112 lines
6.6 KiB
Plaintext
112 lines
6.6 KiB
Plaintext
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Libertarian Labor Review #13
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Summer 1992, pages 18-19
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North American Free Trade?
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As the U.S.-Canada-Mexico Free Trade Agreement talks continue
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on the fast-track, the labor movement--and in particular its left
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wing--is mobilizing its efforts in a last-ditch effort to block an
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agreement they say will devastate the U.S. and Canadian economies.
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The Canadian Labor Congress estimates that 260,000 jobs have
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already been lost as a result of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
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Agreement (though they clearly didn't find their way down to the
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States, as is evidenced by the continuing recession), and the AFL-
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CIO expects that two and a half million jobs would go to Mexico if
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the Free Trade Agreement goes through.
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The government has been relatively open about the rationale
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for a Free Trade Agreement: "By lowering overall costs of U.S.
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manufacturing firms, a free trade agreement would make U.S. firms
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more competitive..." (1991 Economic Report of the President) This
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competitiveness might be realized by moving production to Mexico or
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by driving U.S. wages closer to Mexican levels. Either approach
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makes U.S. firms "more competitive" entirely at the expense of
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their workers.
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Mexican workers are clearly cheaper than their North American
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counterparts, and getting cheaper all the time. High inflation and
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a rapidly devaluing Peso have resulted in average Mexican labor
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costs (wages and benefits) dropping from $3.71 in 1981 to $1.57 in
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1987, and the Mexican economy is in free-fall. The Mexican
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government tightly controls the major labor federation, and
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forcefully intervenes against militant unions and unionists.
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The result has been a cheap, relatively disciplined (though
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not always docile) workforce conveniently located to manufacture
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products for North American markets. Many firms have moved their
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manufacturing operations to Mexico, in particular to low-wage
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"maquiladora" districts near the U.S. border. U.S.-based companies
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have long had extensive investments in Mexico, dominating its auto,
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rubber, mining and chemical industries even before the maquiladora
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program began in 1965. The maquiladoras manufacture products almost
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entirely for U.S. and other foreign markets, and are largely
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exempted from U.S. import duties. Last year, about 500,000 workers
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were employed in 2007 maquiladoras, almost all of them owned by
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U.S. companies.
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U.S.-based companies have proven eager to expand operations in
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Mexico (just as in other low-wage economies). Two years ago, Levi-
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Strauss shut down a San Antonio plant, throwing more than 1,000
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workers out of their jobs. Last year, Pillsbury-Green Giant laid
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off nearly 400 workers from its frozen food plant in Watsonville,
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California, to shift their unionized jobs to a non-union plant in
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Mexico which pays workers only $4 per day. Louisiana-Pacific has
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closed a California plant and built a state-of-the-art sawmill in
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Suarez, where it has already successfully broken the longshore
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union by shutting down production for several days and threatening
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to close the plant altogether. And Procter-Silex (a manufacturer of
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irons, coffee makers, and similar items) recently closed two
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profitable North Carolina plants to shift production to Juarez.
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Already, corporations are blackmailing workers and governments
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in towns, states and entire countries--using their mobility (made
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possible by improved communication and transportation networks, and
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by the increasingly global economy) to pit us against our fellow
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workers around the world. Each concession we make to save our jobs
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is then used as leverage to force concessions somewhere else, and
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the cycle soon returns to slash our wages and/or working conditions
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again. The record clearly demonstrates that companies do not use
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their savings from concessions or tax breaks to modernize, they
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take the money and run. As a result, what happens to our $1-a-day
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Vietnamese fellow workers affects us as directly as what happens to
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our fellow workers in Alabama.
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(Environmentalists, too, oppose the Free Trade Agreement,
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arguing that it will result in environmental safeguards being
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abandoned as impediments to "competitiveness" or as illegal
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restraints on trade. However, the U.S. has long attacked
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environmental standards on such grounds, as in the recent decision
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to resume clear-cutting in public forests in Oregon even though
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this will likely result in the extinction of the spotted owl.)
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As we noted in LLR 2 ("What's To Protect?"), however,
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maintaining existing trade barriers or building new ones is not an
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effective response. The American economy died long ago, and had
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been replaced by a global economy in which most products long ago
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ceased to have any meaningful country of origin. The 1992 Ford
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Crown Victoria, for example, is assembled in Canada using parts
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from Britain, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Spain and the U.S., while
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Toyota Corollas are assembled by a jointly owned GM-Toyota plant in
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California. Harvard economist Robert Reich notes that "almost any
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product weighing more than 10 pounds and costing more than $10 is
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a global composite, combining parts or services from many different
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nations."
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As long as our present economic system continues, the bosses
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will shift manufacturing--and, increasingly, even service
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industries--around the world to wherever they make the most money.
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Governments that obstruct this process will quickly be brought to
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heel through the enormous economic pressures transnational capital
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can bring to bear.
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We can't hope to gain anything by supporting "our" bosses
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against the other guys, whether across the border or across the
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sea. Free trade or no free trade, the bosses will always go where
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the money's best, where unions are weak, where they can maim
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workers and pollute the environment to their heart's content. They
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won't be stopped by legislation (the Free Trade Agreement isn't
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even drafted yet, but employers have been setting up shop in Mexico
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for decades) or by patriotic sentiment.
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But that doesn't mean that they can't be stopped. The flow of
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low-paid jobs to South Korea is slowing and employers are fleeing
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their increasingly militant Korean workers in search of new low-
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wage production sites. Rather than trying to make common cause
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with our exploiters against our fellow workers abroad, we would do
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far better to assist our fellow workers in their struggles to build
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militant, independent unions and to win better working and living
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conditions. As long as workers anywhere are repressed and poverty-
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stricken, the bosses will find a way to exploit their misery--and
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to spread that misery, as best they can, to the rest of us. But if
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we are organized internationally to fight for our own interests, we
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can put the bosses on the run.
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