textfiles/politics/SPUNK/sp000209.txt

Discussion on Radical Strategy, Sabotage, and the Weathermen

The following was written by Michael Albert, the editor of
_Z Magazine_ and sysop of Zbbs.  He is responding to someone who
posted a message on Zbbs about sabotage and its use as a
tactic/strategy for social change.  

I think his response is fairly representative of an evolved radical
approach to social change, and dispells many of the myths (perpetuated
by the corporate media) that "radicals" are reactionary extremists.

Here it is...
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The issue, as I see it, isn't militance versus passive resistence, or
violence vs non violence, but organized informed collective resistance
suited to circumstances vs unorganized and uninformed resistance
unsuited to circumstances.

There are two goals to activism, or should be: (1) winning something,
like a reform or rollback, etc. (2) preparing the way to winning more.

Winning something is easy to understand. The resistance/activism raises
a social cost for those in position to affect the change that they
succomb to. That is it. To end a war, raise the social cost to the
warmakers so high that it exceeds their desire to continue it. To
install a new stoplight at a dangerous street corner, raise the social
cost above the retisense to make the change.

What raises cost? Well thats one thing we might discuss, I think. I
think we'll find that in cases that matter a lot, the critical factor
is the threat of continued growth of resistance...thus connecting points
one and two.

As to preparing the ground for further victories, it seems to me that
this means increasing the number of dissidents, increasing the
understanding dissidents have and their committment, and/or increasing
their organizational capabilities and the means of opposition at their
disposal---and/or weakening those who defend the status quo.

What accomplishes these ends. This seems like another thing we can
discuss. But it certainly includes winning reforms that provide a
better starting place for further battles, again joining one and two.

Different tactics and strategies likely fit different contexts. You
don't use nonviolent marches in the rice paddies in Vietnam to win the
war against the U.S. there.  You don't assault police caravans in the
deltas in Mississippi during the Civil Rights movement.

To argue either for or against some approach as universally, or nearly
universally superior or inferior to another, one would have to show
that it inevitably has certain really good or really bad effects.

This is possible, of course. I use this approach to argue against
Leninist organization and inner movement deception, for example, by
arguing that the effect of these on movement capacities to reach out to
larger constituencies (in the U.S. for example), or to win anything
desireable (here and elsewhere too) is so negative as to offset any
possible advantages. Likewise, one might argue against incorporating
class divisions, or race hierarchies, or sexism, within the movement. I
would do this too.

Advocates of non-violence use this approach to argue that violent
tactics should be avoided always because the cost to the movement in
reduced capability to gain anything worthwhile in the future is greater
than any momentary accomplishments.  I think they have a very strong
point, but one that isn't always valid.


Any change within the
bounds of the system, that isn't a revolution, certainly leaves the
system intact. True. But that doesn't mean that such a change can't be
part of a revolutionary process and can't have very important and
necessary effects for constituencies that deserve better circumstances.

Reforms can be won against the opposition of elites and by dissident,
disenfranchised and otherwise badly off constituencies and can (a)
improve their conditions and circumstances and (b) leave them in a
better position to win still more gains and develop a still more
powerful movement, either because of gains in consciousness,
organization, rights, etc.  etc.

So if you think that oppressed constituencies can go from a position of
little power and cohesion to revolution in one swooooop, and any lesser
shortterm aim is a waste of time, I guess you come up with your view.

But if you understand that the process of developing social movements
and oppositional infrastructure and dissident consciousness takes time,
and people need improvements in their lives now, and if you understand
that improvements can facilitate the whole process, then you come up
with a perspective that distinguishes between what a fellow named Andre
Gorz used to term reformist reforms (which are system reinforcing, do
not increase the power of dissidents, etc.) and revolutionary reforms
(which are part of a larger on-going process).

Imagine workers winning, sequentially, the right to have shop floor and
firm wide workers councils. The right for those to meet some amount of
time weekly. The right of access to all information bearing on
production, pricing, and other workplace decisions. The right to
veto price hikes, in consultation with consumer groups. The right to
determine shop floor working conditions. And so on, and so forth, till
workers councils, with other popular institutions, culminate their
activities in a revolution that changes society's basic defining
institutions.

Imagine workers without having ever won anything, having consistently
either ignored shortterm struggle or, if more conscious, disdained it,
suddenly rise up and take over the economy, transforming its basic
institutions.

I guess, I find the first scenario infinitely more plausible and
infinitely more likely to yield a new system that isn't, as the song
says, the same (in essence) as the old one.

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The following is a continuation of the discussion of 
sabotage on Zbbs.  There are three articles I am posting 
here.  This one is by Michael Albert, the editor of _Z 
Magazine_ and sysop of Zbbs.  It goes into liberal reform 
politics versus direct action politics (and the good/bad 
things about both).  He brings up his experiences (negative) 
with the Weathermen, the 60s underground organization 
who used to blow things up.

I find this topic very interesting and relevent to some 
threads on this forum, and so I am posting here for others to 
read.  I am interested in discussing these ideas with anyone.  
Thanks.

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[Previous to the following was a post from someone 
advocating direct action politics, not necessarily sabotage, 
which he agreed is oftentimes counter-productive.  He was 
very critical of liberal/reform politics]

Michael Albert's reply:

I share your frustration with liberalism, etc. And while I 
sometimes encounter serious people arguing for such 
positions, with dignity, I often also encounter people who 
are, I think, being quite dense or hypocritical. But there are 
also dense, or hypocritical, or self serving people who 
propose, enact, follow direct action approaches. So the 
issue isn't merely who is doing it, but should people who 
know what they are doing and are commited do it. I think 
we probably agree.

I could go on forever, I suppose, with stories about not only 
the weathermen, but just about every constituency and 
group active in the 60s, etc. As you say, I was there, and 
indeed, involved in many many aspects.

At one point, I and a close friend, Peter Bohmer--who is 
also active on this board--were, I suppose you could say, 
rushed by the local Boston chapter of Weatherman. As in 
most cities, the folks who started Weatherman were, I think 
I would have to say, very much in tune with the sentiments 
you voice--quite intelligently. They were generally among 
the best informed and most committed activists in each 
community. They were tired of liberal and 30s influenced 
bullshit. They saw, rather more clearly than many, the 
dimensions of the "enemy." And they were impatient to 
win.

So they formed an organization designed to "bring the war 
home" as in provoke conflict and hostility here in the U.S. 
so that all those of good heart and courage would take up 
on the left side, and the rest would be clearly evident on the 
right side, and the hostilities would tie up the monster's 
resources, and the people of the third world would be free 
to liberate themselves as their enemy was tied up at home.

In fact, they had virtually no good effects and contributed 
mightily, I think, to the dissolution of the left, which had 
serious prospects but for this and other internal problems.

Anyhow, because these Weather folks were quite smart and 
seemed quite serious and committed and so on, and, at that 
stage, had not lost touch with reality, Peter and I paid 
attention. These folks were not saddled by reticense of any 
kind, least of all silly notions of obedience, prospects for 
liberal politicians, etc.

I can't remember the order of events that led to us saying no 
to recruitment--I stayed friends with these folks, despite our 
strong and steadily growing disagreements. The events 
were, however, the following.

First, I went to Chomsky and asked his thoughts on it. He 
was loathe then, and remains loathe now, to comment on 
strategy. He feels it is not something he has much to say on, 
much knowledge about. But, we talked and he said, and I 
am not abridging for want of space--"It is a shame. Some 
very good people are going to die. Nothing of value will 
come of their sacrifice." This, in fact, is precisely what 
happened.

Still, we want on a kind of "see how we operate" action 
with the local weather folks. First we hopped a subway car. 
On it, one of the weatherpeople was scheduled to get up 
and give a provocative speech, to separate those who were 
part of the problem from those who might become part of 
the solution, on the train--their usual aim. So he stood up on 
a chair, rather nervous, and he gave his speech. Again, no 
brevity from me. Here is the whole, unedited thing. I will 
not likely ever forget it. "Country sucks, kick ass." He may 
have said it twice.

The action we went on was these folks going to a mixer 
(that was a type of dance where college folks went to meet 
others) and circulating on the floor, breaking up couples 
(bourgeois behavior) and generally creating infantile 
mayhem.

We didn't join.

After much maturing of the organization -- remember these 
folks were, truly as opposed to Kennedy rhetoric -- among 
the best (most ethically motivated) and brightest (most 
knowledgeable and confident) in each locale where they 
emerged -- and many actions (such as going to a working 
class beach and planting an NLF flag to provoke pitched 
fighting to find tough folks to recruit and convince others of 
their sincerety, or stealing clothes and food, individually 
[the leader in Boston, a brilliant guy, was once arrested for 
shoplifting underwear], or going to demonstrations, 
provoking cops, and then running while others stayed to
help those who had no experience and didn't know what to 
do, etc.) -- one night a bunch of weatherfolks showed up at 
my apartment. They knocked and asked if they could stay 
the night. They needed a place to hide and crash. I let them 
in. They told me they were hiding out. They said "We are 
the Vietcong, and they are after us." They were delusional
and paranoid. The final result of a trajectory that was at 
least as destructive as writing idiotic letters to a 
Congressperson.

Their experience doesn't rule out direct action as a viable 
tactic. It rules out uninformed stupidity as a framework able 
to sustain worthwhile direct action. Likewise, the 
experiences you have had with some advocates of marching 
or holding teach-ins or even writing letters, certainly 
doesn't rule out these activities as possibly important
tactics, it rules out liberalism (uniformed stupidity and/or 
hypocrisy) as a framework able to sustain worthwhile 
reform struggle.

Enough for now --- though if you would like more reports 
on the period, and whatever lessons I and others took from 
it, I am happy to comply.  Indeed, I guess that could be one 
rather valuable contribution a bbs like this could make.

And I want to apologize for something, though I am not 
sure it makes sense to act any differently. Whenever I write 
a reply to a post on zbbs, I write for a potentially broad 
audience of readers. I thus try to pay attention to what I am 
responding to, but I also try to make points that may be of 
more general interest, and may even recross territory the
original poster needs no comment on.

The gap that continues in our discussion, I think, is that 
while I freely acknowledge that what you call reform type 
tactics and aims can be counter productive, or at least not 
particularly advantageous to real social change--you 
haven't, I think, at any time indicated a similar feeling about 
direct action, particularly certain types of it, having in-built 
attributes which can be quite counter productive at certain
times and in certain contexts. I get the feeling, and maybe I 
am just reading it in, that for you direct action is somehow 
like -- say, truth.  There is a tremendous burden of proof to 
do anything else.

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This is a repost from a discussion going on currently on 
Zbbs.  It is a reply to Michael Albert's  post appearing 
above.  The post after this is Albert's counter-reply.  You 
may want to read the three in order, or again, you may not.  
It is mostly about the Weathermen.

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Your talk about the Weathermen spurred me to take a look 
at the top of my bookshelf, where I have several copies of 
Osawatamie, the official paper of the Weather Underground 
(I wonder if they are collector's items now?). Blowing off 
the dust, I spent an hour or so remembering them and their 
political effort. I agree that the Weather Underground's 
efforts turned out badly for most of the Left, but we may 
differ on why this happened. 

To the establishment, the Weathermen were their worst 
nightmare come true. Armed revolutionaries, intelligent (for 
the most part), organized (for the most part), with an ability 
to be effective. That is, the bombings carried out by the 
Weathermen were not against individuals, and in fact, I 
believe that the only people ever killed by Weathermen 
bombings were their own due to mistakes.

To hear the government describe Weathermen activities, you 
would believe that they were the worst kind of terrorists, but 
this was not the case. Every bombing had a purpose and a 
message. These were not random acts of violence. This fact 
was, of course, obscured through the establishment press of 
the time. Similar to the press treatment of the Red Brigade 
(their "knee-cappings" were 100% restricted to individuals 
with ties to the Nazi SS). 

Take for example, this excerpt from Osawatomie (Autumn 
1975 No. 3):

Weather Underground Organization
   Bombs Kennecott Corporation
Salt Lake City, Utah September 4, 1975

On the second anniversary of the fascist coup in Chile, we 
attacked the national headquarters of Kennecott Corporation 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, in solidarity with the heroic 
resistance of the Chilean people. We attacked Kennecott for 
all the years it has robbed the Chilean people of their copper, 
and wealth, for its role in the overthrow of the Popular Unity 
government and the murder of Salvador Allende, and for its 
oppression and exploitation of working people in the US.

Kennecott, Anaconda and ITT share responsibility with 
Kissinger and the CIA for the overthrow of the 
democratically-elected Popular Unity government. 
Kennecott and Anaconda organized for an international 
boycott  of Chile's copper and simultaneously forced the 
undermining of the economy. Kennecott continues to drain 
wealth from the Chilean people. Kennecott is now receiving 
$68 million from the military dictatorship in "compensation" 
for the nationalization of its mines. This on top of more than 
$4 billion in copper profits which Kennecott and Anaconda 
together mined out over a 40-year period....

****
That the Weathermen acted on their beliefs, to the point that 
they were willing to go "underground", and carry out an 
armed struggle against the US government, required that this 
same government make sure that they not only did not 
succeed, but that their message did not get out to the people 
who were ready (in a number of cases) to hear it. Thus, they 
were painted as simple, yet extremely dangerous, criminals, 
not political revolutionaries. Reports on their bombings were 
muted, their related messages not published. In the end they 
were hunted down, stifled, with a few left to fend for 
themselves. (Recently reemerging to try and continue their 
assimilation back into society above ground). 

This level of commitment, I imagine, also had a profound 
affect on the Left, especially those who were unwilling or 
unable to go so far. 

They are now gone and for the most part forgotten, 
intentionally. I couldn't help but notice that during a 5-10 
minute news segment about Bernadine Dohrn, that not a 
single mention was made of the Weather Underground. Her 
involvement was always mentioned as with a "political 
movement" or group. Perhaps a final attempt to push the 
memory  of the Weathermen into oblivion.

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This is the third post in a three-post series on sabotage, 
reform versus direct action politics, and the Weathermen.  It 
is a reply to the previous post.

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Well, I guess we can all have our own memories, or 
reconstructions based on writings.

But in my memory the weatherman were a sad and arguably 
pitiful waste of life and talent. Despite and even because of 
their sacrifices...

Their effect on the broader movement was not exemplary or 
inspiring but nearly universally destructive. Had you seen a 
bottle and chain fight between weathermen and pl-ers, and 
the effects on those around, and the numerous other 
instances I could dredge up, you might have a somewhat
different view of their impact. Had you watched them 
ridicule people moving left, but not yet ready (or not stupid 
enough) to take lunatic risks for no purpose, you might not 
think they were a force strengthening the movement as a 
whole.

For the most part, perhaps even exclusively, in the few 
instances they bombed something other than themselves, the 
weathermen bombed empty toilet stalls. Forgive me, but I 
was not impressed then, and the memory is only sad.

Their analysis of the world, insofar as it differed from others 
on the left -- everyone had a lot in common, which was, I 
think, basically quite correct -- was ignorant and even silly. 
>From their belief that the revolution, for all humanity, was 
around the corner, to their belief that third world uprisings 
were both the optimum of humanism/socialism and 
inevitably the tide that would soon crush capital, to their 
disdain and hostility for almost all people in their own 
country.

I remember many stories that make the points. Here is but 
one. There was a session in Cuba. A film was shown of war 
activity -- in Vietnam, of course -- and during the film there 
was a clip of some Vietnamese shooting down an American 
plane. Some people in the audience applauded, as if 
watching a ball game. After the film the Cuban in charge of 
the event lectured the watchers on the immorality and 
innanity of clapping for the death of one's fellow citizens.

The weathermen went from the salt of our generation, so to 
speak, to a bunch of paranoid posturers in a matter of 
months. It is a testimony to the power of poorly chosen ideas 
and tactics to corrupt those adopting them.

If the weathermen hadn't existed, far from being a boon for 
capital and the government, capital and the government 
would have had to invent them.

As to coverage. Again I think things were rather different 
than you think they were. There was plenty of coverage of 
the weathermen. And they were consistently called 
revolutionaries, too. For the same reason the Soviet Union 
was consistently called socialist, to devalue the label via the 
sins of the labeled. What was missing from coverage of the 
left was not notices of weatherman actions--but coverage of 
serious organizing, coverage of serious ideas, etc. etc.
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