182 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
182 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
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File: THE FBI GOES AFTER ADS HACKERS
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Read 17 times
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FBI GOES AFTER ADS HACKERS
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[2600 - January 1984]
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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IBM must press charges before action can be taken -- Feds reveal their tactics,
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blow source
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We received this bombshell from an anonymous contributor. It seems that a
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group of hackers was making use of one of IBM's ADS systems. (Audio
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Distribution Systems enable users with touch-tone phones to send voice messages
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back and forth to each other...) Unforturately, as is all too often the case,
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one of these hackers was really an FBI informant who was taking note of all of
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the illegitimate users (around 40 or so). Luckily for this particular group,
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the informant was sloppy and left many telltale clues which gave them literally
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months of warning. So, when the informant decided to send a message to the
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system operator, advising IBM to take action against the hackers and to call
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the FBI for more information, the hackers were ready. The system operator's
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account had also been penetrated by them and hence, the message was received by
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the hacker's first! One of them actually followed the instructions in the
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message and called the FBI! And for some reason, the investigator there
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thought he was talking to an IBM executive. This is some of what he said.
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*****
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One of the individuals that supplies me with information from time to time
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has uncovered a lot of abuse within the ADS systems, not only here in the
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United States, but in England and Italy. I talk to this individual on a
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private bulletin board...
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We have no ability to come in as an outside investigative or law enforcement
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agency and do anything about it because, first off, we don't have a
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complainant. We don't want to step on anybody's toes, but it's been our policy
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to monitor bulletin boards and phone phreaking activity across the country and
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advise commercial computer systems and corporations if we do discover certain
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computers along with the passwords and account numbers being published on the
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board. We do this on a one on one basis.
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The GTE Telemail Connection
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That was my baby, too! As a matter of fact, that's how we came across the
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ADS system -- through the GTE investigation. [These] people are not just
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interested in data communications through terminals -- they will leave voice
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messages on an ADS. We have been slowly uncovering more and more on the ADS in
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the last two months.
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The major phase of [the Telemail investigation] was about 20 individuals
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that we had located and identified and we're looking for indictments on most of
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them coming down in the next month or two. We're talking about a group of
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highly organized people that do communicate on a daily basis all the way across
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the country -- from San Francisco and L.A. to Denver to upstate New York. So
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we have a core of individuals that we are still looking at that are using your
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system and then we have this peripheral that we are not as concerned about
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because they are not part of an out & out conpiracy or an organized network,
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per se. I know of at least 8 or 10 that are the central figures in this, the
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carryover from Telemail. And we keep hearing information of other people who
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are calling in with junk messages--there's no real substance to their messages.
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Now the reason I know that is that they have included on of my sources of
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information onto their system and so he gets messages from the other parties.
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The Communist Connection
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In a way we're somewhat fortunate that it's 16-year-olds or 26-year-olds as
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opposed to people from behind the Iron Curtain. It gives us the opportunity to
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see how these systems work and see if we can plug any loopholes before somebody
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from a not-friendly nation would try the same thing. I personally fully expect
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it -- I'm surprised it hasn't happened in the past. It may have. We just
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haven't caught it. But the kids are a little bit sloppier and they're getting
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caught...I hate to sound paranoid, but we're supposed to be concerned with the
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big picture as far as is there anything sensitive in nature. For us within the
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bureau, sensitive in nature first off means national security and you've got
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corporate trade secrets and the like that you don't want being distributed.
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How the FBI Wins Trust and Gets Info
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The subjects have an ego problem and they love to talk to other individuals
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about what they are capable of doing and braggin about it. They have a
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tendency to trade information. Everything is negotiable with them. We have
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never had to barter away access to systems -- we do it more on the technical
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information of phone networks, computer systems, and the like to where it's
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more of a technical information tradeoof as opposed to an access tradeoff. [An
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example would be the] logon procedure for a PDP-11. You integrate yourself
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within their confidence and their circle of friends. You feed them a little
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bit of bait and a lot of times they'll go for it. You enter into a dialogue
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with them and they end up taking you for a ride.
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These people are very hungry for technical avenues through which they can
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communicate. It used to be the personal computer bulletin boards -- public
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messages that anybody can read. You start finding out that they leave a phone
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number or address -- and you start finding out who the parties are. There's
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thousands of these bulletin boards across the country and you narrow in on
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maybe twenty or so that are the more hardcore bulletin boards that are being
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used for exchange of illicit information. Then they move from there to an
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electronic mail service, namely GTE Telemail. They caused fits within Telemail
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when they decided to get a little bit cocky and see if they could shut down
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accounts and change passwords of administrators and things like that. From
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there they have moved one step further to where they are now the same
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individuals communicating through the ADS systems and they also set up
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conference calls through the Bell System, so they're not just attacking one
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particular system or one individual avenue of communciatons -- they try to hit
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them all. It's an ego trip for all of them.
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Pen Registers
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We would put a pen register on the phone line of the individual (suspect)
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and it would record only the digits dialed on his telephone -- we would not use
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a full blown wiretap to record his voice. We can only put a pen register on an
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individual's phone for like, thirty days before we have to go back to a judge
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an try to get an extension and we try to minimize the use of our electronic
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surveillance equipment so the public does not think we're the Big Brother of
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1984. (laughter) It's coming. Actually, we're already there! (hearty
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laughter)
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We have not utilized any pen registers for the specific purposes of going
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aftr abusers of the ADS systems. First off, we have to have an actual case
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presented to us or a complaint. It's a roundabout way of doing it, but it's
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the way that we, in the bureau, have to have somebody outside com to us.
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Otherwise we can carry on the whole investigation without IBM even being aware
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that we are monitoring activity on thier system and we don't want to become
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that secret police, or anything like that. We want to be above board and work
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with the corporations in the community.
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Just How Much Trouble Are These Hackers In?
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On the federal level we can prosecute them for telephone fraud (fraud by
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wire) if we can determine that the ADS in an ongoing busines operation and that
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you are being denied your just revenues by them sneaking onto your system and
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abusing your system. The strictest penalty is a $1000 fine and 5 years in jail
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for an actual conviction of fraud by wire violation. Those are always lax -- a
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more common sentence for an adult maybe a year in jail, 18 months, or a fine,
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sometimes they get probation, or agree to pay back an fraudulent money obtained
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or for service rendered or whatever to the client company -- it stays on his
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record for a year, he's on probation for a year and at the end of that, his
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record is wiped clean. Rarely do they get the maximum penalty. It just
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doesn't happen.
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Do Me a Favor
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Please do not disclose any geographical location because we are kind of
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unique in that we do not have any other source available in any other part
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of the coutry that could supply us with information like this. He may be one
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of 200 people, but if you identify Michigan you identify between 2 or 3
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indiviudals and it may burn the source.
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*****
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We'd like to make it clear that we don't intend to do this kind of thing
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very often, since rumours about certain people being informatns are very common
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in this business. But this is no rumour. This, friends, is solid fact -- we
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would not have printed this story if we were'nt able to substantiate the claims
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it makes, and we had no trouble at all doing that. Our intent is making this
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information known was not to screw up the FBI's fun (they're really not doing
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all that much out of the ordinary anyway), but rather to expose a very
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dangerous individual who goes by the name of Cable Pair (some say his real name
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is John Maxfield). This person has been posing as an extremely friendly hacker
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who lives in Detroit and is just bubbling over with technical information in
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exchange for your secrets. He claims to have been one of the nation's first
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phreaks, which may or may not be true. He gives out his telephone numbers
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freely, will do anything to communicate with somebody (like place conference
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calls on his own private PBX system, provided you give him YOUR phone number),
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and generally will use anything you say to him against you in the future. Our
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advice is simple: stay the hell away fromthis person. Even if you haven't
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done anything wrong yourself, your life can still be made miserable by him if
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you're even suspected of having contact with wrongdoers.
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This latest turn of events has saddened us -- we thought Cable Pair would
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be a promising contributor to this publication and instead we learned a
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valuable lesson: don't trust anybody. Have fun, Cable Pair. Enjoy yourself.
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Just don't expect to see any of us over at the Chestnut Tree Cafe with you.
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You're on your own now. <>
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SF][G8:ba003.010185
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[Courtesy of Sherwood Forest ][ -- (914) 359-1517]
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-----End of File
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Call The Works BBS - 1600+ Textfiles! - [914]/238-8195 - 300/1200 - Always Open
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Call The Works BBS - 1600+ Textfiles! - [914]/238-8195 - 300/1200 - Always Open
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