171 lines
8.5 KiB
Plaintext
171 lines
8.5 KiB
Plaintext
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
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<20> VIRUS REPORT <20>
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<20> Jerusalem Virus <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
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Synonyms: Israeli, Friday the 13th, Black Hole, Black Box, PLO, 1808
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(EXE), 1813 (COM), sUMsDos, Russian.
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Date of Origin: December 24, 1987 (date first detected in Israel).
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Place of Origin: Israel.
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Host Machine: PC compatibles.
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Host Files: Remains resident. Infects COM, EXE, overlay files.
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Increase in Size of Infected Files: 1808 bytes for EXE files (usually),
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1813 bytes for COM files.
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Nature of Damage: Affects system run-time operation. Corrupts program or
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overlay files.
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Detected by: Scanv56+, F-Prot, IBM Scan, Pro-Scan.
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Removed by: CleanUp, UNVIRUS, IMMUNE, M-J, Scan/D/A, Saturday, F-Prot.
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Derived from: Suriv03
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Scan Code: 8E D0 BC 00 07 50 B8 C5 00 50 CB FC 06 2E 8C 06 31 00 2E 8C 06
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39 00 2E 8C 06 3D 00 2E 8C 06 41 00 8C C0. You can also search at offset
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095H for FC B4 E0 CD 21 80 FC E0 73 16.
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History: The Jerusalem virus was first discovered at the Hebrew
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University in Jerusalem on December 24, 1987, and reported to the virus
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research community by Y. Radai of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. My
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personal suspicion is that the virus was written by a Palestinian, or
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other enemy of Israel, and planted within Israel. Israel was declared an
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independent state on May 14, 1948. Friday, May 13, 1988 would have been
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40 years in which Palestine was no longer sovereign. Although it was
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detected in late 1987, it contained code to prevent it from going off
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until May 13, 1988. Other viruses set to go off on Friday the 13th are
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likely copy-cats, whose authors simply thought that Friday the 13th was
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unlucky, wanted a trigger date, and thought this would do fine.
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Operation: This virus is a memory resident infector. Any "clean
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program" run after an infected program is run will become infected. Both
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COM and EXE files are infected. The virus occurs attached to the
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beginning of a COM file, or the end of an EXE file. A COM file also has
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the five-byte marker attached to the end. This marker is usually (but
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not always) "MsDos", and is preceeded in the virus by "sU". "sUMsDos" is
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not usually found in newer varieties of this virus. COM files increase
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in length by 1813 bytes. EXE files usually increase by 1808 bytes, but
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the displacement at which to write the virus is taken from the length in
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the EXE header and not the actual length. This means that part or all of
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this 1808 bytes may be overwritten on the end of the host program.
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It becomes memory-resident when the first infected program is run,
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and it will then infect every program run except COMMAND.COM. COM files
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are infected once only, EXE files are re-infected each time they are run.
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Interrupt 8 is redirected. After the system has been infected for
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thirty minutes (by running an infected program), an area of the screen
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from row 5 column 5 to row 16 column 16 is scrolled up two lines creating
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a black two line "window". From this point a time-wasting loop is
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executed with each timer interrupt, slowing the system down by a factor
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of 10.
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If the system was infected with a system date of Friday the
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thirteenth, every program run will be deleted instead. This will
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continue irrespective of the system date until the machine is rebooted.
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The end of the virus, from offset 0600H, is rubbish and will vary from
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sample to sample.
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Jerusalem contains a flaw which makes it re-infect EXE (but not COM)
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files over and over (up to five times or until the file becomes too big
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to fit into memory, whichever comes first.)
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The names 1808 and 1813 come from the fact that files grow by 1808 or
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1813 bytes, without changing their date and time or read/write/hidden
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attributes. COMMAND.COM does not grow, to help it avoid detection. In
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fact, it seems likely that the disk version of COMMAND.COM is not
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modified, but that the in-memory copy of COMMAND.COM is modified when an
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infected program is run.
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The virus causes some intentional damage:
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* there is code in the virus for deleting each program that you run on
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every Friday 13th. On January 13 (Friday), 1989, this virus made a
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shambles of hundreds of PC-compatibles in Britain<Note: Jonathan
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Randal, "Friday the 13th is Unlucky for British Computer Users;
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Software Virus Disrupts IBM PC Programs" The Washington Post,
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January 14, 1989, p. D10.>
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* The virus re-directs interrupt 8 (among others) and one-half hour
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after an infected program loads, the new timer interrupt introduces a
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delay which slows down the processor by a factor of 10. (see figure).
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It is difficult to estimate the total dollar value of damage done by
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this virus to date. In just one case, reported in the Israeli newspaper
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Maariv, it destroyed $15,000 worth of software and two disks in which
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7,000 hours of work had been invested.<Note: Reported by Jonathan
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Randal, "Friday the 13th is Unlucky for British Computer Users; Software
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Virus Disrupts IBM PC Programs" The Washington Post, January 14, 1989,
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p. D10.>
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Disinfection can be a complex process. UNVIRUS will easily
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eradicate this virus and 5-6 others as well. IMMUNE will prevent further
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infection.
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Alternatively, shareware programs written by Dave Chamber and
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distributed through bulletin boards under the name M-J may be used. M-J
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removes the virus from hard disks; M-JFA removes the virus from floppy
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disks that are inserted into the system's A drive; M-JFB removes the
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virus from floppy disks that are inserted into the system's B
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drive.<Note: The M-J disinfector is successful in removing the Jerusalem
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virus in virtually all instances. However, it will destroy, on the
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average, one EXE file in ten during the disinfection attempt. It will not
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harm COM files. It is recommended that every infected program be
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executed after the disinfection process. Programs that have been
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disabled during the disinfection process will not execute.>
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Alternatively, here is the process for removal:
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* power down the system.
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* Boot from a write-protected, clean system master diskette.
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* Delete all of the infected programs as indicated by VIRUSCAN.
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* Replace the programs from original write-protected program
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distribution diskettes.
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* Do not execute any program from the infected hard disk until the
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disinfection process is complete.
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* After cleaning all hard drives in the infected system, all floppies
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that have come into contact with the system should be SCANned and
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disinfected in the same manner.
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Another means of detection: using PCtools or another text search
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utility, search for the ASCII string "sUMsDos". This string is present
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in all copies of this particular virus strain.
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
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<EFBFBD> This document was adapted from the book "Computer Viruses", <20>
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<EFBFBD> which is copyright and distributed by the National Computer <20>
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<EFBFBD> Security Association. It contains information compiled from <20>
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<EFBFBD> many sources. To the best of our knowledge, all information <20>
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<EFBFBD> presented here is accurate. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> Please send any updates or corrections to the NCSA, Suite 309, <20>
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<EFBFBD> 4401-A Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20008. Or call our BBS <20>
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<EFBFBD> and upload the information: (202) 364-1304. Or call us voice at <20>
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<EFBFBD> (202) 364-8252. This version was produced May 22, 1990. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> The NCSA is a non-profit organization dedicated to improving <20>
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<EFBFBD> computer security. Membership in the association is just $45 per <20>
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<EFBFBD> year. Copies of the book "Computer Viruses", which provides <20>
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<EFBFBD> detailed information on over 145 viruses, can be obtained from <20>
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<EFBFBD> the NCSA. Member price: $44; non-member price: $55. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> The document is copyright (c) 1990 NCSA. <20>
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<EFBFBD> <20>
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<EFBFBD> This document may be distributed in any format, providing <20>
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<EFBFBD> this message is not removed or altered. <20>
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
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Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253
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