1134 lines
48 KiB
Plaintext
1134 lines
48 KiB
Plaintext
![]() |
<20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> JAN-89
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<20> <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ <20>
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<20>Ķ THE DNA BOX <20><><EFBFBD>
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<20>Ķ Hacking Cellular Phones <20>Ŀ
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<20> <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ѽ <20>
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<20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20>
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<EFBFBD> P A R T O N E <20>
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
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It turns out that there are several Japanese handheld transceivers (HT's)
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availible in the US for use by ham radio hobbyists that have hidden
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features allowing them to operate in the 800MHz band used by cellular
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telephones. Using an FSK decoder chip and a personal computer running an
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assembly language program to record and decypher the ID beeps at the beginning
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of cellular calls, a "phone book" of cellular ID's can be compiled. A simple
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FSK oscillator controlled by the PC can then be used to dial out using the
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Handheld Transceiver and the captured ID codes.
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A low tech analysis could be done by taping the beeps and playing them back
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at slow speed into an oscilloscope. An edited tape may even be adequate for
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retransmission; no decyphering required.
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Several radio stores in Los Angeles sell the HT's and have given advice in
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the past about how to access the hidden out-of-band tuning features in the
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ROMS of the Japanese HT's. It's possible now to listen in to cellular
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phone conversations without building any special hardware. In fact if you
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have a good antenna, or live near a cellular repeater tower, you can
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pick up celluar calls using a UHF TV with a sliding tuner by tuning in
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"channels" between 72 and 83 on the UHF dial.
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Beside the obvious benefits of unlimited, untraceable, national mobile
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voice communication, there are other uses for cellular hacking.
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For instance: most people using cellular phones are pretty upscale.
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It may be possible to scan for ID codes of the telephones of major
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corporations and their executives and get insider stock trading information.
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Simply by logging the called and calling parties you will be able to compile
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a database mapping out the executive level command & communication structure.
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If this is linked to a remote controlled tape deck you will know precisely
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what is going on and be able to note any unusual activity, such as calls
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between the executives of corporations that are in a takeover or leveraged
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buy out relationship. It is even likely that you will occasionally intercept
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calls between investors and their stock brokers, or calls discussing plans
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for new contracts.
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This data is most safely used for insider trading of your own; there will be
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no way that the Securities and Exchange Commission can establish a link
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between you and the insiders. A more risky proposition would be to offer any
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intelligence gathered to competitors for a price as industrial espionage.
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Then there are the anarchy & disruption angles for cybernetic guerrilla
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action at the corporate economic & financial level. Leaking info to the
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press can kill a deal or move stock prices prematurely. Intelligence
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gathered via cellular hacking can also be used to plan operations against
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corporate mainframes by providing names and keywords, or indicating vital
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information to be searched for. Listening to the phone calls of candidates
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and their campaign staff is also a field rich in possibilities.
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A related technology waiting to be hacked is the nationwide net of pocket
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pagers. The possibilities for executive harrassment using beeper technology
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are relatively unexplored.
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There are also several on-line instant stock & commodity quotation systems
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that use SCA subcarriers to transmit investment data. By watching activity
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on these networks you will be able to look over the shoulder of investors
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as they plan their strategy - what kind of inquiries are they making and what
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the results are.
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Here are a few of the online investment services (business offices, ca.1987)
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DATAQUICK 1-800-762-DATA (voice) Southern CA Real Property Data
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Lotus Signal/QuoTrek 1-800-272-2855 (voice) Stock Market Data
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1-800-433-6955 (voice)
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FutureSource 1-800-621-2628 ext.34 (voice) Futures Trading Data
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(Or check recent ads in Wall Street Journal etc.)
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At any rate, I propose that we start pooling info about cellular phones
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toward the goal of building a 'rosetta stone' of cellular dialing protocols,
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frequencies, technical info and hardware/software hacks.
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High on the hit list is a service/repair manual for a cellular phone, and
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journal or technical articles about the inner workings of the cellular
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phone system.
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
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<EFBFBD> The DNA BOX - Striking at the Nucleus of Corporate Communications. <20>
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<EFBFBD> A current project of... <20>
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Outlaw
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Telecommandos
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<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
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<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
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<20> <20> <20><><EFBFBD> <20> <20>ڿ <20><><EFBFBD> <20> <20><>ڿ JAN-89
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ <20>
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<20>Ķ THE DNA BOX <20><><EFBFBD>
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<20>Ķ Hacking Cellular Phones <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
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<20> <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ѽ <20>
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<20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20> <20>
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<EFBFBD> P A R T T W O <20>
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
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The previous DNA file discussed the possibility of using Japanese handheld
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HAM radios and personal computers, or tape recorders to hack Cellular Phone
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codes, and possible uses for investment & business info obtained by
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hacking executive and corporate phone calls, and investment info services.
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Here I want to mention the obvious idea of simply modifying or replacing the
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ROMs in a standard Cellular Phone, and disassembling the ROM software that
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operates the Phone in order to "customize" it for scanning, data monitoring,
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evesdropping and (of course) making free calls using the codes of registered
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subscribers.
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Simply unplugging the ROMS, putting them on a ROM card for a PC and then
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copying the software to disk for disassembly is the obvious first step.
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Use of a logic analyzer to monitor and record activity on the Cellular Phone's
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digital bus would simplify things by providing a map of where data is stored
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and which instructions are executed during each period of activity:
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decoding/sending ID tones, selecting frequencies, dialing, and talking.
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Checking the part number on the CPU embedded in the Cellular Phone will tell
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you which disassembler to use to give a first draft of the ROM code.
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The next step is to generate a map of the locations of every subroutine
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call's entry point, any branch & loop locations, and all addresses written to,
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read, or read-only (to map out any variables and data). Locations incremented,
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decremented or tested by branch instructions should also be noted, along with
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their initial and final values.
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Each address in the map should be given a symbolic label in your draft of
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the assembly code. Comments can also be entered with high-level language
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equivalents that summarize the assembly code as you understand it.
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Pay special attention to data or loop limits that match elements of the
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Cellular Phone ID codes (length or contents), or any data locations that
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are always accessed as a group. This may give you enough info to find the
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location of the ID code and burn an EPROM with any ID's you've hacked
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by listening to Cellular Calls.
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If you have identified the subroutines that accept phone numbers for dialing,
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you can patch in a second subroutine that accepts an ID code from the keypad
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and stores it in RAM before calling out, and modify any routines that
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utilize ID Codes to use RAM addresses instead of ROM addresses.
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Chances are that the software takes up most or all of the available ROM
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and RAM scratchpad space on the single-chip microprocessor. If this is the case
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it might be neccessary to piggyback additional memory chips onto the circuit
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board to hold any new subroutines you want to add.
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Suggested new features:
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1) Have the Cellular Phone scan for an empty channel and wait for an ID code.
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Capture the ID code into a table of ID's in RAM and display the captured codes
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on the liquid crystal display.
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2) Program the Cellular Phone to emulate the switching signals and codes sent
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by PacBell (or your local Cellular carrier), bypassing central switching
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entirely. This would be useful for making 100% untraceable calls to other
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Cellular subscribers within direct radio range. This can be used to do your own
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routing, emulating a phantom switching cell. This could be used to extend
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cellular service into an otherwise inaccessible area by coupling your Cellular
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Phone to a 1.2GHz linear amplifier modified to work in the 800MHz band.
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3) Make the Cellular Phone recieve data under one ID/Frequency and retransmit
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it under another. This would make it impossible to monitor both sides of a
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conversation. This feature could also be used to implement conference calling
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by running several calls at once out of one phone.
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
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<EFBFBD> The DNA BOX - Striking at the Nucleus of Corporate Communications. <20>
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<EFBFBD> A current project of... <20>
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Outlaw
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Telecommandos
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<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
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<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
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<20>01-213-376-0111<31>
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<20><><EFBFBD>Ŀ <20><><EFBFBD> <20>Ŀ <20>Ŀ <20>Ŀ ڿ <20> <20> 1-FEB--89
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ڿ <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ<EFBFBD><CDBB><EFBFBD>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ķ THE DNA BOX <20><><EFBFBD>
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<20><><EFBFBD> ڶ Hacking Cellular Phones <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
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<20><><EFBFBD> <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ѽ <20><><EFBFBD>
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<20> ' ` ' ` ' ` ' ` ' ` ' ` <20> <20><><EFBFBD>
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<EFBFBD> P A R T T H R E E <20>
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<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
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Previous DNA files discussed the possibility of using Japanese handheld
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HAM radios and personal computers, or tape recorders to hack Cellular Phone
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codes, and possible uses for investment & business info obtained by
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hacking executive and corporate phone calls, and investment info services,
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as well as approaches to modifying the Cellular Phones themselves for use as
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hacking tools and pirate communication devices.
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Here using and modifying UHF-band radio scanners to hack and monitor
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Cellular and Mobile telephone systems will be dealt with.
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Radio Shack, Uniden, and several other manufacturers make scanners
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for use by amateur radio hobbyists. Most of these will intercept mobile
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radiotelephone calls without modification by tuning in frequencies in the
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156 MHz and 475 MHz regions. Most of these scanners have line-level
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audio outputs that can feed a tape recorder or demodulator/tone decoder
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chip which can then interface directly to a computer for analyzing codes.
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Mobile phones use a tone-pulse dialing protocol that should be simple to decode
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and emulate using standard handheld ham radio gear. You can almost count
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the dialing beeps without any special equipment. Phone channels are easy to
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find: they usually broadcast a standard busy signal or an idle tone
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(a fixed audio sine wave) when waiting for the next call. You will also hear
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conversations, ringing, and mobile phone operators on these channels.
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Here's a partial list of frequencies used by mobile phones:
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(frequencies in MHz)
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152.51 154.57 152.66 152.69 152.72 152.78 154.54
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475.45 475.475 475.55 475.6 475.8 475.825 475.85 475.9 476.05
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As you can see, many of the frequencies are spaced 30KHz or 25KHz apart,
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so there are probably more channels in the gaps at those intervals.
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These frequencies were gathered in a few minutes of casual listening using
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an unmodified Radio Shack Pro-2021 scanner in search mode.
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SCANNING CELLULAR FREQUENCIES:
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Hobby scanners capable of monitoring Cellular Phones are prohibited in the US.
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To save money on the production line, many international scanner manufacturers
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make only one kind of scanning chip which they use in both US and foreign
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models. These chips are capable of scanning in the 800MHz range but this
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feature is diabled by grounding certain pins in the US models.
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Often restoring Cellular scanning functions is merely a matter of cutting
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a circuit trace or removing a single diode from a scanner's printed circuit
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board.
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For instance, removing diode 513 from a Radio Shack Pro-2004 Scanner will
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enable the 870MHz Cellular range. Installing diode 510 will increase the
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number of scanning channels from 300 to 400. Installing diode 514 will
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increase the scanning rate from 16 to 20 channels per second.
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These are located on the printed circuit board labeled PC-3.
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The Uniden Bearcat 200/205XLT can be modified for Cellular scanning
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by cutting or removing the 10K-ohm resisitor located on the printed circuit
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above the letters "DEN" on the microprocessor chip labeled "UNIDEN UC-1147".
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The Regency Electronics MX7000 Scanner reportedly scans Cellular Phones
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without modification.
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An additional scanner rumored to be modifiable is the Realistic Pro-32.
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Another source of useful radio gear are "Export Only" manufacturers.
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One of these is currently rumored to be offering a handheld cellular phone
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that does it's own routing and has an operating radius of 160 kilometers!
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CELLULAR PHONE FREQUENCIES:
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Here are the frequency range assignments for Cellular Telephones:
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Repeater Input (Phone transmissions) 825.03 - 844.98 Megahertz
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Repeater Output (Tower transmissions) 870.03 - 889.98 Megahertz
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There are 666 Channels. Phones transmit 45 MHz below the corresponding
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Tower channel. The channels are spaced every 30 KHz.
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CORDLESS PHONE FREQUENCIES:
|
|||
|
It's also possible to hack the popular cordless phones. These use the 49MHz
|
|||
|
band used by baby monitors and toy FM walkie talkies. Scanners can be used
|
|||
|
to monitor these without modification, and FM handheld transceivers will
|
|||
|
allow 2-way hacking of these frequencies, which some may find amusing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Channel Handset Transmit Base Transmit
|
|||
|
------- ---------------- -------------
|
|||
|
1 49.67 46.61 (frequencies in Megahertz)
|
|||
|
2 49.845 46.63
|
|||
|
3 49.86 46.67
|
|||
|
4 49.77 46.71
|
|||
|
5 49.875 46.73
|
|||
|
6 49.83 46.77
|
|||
|
7 49.89 46.83
|
|||
|
8 49.93 46.87
|
|||
|
9 49.99 46.93
|
|||
|
10 49.97 46.97
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Business Update:
|
|||
|
As of January 1989 there are legal maneuvers going on to lift the
|
|||
|
ban on portable phones by traders at the NY Stock Exchange.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> The DNA BOX - Striking at the Nucleus of Corporate Communications. <20>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> A current project of... <20>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Outlaw
|
|||
|
Telecommandos
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20>01-213-376-0111<31>
|
|||
|
<20>Ŀ <20>Ŀ 3-FEB-89
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ<EFBFBD><CDBB><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20>Ķ THE DNA BOX <20><><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ķ Hacking Cellular Phones <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD> <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ѽ <20><><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD> ' ` ' ` ' ` ' ` ' ` ' ` ' <20><><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> P A R T F O U R <20>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> <20>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> T H E N U M B E R O F T H E B E A S T <20>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
Preliminary technical info about the AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone System).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
MOBILE TELEPHONE SWITCHING OFFICE (MTSO)
|
|||
|
Cell Control Sites (Towers) are connected to the Mobile Telephone Switching
|
|||
|
Office (MTSO) by a pair of 9600 baud data lines, one of which is a backup.
|
|||
|
The MTSO routes calls, controls and coordinates the cell sites (especially
|
|||
|
during handoffs as a mobile phone moves from one cell to another while a
|
|||
|
call is in progress), and connects to a Central Office (CO) of the local
|
|||
|
telephone company via voice lines.
|
|||
|
There is some indication that an MTSO may be re-programmed and otherwise
|
|||
|
hacked via standard phone lines using a personal computer/modem.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
NUMERIC ASSIGNMENT MODULE (NAM)
|
|||
|
There is a PROM chip in every cellular phone that holds the phone number (MIN)
|
|||
|
assigned to it. This is the "Numerical Assignment Module" or NAM. Schematics
|
|||
|
and block diagrams occasionally call this the "ID PROM". The NAM also
|
|||
|
holds the serial number (ESN) of the cellular phone, and the system ID (SID)
|
|||
|
of the mobile phone's home system.
|
|||
|
By encoding new PROM chips (or re-programming EPROM chips) and swapping them
|
|||
|
with the originals, a cellular phone can be made to take on a new identity.
|
|||
|
It is possible to make a circuit board with a bank of PROMs that
|
|||
|
plugs into the NAM socket, and allows quick switching between several
|
|||
|
phone ID's. It's even feasible to emulate the behavior of a PROM with
|
|||
|
dual-port RAM chips, which can be instantly updated by a laptop computer.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A photograph of a "BYTEK S1-KX NAM Multiprogrammer" suggests that this
|
|||
|
"sophisticated piece of equipment" is merely a relabled generic PROM burner.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
==============================================================================
|
|||
|
MOBILE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (MIN)
|
|||
|
The published explanations of how to compute this number all contain
|
|||
|
deliberate errors, probably for the purpose of thwarting phreaks and people
|
|||
|
attempting to change the serial numbers and ID codes of stolen phones.
|
|||
|
Even the arithmetic is wrong in some published examples!
|
|||
|
Until the FCC/IEEE spec is available (a trip is planned to a university
|
|||
|
engineering library) the following is almost certainly the way that MIN is
|
|||
|
computed, taking into consideration how such codings are done elsewhere,
|
|||
|
comparing notes and tables from a variety of sources, and using common sense.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A BASIC program (MIN.BAS) that computes MINs from phone numbers is being
|
|||
|
distributed with this file.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are two parts to the 34-bit MIN.
|
|||
|
They are derived from a cellular phone number as follows:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
MIN2 - a ten bit number representing the area code.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Look up the three digits of area code in the following table:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Phone Digit: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
|
|||
|
Coded Digit: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(Or just add 9 to a digit and use the right digit of the result)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Then convert that number to a 10-digit binary number:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For example, for the (213) area code, MIN2 would be 102,
|
|||
|
which expressed as a 10-digit binary number would be 0001100110.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Area Code = 213 (get Area Code)
|
|||
|
102 (add 9 to each digit modulo 10, or use table)
|
|||
|
MIN2 = 0001100110 (convert to binary)
|
|||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
MIN1 - a 24 bit number representing the 7-digit phone number.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The first ten bits of MIN1 are computed the same way as MIN2, only
|
|||
|
the next 3 digits of the phone number are used.
|
|||
|
The middle four bits of MIN1 are simply the fourth digit of the phone number
|
|||
|
expressed in binary (Remember; a "0" becomes a "10").
|
|||
|
The last next ten bits of MIN1 are encoded using the final three digits of
|
|||
|
the phone number in the same way.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So, MIN1 for 376-0111 would be:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(get Phone Number) 376 0 111
|
|||
|
(modify digits where appropriate) 265 (10) 000
|
|||
|
(convert each part to a binary number) 0100001001 1010 0000000000
|
|||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Thus the complete 34-bit Mobile Identification Number for (213)376-0111 is:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
376 0 111 213
|
|||
|
________ __ ________ ________
|
|||
|
/ \/ \/ \/ \
|
|||
|
MIN = 0100001001101000000000000001100110
|
|||
|
\______________________/\________/
|
|||
|
MIN1 MIN2
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ELECTRONIC SERVICE NUMBER (ESN)
|
|||
|
The serial number for each phone is encoded as a 32 bit binary number.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Available evidence suggests that the ESN is an 8-digit hexadecimal
|
|||
|
number, which is encoded directly to binary:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Serial Number = 821A056F
|
|||
|
Digits = 8 2 1 A 0 5 6 F
|
|||
|
ESN = 0001 0001 0001 1010 0000 0101 0110 1111
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Here is a table for converting Hexadecimal to Binary:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Hex Binary Hex Binary Hex Binary Hex Binary
|
|||
|
--- ------ --- ------ --- ------ --- ------
|
|||
|
0 0000 4 0100 8 1000 C 1100
|
|||
|
1 0001 5 0101 9 1001 D 1101
|
|||
|
2 0010 6 0110 A 1010 E 1110
|
|||
|
3 0011 7 0111 B 1011 F 1111
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION (SID)
|
|||
|
A 15 bit binary number representing a mobile phone's home cellular system.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
============================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
---------------------CELLULAR PHONE FREQUENCIES-----------------------------
|
|||
|
Here, again, are the frequency range assignments for Cellular Telephones:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Repeater Input (Phone transmissions) 825.030 - 844.980 Megahertz
|
|||
|
Repeater Output (Tower transmissions) 870.030 - 889.980 Megahertz
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are 666 Channels. Phones transmit 45 MHz below the corresponding
|
|||
|
Tower channel. The channels are spaced every 30 KHz.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These channels are divided into "Nonwireline" (A) and "Wireline" (B) services.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Nonwireline (A) service uses the 825-835/870-880 frequencies (channels 1-333)
|
|||
|
Wireline (B) service uses the 835-845/880-890 frequencies (channels 334-666)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A channel is either dedicated to control signals, or to voice signals.
|
|||
|
Digital message streams are sent on both types of channels, however.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are 21 control channels for each service.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Non-Wireline (A) control channels are located in the frequency ranges
|
|||
|
834.39 - 834.99 and 879.39 - 879.99 (channels 312 - 333 )
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Wireline (B) control channels are located in the frequency ranges
|
|||
|
835.02 - 835.62 and 880.02 - 880.62 (channels 334 - 355)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The new 998 channel systems use 332 additional channels in the ranges
|
|||
|
821-825/866-870 and 845-851/890-896.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Cell Control Sites (Towers) are connected to an MTSO (Mobile Telephone
|
|||
|
Switching Office) which connects the cellular system to a Central Office (CO)
|
|||
|
of a conventional telephone system.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Each Cell Control Site uses a maximum of 16 channels, up to 4 of which
|
|||
|
may be control channels. There will always be at least 1 control channel
|
|||
|
available in each cell. Cellular Towers are easily identified by the
|
|||
|
flat triangular platforms at the top of the mast, with short vertical
|
|||
|
antennas at each corner of the platform.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Most UHF Televisions and cable-ready VCR's are capable of monitoring
|
|||
|
Cellular Phone channels. Try tuning between UHF TV channels 72 - 76 for
|
|||
|
mobile phones, and between UHF TV channels 79 - 83 for towers.
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SUPERVISORY AUDIO TONE (SAT)
|
|||
|
A mobile phone must be able to recognize and retransmit any of the
|
|||
|
three audio frequencies used as SAT's.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These tones (and their binary codes) are:
|
|||
|
(00) 5970 Hz
|
|||
|
(01) 6000 Hz
|
|||
|
(10) 6030 Hz
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The SAT is used during signaling, but not during data transmission.
|
|||
|
The binary codes are sent during data transmission to control which of the
|
|||
|
SAT tones a mobile phone will be using.
|
|||
|
Each cell site (or tower) uses only one of the three SATs. The mobile
|
|||
|
transmitter returns that same SAT to the tower.
|
|||
|
Tone recognition must take place within 250 milliseconds.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SIGNALING TONE (ST)
|
|||
|
A 10 KHz tone is used for signaling by mobile phones during alert, handoff,
|
|||
|
certain service requests, and diconnect.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DATA TRANSMISSION
|
|||
|
Cellular Phones use a data rate of 10 Kilobits per second, and must be
|
|||
|
accurate to within one bit per second.
|
|||
|
Frequency Modulation (FM) is used for both voice and data transmissions.
|
|||
|
Digital data is transmitted as an 8KHz frequency shift of the carrier.
|
|||
|
A binary one is transmited as a +8KHz shift and a binary zero as a -8KHz
|
|||
|
shift. NRZ (Non-Return to Zero) coding is used, which means that the carrier
|
|||
|
is not shifted back to it's center frequency between transmitted binary bits.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> The DNA BOX - Striking at the Nucleus of Corporate Communications. <20>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> A current project of... <20>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Outlaw
|
|||
|
Telecommandos
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20>01-213-376-0111<31>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ 6-FEB-89
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ķ THE DNA BOX <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ķ Hacking Cellular Phones <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ѽ <20><><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD> <20><><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
P A R T F I V E
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
CELLULAR TELEPHONE SIGNALING FORMATS
|
|||
|
===========================================================================
|
|||
|
(RECC) Reverse Control Channel (mobile-to-tower on control channel)
|
|||
|
RECC Message Format:
|
|||
|
----------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Seizure Precursor:
|
|||
|
Dotting (30 bits) 1010101010101010101010101010101
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) 11100010010
|
|||
|
DCC (7 bits) xxxxxxx Digital Color Code (DCC)
|
|||
|
Received Coded
|
|||
|
-------- -------
|
|||
|
00 0000000
|
|||
|
01 0011111
|
|||
|
10 1100011
|
|||
|
11 1111100
|
|||
|
Message: (from one to five words in length)
|
|||
|
First Word repeated 5 times (240 bits)
|
|||
|
Second Word repeated 5 times (240 bits)
|
|||
|
Third Word repeated 5 times (240 bits)
|
|||
|
Fourth Word repeated 5 times (240 bits)
|
|||
|
Fifth Word repeated 5 times (240 bits)
|
|||
|
----------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
There are 4 types of RECC messages:
|
|||
|
Page Response Message
|
|||
|
Origination Message
|
|||
|
Order Confirmation Message
|
|||
|
Order Message
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These are composed of combinations of the following message words:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Abbreviated Address Word:
|
|||
|
F (1bit) 1 (first word indicator)
|
|||
|
NAWC (3 bits) xxx (number of additional words to send)
|
|||
|
T (1 bit) x (0=response,1=origination/order)
|
|||
|
S (1 bit) x (1=serial number will be sent)
|
|||
|
E (1 bit) x (1=area will to be sent)
|
|||
|
(1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
SCM (4 bits) xxxx (station class mark)
|
|||
|
MIN1 (24 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (coded 7 digit phone number)
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx (Parity)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Extended Address Word:
|
|||
|
F (1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
NAWC (3 bits) xxx
|
|||
|
LOCAL (5 bits) xxxxx (local control - system specific)
|
|||
|
ORDQ (3 bits) xxx (order qualifier)
|
|||
|
ORDER (5 bits) xxxxx (order code)
|
|||
|
LT (1 bit) x (1=last try)
|
|||
|
(8 bits) 00000000
|
|||
|
MIN2 (10 bits) xxxxxxxxxx (coded Area Code)
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Serial Number Word:
|
|||
|
F (1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
NAWC (3 bits) xxx
|
|||
|
SERIAL (32 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (serial number)
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
First Word of Called Address: [D1..D16 are the encoded digits]
|
|||
|
F (1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
NAWC (3 bits) xxx
|
|||
|
D1 (4 bits) xxxx Table of Digit Codes:
|
|||
|
D2 (4 bits) xxxx -----------------------------
|
|||
|
D3 (4 bits) xxxx 1 0001 7 0111 NULL 0000
|
|||
|
D4 (4 bits) xxxx 2 0010 8 1000
|
|||
|
D5 (4 bits) xxxx 3 0011 9 1001
|
|||
|
D6 (4 bits) xxxx 4 0100 0 1010
|
|||
|
D7 (4 bits) xxxx 5 0101 * 1011
|
|||
|
D8 (4 bits) xxxx 6 0110 # 1100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Second Word of Called Address:
|
|||
|
F (1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
NAWC (3 bits) 000
|
|||
|
D9 (4 bits) xxxx (encoded digits, see above table)
|
|||
|
D10 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D11 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D12 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D13 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D14 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D15 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D16 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
===========================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(RVC) Reverse Voice Channel (mobile-to-tower on voice channel)
|
|||
|
RVC Message Format:
|
|||
|
--------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Dotting (101 bits) 101010101....101
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) 11100010010
|
|||
|
Repeat 1 Word 1 (48 bits) xxxxx ... xxxxx
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits) 1010101010101010101010101010101
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) 11100010010
|
|||
|
Repeat 2 Word 1 (48 bits) xxxxx ... xxxxx
|
|||
|
. .
|
|||
|
. . [same pattern of repetition]
|
|||
|
. .
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits)
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits)
|
|||
|
Repeat 5 word 1 (48 bits)
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits)
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits)
|
|||
|
Repeat 1 Word 2 (48 bits)
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits)
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits)
|
|||
|
Repeat 2 Word 2 (48 bits)
|
|||
|
. .
|
|||
|
. . [same pattern of repetition]
|
|||
|
. .
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits) 1010101010101010101010101010101
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) 11100010010
|
|||
|
Repeat 5 word 2 (48 bits) xxxxx ... xxxxx
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
There are two kinds of RVC messages:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Order Confirmation Message
|
|||
|
Called Address Message
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
----------
|
|||
|
Order Confirmation Message Word:
|
|||
|
F (1 bit) 1
|
|||
|
NAWC (2 bits) 00
|
|||
|
T (1 bit) 1
|
|||
|
LOCAL (5 bits) xxxxx
|
|||
|
ORDQ (3 bits) xxx
|
|||
|
ORDER (5 bits) xxxxx
|
|||
|
(19 bits) 0000000000000000000
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
---------
|
|||
|
---------
|
|||
|
Called Address Message, First Word:
|
|||
|
F (1 bit) 1
|
|||
|
NAWC (2 bits) 01
|
|||
|
T (1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
D1 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D2 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D3 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D4 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D5 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D6 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D7 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D8 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Called Address Message, Second Word:
|
|||
|
F (1 bit) 1
|
|||
|
NAWC (2 bits) 00
|
|||
|
T (1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
D9 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D10 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D11 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D12 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D13 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D14 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D15 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
D16 (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
--------
|
|||
|
===========================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(FOCC) Forward Control Channel (tower-to-mobile on control channel)
|
|||
|
FOCC Message Format:
|
|||
|
--------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Dotting (10 bits) b1010101010
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) b11100010010
|
|||
|
Repeat 1 word A (40 bits) bxxxxxxxxxxbxxxxxxxxxxbxxxxxxxxxxbxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
Repeat 1 word B (40 bits) A Busy/Idle Bit (b) is inserted
|
|||
|
Repeat 2 word A (40 bits) at the beginning of Dotting and
|
|||
|
Repeat 2 word B (40 bits) Word Sync, and every 10 bits
|
|||
|
Repeat 3 word A (40 bits) during word repetitions beginning
|
|||
|
Repeat 3 word B (40 bits) at the start of the first word.
|
|||
|
Repeat 4 word A (40 bits) b=1 when the RCC is Idle.
|
|||
|
Repeat 4 word B (40 bits) b=0 when the RCC is Busy.
|
|||
|
Repeat 5 word A (40 bits)
|
|||
|
Repeat 5 word B (40 bits) bxxxxxxxxxxbxxxxxxxxxxbxxxxxxxxxxbxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
Dotting (10 bits) b1010101010
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------
|
|||
|
There are three types of FOCC messages:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Mobile Station Control Message
|
|||
|
Overhead Message
|
|||
|
Control-filler Message
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Mobile Station Control Message: (one,two or four words)
|
|||
|
------------------------------
|
|||
|
Abbreviated Address Word:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 0x (00=if one word sent, 01=if multiple words sent)
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx Digital Color Code
|
|||
|
MIN1 (24 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Extended Address Word: (two versions of this word occur)
|
|||
|
----------------------------- -----------------------------
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 10 TT (2 bits) 10
|
|||
|
SCC (2 bits) 11 SCC (2 bits) xx [not=11]
|
|||
|
MIN2 (10 bits) xxxxxxxxxx MIN2 (10 bits) xxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
(1 bit) 0 (1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
LOCAL (5 bits) xxxxx VMAC (3 bits) xxx (attenuation code)
|
|||
|
ORDQ (3 bits) xxx CHAN (11 bits) xxxxxxxxxxx (channel number)
|
|||
|
ORDER (5 bits) xxxxx P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
First Directed-Retry Word:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 10
|
|||
|
SCC (2 bits) 11 SAT Color Code
|
|||
|
CHANPOS (7 bits) xxxxxxx channel position relative to first access channel
|
|||
|
CHANPOS (7 bits) xxxxxxx
|
|||
|
CHANPOS (7 bits) xxxxxxx
|
|||
|
(3 bits) 000
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Second Directed-Retry Word:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 10
|
|||
|
SCC (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
CHANPOS (7 bits) xxxxxxx
|
|||
|
CHANPOS (7 bits) xxxxxxx
|
|||
|
CHANPOS (7 bits) xxxxxxx
|
|||
|
(3 bits) 000
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
-------------------------------
|
|||
|
-------------------------------
|
|||
|
Overhead Messages:
|
|||
|
System Parameter Overhead Message:
|
|||
|
Global Action Overhead Message:
|
|||
|
Registration Identification Message:
|
|||
|
Control-filler Message:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
System Parameter Overhead Message:
|
|||
|
----------------------------------
|
|||
|
System Parameter Word 1:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
(3 bits) 000
|
|||
|
NAWC (4 bits) xxxx
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 110 (overhead message type)
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
System Parameter Word 2:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
S (1 bit) x (serial number flag)
|
|||
|
E (1 bit) x (extended address flag)
|
|||
|
REGH (1 bit) x (registration for home stations)
|
|||
|
REGR (1 bit) x (registration for roaming stations)
|
|||
|
DTX (1 bit) x (discontinuous transmission flag)
|
|||
|
(1 bit) 0
|
|||
|
N-1 (5 bits) xxxxx (number of paging channels in system minus 1)
|
|||
|
RCF (1 bit) x (read-control-filler flag)
|
|||
|
CPA (1 bit) x (combined paging/access flag)
|
|||
|
CMAX-1 (1 bit) x (number of access channels in system minus 1)
|
|||
|
END (1 bit) x (1=last word of overhaed message train)
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 111
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
-------------------------------
|
|||
|
-------------------------------
|
|||
|
Global Action Overhead Messages:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Rescan Global Action Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bit) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 0001
|
|||
|
(16 bits) 0000000000000000
|
|||
|
END (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Registration Increment Global Action Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 0010
|
|||
|
REGINCR (12 bits) xx (registration increment)
|
|||
|
(4 bits) 0000
|
|||
|
END (1 bits) xx
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
New Access Channel Set Global Action Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 0110
|
|||
|
NEWACC (11 bits) xxxxxxxxxxx (new access channel starting point)
|
|||
|
(4 bits) 0000
|
|||
|
END (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Overload Control Global Action Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 1000
|
|||
|
OLCD0 (1 bit) x (overload class flags)
|
|||
|
OLCD2 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD3 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD4 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD5 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD6 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD7 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD8 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD9 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD10 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD11 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD12 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD13 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD14 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OLCD15 (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
END (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Access Type Paramters Global Action Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 1001
|
|||
|
BIS (1 bit) x (busy/idle status flag)
|
|||
|
(15 bits) 000000000000000
|
|||
|
END (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Access Attempt Parameters Global Action Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 1010
|
|||
|
MAXBUSY-PGR (4 bits) xxxx (maximum busy occurrences, page response)
|
|||
|
MAXSZTR-PGR (4 bits) xxxx (maximum seizure tries, page response)
|
|||
|
MAXBUSY-OTHER (4 bits) xxxx (maximum busy occurrences, other accesses)
|
|||
|
MAXSZTR-OTHER (4 bits) xxxx (maximum seizure tries, other accesses)
|
|||
|
END (1 bits) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Local Control 1 Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) x
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 1110
|
|||
|
LOCAL CONTROL (16 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (any local control code)
|
|||
|
END (1 bits) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Local Control 2 Message:
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
ACT (4 bits) 1111
|
|||
|
LOCAL CONTROL (16 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
END (1 bits) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 100
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
-------------------------------
|
|||
|
Registration Identification Message:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
REGID (20 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (registration ID)
|
|||
|
END (1 bit) x
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 000
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Control-Filler Message:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 11
|
|||
|
DCC (2 bits) xx
|
|||
|
(6 bits) 010111
|
|||
|
CMAC (3 bits) xxx (current mobile attenuation)
|
|||
|
(7 bits) 0011001
|
|||
|
WFOM (1 bit) x (wait for overhead message)
|
|||
|
(4 bits) 1111
|
|||
|
OHD (3 bits) 001
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
===========================================================================
|
|||
|
(FVC) Forward Voice Channel: (tower-to-mobile on voice channel)
|
|||
|
FVC Message Format: * BUSY/IDLE bits are inserted into FVC messages in a
|
|||
|
format similar to that of FOCC messages)
|
|||
|
--------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Dotting (101 bits) 101010101...101
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) 11100010010
|
|||
|
Repeat 1 Word (40 bits) xxxxx...xxxxx
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits) 1010101010101010101010101010101
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) 11100010010
|
|||
|
Repeat 2 Word (40 bits) xxxxx...xxxxx
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits)
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits)
|
|||
|
Repeat 3 Word (40 bits)
|
|||
|
. .
|
|||
|
. . [same pattern of repetition]
|
|||
|
. .
|
|||
|
Dot (37 bits) 1010101010101010101010101010101
|
|||
|
Word Sync (11 bits) 11100010010
|
|||
|
Repeat 11 Word (40 bits) xxxxx...xxxxx
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
There is only kind of FVC message:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Mobile Station Control Message:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Mobile Station Control Word: (two versions of this word occur)
|
|||
|
----------------------------- -----------------------------
|
|||
|
TT (2 bits) 10 TT (2 bits) 10
|
|||
|
PSCC (2 bits) xx PSCC (2 bits) xx (present SAT code)
|
|||
|
(9 bits) 000000000 (9 bits) 000000000
|
|||
|
LOCAL (5 bits) xxxxx VMAC (3 bits) xxx (attenuation code)
|
|||
|
ORDQ (3 bits) xxx CHAN (11 bits) xxxxxxxxxxx (channel number)
|
|||
|
ORDER (5 bits) xxxxx P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
P (12 bits) xxxxxxxxxxxx
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
===========================================================================
|
|||
|
* See Part Six for information describing various codes used in message
|
|||
|
word fields.
|
|||
|
===========================================================================
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> The DNA BOX - Striking at the Nucleus of Corporate Communications. <20>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> A current project of... <20>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Outlaw
|
|||
|
Telecommandos
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20>01-213-376-0111<31>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD> 9-FEB-89
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ķ THE DNA BOX <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD> <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ķ Hacking Cellular Phones <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ѽ
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD> <20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
P A R T S I X
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
CELLULAR TELEPHONE MESSAGE CODES
|
|||
|
============================================================================
|
|||
|
The previous file (Part Five) listed the Message Formats and Message Words
|
|||
|
used by the Cellular Telephone system. Message words have variable
|
|||
|
sub-fields that are set to convey various information (such as dialed
|
|||
|
numbers, mobile phone ID, commands, requests, channel assignments etc.).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Here are the codes used in Message Word subfields during data transmissions.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
============================================================================
|
|||
|
Mobile Station Automatic Attenuation Levels
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Mobile Attenuation Code (MAC)
|
|||
|
Power Classifications
|
|||
|
MAC I II III Nominal ERP Power Outputs
|
|||
|
--- --- --- --- Class ERP Level
|
|||
|
000 6 2 -2 --------- ---- --------
|
|||
|
001 2 2 -2 Class I 4W ( 6 dBW)
|
|||
|
010 -2 -2 -2 Class II 1.6W ( 2 dBW)
|
|||
|
011 -6 -6 -6 Class III 0.6W (-2 dBW)
|
|||
|
100 -10 -10 -10
|
|||
|
101 -14 -14 -14
|
|||
|
110 -18 -18 -18
|
|||
|
111 -22 -22 -22
|
|||
|
(Attenuation in dBW)
|
|||
|
=========================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Station Class Mark (SCM)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SCM Station Class, Transmission
|
|||
|
---- ----------------------------
|
|||
|
xx00 Class I
|
|||
|
xx01 Class II
|
|||
|
xx10 Class III
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
00xx Continuous Transmissions
|
|||
|
01xx Discontinuous Transmissions
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(for example 0010 means Class I Continuous Transmissions)
|
|||
|
=========================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Digital Color Code (DCC)
|
|||
|
Received Coded
|
|||
|
-------- -------
|
|||
|
00 0000000
|
|||
|
01 0011111
|
|||
|
10 1100011
|
|||
|
11 1111100
|
|||
|
=======================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SAT Color Code (Supervisory Audio Tone)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Code Frequency
|
|||
|
---- ---------
|
|||
|
00 5970 Hz
|
|||
|
01 6000 Hz
|
|||
|
10 6030 Hz
|
|||
|
11 (not a channel designation)
|
|||
|
====================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Digit Code (for dialed numbers etc.)
|
|||
|
Digit Code
|
|||
|
----- ----
|
|||
|
1 0001
|
|||
|
2 0010
|
|||
|
3 0011
|
|||
|
4 0100
|
|||
|
5 0101
|
|||
|
6 0110
|
|||
|
7 0111
|
|||
|
8 1000
|
|||
|
9 1001
|
|||
|
0 1010 (zero is encoded as a binary ten)
|
|||
|
* 1011
|
|||
|
# 1100
|
|||
|
Null 0000 (when no digit present)
|
|||
|
===================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Order and Qualification Codes
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Order Qual Function
|
|||
|
----- --- ---------------------
|
|||
|
00000 000 page (or origination)
|
|||
|
00001 000 alert
|
|||
|
00011 000 release
|
|||
|
00100 000 reorder
|
|||
|
00110 000 stop alert
|
|||
|
00111 000 audit
|
|||
|
01000 000 send called-address
|
|||
|
01001 000 intercept
|
|||
|
01010 000 maintenance
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
01011 000 change to power level 0
|
|||
|
01011 001 change to power level 1
|
|||
|
01011 010 change to power level 2
|
|||
|
01011 011 change to power level 3
|
|||
|
01011 100 change to power level 4
|
|||
|
01011 101 change to power level 5
|
|||
|
01011 110 change to power level 6
|
|||
|
01011 111 change to power level 7
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
01100 000 directed retry - not last try
|
|||
|
01100 001 directed retry - last try
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
01101 000 non-autonomous registration - do not make whereabouts known
|
|||
|
01101 001 non-autonomous registration - make whereabouts known
|
|||
|
01101 010 autonomous registration - do not make whereabouts known
|
|||
|
01101 011 autonomous registration - make whereabouts known
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
11110 000 local control
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(All other codes are reserved)
|
|||
|
==============================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Overhead Message Type
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Code Order
|
|||
|
---- ------------------
|
|||
|
000 registration ID
|
|||
|
001 control-filler
|
|||
|
010 (reserved)
|
|||
|
011 (reserved)
|
|||
|
100 global action
|
|||
|
101 (reserved)
|
|||
|
110 word 1 of system parameter message
|
|||
|
111 word 2 of system parameter message
|
|||
|
=======================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Global Action Message Types
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Code Action Type
|
|||
|
---- -----------
|
|||
|
0000 (reserved)
|
|||
|
0001 rescan paging channels
|
|||
|
0010 registration increment
|
|||
|
0011 (reserved)
|
|||
|
0010 (reserved)
|
|||
|
0011 (reserved)
|
|||
|
0100 (reserved)
|
|||
|
0101 (reserved)
|
|||
|
0110 new access channel set
|
|||
|
0111 (reserved)
|
|||
|
1000 overload control
|
|||
|
1001 access type parameters
|
|||
|
1010 access attempt parameters
|
|||
|
1011 (reserved)
|
|||
|
1100 (reserved)
|
|||
|
1101 (reserved)
|
|||
|
1110 local control 1
|
|||
|
1111 local control 2
|
|||
|
====================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Restricted Central Office Codes.
|
|||
|
Cellular phone numbers are NEVER issued with these patterns in order
|
|||
|
to prevent Word Sync patterns from occuring inside a command word.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1xx-xxxx 544-2xxx 864-2xxx
|
|||
|
224-2xxx 568-1xxx thru 568-7xxx 899-xxxx
|
|||
|
288-2xxx 595-8xxx thru 595-0xxx 800-xxxx
|
|||
|
339-8xxx thru 339-0xxx 663-xxxx thru 666-xxxx 928-2xxx
|
|||
|
352-xxxx 672-2xxx 992-2xxx
|
|||
|
416-2xxx 736-2xxx 909-xxxx
|
|||
|
470-2xxx 790-2xxx 0xx-xxxx
|
|||
|
508-2xxx 851-8xxx thru 851-0xxx
|
|||
|
=====================================================================
|
|||
|
Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) Codes
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Right now the best GUESS, based on available material, is that BCH coding
|
|||
|
is the way that the 12 bit Parity field is computed.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The "polynomial" that generates the code is given as:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
12 10 8 5 4 3 0
|
|||
|
gB(X)= X + X + X + X + X + X + X
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Taking this verbatim in the usual way (superscripts meaning exponentiation)
|
|||
|
gives ridiculous results that would be difficult to compute at the
|
|||
|
10 Kb/s data rate required by the Cellular Data Protocol. It makes more sense
|
|||
|
to interpret this notation to indicate that the bits of the message word are
|
|||
|
summed (in binary) in 12, 10, 8, 5, 4, and 3 bit bytes with 1 added.
|
|||
|
That is: the word is broken up into a bunch of sub-bytes of a certain length,
|
|||
|
these are added together, the original word is again broken into sub-bytes of
|
|||
|
the next length and those are summed ... until all listed lengths have been
|
|||
|
summed. THEN all of those sums are summed and 1 is added. The low order
|
|||
|
12 bits of the results of this procedure are used as the parity bits.
|
|||
|
THIS IS ALMOST PURE SPECULATION. Confirmation is currently being sought at
|
|||
|
university engineering libraries, or by examining the parity bits in
|
|||
|
published examples or intercepted cellular messages.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Parity bits are irrelevant to hacking Cellular ID codes however, because
|
|||
|
message words are repeated many times in each message block, and the ID
|
|||
|
fields (MIN1, MIN2, and SID) can simply be lifted from the most
|
|||
|
frequent (and most likely error-free) message words in the block.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
HOWEVER: If BCH coding transforms the message bits as well as the Parity
|
|||
|
bits then the proper BCH coding algorithm becomes critical. If all else fails,
|
|||
|
diassembling the ROM firmware from a Cellular Phone should be conclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>Ŀ
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> The DNA BOX - Striking at the Nucleus of Corporate Communications. <20>
|
|||
|
<EFBFBD> A current project of... <20>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Outlaw
|
|||
|
Telecommandos
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20><>ݳ<EFBFBD><EFBFBD><DEBA>ݳ<EFBFBD>ݳ<DEB3>
|
|||
|
<20>01-213-376-0111<31>
|
|||
|
|