310 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
310 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
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NCSL BULLETIN
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Advising users on computer systems technology
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July 1990
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NCSL Bulletins are published by the National Computer Systems
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Laboratory (NCSL) of the National Institute of Standards and
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Technology (NIST). Each bulletin presents an in-depth
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discussion of a single topic of significant interest to the
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information systems community. Bulletins are issued on an
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as-needed basis and are available from NCSL Publications,
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National Institute of Standards and Technology, B151,
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Technology Building, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, telephone (301)
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975-2821 or FTS 879-2821.
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The following bulletins are available:
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Data Encryption Standard, June 1990
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GUIDANCE TO FEDERAL AGENCIES
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ON THE USE OF
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TRUSTED SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
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INTRODUCTION
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Purpose. The purpose of this document is to provide initial
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guidance to federal departments and agencies on the use of
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trusted systems technology in computer systems which handle
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unclassified sensitive information.
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Background. The National Institute of Standards and
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Technology (NIST) has received many inquiries from federal
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agencies regarding the applicability of Department of Defense
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(DoD) Standard 5200.28-STD, DoD Trusted Computer Systems
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Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), and National Telecommunications
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and Information Systems Security Policy (NTISSP) Number 200,
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National Policy on Controlled Access Protection, to computer
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systems which are used to process unclassified sensitive
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information and which are covered by the Computer Security
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Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235). The TCSEC, often called
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the "Orange Book," was developed by the National Computer
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Security Center (NCSC) of the National Security Agency (NSA).
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NTISSP 200 was published under authority of National Security
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Decision Directive (NSDD) 145 prior to the passage of the
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Computer Security Act, which established new federal
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authorities and policy on protection of unclassified computer
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systems.
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Authority -- NIST Responsibilities under Computer Security
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Act. The Computer Security Act of 1987 assigns NIST the
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responsibility for developing security standards and
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guidelines for federal computer systems, with the exception
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of classified and a specified category of Department of
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Defense unclassified systems (referred to as "Warner
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Amendment" systems). NIST is therefore responsible for
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advising all federal agencies on the use of trusted systems
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technology in most unclassified computer systems.
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Objectives. Specific objectives of this document are to:
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o provide guidance to federal agencies on the use of
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trusted systems technology;
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o clarify the applicability of the TCSEC and NTISSP
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Number 200; and
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o describe NIST's long-range plans for the development
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of additional policy, guidance, and technical
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recommendations on the use of trusted system
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technology.
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Definition. Trusted Systems Technology - The technical
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methods and mechanisms that are used to develop trusted
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systems, are used to assure the enforcement of a security
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policy in such systems, and are contained within the trusted
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systems. Examples of trusted systems are trusted operating
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systems, trusted networks, trusted databases, and trusted
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applications. Examples of methods are modeling, software
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engineering, and automated evaluation. Examples of
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mechanisms include identification, authentication, auditing,
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and access control.
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Applicability. This guidance applies to those federal
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computer systems defined in the Computer Security Act of
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1987.
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POLICY GUIDANCE
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Use of Trusted Systems Technology. Each agency should select
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computer security controls, including trusted systems
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technology, for its systems which are commensurate with the
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estimated risk and magnitude of potential loss of
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confidentiality, integrity or availability. The selection
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should be based upon an analysis of the security risks for
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each system within its particular environment. Trusted
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systems technology can be particularly useful for agencies
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with significant requirements for confidentiality of
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computer-based information. It can also provide basic access
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control protection to help meet information integrity
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requirements.
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Applicability of NTISSP Number 200. There is no binding
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national policy on the applicability and use of trusted
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systems technology in federal computer systems which process
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unclassified information. In particular, NTISSP Number 200
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does not apply to unclassified systems covered by the
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Computer Security Act of 1987.
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USE OF TRUSTED SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
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Value of Trusted Systems. NIST recommends the use of trusted
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systems technology when such technology satisfies
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requirements for adequate and cost-effective access control
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protection. Such requirements exist when there is a need for
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safeguarding the confidentiality and integrity of
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information. In addition, the assurance process which is a
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part of trusted systems technology can help support system
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availability requirements. All these requirements should be
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planned for and validated by a formal risk management
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procedure. As an integral part of the planning process
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required by the Computer Security Act, the first step in risk
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management is the conduct of a thorough risk analysis. The
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second step in risk management is selection of appropriate
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security controls based on the analysis of the security risks
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for the environment involved. This risk management process
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should balance security and performance requirements and
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provide for cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive
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information in the system. Effective use of trusted systems
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technology, like any other security control, should
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substantially increase the protection relative to the
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additional acquisition, operating and maintenance costs of
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the security mechanisms obtained.
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Computer Security Planning and Protection Strategy. A
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security protection strategy consists of a mix of physical,
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administrative, and technical safeguards, including trusted
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systems technology. The use of trusted system technology can
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be an effective part of a larger computer security protection
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strategy for satisfying confidentiality, integrity, and
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availability requirements. As with other types of protection
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mechanisms, the benefits attainable from trusted systems
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technology can only be realized if these mechanisms are used
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properly in a complementary fashion.
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Use of Evaluated Products. Agencies with a need for systems
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with trusted technology features should select those systems
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from NSA's Evaluated Products List (EPL). If EPL products
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are not available, then agencies may select or design systems
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that best meet their security requirements using the TCSEC as
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a guide. NSA's Information Systems Security Products and
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Services Catalog contains the EPL, which lists evaluated
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products, those systems that are currently undergoing
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evaluation, and the current status of such evaluations.
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Use of Class "C2" Systems. Systems designed to meet "C2" or
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higher classes of the TCSEC should first be considered when
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acquiring multi-user computer systems with a requirement to
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control user access to information according to "need to
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know" and authorization. The "C2" and other TCSEC criteria
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were designed to achieve confidentiality through improved
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access control. The same access control mechanisms can also
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be beneficial for helping to maintain information integrity.
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While it should be recognized that access controls are a
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necessary part of achieving integrity and availability, there
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are other requirements for integrity and availability not
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covered by the TCSEC. NIST recommends that federal
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departments and agencies consider using "C2" functionality as
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a minimum to help protect their multi-user systems having
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confidentiality or integrity control requirements.
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Use of Division "B" Systems. When acquiring multi-user
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computer systems with a requirement for mandatory separation
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of sensitive information and for which security labels can be
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established, systems designed to meet the criteria of the "B"
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division of the TCSEC can be useful. Systems in that
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division are designed to enforce a mandatory access control
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or multi-level security policy. However, the cost benefit
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considerations discussed earlier are of particular importance
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when considering the use of "B" division level systems. In
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the context of this guidance document, the term "security
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label" is used to denote confidentiality, integrity, or
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availability categories established pursuant to a larger
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organizational information security policy. Security labels
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are a generalization of the "sensitivity labels" used in the
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TCSEC.
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NIST PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTED SYSTEMS GUIDANCE
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NIST recognizes that federal agencies in their unclassified
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computer security programs will require additional guidance
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on the use of trusted systems technology as it evolves. NIST
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has an active program to develop such guidance. This section
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describes some of the current activities designed to provide
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this guidance over the next few years.
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National Evaluation Criteria. NIST plans to publish guidance
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on information and system integrity, focusing first on
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technical methods of achieving effective integrity controls
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in computer and telecommunications systems. NIST recognizes
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the benefits of TCSEC evaluated products and will work
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closely with NSA and other private and public sector
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organizations to create a set of national evaluation criteria
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that will emphasize integrity and availability to complement
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the TCSEC. NIST will work with NSA to extend NSA's
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evaluation program to incorporate these methods into trusted
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systems.
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Security Criteria for Distributed Systems. NIST and NSA are
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studying the need for security criteria in distributed
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computer systems to address integrity, availability and
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confidentiality of unclassified information.
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Security Labels. NIST also plans to work with government
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organizations and industry in developing suggested standard
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categories of data to which security labels, which would
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control the handling of that data, can be applied. The
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labels can be applied to categories of unclassified
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government and commercial information that require protection
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for confidentiality, integrity and availability purposes.
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These labels can then be used with "B" division trusted
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systems. Note that any security labeling scheme should
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complement an organization's information protection policy.
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Guide to Use of Trusted Systems Technology. NIST is
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preparing additional guidance to assist federal agencies in
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deciding how to use trusted systems technology to protect
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computer systems containing unclassified sensitive
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information. This guide will include more detailed
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information on the extent to which that technology provides
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system-level confidentiality, integrity and availability
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protection for unclassified systems. The guide will stress
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the key point that the risk analysis-based process of
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identifying valid information protection requirements is an
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essential prerequisite for determining the full set of
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protection mechanisms (trusted systems included) to be
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effectively applied to computer systems. This guide can be
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viewed as complementing the NSA's "Yellow Book" (CSC-STD-004-
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85, Guidance for Applying the DoD Trusted Computer System
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Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments, June 25, 1985),
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which addresses the use of trusted technology in systems
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processing classified information.
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International Evaluation Criteria. NIST is participating in
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international computer security standards activities that are
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specifying a wide range of security services and mechanisms
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in information technology. NIST recognizes the efforts and
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contributions of numerous international organizations
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presently developing security architectures, profiles, and
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criteria. Specifically, NIST is reviewing the Information
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Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) that have
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been proposed for European Community use and is preparing
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comments on their utility for U.S. Government unclassified
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applications.
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REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
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Computer Security Act. The Computer Security Act of 1987 was
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signed into law on January 8, 1988, therefore superseding
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NTISSP Number 200 for systems processing sensitive
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unclassified information. It established NIST's authority to
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develop uniform technical, management, physical, and
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administrative standards and guidelines for the cost-
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effective security and privacy of sensitive information in
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federal computer systems, except those systems processing
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classified or Warner Amendment information. The Act also
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prescribed a process whereby agencies are required to prepare
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plans for the security and privacy of federal computer
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systems containing sensitive information.
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NSDD-145. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 145,
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National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated
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Information Systems Security, was issued on September 17,
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1984. NSDD-145 required federal agencies to establish
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policies, procedures, and practices to protect national
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security related information in computer systems. NSDD-145
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established the National Telecommunications and Information
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Systems Security Committee (NTISSC) to develop and issue
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national system security operating policies.
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NTISSP Number 200. The NTISSC issued NTISSP Number 200 on
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July 15, 1987. NTISSP 200 required multi-user computer
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systems containing classified or unclassified sensitive
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information operated by federal agencies and their
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contractors to have "controlled access protection" as a
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minimum level of security protection. Controlled access
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protection is technically defined in the TCSEC as the "C2"
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class of trust. Further, NTISSP 200 required federal
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agencies and contractors to provide this controlled access
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protection in automated information systems containing
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sensitive information within five years (hence the well-known
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phrase "C2 by '92").
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NIST'S COMPUTER SECURITY PROGRAM
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For further information regarding other aspects of NIST's
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computer security program, including NIST's federal agency
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assistance program, please contact:
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Computer Security Division
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National Computer Systems Laboratory
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Building 225, Room A216
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National Institute of Standards and Technology
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Gaithersburg, MD 20899
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Telephone (301) 975-2934
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Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253
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