|
|
|
Computer researchers at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, a federal weapons
|
|
center in Livermore, California, have designed similar programs that patrol
|
|
computer networks in search of breaches through which viruses could enter the
|
|
system.
|
|
|
|
Viruses, which got their name because they mimic in the computer world the
|
|
behavior of biological viruses, are programs, or sets of instructions, that can
|
|
secretly be spread among computers.
|
|
|
|
Viruses can travel either over a computer network or on an infected disk passed
|
|
by hand between computer users.
|
|
|
|
Once the infection has spread, the virus might do something as benign as
|
|
displaying a simple message on a computer screen or as destructive as erasing
|
|
the data on an entire disk.
|
|
|
|
Computer security experts have been concerned for several years by the
|
|
emergence of vandals and mischief makers who deliberately plant the destructive
|
|
programs.
|
|
|
|
But in recent weeks international alarm has reached new heights as rumors have
|
|
spread that a virus program will destroy data on thousands of computers this
|
|
month, on Friday the 13th.
|
|
|
|
Computer security researchers said the virus, known as Datacrime, was one of at
|
|
least three clandestine programs with internal clocks set to destroy data on
|
|
that date.
|
|
|
|
As is usually the case, no one knows who wrote the program, but U.S. military
|
|
officials have mentioned as possible suspects a European group linked to West
|
|
German terrorists and a Norwegian group displeased with the fame of Christopher
|
|
Columbus, who is honored next week.
|
|
|
|
Largely in response to customer concerns, IBM said on Monday that it was
|
|
offering programs for its personal computers that would scan for viruses.
|
|
|
|
But several computer security experts say public fears are largely exaggerated.
|
|
|
|
They note that there have been fewer than a dozen reported appearances of the
|
|
Datacrime virus in the United States, and contend that the whole issue is
|
|
overblown.
|
|
|
|
Still, in the personal computer world, where many users have little knowledge
|
|
of the technical workings of their machines, concern over computer viruses has
|
|
become widespread.
|
|
|
|
The issue got the most attention last November, when, it is charged, Robert
|
|
Morris, a graduate student at Cornell, unleashed a rogue program that because
|
|
of a small programming error, ran wildly out of control, copying itself
|
|
hundreds of times on thousands of computers, overloading a national network,
|
|
|
|
As a result of the mounting concern, a new industry has blossomed offering
|
|
users protective programs known as vaccines, or anti-viral software.
|
|
|
|
These programs either alert users that a virus is attempting to tamper with
|
|
their computer or scan a computer disk and erase any rogue program that is
|
|
detected.
|
|
|
|
These conventional programs do not automatically migrate from computer to
|
|
computer, but now some experts are exploring fashioning programs that graft the
|
|
powers of the vaccines onto viruses in order to pursue and stop them wherever
|
|
they go.
|
|
|
|
Designing and spreading such programs was proposed in August by several people
|
|
attending an international gathering of computer hobbyists, or "hackers," in
|
|
Amsterdam.
|
|
|
|
They suggested that it was a good way for members of the computer underground
|
|
to make a positive contribution.
|
|
|
|
But many researchers believe the idea is dangerously flawed because of the
|
|
possibility of accidentally doing great damage.
|
|
|
|
Some computer security researchers worry that writing an infectious program to
|
|
stop viruses may be taken as an intellectual challenge by hackers who are well
|
|
meaning but do not grasp what problems they could create.
|
|
|
|
"One of the questions that the hacker community is now addressing is what you
|
|
do about young hackers," said Stewart Brand, a writer in Sausalito, California,
|
|
who is working on a book on outlaw cultures and high technology.
|
|
|
|
"They don't have a sense of responsibility; they have a sense of curiosity.
|
|
These are deliciously debatable issues, and I don't see them going away."
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Three, Issue 29, File #12 of 12
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
|
|
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXIX/Part 3 PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN November 17, 1989 PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
|
|
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Cuckoo's Egg October 18, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
by By Christopher Lehmann-Haupt (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
"Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage"
|
|
|
|
It all begins with a 75-cent discrepancy in the computer complex's accounting
|
|
system. Clifford Stoll, the new man in the office, is assigned to reconcile
|
|
the shortfall.
|
|
|
|
Although an astronomer by training, Stoll has recently seen his grant money run
|
|
dry and so has been transferred from the Keck Observatory at the Lawrence
|
|
Berkeley Lab down to the computer center in the basement of the same building.
|
|
No wizard at computers, he thinks he can pick things up fast enough to get by.
|
|
So he sets out to look for the 75 cents.
|
|
|
|
He quickly discovers that no glitch in the accounting programs has occurred.
|
|
No, what seems to have happened is that an unfamiliar user named Hunter briefly
|
|
logged on to the system, burning up 75-cents worth of time. Since there is no
|
|
account record for Hunter, Stoll erases him from the system. The problem is
|
|
solved, or so it seems.
|
|
|
|
But almost immediately, an operator from Maryland on the same network that the
|
|
Lawrence Berkeley Lab uses complains that someone from Stoll's lab is trying to
|
|
break into his computer. When Stoll checks the time of the attempt, he
|
|
discovers that the account of someone named Joe Sventek, who is known to be in
|
|
England for the year, has been used. So he guesses that the user calling
|
|
himself Hunter has somehow activated Sventek's account. But who is this hacker
|
|
(as Stoll begins to refer to him), where is he operating from and how is he
|
|
getting into the system?
|
|
|
|
Next Stoll sets up systems to alert him every time the hacker comes on line and
|
|
monitor his activities without his being aware of it. He watches as the hacker
|
|
tries to lay cuckoo's eggs in the system's nest, by which of course he means
|
|
programs for other users to feed -- for instance, a program that could decoy
|
|
other users into giving the hacker their secret passwords. He watches as the
|
|
hacker invades other computer systems on the networks the Lawrence Berkeley Lab
|
|
employs, some of them belonging to military installations and contractors.
|
|
|
|
The mystery grows. Telephone traces gradually establish that the hacker is not
|
|
a local operator, is not on the West Coast and may not even be in North
|
|
America. But of the various three-letter organizations that Stoll appeals to
|
|
for help -- among them the FBI, the CIA and even the National Security Agency
|
|
-- none will investigate, at least in an official capacity.
|
|
|
|
By now a reader is so wrapped up in Stoll's breezily written account of his
|
|
true adventure in "The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of
|
|
Computer Espionage" that he is happy to overlook certain drawbacks in the
|
|
narrative -- most conspicuously the lack of consistently lucid technical talk
|
|
and the author's dithering over whether appealing for help to the likes of the
|
|
FBI and CIA is selling out to the enemy, a qualm left over from the 1960s
|
|
mentality that still afflicts him and his friends.
|
|
|
|
The only truly annoying aspect of the book is that an endpaper diagram gives
|
|
away the location of the computer spy. Readers are advised not to look at the
|
|
endpapers, which do little but spoil the suspense.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately, the narrative, too, eventually helps dissipate the story's
|
|
tension. The officials who finally take over the hunt from Stoll are so
|
|
reluctant to tell him what is happening that all the suspense he has created
|
|
simply evaporates. Even Stoll seems to lose interest in the identity of his
|
|
mysterious antagonist, judging by the limp and haphazard way he finally does
|
|
give us the news.
|
|
|
|
Instead of building his story, he allows himself to be distracted by a banal
|
|
domestic drama centering on his decision to stop being afraid of emotional
|
|
commitment and marry the woman he has been living with for seven years. And he
|
|
continues limply to debate the need of the state to defend the security of
|
|
communications networks against wanton vandalism, as if there were room for
|
|
serious discussion of the question.
|
|
|
|
Still, nothing can expunge the excitement of the first two-thirds of "The
|
|
Cuckoo's Egg," particularly those moments when the author hears his portable
|
|
beeper going off and bicycles to his lab to read the latest printout of the
|
|
hacker's activities.
|
|
|
|
Nothing can relieve our discouragement at the bureaucratic runaround that Stoll
|
|
got. Had a million dollars worth of damage occurred? the FBI kept asking him.
|
|
|
|
"Well, not exactly," he would reply. Then there was nothing the FBI could do.
|
|
|
|
And so it dishearteningly went, although some points should be conceded.
|
|
Certain individuals in government agencies were extremely helpful to Stoll.
|
|
|
|
The entire issue of computer-network security was after all a new and
|
|
unexplored field. And the agencies that the author was asking for help
|
|
probably knew more about the security threat than they were willing to tell
|
|
him.
|
|
|
|
Finally, nothing can diminish the sense of the strange new world Stoll has
|
|
evoked in "The Cuckoo's Egg" -- a world in which trust and open communication
|
|
will determine the quality of the future. Whether such values will prevail
|
|
will prove a drama of momentous significance. Even if this book finally
|
|
dissipates that drama, its very presence makes these pages worth dipping into.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Digital's Hip To The Standards Thing October 10, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
NEW YORK -- During a creative session at a major public relations firm to
|
|
formulate a new corporate message for Digital Equipment Corporation that
|
|
reflects the company's new direction promoting and supporting computing
|
|
industry standards, the shopworn phrase "Digital has it now" was replaced by a
|
|
new tag line that is more contemporary and tied to DEC's adherence to
|
|
standards.
|
|
|
|
DECrap by Rapmaster Ken
|
|
"Digital's Hip to the Standards Thing"
|
|
|
|
|
|
I heard some news just the other day
|
|
It sounded kinda strange and I said, "No way!"
|
|
But I heard it again from another source
|
|
It mighta made sense and I said, "Of course!"
|
|
|
|
Now computer biz has a lotta confusion
|
|
'Cause operating systems abound in profusion.
|
|
But there's a whole new wave in data processing
|
|
Now that Digital's hip to the standards thing.
|
|
|
|
(chorus)
|
|
Digital's hip to the standards thing!
|
|
Digital's hip to the standards thing!
|
|
|
|
Way back when a long time ago
|
|
IBM owned the whole show.
|
|
But other dudes saw this proprietary mess
|
|
And formed committees to find out what's best.
|
|
|
|
Some went their own way and built their own software
|
|
But users were perturbed, "It's just a different nightmare."
|
|
So they got together to look over the picks
|
|
Put down their money on good 'ol UNIX
|
|
|
|
(chorus)
|
|
Digital's hip to the standards thing!
|
|
Digital's hip to the standards thing!
|
|
|
|
Now Digital always kept their users in mind
|
|
And pushed VMS as the best of the kind.
|
|
A lotta folks agreed but kept askin' for
|
|
UNIX support, "We gotta have more!"
|
|
|
|
Soon DEC saw the light and decided to give
|
|
UNIX to the masses, (sorta live and let live).
|
|
So DEC's ridin' the wave ahead of the rest
|
|
On a backplane boogie board on top of the crest.
|
|
|
|
No doubt about it DEC's sprouted its wings
|
|
'Cause Digital's hip to the standards thing.
|
|
|
|
(chorus)
|
|
Digital's hip to the standards thing!
|
|
Digital's hip to the standards thing!
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Hacker Publications November 12, 1989
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Here is a general overview of a pair of the more popular hardcopy hacker
|
|
magazines.
|
|
|
|
2600 Magazine: The Hacker Quarterly
|
|
Volume Six, Number Three
|
|
Autumn, 1989
|
|
|
|
The cover on this issue features a scene from the Galactic Hackers Convention
|
|
that took place in Amsterdam, Switzerland, last August. Although it is not
|
|
explicitly stated or implied, it would appear that the comic illustration
|
|
portrays the hacker "Shatter" being run over by a bus bearing the label "2600
|
|
XPRESS."
|
|
|
|
The articles featured in this issue include:
|
|
|
|
The Nynex Strike
|
|
Grade "A" Hacking: What Is UAPC? by The Plague
|
|
Galactic Hacker Party (GHP)
|
|
British Telecom's Guilty Conscience
|
|
The Death Of COSMOS?
|
|
What's Going On
|
|
- Technological Marvels
|
|
o U.S. Sprint Billing Problems
|
|
o U.S. Sprint Voicecards
|
|
o Other Voiceprints
|
|
o Surveillance
|
|
- Hacker Spies (Chaos Computer Club, KGB Hackers discussed)
|
|
- Nynex Bigotry (Gay And Lesbian Organizations)
|
|
- Dial-It News (Pacific Bell 900 Services)
|
|
- Payphone Choices (AT&T, Sprint, MCI, AOS)
|
|
- Overseas Access (AT&T Calls To Vietnam)
|
|
- News From The U.K.
|
|
o Directory Assistance Operators
|
|
o British Telecom To Buy Tymnet From McDonnel Douglas
|
|
o Chat Lines Banned
|
|
- One Less Choice (The Source and Compuserve)
|
|
- Privacy? What's That?
|
|
o Bulletin Board User Information
|
|
o Illegal Aliens Database
|
|
o Scotland Yard Database
|
|
o Wiretapping
|
|
o Bell of Pennsylvania (giving out confidential information)
|
|
o Personal Smart Card
|
|
- Hackers In Trouble
|
|
o Kevin Mitnick
|
|
o Robert Morris
|
|
- Hacker Fun
|
|
o Friday The 13th Virus
|
|
o Speed Limit Alterations
|
|
o Delray Beach Probation Office
|
|
- Telco Literature (FON Line Newsletter)
|
|
- Calling Card Tutorials
|
|
- Another Telco Ripoff (C&P Telephone)
|
|
- Technology Marches Back
|
|
o French Computer Mixup
|
|
o New York Telephone Repairman Sent On Wild Goose Chases
|
|
- And Finally (Bejing Phone Calls)
|
|
The Secrets of 4TEL
|
|
Letters
|
|
- Moblie Telephone Info
|
|
- A Southern ANI
|
|
- ROLM Horrors
|
|
- A Nagging Question (by The Apple Worm)
|
|
- A Request
|
|
- Another Request (by THOR <claims the Disk Jockey story was a lie>)
|
|
- The Call-Waiting Phone Tap (Alternative Inphormation)
|
|
- Interesting Numbers (1-800-EAT-SHIT, 800, 900 numbers)
|
|
- UNIX Hacking (Unix security, hacking, TCP/IP)
|
|
- Intelligent Payphones
|
|
- Retarded Payphones
|
|
REMOBS by The Infidel
|
|
Gee... GTE Telcos by Silent Switchman and Mr. Ed
|
|
Voice Mail Hacking... by Aristotle
|
|
Punching Pay Phones by Micro Surgeon/West Coast Phreaks
|
|
Touch-Tone Frequencies
|
|
2600 Marketplace
|
|
Carrier Access Codes
|
|
Lair of the INTERNET Worm by Dark OverLord
|
|
Timely Telephone Tips (from a Defense Department Phone Book)
|
|
|
|
There were also plenty of other interesting small articles, pictures, and
|
|
stories about hackers, telephones, computers and much more. All in all, this
|
|
is the best issue of 2600 Magazine I have read in several issues (despite the
|
|
fact that some of the material had appeared in Phrack Inc., LOD/H TJs, and/or
|
|
Telecom Digest previously). Let's hope they continue to be as good.
|
|
|
|
Are you interested in 2600 Magazine?
|
|
|
|
2600 (ISSN 0749-3851) is published quarterly by 2600 Enterprises Inc.,
|
|
7 Strong's Lane, NY 11733. Second class postage permit paid at Setauket, New
|
|
York.
|
|
|
|
Copyright (c) 1989, 2600 Enterprises, Inc.
|
|
Yearly subscriptions: U.S. and Canada -- $18 individual, $45 corporate.
|
|
Overseas -- $30 individual, $65 corporate.
|
|
Back issues available for 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 at $25 per year, $30 per
|
|
year overseas.
|
|
|
|
Address all subscription correspondence to:
|
|
|
|
2600 Subscription Department
|
|
P.O. Box 752
|
|
Middle Island, New York 11953-0752
|
|
|
|
2600 Office Line: 516-751-2600
|
|
2600 FAX Line: 516-751-2608
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
TAP Magazine
|
|
Issue 94
|
|
1989
|
|
|
|
The new TAP Magazine is a smaller publication in comparison to 2600. The
|
|
"outer" cover of this newsletter was a "warning" from The Predat0r concerning
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the nature of the material inside. The true or "inner" cover of the newsletter
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had the following:
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The Information You've Requested Of TAP Publishing Society
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A Unit Of The Technological Advancement Party
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Presents...
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"...a family of people dedicated to the advancement of home computer systems
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and electronic technology, the study and duplication of related communication
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networks and the subsequent utilization of one's own ingenuity in today's
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fast-paced world of creative logic."
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The articles in this issue of TAP included:
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TAP RAP: News From The TAP Staff by Aristotle
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Small Tags Protect Big Stores (continued from TAP 93)
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Ozone (concerning American Telephone & Telegraph's plans for 1994)
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Telephone Wires In New York In 1890
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Mercury Fulminate by Dark OverLord
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How To Hack Stamps
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Hoffman Worked To Help All Of Mankind
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Police Raid 3 Jefferson Homes In Search For Computer Hackers by Calvin Miller
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SummerCon '89 by Aristotle (includes a copy of the official SummerCon '89
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poster and button, although an error stating that the poster was
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shown at 1/2 size when in reality, the original was 8 1/2" by
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14").
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There were a few other interesting "tid bits" of information scattered
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throughout the four loose pages including the new TAP logo (that was made to
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resemble CompuTel) and other pictures.
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The staff at TAP also included a postcard that contained a reader's survey. It
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asked all sorts of questions about how the reader liked certain aspects of the
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publication... I found the idea to be potentially productive in improving the
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quality of the newsletter all around.
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The cost of TAP is rather cheap... it is free. For an issue send a self
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addressed stamped envelope to:
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T.A.P.
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P.O. Box 20264
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Louisville, Kentucky 40220-0264
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:Knight Lightning
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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Phrack World News QuickNotes
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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1. 911 Improvement Surcharge in Chicago (October 16, 1989) -- Monday morning,
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October 16, Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley announced that he would submit
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to the city council a plan to increase city telephone taxes by 95 cents per
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line per month, earmarked for improvements to 911 service. Currently there
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is no such flat charge, simply a percentage tax rate on local telephone
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service.
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Daley's spokespeople commented that 911 service here has been a mess for
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years, and that many of the suburbs charge $1.00 per line per month, so 95
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cents should not be unreasonable. There were no details about what is
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currently wrong or about what specific improvements Daley has in mind.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2. Hacker Caught by Caller-ID (October 9, 1989) -- MIS Week reported the
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apprehension of a 15-year old hacker who used his Amiga personal computer
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to tap into two minicomputers at Grumman. The youngster was from
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Levittown, Long Island and stumbled into the computer by using a random
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dialing device attached to his computer. Grumman security was able to
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detect the intrusions, and the computer's recording of the boy's telephone
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number led police to his home.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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3. 14-Year-Old Cracks TRW Credit For Major Fraud (October 18, 1989) -- A
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14-year-old Fresno, California boy obtained secret "access codes" to the
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files of TRW Credit from a bboard and used them to pose as a company or
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employer seeking a credit history on an individual whose name he picked
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randomly from the phone book. From the histories, he obtained credit card
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numbers which he then used to charge at least $11,000 in mail-order
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merchandise (shipped to a rented storeroom) and make false applications for
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additional cards. He also shared his findings on computer bulletin boards.
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Police began investigating when TRW noticed an unusual number of credit
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check requests coming from a single source, later found to be the youth's
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home telephone number. The high school freshman, whose name was not
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released, was arrested at his home last week and later released to his
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parents. His computer was confiscated and he faces felony charges that
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amount to theft through the fraudulent use of a computer.
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"Here is a 14-year-old boy with a $200 computer in his bedroom and now he
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has shared his data with countless other hackers all over the nation," said
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Fresno Detective Frank Clark, who investigated the case. "The potential
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(for abuse of the information) is incredible." Excerpts provided by
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Jennifer Warren (Los Angeles Times)
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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4. Computer Virus Countermeasures Article (October 25, 1989) -- Readers of
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Phrack Inc. might be interested in an interesting article in the October
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1989 issue of DEFENSE ELECTRONICS, page 75, entitled "Computer Virus
|
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Countermeasures -- A New Type Of Electronic Warfare," by Dr. Myron L.
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Cramer and Stephen R. Pratt.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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5. Computer Viruses Attack China (November 6, 1989) -- The Ministry of Public
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Safety of People's Republic of China found this summer that one tenth of
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the computers in China had been contaminated by three types of computer
|
|
virus: "Small Ball," "Marijuana," and "Shell." The most serious damage
|
|
was found in the National Statistical System, in which "Small Ball" spread
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in 21 provinces. In Wuhan University, viruses were found in *ALL* personal
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computers.
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In China, three hundred thousand computers (including personal computers)
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are in operation. Due to a premature law system the reproduction of
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|
software is not regulated, so that computer viruses can easily be
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|
propagated. Ministry of Public Safety now provides "vaccines" against
|
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them. Fortunately, those viruses did not give fatal damage to data.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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6. More Phone-Card Fraud (October 31, 1989) -- Two men were convicted by Tokyo
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District Court on Monday, October 30, for tampering with Nippon Telephone
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and Telegraph calling cards to increase the number of calls they could
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make. The court ruled that they violated the Securities Transaction Law.
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One man, Kawai, was sentenced to 30 months in prison, and another, Sakaki,
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was given an 18-month suspended sentence.
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Two presiding judges ruled that using falsified telephone cards in pay
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phones is tantamount to using securities.
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However, another judge ruled in a separate case last September that
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tampering with a telephone card does not constitute use of a security, so
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|
legal observers say it will be up to the Supreme Court.
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According to this most recent s ruling, Kawai changed about 1,600 telephone
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cards, each good for 500-yen worth of telephone calls, into cards worth
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20,000 yen. He sold the altered cards to acquaintances for as much as
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3,500 yen.
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Sakaki also sold about 320 tampered cards for about 2 million yen.
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One of the presiding judges ruled that using tampered telephone cards on
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public telephones is the same as misleading Nippon Telegraph and
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Telephone Corporation into believing the cards -- false securities -- were
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genuine. Taken from The Japan Times
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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7. Computer Virus Hits Japanese Quake Data (October 30, 1989) -- Tokyo; A
|
|
computer virus has destroyed information at the University of Tokyo's
|
|
seismological and ocean research institutes, a university official and
|
|
local reports said yesterday.
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|
An official of the university's Ocean Reasearch Institute said the virus
|
|
was detected earlier this month in five of the center's 100 computers,
|
|
but was believed to have first infected the computers in September.
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The virus was found only in personal computers being used by researchers
|
|
and not major computer systems, the official said, requesting anonymity.
|
|
He said the damage was not serious.
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|
He declined to discuss further details, but a report by the Japan
|
|
Broadcasting Corporation said a virus had also been found in the computers
|
|
at the university's Earthquake Research Institute. Thanks to Associated
|
|
Press news services. (Related article follows)
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|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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8. First Virus Attack On Macintoshes In Japan (November 7, 1989) -- Six Macs
|
|
in University of Tokyo, Japan, were found to have caught viruses. Since
|
|
Since this September, Professor K. Tamaki, Ocean Research Institute,
|
|
University of Tokyo, has noticed malfunctions on the screen. In October,
|
|
he applied vaccines "Interferon" and "Virus Clinic" to find his four
|
|
Macintoshes were contaminated by computer viruses, "N Virus" type A and
|
|
type B. He then found ten softwares were also infected by viruses. A
|
|
Macintosh of J. Kasahara, Earthquake Research Institute, University of
|
|
Tokyo, was also found to be contaminated by N Virus and Score Virus. These
|
|
are the first reports of real viruses in Japan.
|
|
|
|
Later it was reported that four Macintoshes in Geological Survey of Japan,
|
|
in Tsukuba, were infected by N Virus Type A. This virus was sent from
|
|
United States together with an editor.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
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9. Hackers Can Tap Into Free Trip (October 1989) -- Attention Hackers: Here
|
|
is your chance to break into a computer system and walk away with a grand
|
|
prize. The "hacker challenge" dares any hacker to retrieve a secret
|
|
message stored in a KPMG Peat Marwick computer in Atlanta.
|
|
|
|
This challenge is being sponsored by LeeMah DataCom Security Corporation, a
|
|
Hayward, California, consulting firm that helps companies boost computer
|
|
security. The winner gets an all-expense paid trip for two to either
|
|
Tahiti or St. Moritz, Switzerland.
|
|
|
|
Hackers with modems must dial 1-404-827-9584. Then they must type this
|
|
password: 5336241.
|
|
|
|
From there, the hacker is on his own to figure out the various access codes
|
|
and commands needed to retrieve the secret message.
|
|
|
|
The winner was announced October 24, 1989 at the Federal Computer Show in
|
|
Washington. Taken from USA Today.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
10. Groaning Phone Network Survives Millions Of Calls (October 18, 1989) --
|
|
The nation's telecommunications network was flooded Tuesday (October 17)
|
|
night by an estimated 20 million attempted telephone calls from people
|
|
around the nation concerned about friends and family after the earthquake
|
|
in the bay area.
|
|
|
|
Except for brief failures, the system did not break down under the record
|
|
load in the areas damaged by the earthquake.
|
|
|
|
AT&T officials said that as many as 140 million long-distance phone calls
|
|
were placed Wednesday (October 18), the highest number for a single day in
|
|
history. Excerpts thanks to John Markoff (New York Times)
|
|
|
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
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