838 lines
45 KiB
Plaintext
838 lines
45 KiB
Plaintext
![]() |
|
||
|
<*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>
|
||
|
<*> Joe Cosmo Presents..... <*>
|
||
|
<*> <*>
|
||
|
<*> Methods of Phreaking and Telco Security Measures <*>
|
||
|
<*> <*>
|
||
|
<*> June 16, 1988 1:30 am <*>
|
||
|
<*> <*>
|
||
|
<*> (updated 7/3/88 for CN/A list & Plus One Service) <*>
|
||
|
<*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
(formatted to 80 Columns)
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dedication: This phile is dedicated to all those great phreakers who taught
|
||
|
me all of this, and to all of the newcomers being born to the phreak world. For
|
||
|
the legends, it is here as their legacy, and for the newcomers, I hope they
|
||
|
will use it as their guide in times of trouble, and may there always be
|
||
|
phreakers in the world.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS
|
||
|
CHAPTER
|
||
|
I. Introduction: What Telephone Fraud Is
|
||
|
II. Who Does It and Why
|
||
|
III. The Systems That Are Fooled
|
||
|
IV. Electronic Toll Fraud
|
||
|
How Boxes Work
|
||
|
The Blue Box
|
||
|
Operation of a Blue Box
|
||
|
Pink Noise
|
||
|
The Black Box
|
||
|
The Red Box
|
||
|
The Cheese Box
|
||
|
V. Divertors
|
||
|
VI. Private Branch Exchanges
|
||
|
VII. Specialized Common Carriers
|
||
|
SCC Extenders List
|
||
|
VIII. PC Pursuit
|
||
|
How to Originate a PC Pursuit Call
|
||
|
IX. Cellular Phone Fraud
|
||
|
ESN Tampering
|
||
|
Obtaining ESN's
|
||
|
X. CN/A's
|
||
|
CN/A List (updated 7/3/88)
|
||
|
XI. Loops
|
||
|
XII. Alliance Teleconferencing
|
||
|
Billing an Alliance Conference
|
||
|
Starting a Conference
|
||
|
XIII. Telephone System Security Measure
|
||
|
ESS Detection Devices
|
||
|
Automatic Number Identification and Centralized
|
||
|
Automatic Message Accounting Tapes
|
||
|
Dialed Number Recorders
|
||
|
Trap Codes
|
||
|
The Lock In Trace
|
||
|
Stopping a Lock In Trace
|
||
|
4Tel (Updated 6/24/88 Thanx to Touch Tone of BC, Canada)
|
||
|
Evading 4Tel
|
||
|
Plus One Service (updated 7/3/88)
|
||
|
Common Channel Inter-office Signaling
|
||
|
XIV. Laws Governing the Rights of Phreakers
|
||
|
XV. Conclusion
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
I. Introduction: What Telephone Fraud Is
|
||
|
Telephone fraud is illegally using the communication facilities of
|
||
|
telephone companies. This is commonly known as "phreaking." The writer's
|
||
|
purpose
|
||
|
is to explore the methods of phreaking, and the various security measures of
|
||
|
telephone companies.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
II. Who Does It and Why
|
||
|
The majority of people who phreak are owners of modems (MOdulators
|
||
|
DEModulators, devices which allow computers to communicate over telephone
|
||
|
lines)
|
||
|
and are usually between the ages of twelve and seventeen. When the person
|
||
|
reaches age eighteen, he or she usually stops, since after that age, if the
|
||
|
person in caught, the penalty can become very serious. Phreaking is the
|
||
|
violation of the law on Fraud In Connection With Access Devices, which carries
|
||
|
maximum penalties of 15 years imprisonment and a fine of $50,000, or twice the
|
||
|
value of the fraudulent activity.
|
||
|
Scattered throughout the country are many different computer bulletin
|
||
|
board
|
||
|
systems, or BBS's. These are computer systems established by private users or
|
||
|
large organizations for the exchange of public and private messages and
|
||
|
software. Most are not a local call, though. Since the normal user calls about
|
||
|
ten different BBS's, with even the lowest long-distance rates, the phone bill
|
||
|
each month can range from $100 to $1000. The solution is to phreak. When these
|
||
|
people learn how to phreak, they also realize that besides making free
|
||
|
long-distance calls from their home, they can also make free calls from
|
||
|
payphones. They also find that there are many other facilities that they can
|
||
|
used without paying.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
III. The Systems That Are Fooled
|
||
|
Their are three types of telephone operating systems in the U.S., Step by
|
||
|
Step (SxS), Crossbar (XB), and Electronic Switching System (ESS). They are
|
||
|
described in detail in the following paragraphs.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Step by Step
|
||
|
Step by Step (SxS) was the first switching system used in America, adopted
|
||
|
in 1918 and until 1978 Bell had over 53% of all exchanges using Step by Step.
|
||
|
A
|
||
|
long, and confusing train of switches is used for SxS switching.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Disadvantages
|
||
|
A. The switch train may become jammed, blocking calls.
|
||
|
B. No DTMF (Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency), to be discussed later.
|
||
|
C. Much maintenance and much electricity.
|
||
|
D. No "Touch-Tone" dialing.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Identification
|
||
|
A. No pulsing digits after dialing or "Touch Tone".
|
||
|
B. Much static in the connections.
|
||
|
C. No Speed calling, Call forwarding, and other services.
|
||
|
D. Pay-phone wants money first before dial-tone.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Crossbar
|
||
|
Crossbar has been Bell's primary switcher after 1960. Three types of
|
||
|
Crossbar switchings exist, Number 1 Crossbar (1XB), Number 4 Crossbar (4XB),
|
||
|
and
|
||
|
Number 5 Crossbar (5XB). A switching matrix is used for all of the phones in an
|
||
|
area. When someone calls, the route is determined and is connected with the
|
||
|
other phone. The matrix is positioned in horizontal and vertical paths,
|
||
|
organizing the train of switches more effectively, and therefore, stopping the
|
||
|
equipment from jamming. There are no definite distinguishing features of
|
||
|
Crossbar switchings from Step by Step.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Electronic Switching System
|
||
|
ESS is the most advanced system employed, and has gone through many kinds
|
||
|
of revisions. The latest system to date is ESS 11a, which is used in Washington
|
||
|
D.C. for security reasons. ESS is the country's most advanced switching system,
|
||
|
and has the highest security system of all. With its many special features, it
|
||
|
is truly the phreaker's nightmare.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Identification
|
||
|
A. Dialing 911 for emergencies.
|
||
|
B. Dial-tone first for pay-phones.
|
||
|
C. Calling services, including Call forwarding, Speed dialing, and Call
|
||
|
waiting.
|
||
|
D. Automatic Number Identification for long-distance calls (ANI), to be
|
||
|
discussed later.
|
||
|
E. "Touch Tone"
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
IV. Electronic Toll Fraud
|
||
|
The ETF's are electrical devices used to get free long-distance calls. The
|
||
|
devices are more commonly known as colored boxes, and using them is known as
|
||
|
"boxing." Boxing is one of the oldest way to phreak, and therefore, it is also
|
||
|
the most dangerous, since the telephone companies are very much aware of their
|
||
|
existence. Colored boxes are not used only for phreaking. There are many types
|
||
|
which have other uses (such as the Tron Box, which lowers your electric bill),
|
||
|
so only those used in telephone fraud will be discussed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
How Boxes Work
|
||
|
In the beginning, all long distance calls were connected manually by
|
||
|
operators who passed on the called number verbally to other operators in
|
||
|
series.
|
||
|
This is because pulse (rotary) digits are created by causing breaks in the DC
|
||
|
current. Since long distance calls call for routing through various switching
|
||
|
equipment and AC voice amplifiers, pulse dialing cannot be used to send the
|
||
|
destination number to the end local office (CO).
|
||
|
Eventually, the demand for faster and more efficient long distance service
|
||
|
caused Bell to make a multi-billion dollar decision. They had to create a
|
||
|
signaling system that could be used on the LD Network. They had two options:
|
||
|
|
||
|
[1] To send all the signaling and supervisory information (eg., ON and OFF
|
||
|
HOOK)
|
||
|
over separate data links. This type of signaling is referred to as out-of-band
|
||
|
signaling.
|
||
|
|
||
|
[2] To send all the signaling information along with the conversation using
|
||
|
tones to represent digits. This type of signaling is called in-band signaling.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
The second seemed to be the most economical choice, and so, it was incorporated
|
||
|
in ESS.
|
||
|
Then, in the 1960's, when the first ESS systems were employed, a toy
|
||
|
whistle was put in each box of Captain Crunch Cereal as a premium. A young
|
||
|
radio
|
||
|
technician in the United States Air Force became fascinated with the whistle
|
||
|
when he discovered that by blowing it into the telephone after dialing any long
|
||
|
distance number, the trunk line would remain open without toll charges
|
||
|
accounting. From then on, any number could be dialed for free. The truth was
|
||
|
that the whistle produced a perfect-pitch 2600 Hz tone, the one used to signify
|
||
|
a disconnect in ESS switching equipment. To overcome the initial charge for the
|
||
|
for the long distance call, he later used toll-free 800 numbers.
|
||
|
Being a skilled technician, Captain Crunch (he began to use the name as an
|
||
|
alias) soon went beyond the simple whistle and experimented with other
|
||
|
frequencies, creating many of the boxes discussed in the following paragraphs.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Blue Box
|
||
|
The "Blue Box" was so named because of the color of the first one
|
||
|
discovered by the authorities. The design and hardware used in the Blue Box is
|
||
|
very sophisticated, and its size varies from a large piece of apparatus to a
|
||
|
miniaturized unit that is approximately the size of a "king size" package of
|
||
|
cigarettes.
|
||
|
The Blue Box contains 12 or 13 buttons or switches that emit the
|
||
|
multi-frequency tones used in the normal operation of the telephone toll (long
|
||
|
distance) switching network. In effect, the the Blue Box can let a person
|
||
|
become
|
||
|
the operator of a phone line. The Blue Box enables its user to originate
|
||
|
fraudulent toll calls by circumventing (fooling) toll billing equipment. The
|
||
|
Blue Box may be directly connected to a phone line, or it may be acoustically
|
||
|
coupled to a telephone handset by placing the Blue Box's speaker next to the
|
||
|
transmitter, or the telephone handset.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Operation of a Blue Box
|
||
|
To understand the steps of a fraudulent Blue Box call, it is necessary to
|
||
|
understand the basic operation of the Direct Distance Dialing (DDD) telephone
|
||
|
network. When a DDD call is originated, the calling number is identified as an
|
||
|
integral part of establishing the connection. This may be done either
|
||
|
automatically by ANI in ESS, or in some cases, by an operator asking the
|
||
|
calling
|
||
|
party for his telephone number. This information is entered on a tape in the
|
||
|
Centralized Automatic Message Accounting (CAMA) office. This tape also contains
|
||
|
the number assigned to the trunk line over which the call is to be made. The
|
||
|
information relating to the call contained on the tape includes the called
|
||
|
number's identification, time of origination of the call, and if the called
|
||
|
number answered the call. The time of disconnect is also recorded. The various
|
||
|
data entries with of the call are correlated to provide billing information for
|
||
|
use by the caller's telephone company's accounting department.
|
||
|
The typical Blue Box user usually dials a number that will route the call
|
||
|
into the telephone network without charge. For example, the user will very
|
||
|
often
|
||
|
call a well-known INWATS (toll-free) number. The Blue Box user, after gaining
|
||
|
this access to the network when somebody picks up and in effect, "seizing"
|
||
|
control of the line, operates a key on the Blue Box which emits a 2600 Hertz
|
||
|
(cycles per second, abbreviated as Hz) tone. This tone causes the switching
|
||
|
equipment to release the connection to the INWATS customer's line. The 2600 Hz
|
||
|
tone is the signal to the switching system that the calling party has hung up.
|
||
|
In fact though, the local trunk on the calling party's end is still connected
|
||
|
to
|
||
|
the toll network. The Blue Box user now operates the "KP" (Key Pulse) key on
|
||
|
the
|
||
|
Blue Box to notify the toll switching equipment that switching signals are
|
||
|
about
|
||
|
to be emitted. The user then pushes the "number" buttons on the Blue Box
|
||
|
corresponding to the telephone number being called. After doing so, he/she
|
||
|
operates the "ST" (Start) key to tell the switching equipment that signaling is
|
||
|
complete. If the call is completed, only the portion of the original call prior
|
||
|
to the operation of the 2600 Hz tone is recorded on the CAMA tape. The tones
|
||
|
emitted by the Blue Box are not recorded on the CAMA tape. Therefore, because
|
||
|
the original call to the INWATS number is toll-free, no billing is rendered in
|
||
|
connection with the call.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The above are the steps in a normal operation of a Blue Box, but they may
|
||
|
vary in any one of the following ways:
|
||
|
|
||
|
A. The Blue Box may include a rotary dial to apply the 2600Hz tone and the
|
||
|
switching signals. This type of Blue Box is called a "dial pulser" or "rotary
|
||
|
SF" Blue box.
|
||
|
|
||
|
B. A magnetic tape recording may be used to record the Blue Box tones. Such a
|
||
|
tape recording could be used in lieu of a Blue Box to fraudulently place calls
|
||
|
to the phone numbers recorded on the magnetic tape.
|
||
|
|
||
|
All Blue Boxes, except "dial pulse" or "Rotary SF" Blue Boxes,
|
||
|
must have the following four common operating capabilities:
|
||
|
|
||
|
A. It be able to emit the 2600 Hz tone. This tone is used by the toll network
|
||
|
to
|
||
|
indicate, either by its presence or its absence, an "on hook" (idle) or "off
|
||
|
hook" (busy) condition of a trunk line.
|
||
|
|
||
|
B. The Blue Box must have a "KP" tones that unlocks or readies
|
||
|
the multi-frequency receiver at the called end to receive the
|
||
|
tones corresponding to the called phone number.
|
||
|
|
||
|
C. The Blue Box must be able to emit DTMF, tones used to transmit phone numbers
|
||
|
over the toll network. Each digit of a phone number is represented by a
|
||
|
combination of two tones. For example, the 2 is 700 Hz and 900 Hz.
|
||
|
|
||
|
D. The Blue Box must have an "ST" key which consists of a combination of two
|
||
|
tones that tell the equipment at the called end that all digits have been sent
|
||
|
and that the equipment should start connecting the call to the called number.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The following is a chart of the multi-frequency (MF) tones produced by the
|
||
|
normal Blue Box.
|
||
|
|
||
|
700 : 1 : 2 : 4 : 7 : 11 : 2600 X
|
||
|
900 : + : 3 : 5 : 8 : 12 :
|
||
|
1100 : + : + : 6 : 9 : KP :
|
||
|
1300 : + : + : + : 10 : KP2 :
|
||
|
1500 : + : + : + : + : ST :
|
||
|
: 700 : 900 :1100 :1300 :1500 :
|
||
|
|
||
|
The "Dial Pulser" or "Rotary SF" Blue Box requires only a dial
|
||
|
with a signalling capability to produce a 2600 Hz tone.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Pink Noise
|
||
|
Since telephone companies have such advanced equipment to detect Blue
|
||
|
Boxes, to help avoid detection "pink noise" is sometimes added to the 2600 Hz
|
||
|
tone.
|
||
|
Since 2600 Hz tones can be simulated in speech, the detection equipment of
|
||
|
the switching system must be attentive not to misinterpret speech as a
|
||
|
disconnect signal. Thus, a virtually
|
||
|
pure 2600 Hz tone is required for disconnect. This is also the reason why the
|
||
|
2600 Hz tone must be sent rapidly; sometimes, it will not work when the person
|
||
|
called is speaking. It is feasible, though, to send some "pink noise" along
|
||
|
with
|
||
|
the 2600 Hz. Most of this energy should be above 3000 Hz. The pink noise will
|
||
|
not reach the toll network, where we want our pure 2600 Hz to hit, but it will
|
||
|
go through the local CO and thus, the fraud detectors.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Black Box
|
||
|
The Black Box is the easiest type to build. The box stops a call from
|
||
|
being
|
||
|
charged to some one only if it is hooked to the line of the person being
|
||
|
called.
|
||
|
In the normal telephone cable, there are four wires: a red, a green, a
|
||
|
black, and a yellow. The red & green wires are often referred to as tip (T) and
|
||
|
ring (R).
|
||
|
When a telephone is on-hook (hung up) there is approximately 48 volts of
|
||
|
DC
|
||
|
current (VDC) flowing through the tip and ring. When the handset of a phone is
|
||
|
lifted, switches close, causing a loop to be connected (which is known as the
|
||
|
"local loop,") between the telephone and the CO. Once this happens DC current
|
||
|
is able to flow through the telephone with less resistance. This causes a
|
||
|
relay
|
||
|
to energize and signal to other CO equipment that service is being requested.
|
||
|
Eventually, a dial tone is emitted. This also causes the 48 VDC to drop down
|
||
|
into the vicinity of 13 volts. The resistance of the loop also drops below the
|
||
|
2500 ohm level. Considering that this voltage and resistance drop is how the CO
|
||
|
detects that a telephone was taken off hook, how a Black Box works is by
|
||
|
allowing the voltage to drop enough to allow talking, but not enough to signal
|
||
|
to the CO equipment to start billing. To do this, a 10,000 Ohm, .5 Watt
|
||
|
resistor
|
||
|
is incorporated in the local loop on the called party's line.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Red Box
|
||
|
A Red Box is a device that simulates the sound of a coin being accepted by
|
||
|
a payphone. When a coin is put in the slot of a payphone, the first obstacle is
|
||
|
the magnetic trap. This will stop any light-weight magnetic slugs. If it passes
|
||
|
this, the coin is then classed as a nickel, dime, or quarter. Each coin is then
|
||
|
checked for appropriate size and weight. If these tests are passed, it will
|
||
|
then
|
||
|
travel through a nickel, dime, or quarter magnet as proper. These magnets start
|
||
|
an eddy current effect which causes coins of the appropriate characteristics to
|
||
|
slow down so they will follow the correct trajectory.
|
||
|
If all goes well, the coin will follow the correct path, striking the
|
||
|
appropriate totalizer arm, causing a ratchet wheel to rotate once for every
|
||
|
5-cent increment (eg, a quarter will cause it to rotate 5 times). The totalizer
|
||
|
then causes the coin signal oscillator to readout a dual-frequency signal
|
||
|
indicating the value deposited to the Automated Coin Toll Service computer
|
||
|
(ACTS) or the Traffic Service Position System (TSPS) operator. These are the
|
||
|
tones emitted by the Red Box.
|
||
|
For a quarter, five beep tones are outpulsed for 66 milliseconds (ms). A
|
||
|
dime causes two beep tones for 33 ms, while a nickel causes one beep tone at
|
||
|
also 33 ms. A beep consists of two frequencies, 2200 Hz and 1700 Hz. As with a
|
||
|
Blue Box, Red Box tones can be recorded on a magnetic tape.
|
||
|
Since any call from a payphone is originated with a "ground test," in
|
||
|
which
|
||
|
the TSPS operator or the ACTS computer checks for the presence of the first
|
||
|
coin
|
||
|
inserted into the phone, by verifying use of the magnetic, weight, and size
|
||
|
traps, when using a Red Box, it is necessary to put in at least one coin.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Cheese Box
|
||
|
A Cheese Box lets a normal telephone emulate a payphone. By emulating a
|
||
|
payphone, using a blue box now becomes safe, because if the CO equipment
|
||
|
recognizes the call as one from a payphone, it does not record it on a CAMA
|
||
|
tape. Since a normal telephone does not have a slot to enter coins, a Red Box
|
||
|
is
|
||
|
needed to generate the sound of a coin dropping.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
V. Divertors
|
||
|
A divertor is a special service that allows businesses to "divert" calls
|
||
|
if
|
||
|
no one answers after a certain number of rings. For example, a person calls a
|
||
|
company, and nobody answers. After about three rings, a few clicks are heard,
|
||
|
then a few fainter rings are heard. The building receiving the call has changed
|
||
|
from the company to another building, usually somebody's house. What has
|
||
|
happened is that the call has been re-routed from building A to building B. In
|
||
|
effect, the number called is not really changed, but instead, building A has
|
||
|
answered the call, called building B, and connected the two lines together. If
|
||
|
the person in building B disconnects, the caller is still connected to building
|
||
|
A. With the way the divertor equipment works in the telephone company, the
|
||
|
phone
|
||
|
line of building A will then emit a dial tone and the caller has total control
|
||
|
of the line, and can originate another call, charging it to building A.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
VI. Private Branch Exchanges
|
||
|
A Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is a system of out-WATS (Wide Area
|
||
|
Telephone Service) lines and in-WATS lines. An out-WATS line allows a business
|
||
|
to make as long-distance calls each month for a flat rate. An in-WATS line is a
|
||
|
toll-free number (800 number) that is also leased to businesses for flat rates.
|
||
|
PBX's save corporations much money when their salesmen, distributors, and
|
||
|
franchisees must make many calls from different parts of the country. It works
|
||
|
much like specialized common carriers (to be discussed later).
|
||
|
First, the employee calls the company on the in-WATS line. The switching
|
||
|
equipment picks up the phone, and send a tone to the employee indicating for
|
||
|
him
|
||
|
to enter the access code of the PBX. If the access code is correct, then the
|
||
|
line is connected to the out-WATS line, and the employee can make a call.
|
||
|
To use PBX's, phreakers must find the access code of the PBX. This can be
|
||
|
done very easily, since the code is usually only a few digits. One way is to
|
||
|
dial different combinations manually on the telephone keypad. The other way is
|
||
|
of the phreaker is the owner of a modem. A simple program can be easily written
|
||
|
to continuously dial digit combinations randomly or sequentially.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
VII. Specialized Common Carriers
|
||
|
Ever since the break up of AT&T's monopoly on long-distance service, there
|
||
|
have been many other corporations that compete with AT&T in the long-distance
|
||
|
market, including Sprint, MCI, All-net, ITT, and Metrophone. These all boast
|
||
|
opportunities for large savings on long-distance calls. These companies are
|
||
|
called specialized common carriers (SCC's).
|
||
|
SCC's cost less because they do not use the AT&T's cable-based systems,
|
||
|
but
|
||
|
instead use microwave links. Some have also added fiber-optic lines to their
|
||
|
networks.
|
||
|
Another way they can save consumers money is by using AT&T's lines.
|
||
|
Instead
|
||
|
of connecting calls by the shortest route, the carrier will use a different
|
||
|
route, so the call goes through places where the long-distance traffic is
|
||
|
heavy,
|
||
|
and the rate is lower. The companies that do this are known as "resellers."
|
||
|
Most SCC's work nearly the same as PBX's. The 800 number is called, a tone
|
||
|
is heard, the private identification number (PIN) is entered, and then the call
|
||
|
can be made. The length of the PIN number can range from four digit to fourteen
|
||
|
digits.
|
||
|
Besides 800 toll free numbers, in some areas, a 950 can be used. A 950
|
||
|
works exactly the same as an 800 number, the only difference is that the
|
||
|
consumer must enter only seven digits before dialing his PIN number instead of
|
||
|
ten with a toll-free number. 950's are free of charge and can be used both at
|
||
|
home and at pay phones.
|
||
|
The PIN numbers can be found the same way as PBX access codes. Since the
|
||
|
number of digits in a PIN is so great, using a computer is much more common
|
||
|
practice than manual dialing.
|
||
|
The following pages are lists of SCC's and their dialups, formats, and
|
||
|
special points. Note that some have many different dialups.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
=============================================================================
|
||
|
[ SCC Extenders List ]
|
||
|
[ 0-9 - Number of digits in code ]
|
||
|
[ [ ] - Dial that exact number ]
|
||
|
[ # - Area code + Prefix + Suffix ]
|
||
|
[ : - Dial tone ]
|
||
|
[ + - Continue dialing ]
|
||
|
=============================================================================
|
||
|
| Extender | Dialing Format | Company | Comments |
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
| 800-223-0548 | 8+[1]+# | TDX | |
|
||
|
| 800-241-1129 | 8+[1]+# | TDX | |
|
||
|
| 800-248-6248 | 6+[1]+# | SumNet Systems | (800)824-3000 |
|
||
|
| 800-288-8845 | 7:[1]+# | TMC Watts | (800)999-3339 |
|
||
|
| 800-325-0192 | [1]+#+6 | MCI | 950-1986 |
|
||
|
| 800-325-1337 | 7:[1]+# | TMC Watts | |
|
||
|
| 800-325-7222 | 6+[1]+# | Max | (800)982-4422 |
|
||
|
| 800-325-7970 | 6+[1]+# | Max | (800)982-4422 |
|
||
|
| 800-327-4532 | 8+# | All-TelCo | |
|
||
|
| 800-327-9488 | #:13 | ITT | 950-0488 |
|
||
|
| 800-334-0193 | [9]+# | Piedmont | |
|
||
|
| 800-345-0008 | [0]+#:14 | US Sprint FON Cards |950-1033 also 9+#|
|
||
|
| 800-368-4222 | 8+# | Congress Watts Lines | |
|
||
|
| 800-437-7010 | 13 | GCI | |
|
||
|
| 800-448-8989 | 14+[1]+# | Call US | |
|
||
|
| 800-521-8400 | 8:# | TravelNet | 950-1088 (voice)|
|
||
|
| 800-541-2255 | 10 | MicroTel | |
|
||
|
| 800-547-1784 | 13 | AmericaNet | |
|
||
|
| 800-621-5640 | 6+[1]+# | ExpressTel | |
|
||
|
| 800-637-4663 | 5+[1]+# | TeleSave | |
|
||
|
| 800-821-6511 950-1033 also 9+#|
|
||
|
| 800-882-2255 | 6:[1]+# | AmeriCall | False Carrier |
|
||
|
| 800-950-1022 | [0]+#:14 | MCI Calling Card | |
|
||
|
| 800-992-1444 | 9+# | AllNet | 950-1444 |
|
||
|
=============================================================================
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
VIII. PC Pursuit
|
||
|
Many modem users know Telenet as a packet-switching network through which
|
||
|
they can connect to different telecommunication services throughout the country
|
||
|
for an hourly rate of $2. With PC Pursuit, Telenet uses the same method as
|
||
|
SCC's, but instead of using microwave links, the call is routed through
|
||
|
computers. Since it is routed through computers, the service can be used by
|
||
|
only
|
||
|
owners of modems. Instead of paying the hourly rate, the consumer needs only to
|
||
|
pay a flat monthly rate of $25.
|
||
|
Using PC Pursuit is a little more difficult than using SCC's, because now
|
||
|
instead of combinations of only ten different characters (0-9), the whole
|
||
|
alphabet can be used in the access code. The following is a chart showing the
|
||
|
steps to originate a typical PC Pursuit call.
|
||
|
|
||
|
How to Originate a PC Pursuit Call
|
||
|
First, the users dials the local Telenet Access Center, which can be found
|
||
|
by dialing Telenet customer service at 1-800-336-0437.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Then:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Note: (cr) signifies the carriage return on a computer keyboard.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Network Shows | User Types | Explanation
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|_____________________________
|
||
|
| (cr) (cr) |
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|_____________________________
|
||
|
TELENET | | Telenet network called and
|
||
|
XXX XXX | | your network address.
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|_____________________________
|
||
|
TERMINAL= | "D1" (cr) | Enter "D1" or press (cr)
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|_____________________________
|
||
|
@ | For 300 bps: | CONNECT command. To access
|
||
|
| "C(sp)DIALXXX/3,XXXX(cr)" | a PC Pursuit city type a PC
|
||
|
| | Pursuit access code and
|
||
|
| For 1200 bps: | your user ID.
|
||
|
| "C(sp)DIALXXX/12,XXXX(cr)" |
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|_____________________________
|
||
|
PASSWORD= | "XXXXXX" (cr) | Type the password
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|_____________________________
|
||
|
DIALXXX/X | "ATZ" (cr) | You are now connected to the
|
||
|
CONNECTED | | PCP city. Type ATZ (upper).
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|____________________________
|
||
|
OK | "ATDTXXXXXXX" (cr) | Dials a number in PCP city
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|____________________________
|
||
|
CONNECT | | Your are now connected to
|
||
|
| | your destination computer.
|
||
|
__________________|____________________________|____________________________
|
||
|
|
||
|
If the number dialed is busy, the user will see BUSY. To call another
|
||
|
number in the same city, the user types "ATZ." The network will answer OK. The
|
||
|
user then types "ATDTXXXXXXX" (cr) to dial the next number.
|
||
|
To connect to a different PC Pursuit City, when the user sees BUSY, he
|
||
|
types "@" (cr). When a @ appears, "D" (cr) is entered. This disconnects the
|
||
|
user
|
||
|
from the previous city. The user then follows the above procedures to dial
|
||
|
another city.
|
||
|
|
||
|
IX. Cellular Phone Fraud
|
||
|
Cellular phones have evolved considerably from previous systems.
|
||
|
Signaling
|
||
|
between mobile and base stations uses high-speed digital techniques and
|
||
|
involves
|
||
|
many different types of digital messages. The cellular phone contains its own
|
||
|
Mobile Identification Number (MIN), which is programmed by the seller or
|
||
|
service
|
||
|
shop and can be changed when, for example, the phone is sold to a new user. In
|
||
|
addition, the U.S. cellular standard incorporates a second number, the
|
||
|
Electronic Serial Number (ESN), which is intended to uniquely and permanently
|
||
|
identify the mobile unit.
|
||
|
According to the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) Interim Standard
|
||
|
IS-3-B, Cellular System Mobile Station Land Station Compatibility
|
||
|
Specification, the serial number is a 32-bit binary number that uniquely
|
||
|
identifies a mobile station to any cellular system. It must be factory-set and
|
||
|
not readily alterable in the field. The circuitry that provides the serial
|
||
|
number must be isolated from fraudulent contact and tampering. Attempts to
|
||
|
change the serial number circuitry should render the mobile station
|
||
|
inoperative.
|
||
|
The ESN was intended to solve two problems the industry observed with its
|
||
|
older systems. First, the number of subscribers that older systems could
|
||
|
support
|
||
|
fell far short of the demand in some areas, leading groups of users to share a
|
||
|
single mobile number (fraudulently) by setting several phones to send the same
|
||
|
identification. Carriers lost individual user accountability and their means
|
||
|
of
|
||
|
predicting and controlling traffic on their systems.
|
||
|
Second, systems had no way of automatically detecting use of stolen
|
||
|
equipment because thieves could easily change the transmitted identification.
|
||
|
In theory, the required properties of the ESN allow cellular systems to check
|
||
|
to
|
||
|
ensure that only the correctly registered unit uses a particular MIN, and the
|
||
|
ESNs of stolen units can be permanently denied service ("hot-listed"). This
|
||
|
measure is an improvement over the older systems, but vulnerabilities remain.
|
||
|
|
||
|
ESN Tampering
|
||
|
Although the concept of the unalterable ESN is laudable in theory,
|
||
|
weaknesses are apparent in practice. Many cellular phones are not constructed
|
||
|
so that attempts to change the serial number circuitry renders the mobile
|
||
|
station inoperative. Contrary to this statement, swapping of one ESN chip for
|
||
|
another in a unitcellular switch's database. With the right equipment, the ESN/MIN pair can be
|
||
|
read right off the air because the mobile transmits it each time it originates
|
||
|
a
|
||
|
call. Service shops can capture this information using test gear that
|
||
|
automatically receives and decodes the reverse, or mobile-to-base, channels.
|
||
|
Another way to obtain the numbers is from service shops. Service shops
|
||
|
keep
|
||
|
ESN/MIN records on file for units they have sold or serviced, and the carriers
|
||
|
also have these data on all of their subscribers. Unscrupulous employees could
|
||
|
compromise the security of their customers' telephones by obtaining these
|
||
|
records.
|
||
|
In many ways, trade in illegally obtained ESN/MIN pairs could, in the
|
||
|
future, resemble what currently transpires in the long distance telephone
|
||
|
business with AT&T credit card numbers and alternate long-distance carrier
|
||
|
(such
|
||
|
as MCI, Sprint and Alltel) account codes. Code numbers are swapped among
|
||
|
friends, published on computer bulletin boards and trafficked by career
|
||
|
criminal
|
||
|
enterprises.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
X. CN/A's
|
||
|
CN/A's, which stands for Customer Names and Addresses, are bureaus that
|
||
|
exist so that authorized Bell employees can find out the name and address of
|
||
|
any
|
||
|
customer in the Bell System. All phone numbers are maintained on file
|
||
|
including
|
||
|
unlisted numbers.
|
||
|
To find the owner of any number, the person first must call the local CN/A
|
||
|
during business hours. Then he must pretend to be from a registered business,
|
||
|
and ask for the owner of the number. In some states, though, the operator will
|
||
|
ask for an ID number. In these cases, one must be guessed at.
|
||
|
There is also a type of reverse CN/A bureau, which is usually called a NON
|
||
|
PUB DA or TOLL LIB. With these numbers, somebody can find unpublished numbers
|
||
|
if
|
||
|
the caller gives the operator the name and locality. These are considerably
|
||
|
harder to use, since the operator will then request the caller's name,
|
||
|
supervisors name, etc.
|
||
|
The following is a list of current CN/A's.
|
||
|
|
||
|
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
|
||
|
1988 CN/A List (subject to change)
|
||
|
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
|
||
|
Area: CN/A Area: CN/A Area: CN/A
|
||
|
201: 201-676-7070 202: 304-343-7016 203: 203-789-6815
|
||
|
204: 204-949-0900 205: 205-988-7000 206: 206-345-4082
|
||
|
207: 617-787-5300 208: 303-293-8777 209: 415-781-5271
|
||
|
212: 518-471-8111 213: 415-781-5271 214: 214-464-7400
|
||
|
215: 412-633-5600 216: 614-464-0519 217: 217-789-8290
|
||
|
218: 402-221-7199 219: 317-265-4834 301: 304-343-1401
|
||
|
302: 412-633-5600 303: 303-293-8777 304: 304-344-8041
|
||
|
305: 912-752-2000 307: 303-293-8777 308: 402-221-7199
|
||
|
309: 217-525-7000 312: 312-796-9600 313: 313-424-0900
|
||
|
314: 816-275-8460 315: 518-471-8111 316: 913-276-6708
|
||
|
317: 317-265-4834 318: 504-245-5330 319: 402-221-7199
|
||
|
401: 617-787-5300 402: 402-221-7199 403: 403-425-2652
|
||
|
404: 912-752-2000 405: 405-236-6121 406: 303-293-8777
|
||
|
408: 415-546-1341 412: 412-633-5600 413: 617-787-5300
|
||
|
414: 608-252-6932 415: 415-781-5271 416: 416-443-0542
|
||
|
417: 816-275-8460 418: 614-464-0123 419: 614-464-0519
|
||
|
501: 405-236-6121 502: 502-583-2861 503: 206-345-4082
|
||
|
504: 504-245-5330 505: 303-293-8777 506: 506-657-3855
|
||
|
507: 402-380-2255 509: 206-345-4082 512: 512-828-2501
|
||
|
513: 614-464-0519 514: 514-394-7440 515: 402-221-7199
|
||
|
516: 518-471-8111 517: 313-424-0900 518: 518-471-8111
|
||
|
519: 416-443-0542 601: 601-961-8139 602: 303-293-8777
|
||
|
603: 617-787-5300 604: 604-432-2996 605: 402-221-7199
|
||
|
606: 502-583-2861 607: 518-471-8111 608: 608-252-6932
|
||
|
609: 201-676-7070 612: 402-221-7199 613: 416-443-0542
|
||
|
614: 614-464-0519 615: 615-373-5791 616: 313-424-0900
|
||
|
617: 617-787-5300 618: 217-525-7000 619: 415-781-5271
|
||
|
701: 402-221-7199 702: 415-543-2861 703: 304-344-7935
|
||
|
704: 912-752-2000 705: 416-443-0542 707: 415-781-5271
|
||
|
712: 402-221-7199 713: 713-961-2397 714: 213-995-0221
|
||
|
715: 608-252-6932 716: 518-471-8111 717: 412-633-5600
|
||
|
718: 518-471-8111 801: 303-293-8777 802: 617-787-5300
|
||
|
803: 912-784-9111 804: 304-344-7935 805: 415-781-5271
|
||
|
806: 512-828-2501 808: 212-226-5487 809: 404-751-8871
|
||
|
812: 317-265-4834 813: 813-228-7871 814: 412-633-5600
|
||
|
815: 217-789-8290 816: 816-275-8460 817: 214-464-7400
|
||
|
819: 514-861-6391 901: 615-373-5791 902: 902-421-4110
|
||
|
904: 912-752-2000 906: 313-424-0900 912: 912-752-2000
|
||
|
914: 518-471-8111 916: 415-781-5271 918: 405-236-6121
|
||
|
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
XI. Loops
|
||
|
The loop is an alternative communication medium that has many potential
|
||
|
uses. Loops are phone lines that are connected when they are called
|
||
|
simultaneously. One use is when somebody wants another person to call them back
|
||
|
but is reluctant to give out their home phone number (eg., if they were on a
|
||
|
party line).
|
||
|
Loops are found in pairs that are usually close to each other (eg.,
|
||
|
718-492-9996 and 718-492-9997). On a loop, one line is the high end, and the
|
||
|
other is the low end. The high end is always silent. The tone disappears on
|
||
|
the
|
||
|
low end when somebody calls the high end.
|
||
|
It is truly only safe to use a loop during non-business hours. During
|
||
|
business, loops are used to test equipment by various telephone companies and
|
||
|
local CO's.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
XII. Alliance Teleconferencing
|
||
|
Alliance Teleconferencing is an independent company which allows the
|
||
|
general public to access and use its conferencing equipment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Billing an Alliance Conference
|
||
|
Alliance Teleconferencing is accessed by dialing 0-700-456-1000 in most
|
||
|
states. In some states, the first and last digits of the suffix vary. There are
|
||
|
four main ways to use Alliance illegally. The first is through a PBX. Some
|
||
|
allow
|
||
|
use of the 700 exchange, but many do not.
|
||
|
The second way is with a Blue Box. After seizing the line,
|
||
|
KP-0-700-456-1000-ST is dialed. The equipment now thinks that Alliance has been
|
||
|
dialed from a switchboard and bills the conference to it.
|
||
|
The third way is to a loop. After being connected to Alliance, the caller
|
||
|
contacts the operator by pressing 0. The caller then can ask for the conference
|
||
|
to billed to another number, giving the operator the number of the high-end of
|
||
|
a
|
||
|
loop. The operator will then call the loop. A friend of the phreaker must be
|
||
|
prepared to answer the call by calling the low-end. When the friend answers and
|
||
|
accepts the billing, the conference will be billed to the loop.
|
||
|
The fourth way is from a divertor. Since the divertor is a normal,
|
||
|
home-type line, the phreaker should not have any problems starting a
|
||
|
conference.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Starting a Conference
|
||
|
When Alliance answers, a two-tone combination is emitted. The caller then
|
||
|
types a two digit combination to tell the equipment how many people will be in
|
||
|
the conference, including the originator. Then either # is pressed to continue
|
||
|
or * is pressed to cancel the conference. To dial a each conferee, the phreaker
|
||
|
simply answers each prompt with the phone number of the corresponding person.
|
||
|
To join the conference, the originator enters #, and to return to control
|
||
|
mode, he enters # again. To transfer control of the conference, #+6+1+ the
|
||
|
phone
|
||
|
number of the person you wish to transfer the control to. To end the
|
||
|
conference,
|
||
|
the phreaker presses the * button.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
XIII. Telephone System Security Measures
|
||
|
To stop telephone fraud, there are many measures which telephone companies
|
||
|
can apply to identify and convict the phone phreaker.
|
||
|
|
||
|
ESS Detection Devices
|
||
|
Telephone companies have had twenty years to work on detection devices;
|
||
|
therefore, they are well refined. Basically, the detection devices will look
|
||
|
for the presence of 2600 Hz where it does not belong, which is in the local CO.
|
||
|
It then records the calling number and all activity after the 2600 Hz.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Automatic Number Identification and the Centralized Automatic Message
|
||
|
Accounting Tapes
|
||
|
Automatic Number Identification (ANI) is an implement in ESS that can
|
||
|
instantly identify the calling party. For every call that is made, information
|
||
|
including the numbers of the calling and receiving parties, the time of
|
||
|
origination of the call, if the called party answered the call, and the time
|
||
|
when the caller has hung-up is recorded on a tape in the Centralized Automatic
|
||
|
Message Accounting (CAMA) office. This includes wrong numbers, toll-free
|
||
|
numbers, and local calls. This tape is then processed for billing purposes.
|
||
|
Normally, all free calls are ignored, but the billing equipment has been
|
||
|
programmed to recognize many different types of unusual activity. One checks if
|
||
|
a certain 800 number is called excessively. If the number is an SCC, the
|
||
|
equipment can instantly check if the caller is a subscriber of the SCC. If it
|
||
|
is
|
||
|
not, it will alert the company of the illegal activity. Another is if there is
|
||
|
a
|
||
|
call where the calling party has stayed off-hook for a large amount of time,
|
||
|
but
|
||
|
the called party never answers. The equipment recognizes this as possible use
|
||
|
of
|
||
|
a Black Box.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dialed Number Recorders
|
||
|
Placing a Dialed Number Recorders (DNR) on a telephone line is standard
|
||
|
procedure when telephone fraud is suspected. The most common DNR's can do the
|
||
|
following: print all touch tone digits sent (in suspected illegal use of an
|
||
|
SCC), print out all MF and record the presence of 2600hz on the line (in
|
||
|
suspected use of a Blue Box), and activate a tape recorder for a specific
|
||
|
amount
|
||
|
of time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Trap Codes
|
||
|
Trap codes are decoy PIN numbers. If a telephone company find that a
|
||
|
certain PIN number is being used illegally, it will call the real owner and
|
||
|
notify him of the change in his account number. The company will then contact
|
||
|
the FBI to bring their telephone trace equipment. There are very many different
|
||
|
types of tracing equipment that exist today, which are nearly impossible to
|
||
|
detect or evade. The only reason why tracing is not used often is that the FBI
|
||
|
charges a very high fee for use of its equipment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Lock In Trace
|
||
|
One very old trace type is the "lock in" trace. A lock in trace is a
|
||
|
device
|
||
|
used by the FBI to lock into the phone user's location. Since all phone
|
||
|
connections are held open by a certain voltage of electricity,
|
||
|
the lock in trace works by patching into the line and generate the same voltage
|
||
|
into the lines. If the caller tries to hang up, voltage is retained. The phone
|
||
|
will continue to ring as if someone was calling even after the call is
|
||
|
disconnected. The trunk then remains open and the call can be traced. The FBI
|
||
|
sets its equipment so that the next time the PIN number is illegally used, the
|
||
|
call goes through, but while the communication is proceeding, the FBI traces
|
||
|
the
|
||
|
call.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Stopping a Lock In Trace
|
||
|
Stopping a lock in trace is theoretically very simple. If the voltage in
|
||
|
the line could be lowered, the trace could not function, since lowering the
|
||
|
voltage would also probably short out the voltage generator. Therefore, any
|
||
|
appliance which uses many volt can be connected to the red and green wires in a
|
||
|
wall jack, and the trace should be removed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4Tel
|
||
|
4Tel is an add on from GTE which can attach to GTD#5 electronic switching
|
||
|
systems. It's main function is to automatically find problems with the exchange
|
||
|
it is connected 24 hours a day. Most phone companies in Canada using it and
|
||
|
most
|
||
|
of the local phone companies in New York and other largely populated states in
|
||
|
the US now use it, as it is extremely advanced (it was designed by Telecom
|
||
|
Canada.) Besides detecting dead grounds and leds and killing power surges, 4Tel
|
||
|
can also detect exchange scanning (war dialing), because it treats 4000 numbers
|
||
|
excuting out of a single phone trunk in a small period of time with the same
|
||
|
time interval between each number as an error, and will log the calling party's
|
||
|
number to the telco's computer.
|
||
|
This also applies to extender or PBX hacking.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Evading 4Tel
|
||
|
To avoid detection By 4Tel, the following steps should be taken when
|
||
|
hacking codes for SCC's and PBX's.
|
||
|
1. Always fill a random block in a range of 9999
|
||
|
2. Modify programs to have a random interval set between each number dialed.
|
||
|
3. Limit hacking to 2000 calls per night.
|
||
|
4. Do not have the modem send a carrier after each number, since 4Tel will
|
||
|
treat it as a 1000 hz tone, and will think somebody is illegally using a
|
||
|
loop.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Plus One Service
|
||
|
A new way that large SCC's may stop code hacking is the installation of a
|
||
|
plus one service. With this service, the use of access codes is removed, and
|
||
|
use
|
||
|
of the SCC's services no longer require a subscription. Plus one service works
|
||
|
by having the user access the network by a toll-free number. When the caller
|
||
|
has
|
||
|
entered the network, his number is found via ANI. The name and address is then
|
||
|
found via CN/A, and the bill is sent to the user. Two companies, Sprint and
|
||
|
MCI,
|
||
|
have already installed their plus-one services, and more will follow.
|
||
|
*Note: In around February, 1988, many phreakers aquired many Sprint Plus
|
||
|
One access numbers and mistakenly thought that they were Sprint "Back-doors."
|
||
|
Their mistake was realized when afterward, they were sent bills for the call
|
||
|
that they made.
|