135 lines
4.2 KiB
Plaintext
135 lines
4.2 KiB
Plaintext
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Saddam-Glaspie meeting
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Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein and
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U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. - July 25, 1990 (Eight days before the
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August 2, 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait).
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July 25, 1990 - Presidential Palace - Baghdad
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U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
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I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our
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relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher
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oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As
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you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to
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rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our
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opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country.
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(pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the
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south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens
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in the context of your threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for
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us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask
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you, in the spirit of friendship - not confrontation - regarding your
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intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait's borders?
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Saddam Hussein -
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As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a
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settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days;
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I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause)
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When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope,
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then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will
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be natural that Iraq will not accept death.
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U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
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What solutions would be acceptable?
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Saddam Hussein -
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If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in
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our war with Iran - we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are
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forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq
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(i.e., in Saddam<61>s view, including Kuwait) then we will give up all of the Shatt
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to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we
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wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States' opinion on this?
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U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
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We have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute
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with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize
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the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960's, that the Kuwait issue is not
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associated with America. (Saddam smiles)
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On August 2, 1990 four days later, Saddam's massed troops invade and
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occupy Kuwait.
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*******************************************************
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Baghdad, September 2, 1990, U.S. Embassy
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One month later, British journalist obtain the the above tape and
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transcript of the Saddam - Glaspie meeting of July 29, 1990. Astounded,
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they confront Ms. Glaspie as she leaves the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
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Journalist 1 -
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Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador?
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(Ambassador Glaspie does not respond)
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Journalist 2 -
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You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait) but you didn't warn
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him not to. You didn't tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him
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the opposite - that America was not associated with Kuwait.
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Journalist 1 -
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You encouraged this aggression - his invasion. What were you
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thinking?
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U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
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Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were
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going to take all of Kuwait.
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Journalist 1 -
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You thought he was just going to take some of it? But, how could you?
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Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed, he would give up his Iran (Shatt
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al Arab waterway) goal for the Whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be.
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You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as an
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historic part of their country!
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Journalist 1 -
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American green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit
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signaling Saddam that some aggression was okay - that the U.S. would not
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oppose a grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the
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Gulf Islands (including Bubiyan) - the territories claimed by Iraq?
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(Ambassador Glaspie says nothing as a limousine door closed behind her and
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the car drives off.)
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