134 lines
6.9 KiB
Plaintext
134 lines
6.9 KiB
Plaintext
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
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<20> VIRUS REPORT <20>
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<20> Lehigh <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
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Date of Origin: late 1987.
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Place of Origin: Lehigh University, Pennsylvania.
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Host Machine: PC compatibles.
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Host Files: Remains resident. Infects COMMAND.COM.
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Increase in Size of Infected Files: overwrites files.
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Nature of Damage: Corrupts program or overlay files. Overwrites the FAT
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and boot sector after infecting four floppies.
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Detected by: Scanv56+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan.
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Removed by: CleanUp, or use MDisk and replace COMMAND.COM with a clean
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copy, or use F-Prot.
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Scan Code: 50 53 80 FC 4B 74 08 80 FC 4E 74 03 E9 77 01 8B DA 80 7F 01 3A
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75 05 8A 07 EB 07. You can also search at offset 01CH for B4 19 CD 44 04
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61 1E 51 52 57.
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History: This is a COMMAND.COM infector that first surfaced at Lehigh
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University in late 1987. It is one of the best known of viruses, and
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widely discussed and analyzed.
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Description of Operation: Infects only COMMAND.COM, where it overwrites
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the stack space. If a disk which contains an uninfected copy of
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COMMAND.COM is accessed, that copy is also infected. A count of
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infections is kept within each copy of the virus, and when this count
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reaches 4, every disk (including hard disks) currently in the computer
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is trashed by overwriting the initial tracks (boot sector & FAT).
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Infection changes the date and time of the infected file. If a floppy
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with an uninfected COMMAND.COM is write-protected, there will be a
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"WRITE PROTECT ERROR" message from DOS.
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I have reprinted below the warning that Kenneth van Wyk distributed
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on this virus.
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"WARNING: MS-DOS COMMAND.COM "virus" program will
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reformat your disks!!
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"Last week, some of our student consultants discovered a virus
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program that's been spreading rapidly throughout Lehigh University. I
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thought I'd take a few minutes and warn as many of you as possible
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about this program since it has the chance of spreading much farther
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than just our University. We have no idea where the virus started, but
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some users have told me that other universities have recently had
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similar problems.
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"The virus: the virus itself is contained within the stack space of
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COMMAND.COM. When a PC is booted from an infected disk, all a
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user need do to spread the virus is to access another disk via TYPE,
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COPY, DIR, etc. If the other disk contains COMMAND.COM, the virus
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code is copied to the other disk. Then, a counter is incremented on the
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parent. When this counter reaches a value of 4, any and every disk in
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the PC is erased thoroughly. The boot tracks are nulled, as are the FAT
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tables, etc. All Norton's horses couldn't put it back together again... :-)
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This affects both floppy and hard disks. Meanwhile, the four children
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that were created go on to tell four friends, and then they tell four
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friends, and so on, and so on.
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"Detection: while this virus appears to be very well written, the
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author did leave behind a couple footprints. First, the write date of the
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COMMAND.COM changes. Second, if there's a write protect tab on an
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uninfected disk, you will get a WRITE PROTECT ERROR... So, boot up
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from a suspected virus'd disk and access a write protected disk - if an
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error comes up, then you're sure. Note that the length of
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COMMAND.COM does not get altered.
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"I urge anyone who comes in contact with publicly accessible disks
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to periodically check their own disks. Also, exercise safe computing -
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always wear a write protect tab.
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"This is not a joke. A large percentage of our public site disks has
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been gonged by this virus in the last couple days."<Note: Kenneth R. van
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Wyk, User Services Senior Consultant, Lehigh University Computing
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Center, (215)-758-4988>
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The Lehigh original virus has been sporadically reported at dozens
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of installations outside of the university for over a year. It is not a
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particulary successful replicator <197> probably because of the
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extremely short activation fuse - and it is difficult to detect and
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report because there are few symptoms prior to activation. But there
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should certainly be no surprise that it's in the public domain.
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John McAfee has written: "The belief that viruses can be contained by
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early counter-action is belied by the Lehigh University experience. I
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have spoken to a number of individuals at the University who belived
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that the virus had somehow been contained because "no copies of the
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virus were distributed to outside organizations". This assumed, of
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course, that the original virus writer gave up after being foiled at
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Lehigh and did not insert the virus at any other location, and that all
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copies of the virus at Lehigh had indeed been accounted for. The first
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issue rests solely in the hands of the perpetrator and is beyond any
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containment controls. The second issue relies on an error-free
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containment process - allowing no possibility for overlooking, losing or
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mistaking an infected diskette. In any case, the Lehigh virus was by no
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means contained. I received a copy, as did virtually every virus
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researcher, in mid-1988, and infection reports issued throughout the
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year from universities, corporations and individual computer users."
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
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<EFBFBD> This document was adapted from the book "Computer Viruses", <20>
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<EFBFBD> which is copyright and distributed by the National Computer <20>
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<EFBFBD> Security Association. It contains information compiled from <20>
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<EFBFBD> many sources. To the best of our knowledge, all information <20>
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<EFBFBD> presented here is accurate. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> Please send any updates or corrections to the NCSA, Suite 309, <20>
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<EFBFBD> 4401-A Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20008. Or call our BBS <20>
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<EFBFBD> and upload the information: (202) 364-1304. Or call us voice at <20>
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<EFBFBD> (202) 364-8252. This version was produced May 22, 1990. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> The NCSA is a non-profit organization dedicated to improving <20>
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<EFBFBD> computer security. Membership in the association is just $45 per <20>
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<EFBFBD> year. Copies of the book "Computer Viruses", which provides <20>
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<EFBFBD> detailed information on over 145 viruses, can be obtained from <20>
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<EFBFBD> the NCSA. Member price: $44; non-member price: $55. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> The document is copyright (c) 1990 NCSA. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> This document may be distributed in any format, providing <20>
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<EFBFBD> this message is not removed or altered. <20>
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
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Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253
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