183 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
183 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
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### ###
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### #### ### ### ### ####
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### ### ##### ### ###
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########## ### ### ##########
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### ###
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### ###
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Underground eXperts United
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Presents...
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#### ## ## #### # # ####### ## ## #######
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[ Is Meat Murder? ] [ By The GNN ]
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____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
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IS MEAT MURDER?
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by THE GNN/DualCrew-Shining/uXu
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The coolest thing to do nowadays is not to drink whiskey, drive fast cars
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and smoke sixty cigarettes every day. If you want to be a cool dude today,
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your personal collection of ism's should include vegetarianism.
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I find this rather interesting. It is not often it is considered hip to
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be 'aware'. But then, are vegetarians aware? Are they really as intelligent
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and open-minded as they believe? Not really. Let us take a closer look.
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Vegetarians claim that it is wrong to eat animals. That is, it is wrong for
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_humans_ to do it. Vegetarians seldom (even though there are some bizarre
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exceptions) mean that other species may not consume their fellow creatures.
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Even though there is an apparent inconsistency in the above (after all,
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man is an animal too, so what is the difference?), it can be resolved. The
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human race is, of course, an animal - but an animal that has a higher form
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of consciousness and intelligence. 'Lower' animals are excused in their
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behaviour because they do not know what is 'right' or 'wrong'. 'Ought'
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implies 'can', and we cannot demand from a lion that 'he ought not eat
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other animals' because the lion just cannot refrain from doing it.
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So far, so good. The remaining question still needs an answer: why is it
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the case that humans ought not eat other animals? Why is it wrong? We need
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not uphold ourselves with the clique of vegetarians that base their opinions
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upon the belief that there is a 'moral order' in the universe that forbids
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us to behave in certain ways. Arguments based upon a transcendent 'moral
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order' takes us nowhere; it only creates more questions, like 'if the moral
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order is transcendent, how the hell did you get to know about it in the
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first place?'
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This is not to say that it is impossible that there is a 'moral order'
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in the universe. It could very well be the case. But it could also very
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well be the case that Elvis Presley is alive. We do not know - and it seems
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utterly strange to bring forward normative prescriptions like 'we ought all
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to listen to Blue Hawaii all day long' from mere guesses. Also, the moral
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order could very well prescribe that we ought to slaughter and eat all
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animals we see - including our neighbours, children, grandparents and why
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not ourselves even? We do not know.
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The argument from 'orders' is not mainly concentrated to vegetarians,
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however. Some of those who oppose the view that we should not eat animals
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also use this argument, but in a slightly different way. They claim that
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it is 'natural' for humans to eat meat, and 'unnatural' (or 'not normal')
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to not do it. As with the 'moral order', this argument is also clearly
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dubious. Is it 'natural' for human to drive fast cars, drink whiskey or
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listen to Elvis Presley? We do not know this either.
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Let us therefore skip these lines of reasoning and turn to what we know,
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or at least 'have very good reasons to believe is true'.
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There are several arguments available why we should not eat animals. Some
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speak in terms of health: the human race is not made for eating meat. We
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are, they say, constructed for a diet of vegetables. I cannot find any good
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support for this, since mankind has survived pretty good anyway even though
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we have consumed meat. And this is certainly not an argument that is common
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among the more hard-core supporters of vegetarians. They prefer to build
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their line of thinking in moral terms - it is _morally wrong_ to eat
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animals, no matter if it is conductive to our health or not.
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Morality seeks to avoid what is bad (wrong), and seek what is good
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(right). The morality vegetarians adhere to seems to be a form of hedonism.
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'Pleasure' is good, 'pain' is bad. It is thus wrong, all things being equal,
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to inflict pain in any living creature that is able to experience that kind
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of sensation. Since hedonists calculate the net balance of pleasure over
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pain in a large perspective, it can be right to inflict pain for the sake of
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avoiding a greater future pain; but it is never right to do it without any
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reason at all. Since humans can survive on a diet of water and vegetables,
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there exists no reason for us to hurt, kill and prepare dinners out of cute
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little animals.
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Even though hedonism cannot all there is in morality, we can grant it a
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certain status when it comes to the be or not to be of vegetarians. If it
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can be shown that animals actually suffer from the way we treat them, that
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would sure be a good argument for vegetarianism. The crucial question is
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thus: can animals experience pain?
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Prima facie, we are all inclined to give a positive answer to that
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question. Since we are not able to communicate with animals (and ask them
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if they are in pain), we build our conviction upon empirical examinations of
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how animals behave under certain conditions. We all know that they seem
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able to experience pain; after all, they scream when they are hurt, they
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run when in danger and avoid things that might inflict pain.
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But what is 'pain'? For humans, the answer is simple. It is something
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that we directly experience as bad. But do animals experience is as bad?
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Yes, of course they do - if they did not, they would not seek to avoid it,
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it is said. But need this to be the case? If I programme a robot to avoid
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people with blonde hair and blue eyes, it does not follow that this robot
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experiences 'pain' whenever it is in my company. It may scream to make me
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leave and it might try to run away to avoid me, but that does not imply that
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it experiences any kind of emotion. The other way around works fine to: if I
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programme it to stay close to people with blonde hair, this does not mean
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that it feels 'pleasure' whenever it finds such a person.
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Contrary to robots, however, animals are biological. And so are humans.
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Therefore, it is easy to conclude that animals can experience the same kind
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of 'pain' as we are able to feel. But this conclusion is not necessarily
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correct. As said, humans posses a higher form of consciousness than animals.
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We are able to reflect upon our own thinking and our own sensations. We
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_know_ when we are in pain - we do not merely experience it. We know the
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true meaning of the notions of 'pain', 'pleasure', 'desire', 'life' and
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'death' (just perform some simple introspection and you will see). Since
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animals do not know this, it would be quite strange to claim that they
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'know' that 'pain is bad'. For us, 'pain' entails the concept of 'a raw
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sensation of a bad feeling' which 'ought to be avoided'. For animals, 'pain'
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does not entail any concept at all - simply because they are not constituted
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to grasp any form of concept.
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If animals were able to understand concepts, they would not act like they
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do. They would act like humans in all aspects, less ruled by their primitive
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drives - and clearly, this is something they do not do. Therefore, it seems
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to me that animals are nothing more than biological robots, well-made
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machines without concepts. To deny this would be to ascribe them more
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consciousness than they actually have. (Recall, most vegetarians accept that
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animals may eat each other. The reason for this was that animals are not
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aware of certain concepts, in this case 'ought' and 'can' (and to understand
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those concepts, one must also understand 'right, 'wrong' and 'good', 'bad').
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So the veggie that accepts this premise must grant my conclusion some force
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too.)
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But from where comes the belief that animals are like us when it comes
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to pain? Probably from a extrapolation that is not very well-reasoned. We
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see that other creatures that are not like ourselves behave like we do when
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they are in pain. From this we jump to the conclusion that they actually
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experience pain in the same manner as we do; but, as I have tried to argue,
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this is not obviously so. (In the future, some people will probably claim
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that robots are able to feel pain too, just because they behave like we do
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in alike situations.)
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Please note that I do not claim that animals are unable to experience
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pain at all. What I claim is that animals merely experience 'something' that
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'ought to be avoided' (in the same sense as my robot when it sees me) not
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'the raw sensation of that special feeling'. For animals, 'what ought to be
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avoided' does not entail 'bad' - because the full meaning of 'bad' is
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something they cannot understand (like my robot).
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Yet another possible misunderstanding of the above must also be sorted
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out. What I claim is not that animals experience the same sort of pain
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as we do, with the exception that they do not know that pain is bad. What
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I deny is that animals actually 'experience the same sort of pain as we do'.
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Animals experience 'something' when they are in pain. But since animals
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are unable to relate this 'something' to 'bad', this 'something' is nothing
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more than one experience (even though I believe this term is rather
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misleading) among others for them.
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It should be mentioned that another form of argument for vegetarianism
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might follow from the above. Since some people suffer when they see sausages
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and hamburgers, we ought to refrain from eating animals. We should avoid
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meat, not for the sake of the animals, but for the sake of a hedonistic
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calculus concerning humans. This is a good argument (within its own
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framework), but unfortunately it will not do. I see no reason for granting
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irrational beliefs any status. I do not accept hedonism on the basis of its
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narrow-minded justification. It is clearly not a satisfying form of
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'morality' - it can be constructed to justify horrible and insane things,
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and (as in this case) constructed to forbid almost anything, whether it is
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rational or not.
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It would be quite lame if I did not include a fine argumentum ad hominem
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(just for the sake of stirring up some anger) in this text: Meat is not
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murder. Meat is delicious. And yes, it is hip to drink whiskey, smoke sixty
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cigarettes a day and drive fast cars.
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It is not cool to be a vegetarian. It is ridiculous.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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uXu #404 Underground eXperts United 1997 uXu #404
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Call CATHEDRAL CROWBAR -> +45-463-21317
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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