83 lines
3.3 KiB
Plaintext
83 lines
3.3 KiB
Plaintext
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5 September 1990
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David,
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I thought that you may want to see this....Please read it carefully
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and compare notes on what you have and what you have documentation
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for. Please get back to me as soon as possible to discuss the
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situation. This is an analysis that I did today on the strain that I
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D/L'ed from the NCSA Board....Go figure. ,-)
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-Paul
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===============================================================================
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This analysis was preformed under the following circumstances:
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Test machine: AT 80286 Turbo Clone, Phoenix ROM-BIOS version 3.30, 1Mb RAM
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(640 base, 384 extended), Seagate ST-225 21Mb Hard Dirve and
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High Density (1.2 Mb) 5.25", 360 Kb Floppy Drive.
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Operating Sytem: Ms-DOS version 4.01
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Memory Mapping Utility: Central Point Software, Inc.,
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"Memory Info", version 5.24
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Notes: Clean, uninfected "goat" files (ie. .COM and .EXE) were
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introduced into the viral environment for testing purposes.
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The entire testing process is documented, in case you have
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any particular questions.
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McAfee Associates ViruScan version 66b identifies this virus
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as Jerusalem B, but the differences in replication are
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substantial enough to warrant a separate strain
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classification. Comments, etc. are most certainly welcome.
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===============================================================================
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Virus: Jerusalem-DC
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----- ------------
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(Note - Yep, I stuck the DC strain-tag on this one..it does not possess
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the same characteristics of any other of the documented strains,
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although McAfee's ViruScan ID's it as J-B... -Paul)
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Observations:
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-------------
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When an infected file is initially executed, the virus loads TSR. This can be
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observed with a memory mapping utility (see above). This also reveals that
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the infected file <name> has been loaded next TSR. It should also be
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annotated at this point that the program that was used to view memory at
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this point has, too, become infected. File size increases are as follows:
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.COM files - 1813 bytes and will only be infected once. COMMAND.COM will
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not become infected.
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.EXE files - 1820 bytes initially; 1808 bytes upon each subsequent
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infetion. (This seems almost inversely proportional to the
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description of Spanish JB, or Jerusalem E2.)
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The "Black Box" effect is still apparent approx. 1/2 hour after the virus
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is loaded TSR, as it is in the original J-B virus. The usual text string
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"uSMsDOS" is not present in this strain.
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Please direct any (more detailed) questions via message to:
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The National Computer Security Association
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NCSA BBS,
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Washington, DC.
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(202) 364-1304
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300/1200/2400 at 8,N,1
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(Preferrably within the VIRUS Conference.)
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