314 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
314 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
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T H E A N A R C H I S T
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Volume 1 Number 1 No God, No Master
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PACIFIC'S LONGEST WAR -by Brendan Greenhill
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The 25th South Pacific Forum held in Brisbane in August failedto
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officially recognise the Pacifics longest war since
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WW2.Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating dismissed criticism
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ofthe handling of the issue and the then PNG Prime Minister
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PiasWingti claimed Bougainville was an internal matter for
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PapuaNew Guinea. As he spoke, the troops of the PNG Defence
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Forcewere mounting their most ambitious operation. This was
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theassault on the Australian owned CRA copper mine at Panguna;the
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main prize for the government in its effort to eliminatethe
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Bougainville rebels (Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia, asubsidiary of
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Rio Tinto Zinc - ed.
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Despite reports that the PNG government was going bankrupt,the
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money was found for one last offensive. Heavy fightingtook place
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along the Panguna Mine Access road between thePNGDF and the
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Bougainville Revolutionary Army from the 31st ofJuly and early
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August. Patrols pushed towards the mine butwere met by BRA
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resistance.
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HIGH SPEED
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On August 15th, Papua New Guinea began an assault to take themine
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site. Called Operation "High Speed", it involved a majorthree
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pronged advance to Moroni village, overlooking the minesite. The
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advances were backed up with helicopter landings ofmore troops.
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One PNG soldier was killed on the first day
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At this news Pias Wingti proclaimed that the civil war wasover
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and the mine was taken. He was uncriticly reported by
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theAustralian media. Newspapers and media outlets such as theAAP,
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ABC, Age, Sydney Morning Herald, the Courier Mail and
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theAustralian Democrats Vicki Bourne all believed this was
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thecase. By the 17th the PNGDF had moved near the mine
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site,including Guava village, the home of President of
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theBougainville Interim government, Mr Francis Ona.
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BrigadierGeneral Ted Dademo, the PNGDF's top officer claimed it
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wascaptured and that a care centre was being set up there.
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Itseems that no one told the people at Panguna as villagers
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wentabout their daily chores near the mine
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DRAWING THE PNGDF OUT
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At first the BRA offered little resistance to troops movinginto
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the area. The strategy of the BRA was to draw the PNGDFout of
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their bunkers on the coast into the mountains were theywere more
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vulnerable to attack. The PNGDF was also at the endof a
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precarious supply line with the only hope of supplies,relief or
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reinforcements for some soldiers being byhelicopter. And they
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soon found out how precarious it was. OnMonday the 15th of
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August, a "civilian" helicopter owned byHevi Lift, a helicopter
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contractor for the PNG government washit by BRA ground fire at
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Tonu. The New Zealand pilot, MrDennis Killip, was wounded in an
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attempt to evacuate a woundedPNGDF soldier from the battlefield
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in Siwai, South West Bougainville. The damaged helicopter was
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grounded at Wakunaion Bougainville. And later on Friday the 19th,
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the BRA counterattacked at Moroni near Panguna in Operation Warm
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Up.Over 100 rounds were fired at a PNG helicopter by the BRAusing
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homemade guns, SLR and machine guns at Moroni. Accordingto the
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BRA this helicopter was owned by the "NationalEmergency Service"
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and bore an Australian flag. The helicopterwas forced to limp
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back and make an emergency landing atWakunai. According to the
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BRA the European pilot was alsowounded
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Because of lack of air support, the PNGDF were in a
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panic.Counterattacks were made at Dampari, Java, Moroni and
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thePanguna mine site. At Lambalam, the PNGDF and
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militia"resistance forces" (Bougainvillians supporting supporting
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thePNG forces) were attacked on the 19th of August.
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TheBougainville Revolutionary Army shot 8 army and
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resistancefighters and suffered 1 casualty themselves
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MOUNTING CASUALTIES
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At the Mt Kaupara repeater station, a PNGDF unit that waslanded
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there by helicopter was cut off due to lack of airsupport. They
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later had to retreat and a soldier was woundedon the 22nd of
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August. No helicopter was available to evacuatehim. The same day,
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BRA were able to attack the provincialcapital, Arawa and 1
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soldier was shot at Arco motors. On the24th, 7 casualties were
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suffered near Guava. 3 were confirmedkilled. Also killed was
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Major Kekebogi, the commander of theattack on Panguna; he died
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near Guava. More casualties wereinflicted at the Mt Kaupara
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repeater station on the 24th. LtColonel Jerry Singarok, the PNGDF
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commander on Bougainville,was wounded on the 26th. His Iroquois
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helicopter was also hiton a mission to recover the casualties
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from Moroni. Thisheralded the disintegration of the offensive.
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PNGDF were inretreat and BRA were on the offensive to regain the
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advantage
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According to BRA sources, casualties suffered by both sides
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upuntil the 26th of August were: PNGDF and resistance forces
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41killed or wounded.They described these as conservativefigures.
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BRA had 1 killed and 3 wounded in action.
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REMODELLING
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One further clash occurred on Sunday the 4th of September.
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ThePNGDF burnt down 34 houses at Moroni. This village was
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a"model" village set up by Bougainville Copper Ltd when themine
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was established in the '60s. The PNGDF attacked despiteorders to
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remain in static positions. Local BRA who lived atMoroni
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retaliated and killed at least 2 soldiers. One body wasevacuated
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by helicopter. This was the most serious breach ofthe ceasefire
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but it has not jeopardised the peace process.
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THE OFFENSIVE COLLAPSES
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The collapse of the offensive and the rout of the PNG forceswas
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now complete. Units were cut off and cut to pieces,officers were
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being killed and wounded, helicopters were beingshot up and their
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pilots wounded.It was obvious operation"High Speed" had failed.
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what made these successes by BRA more amazing was that their
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commander, Sam Kauona had left Bougainville as the attack on
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Panguna started. He describedthe attack as a complete flop and an
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insult to the peaceprocess which the Bougainville people had
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embarked on. MartinMirori from the Bougainville Interim
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Government stated thatthe fighting has helped the BIG negotiate
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from a position ofstrength. He said "The fighting has made a
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difference in thenegotiations because of the pressure the BRA is
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putting on thePNGDF in the battlefront".
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UN PRESSURE
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The United Nations is also putting pressure on PNG to resolvethe
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Bougainville conflict. The UN Human Rights committeepassed a
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resolution on Bougainville on 25th of August. Theresolution
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called on PNG to return to the negotiating table,to immediately
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allow medical supplies into the areas beingblockaded by PNG and
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urged PNG to cooperate with the SpecialRapporteurs on Torture and
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Extra Judicial Executions to enablethem to investigate reports of
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human rights violations onBougainvillle. The resolution also
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requested the SecretaryGeneral of the UN to consider the
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appropriateness ofappointing a Special Representative concerning
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the humanrights situation on Bougainville. This move served to
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furthererode PNG's reputation in the international community
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Sam Kauona arrived in the Solomon Ils on Friday the 26th ofAugust
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and met with Francis Saemala, Foreign Minister of theSolomon Ils.
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Mr Saemala then convened a meeting betweenofficials of the
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Government of Papua New Guinea and "theOrganisation known as the
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Bougainville Interim Government" andthe Bougainville
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Revolutionary Army on Saturday the 27th. SamKauona was present in
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negotiations for the first time sincethe crisis started in 1989.
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The meeting was held in a full andfrank atmosphere and resolved
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that the first priority wasceasefire and peace. Other issues to
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be discussed were theconvening of a Pan Bougainville peace
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conference between allBougainvillians to resolve their
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differences. Consultativemeetings were held between the BIG, the
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BRA and the sevenBougainville Interim Authorities starting on
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Monday the 29thof August. The Bougainville Interim Government
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demanded thisfrom the PNG negotiators. Recommendations were then
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put to aMinisterial meeting held on the 2nd of September.
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EXIT PIAS
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In the meantime, politics caught up with Pias Wingti. He
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hadresigned from the Prime Minister's job last year in order
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tothwart a vote of no confidence in him. He was then reelectedand
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became Prime Minister again. The PNG opposition pursuedhis
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constitutional coup though the courts and the SupremeCourt found
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that he had acted against the PNG constitution. Hewas forced to
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act in a caretaker role as Prime Minister. Whenthe vote for a new
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Prime Minister was held on the 30th ofAugust, his supporters fled
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him and supported Sir Julius Chan.Chan was then elected the new
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Prime Minister of Papua NewGuinea. His first priority was the
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Bougainville issue andpeace talks. The one mystery of this little
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saga is why the PNG Supreme court brought down its decision at
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such a crucialtime for Pias Wingti. The Supreme Court had been
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consideringthis case for some time and the decision could not
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have comeat a worse time for Wingti. Who knows what went on
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behind the scenes.
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The parties agreed to cease operations from the 3rd ofSeptember
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and all military units were to remain in placepending an official
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signing of instruments of ceasefire. Afurther clash occurred on
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the 4th but apart from this, noother fighting has occurred so
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far. The ceasefire wasdifficult for the BRA to enforce due to
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communicationdifficulties. According to Martin Miriori, despite
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the bestefforts of the BRA leadership and broadcasts over Radio
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FreeBougainville, it may take weeks for all the BRA units to
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be contacted.
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The Ministerial Meeting was held in the Solomon Islands on the2nd
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of September and was chaired by Solomon Island Deputy Prime
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Minister Francis Saemala. Sir Julius Chan led the PNG delegation
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and General Sam Kauona of the BRA led theBougainville Interim
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Government/BRA delegation. Called the Honiara Commitments to
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Peace, this agreement brought in apeace agreement for a cessation
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of the five year war onBougainville. Sam Kauona said that the
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consultative processneeded time and should not be rushed. He
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wanted the roots ofthe war to be addressed carefully. Mr Kauona
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stated that PNGfought the war to enforce its sovereignty but the
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Bougainville people fought to protect their rights, land rights,
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economicand political rights. The ceasefire came into effect
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onmidnight, Friday 9th of September 1994, seven days after
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the meeting.
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PEACE CONFERENCE
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The installation of a South Pacific peace keeping team wasseen as
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a priority. The BIG/BRA team also called for the lifting of the
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blockade and the planning of a Bougainville Peace Conference to be
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held in Bougainville. Another issue to be discussed is the
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political question for a settlement for the people of
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Bougainville. Moses Havimi from the BougainvilleInterim
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Government said that independence was definitely stillon the
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cards. It was hoped that Bougainville could carve outits own
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future.
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Concern has been expressed at representation in the Pan-
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Bougainville peace conference. Bougainville land ownership
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hastraditionally rested with the women. The principlenegotiations
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have taken place between men so far. Lets hopethat all
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Bougainvilleans can decide their own future and thatgroups such
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as the Panguna Womens Association will have astrong and
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representative voice in the future of Bougainville.The
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Bougainville Interim Government has stated that talks willtake
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place between all people, women and men
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The South Pacific Regional Peace Keeping Force itself seems tobe
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contentious.Some observers have stated that 200 troops and2
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weeks to prepare for the Pan-Bougainville peace conference is not
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enough time. With 1000s of people to go to theconference, it
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seems that few peacekeepers would find itdifficult to guarantee
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the safety of Bougainvillians all overthe island. It is proposed
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that a handover of arms by BRA toSPRPKF take place but the BRA
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obviously don't want them in toend up in the hands of the PNGDF.
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The haste at which the forcehas been set up and indeed the whole
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peace process isunseemly. General Sam Kauona of the BRA has
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expressed deepdissatisfaction with the arrangements being made.
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He said thatthere was supposed to be close consultation between
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bothsides. This has not been taking place.
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INNOCENT BYSTANDERS
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There is also concern about Australia's role. The BRA feel that
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Australia is a party to the war and should not lead
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the peacekeeping force or enforce the border
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arrangements.Australia is supplying warships, logistics and
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funding for thepeace process. Australia may possibly be
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manipulating the process to gain an outcome favourable to its
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interests and in the event that the peace process fails would have
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substantialforces in the area, nationals at "risk" and a perfect
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excuse to intervene like what happened in Grenada or Haiti with
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theUS
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DIVISIONS ON BOUGAINVILLE
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The distrust between the BRA and the Bougainville
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Interimauthorities seems to be only exceeded by their
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mutualunhappiness with the way the peace arrangements are going.
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TheWakunai resistance leaders won't observe the ceasefire
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unlessChan goes and talks to them. They want the PNGDF to stay
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andare not happy with the BRA. Nick Penalai from the South
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WestBougainville Interim Authority, for instance, could find
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thata Peace settlement will leave him out on a limb. This
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appliesalso to the so called "Cease fire BRAs". These people
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arerenegades and criminal raskols who were in the BRA earlierthen
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joined resistance forces. They allegedly committed
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manyatrocities. They may find their position similar to that
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ofthe South Vietnamese supporters of the US when Saigon fell;Get
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on the boat or off to "reeducation" camp
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The PNGDF are also are spreading disinformation. They spread
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astory that Sam Kauona was not the BRA representative and
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hadbeen kicked off Bougainville. Clearly, this is absurd. Itseems
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that there are some groups in the PNGDF who don't wantto pullout
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of Bougainville at any price. But they may bebrought under
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control. Brigadier General Daedemo was sacked bySir Julius Chan
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because of long term animosities and hisbungling of the last
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offensive and inability to bring thePNGDF in Bougainville under
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the control of the central PNGgovernment
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The time is not one for complacency or belief that the war isnow
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over. The situation on the ground is very sensitive. Aceasefire
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is a very delicate military state of affairs andrelies completely
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on good faith and consultation. And the restoration of essential
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services must be a priority for allBougainvilles sake. But if
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Australia intervenes, MartinMiriori has said though that if peace
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fails the fight will goon
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The Bougainville Freedom Movemen can be contacted at: PO Box
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5409 West En Qld 410 Fax + 61 7 846 589 email zzzfm@peg.oz.au
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CASH SCAM EXPOSED
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Money from the Bougainville Peace Restoration Appeal is going to
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the Papua New Guinea Defence Force. The appeal is supposed to
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provide funds to avert a Somalia or Rwanda type refugee crisis on
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Bougainville. Instead, about $60 000 is going to the PNGDF to
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provide supplies for "care centres". The appeal is being run by
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the Faces of Papua New Guinea Committee, which has direct links
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with the Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan.
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