73 lines
3.7 KiB
Plaintext
73 lines
3.7 KiB
Plaintext
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Elusive New Viruses Can Avoid Detection
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By Dennis Flanders
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While computer users nationwide took time to download anti- virus
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software to detect the latest viral strains, someone was busy creating
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the electronic version of the stealth bomber. The "stealth" viruses are
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the deadliest infection to date.
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At one time the message "126 files scanned - No viruses detected"
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would cause a sigh or relief. Now it may mean "126 files scanned -
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126 files infected." Not only do these evasive new bugs elude
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detection, they can turn your favorite scan program into a "typhoid
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Mary."
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Most viruses announce their presence by doing such obvious things as
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consuming system resources, destroying files or causing distinctly
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abnormal actions on the screen. The stealth virus, on the other hand,
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quietly sits in the computer's memory doing nasty things to your
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system over a long period.
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The 4096 virus is destructive to both data and executable files.
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Because the virus slowly cross-links files on the system's disk, it gives
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little indication of its presence. The cross-linking occurs so slowly that
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it appears there is a hardware problem when it is the result of the
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virus manipulating the FATs and changing the number of available
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sectors.
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Masquerading as hardware failures, stealth viruses can cause much
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time and money to be wasted chasing the wrong problem and repairing
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good equipment. After finally discovering the virus the infected PC's
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data and programs may be beyond recovery. Often several generations
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of backups will contain files contaminated or destroyed by the virus.
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Currently 4096 and Joshi-B are the most prevalent of the stealth
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viruses. Once installed in memory, a typical stealth virus will
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insinuate itself between DOS and the user. It will protect itself by
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filtering information passed between DOS and programs.
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Whenever DOS opens a file, the virus will intercept the call and
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manipulate the file. If the opened file is not infected, it will become
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infected. If the file is infected the virus will make it appear to be
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"clean" by removing itself. Thus anti-viral scanners are unable to
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detect its presence.
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If the anti-viral software does not scan memory, the stealth virus will
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go completely undetected. In fact anti-viral programs will lie and
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report that the PC is "clean" even as it becomes the primary vehicle for
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infection. Commonly used programs often become the primary source
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for contamination. For instance, typing COPY or XCOPY will cause the
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virus to infect both the original and the new files. Viruses always
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add code to the programs they infect. For instance the 4096 virus will
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increase the size of an infected file by 4096 bytes. Stealth viruses also
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manipulate commands such as DIR that report file lengths. They will
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subtract the length of the viral code from the file size before passing it
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on to the requesting program, making it appear normal.
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Programs that depend on CRC checks to validate the existence of a
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virus are not effective. They perform their calculations on a "sanitized"
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version of an infected program. This causes the CRC to be correct.
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The only sure protection is prevention. In the past genuine hardware
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problems have been blamed on viruses. We may now have come full
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circle. Genuine virus problems may be blamed on hardware glitches,
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according to David Stang, chairman of the National Computer Security
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Association. Stang went on to say that the association's BBS (see
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insert) has software and clear instructions for dealing with stealth
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viruses.
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Insert:
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The National Computer Security Association 4401-A Connecticut Ave.
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NW, Suite 309 Washington, DC 20008 202-364-8252 (Voice)
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202-364-1304 (Data)
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