1425 lines
45 KiB
Plaintext
1425 lines
45 KiB
Plaintext
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### ###
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Underground eXperts United
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Presents...
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## ## ####### ####### # # ####### ###### #######
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[ The Voter's Paradox ] [ By Leon Felkins ]
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____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
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6330 words
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First Serial Rights
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(c) Leon Felkins, 1994
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THE VOTER'S PARADOX
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(The Conflict of Group Interest and Individual Rationality)
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by
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Leon Felkins
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leonf@nancy.msfc.nasa.gov
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Version: 6/18/94
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[Note, this is an abbreviated version of a work now in
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progress to be published in the near future.]
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Introduction
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Diabolical Choices of the Individual in a
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Group
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Related Philosophical Dilemmas
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Definition of the Paradox
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Exploring all sides of the issue
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Public Vs Private Solutions
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The Paradox in other Dimensions
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Time
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Looking out for Future Generations
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The Classic Definition
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The Extended Definition
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Rational Behavior
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The Rationale for being Rational
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"Rational Behavior" defined
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Limited Resources and Tradeoffs
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Internal Programming
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The Perceived Environment
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Good feelings
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Is it a good thing?
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My Reputation
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The Motivating Forces behind Good
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Feelings
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The Programming - Genes and
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Memes
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The Current Environment
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Our Perceptions
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Ignorance ("extra rational")
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Detailed Analysis
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The Net Return
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BG
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Community Center built from
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Volunteer Contributions
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Volunteers save the Town by
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Sandbagging the Levee
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BI
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Contribution to Public
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Television
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C
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The "Holistic" effects
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Impact of Infinite Vs Finite payoff
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The impact of Discreet results
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"But my vote might break the tie"
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The Wasted Vote Myth
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The Impact of Large size with some
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randomness
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A change so small it cannot be detected
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Impact of group size
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The Size of the Group
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Anonymity
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The Psychological
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Cost/Benefits
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Behavior and the size of the
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group
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Freeloaders
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But what if everyone did that?
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Examples
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Cutting off my nose to spite my face
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Ramifications
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Crime
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Social acceptability of criminal
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activity
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Decrease in expected punishment
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Reduced expectation of actually being
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punished
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Sex
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Politics
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Government
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Ways to Remove the Paradox
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Directly tying the return to the cost
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Small Groups
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Coercion and other outside inducements
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Using the Government to do your dirty
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work
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Environmental Groups
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Funding of the arts
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Summary
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Societal Problems resulting from the VP
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Many do cooperate and that is enough for
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success in many situations
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References
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I. Introduction
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A. Diabolical Choices of the Individual in a Group
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When an individual has reason to contribute to what is
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basically a group activity in which the benefits of the
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group activity are shared by the group, certain puzzling
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phenomena are evident that can only be described as
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"diabolical". While there is no generally accepted
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terminology for these phenomena, various manifestations are
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often referred to as the "Voter's Paradox", the "Volunteer's
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Paradox", the "Tragedy of the Commons", and similar terms.
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The definition for "paradox" used in this essay is "a
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person, situation, act, etc. that seems to have
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contradictory or inconsistent qualities" from Webster's
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dictionary. Basically, what we have is two apparently
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contradictory truths in the same phenomena.
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Strangely, the "Voter's Paradox" manifestation seems to
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be a double paradox. The first can be expressed as, "while
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it is true that a particular endeavor would return a benefit
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to all members of the group where each individual would
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receive rewards that more than compensate for each
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individual's contribution, it is also true that any
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particular individual would receive an even greater net
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return by not contributing anything". I will call this the
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"freerider" aspect.
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The second paradox is that, "while it is true that the
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outcome of a group effort is made up of the sum of the
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individual efforts, in many cases a particular individual's
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contribution makes no significant and/or measurable impact
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on the outcome". I will call this the "my vote doesn't
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count" aspect.
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Let us make sure we have a clear understanding of what
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we are talking about as the insinuation that a paradox
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exists is a serious assertion. Utmost precision is required
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to insure that we are not just experiencing a problem of
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sloppy thinking here.
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The claim is that a situation can exist such that: (1);
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while everyone would be better off if everyone contributed
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(cooperating), a particular individual is always better off
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not contributing (defecting) and (2); the individual's
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contribution will not effect the outcome anyway. The reader
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should not be too quick to cynically regard this assertion
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as some academic pathological construct. On the contrary, I
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will attempt to show in this essay that the situation
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described is extremely common by providing examples
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occurring in all walks of life.
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B. Related Philosophical Dilemmas
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Some logical philosophers claim that the Voter's
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Paradox is a special case of another well known peculiar
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situation called the "Prisoner's Dilemma". In the Prisoner's
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Dilemma, a situation is described in which rewards are in
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amounts such that it would be in the long term best
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interests of the participants to cooperate but the short
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term best interests of an individual is to defect. That is,
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if you played the game over and over and you added up
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everyone's score, the total would be a maximum if everyone
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cooperated all the time. Yet a logical player is presented a
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payoff matrix that pays most for defection in every single
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play. The situation we want to discuss here, "The Voter's
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Paradox", is similar in the conflict in payoffs but
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otherwise is much different from "The Prisoner's Dilemma" -
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and is much more common in the real world.
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II. Definition of the Paradox
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A. Exploring all sides of the issue
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It is the rule rather than the exception that the
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contribution a person would make to some group activity will
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exceed the benefit that individual might receive in return
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from being a member of the group. The voting example is a
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particularly good example of this phenomena in that it can
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easily be shown that one vote is highly unlikely to do any
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good whatsoever while there is cost to the person making the
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vote (admittedly small, usually).
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The good news is that people do not always act
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"rationally" - in the sense just described. In fact, most of
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the time, enough people cooperate in these situations of
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public good such that the collective effort does not fail.
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In this article I will try to comprehensively explore
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these conflicts between the interests of the individual and
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the group. I will examine the question of why, in situations
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in which collective action is involved, do people cooperate
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when it is often not it their best interests to do so.
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Actually it is more difficult to explain why people
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cooperate rather than not.
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My attempt in this essay is to define the phenomena of
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the so-called "Voter's Paradox" (which I will abbreviate to
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"VP" for convenience) and related phenomena as clearly as
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possible. While it is recognized that the impact of the VP
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on our daily lives is enormous1. the primary purpose of this
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essay is to present the paradox itself in enough detail such
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that the phenomena can be clearly understood and evaluated.
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When the VP is presented to most people, the typical
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response is "But what if everyone did that"? Upon the most
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casual examination, the question turns out to be quite
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ridiculous. If everyone chose not to vote then the election
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would fail. That's the answer, but it has nothing to do with
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the VP.
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Let us examine the two cases:
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1. Everyone behaves as usual. Result: my
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choice to not vote has no impact.
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2. Everyone chooses not to vote. Result: my
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choice to not vote still doesn't do anything
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(Strangely, if I chose to vote, my vote might
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now be significant!)
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Is there a problem of my action of not voting
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influencing others to do the same? Not very likely. It is
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very difficult for the private citizen to influence others
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even if he or she tried. Practically speaking, my actions in
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any group large enough for anonymity, are not likely to have
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any impact on what others do.
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1. Public Vs Private Solutions2
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Many people that have the means to do so, accepting
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that an individual investment into the solution to a public
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problem nets a very minuscule return, take the matter in
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their own hands and sponsor a private solution. For example,
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if the community's public water supply is running low,
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rather than contributing to the public fund, a person may
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elect to put in his own pump.
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2. The Paradox in other Dimensions
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a) Time
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The VP can be displayed in time as well as space. For
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example, in a long project in which the end date is subject
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to significant variability, what difference would taking a
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day off make?
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Most likely, it would make no difference at all. Most
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large projects have definate break points in time for the
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major milestones. If you miss the due date, the impact could
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be severe. But if you are early, a day one way or the other
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will make no difference in the final outcome.
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But what if I take lots of days off? There you go
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again. That is still a meaningless question since we were
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only talking about one day's impact on the final result.
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b) Looking out for Future Generations
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Why should I make significant sacrifices for the
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benefit of those yet to come? Even if I consume a great part
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of the Earth's resources and just leave garbage and
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contamination, I will likely not live to see the
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consequences. It is difficult for a rational person to give
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up very much for the generations that come after his or her
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death.
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There is the possibility that our actions today may
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spell the end of humanity. What if our selfish actions today
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results in the destruction of the survival resources of the
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earth? What if the war machines we build create a very high
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probability that the Earth will be destroyed? Should I
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sacrifice my safety and immediate financial rewards?
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Here we have a double whammy of the VP. First, will
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anything I do as an individual affect what the mass of
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humanity receives in rewards? No. Second will anything I do
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affect future generations to come? Possibly, but I will not
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be here.
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B. The Classic Definition
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Consider a group with two or more members and a
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situation in which the group as a whole would benefit from
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certain actions of the individuals in the group. While it is
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not necessary that the benefits be shared equally, we will
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assume that all members get some portion of the benefits and
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that a portion received by a member is not dependent on
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his/her contribution. The contribution of the individual is
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voluntary.
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Under these conditions, so common to modern society,
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the payoff to the individual (share of group benefit minus
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his/her cost) is usually optimum when the individual does
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nothing at all!
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Further, we can assume that if all or most of the
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members of the group contribute, all members of the group
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would benefit more than they would if there was not
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cooperation. That is, if most or all would contribute, the
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return for each individual is greater than it would be if
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each kept his or her contribution and proceeded alone. A
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valid assumption since otherwise there would be little
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reason to cooperate in the first place.
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In summary, in this classic "individuals may volunteer
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but everyone benefits" scenario, it is evident that the
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decision to do nothing is always the best strategy
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regardless of what the rest of the group does since the
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individual partakes of the benefits whether he or she
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contributes or not.
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C. The Extended Definition
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The classic definition, as described above, suffers
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from the criticisms that it is too general, leaves out some
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additional complicating details, and does not include real
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world secondary reactions that would impact a "rational"
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person's reasoning. An example of "complicating details" is
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the binary nature of elections. And many will suggest that
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secondary effects such as a person's reputation may
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completely override such "rational" decisions to be
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uncooperative.
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I will try to examine these additional details by
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extending the definition in several ways.
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D. Rational Behavior
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1. The Rationale for being Rational
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The theme of this essay is based on the concept that a
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person should be rational. Rather complex philosophical
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arguments can be made that this may not always be the case.
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Some would argue that ignorance is best for most of humanity
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and evidence from recent history would seem to support this
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in that it appears that for much of the world, the loss of
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innocence seems to be closely correlated with diminished
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happiness.
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These arguments lead in to philosophical morass that
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any study of would be far outside of the scope of this
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article. Therefore, in this essay, we will assume that it is
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in the best interests of an individual to be rational.
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2. "Rational Behavior" defined
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To make any progress in the study of this apparent
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dilemma, the concept of "rational behavior" has to be
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carefully defined. Unfortunately, that is extremely
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difficult. Reviewing references in support of this essay
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revealed that most authors avoid the subject alltogether.
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This essay places much emphasis on rational behavior.
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In particular, statements are made that supporting the
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group's interest over the individual's interest is most
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likely not "rational". So, when we say a person acts
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irrationally, what do we mean? Do we mean that the person
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||
|
had good information but ignored it or that the person had
|
||
|
bad information,thought it was correct, and acted logically
|
||
|
based on that information?
|
||
|
|
||
|
For the purposes of this analaysis, "rational behavior"
|
||
|
means that behavior that would actually provide a good
|
||
|
return for the person's contribution - based on the
|
||
|
currently available information whether that information is
|
||
|
correct or not (an action can be rational even if the
|
||
|
information available is faulty or erroneous). This does not
|
||
|
require optimality but does require that the return to the
|
||
|
individual be at least equal to the cost to the individual.
|
||
|
When there are alternate paths to take and a choice must be
|
||
|
made, a rational choice would be the one that would provide
|
||
|
the best actual return to the individual making the choice
|
||
|
(assuming correct information).
|
||
|
|
||
|
It comes as no surprise that a person's perceptions
|
||
|
and/or a person's internal programming can cause irrational
|
||
|
behavior - based on the above definition.
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. Limited Resources and Tradeoffs
|
||
|
|
||
|
The person having unlimited resources is a rarity. By
|
||
|
far, most of us are burdened by the fact that every
|
||
|
contribution of time and/or resource to any particular
|
||
|
action is at the cost to all other actions we might take
|
||
|
with that time and/or resource. That is, when we ponder
|
||
|
whether we can contribute $10 to some particular activity
|
||
|
that would result is some reward, a rational person must
|
||
|
consider the impact of the loss of that ten bucks to all
|
||
|
other potentially rewarding activities.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. Internal Programming
|
||
|
|
||
|
How a person reacts to the environment is determined by
|
||
|
that person's internal programming. For the purpose of this
|
||
|
analysis, that programming is considered to consist of two
|
||
|
categories: genes and memes. An excellent discussion on both
|
||
|
of these forces is contained in Dr. Dawkin's book, The
|
||
|
Selfish Gene3. Also, see the essay by Henson4. For our
|
||
|
purposes here it should be sufficient to say that "memes"
|
||
|
are those psychological forces that become instilled in a
|
||
|
person from learning and societal influences.
|
||
|
|
||
|
5. The Perceived Environment
|
||
|
|
||
|
The individual must act in any situation on his or her
|
||
|
perception of the environment and the expected results of
|
||
|
whatever action might be taken. That these perceptions are
|
||
|
likely to be in serious error in many situations, is no
|
||
|
surprise to anyone. The available data is almost always
|
||
|
incomplete and often contaminated by others who wish to
|
||
|
control the individual's action. Further, the analysis of
|
||
|
this data by the individual is usually flawed due to the
|
||
|
confused and improper internal programming of the individual
|
||
|
making the analysis.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Of course, people don't act on just material rewards
|
||
|
alone. The benefits that a person receives come in many
|
||
|
forms, but the most common non-material benefit is likely to
|
||
|
be "good feelings".
|
||
|
|
||
|
a) Good feelings
|
||
|
|
||
|
The good feelings that many get from making a
|
||
|
contribution to the public welfare may be substantial and
|
||
|
may exceed the cost considerably.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) Is it a good thing?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Many people are motivated to contribute to a group
|
||
|
activity if they believe that the activity is honest and
|
||
|
useful.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(2) My Reputation
|
||
|
|
||
|
"How will I be regarded by the rest of the community
|
||
|
for the action I am about to take?" is a very powerful
|
||
|
consideration for most people. Note, however, this powerful
|
||
|
influence fades away when the community is large and my
|
||
|
actions are unknown.
|
||
|
|
||
|
b) The Motivating Forces behind Good Feelings
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) The Programming - Genes and Memes
|
||
|
|
||
|
The good feeling we get from doing any particular thing
|
||
|
comes from our programming by our genes and memes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(2) The Current Environment
|
||
|
|
||
|
The psychological environment that a person is subject
|
||
|
to has a great impact on the feelings that a person has
|
||
|
about doing or not doing a specific act. For example, in
|
||
|
World War II, a group of soldiers boarding a landing boat in
|
||
|
preparation to attack a beach, knowing that there is little
|
||
|
chance of survival, still do it. That is because that action
|
||
|
is the only acceptable action in that current environment.
|
||
|
But times change; in more recent wars, soldiers have refused
|
||
|
to fight because the pressure to do so was not so great.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(3) Our Perceptions
|
||
|
|
||
|
Whether we take a particular action or not is
|
||
|
determined by what we believe the values of the variables in
|
||
|
the cost-return equation to be - not what they might
|
||
|
actually turn out to be. Our beliefs can change the
|
||
|
perceived values of these factors enormously.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Much cooperative activity that would be deemed as
|
||
|
irrational if all facts were known may be still carried out
|
||
|
if the future result is not known for certain but only as a
|
||
|
probability. While a person would most likely not bother to
|
||
|
vote if he or she knew that the potential winner was
|
||
|
thousands of votes ahead and he/she was the only one left to
|
||
|
vote, that person would still vote if the election details
|
||
|
were still unknown or in the future even though there was
|
||
|
reliable information that one of the candidates is expected
|
||
|
to win by thousands of votes. For much of the population,
|
||
|
"as long as there is some chance" that their vote will
|
||
|
"count", they vote without regard for the incredibly small
|
||
|
probabilities involved.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Some people apparently believe that their actions will
|
||
|
encourage others to do the same. This belief greatly impacts
|
||
|
the perceived value of the group benefit.
|
||
|
|
||
|
c) Ignorance ("extra rational")
|
||
|
|
||
|
If cooperating is more beneficial to the group, but
|
||
|
cooperating is irrational for the individual, then ignorance
|
||
|
can actually be best for the group - a concept well known by
|
||
|
governments and religions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
E. Detailed Analysis
|
||
|
|
||
|
If we hope to understand this apparent paradox, we must
|
||
|
examine each of its components very carefully. While the end
|
||
|
result appears to be paradoxical, each component, under
|
||
|
careful consideration, is quite straightforward.
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. The Net Return
|
||
|
|
||
|
Let us define a few symbols to make the reasoning more
|
||
|
concise and precise.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Let
|
||
|
|
||
|
C = The direct personal cost or
|
||
|
contribution
|
||
|
|
||
|
BG = Benefit derived from being a member
|
||
|
of the group
|
||
|
|
||
|
BI = Benefit derived directly to the
|
||
|
individual
|
||
|
|
||
|
R = Net return
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Then for any action taken,
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
R = BG + BI - C
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Again, I must emphasize that the most important fact to
|
||
|
recognize in understanding the VP is that the components of
|
||
|
R can be, and usually are, quite independent. I believe that
|
||
|
a misunderstanding of this fact is the reason that many
|
||
|
people have a hard time accepting and understanding the VP.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Further, since a person must act now on the basis of a
|
||
|
future return, these variables represent perceived not
|
||
|
actual values. Obviously, the individual acts on what he or
|
||
|
she perceives the costs and benefits to be, not what they
|
||
|
actually are. This is very significant and will be discussed
|
||
|
further in the following pages.
|
||
|
|
||
|
a) BG
|
||
|
|
||
|
BG is the benefit to the individual derived from being
|
||
|
a member of the group and the result of this particular
|
||
|
action. BG could be a function of C but this article's
|
||
|
purpose is to examine the case in which it is independent or
|
||
|
nearly so. Societal benefits generally accrue to the
|
||
|
individual whether the individual makes a contribution or
|
||
|
not (unless no one or an insufficient number contributes).
|
||
|
More examples will be presented in detail later but for now
|
||
|
a couple will be provided to illustrate the independence.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) Community Center built from Volunteer
|
||
|
Contributions
|
||
|
|
||
|
Our community wants to build a Community Center and to
|
||
|
do it from contributions. I can contribute or not but in
|
||
|
either case I still get to use the Center. Unless, of
|
||
|
course, no one contributes (more precisely, the
|
||
|
contributions are below some minimum value), in which case
|
||
|
the community center will not be built.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(2) Volunteers save the Town by Sandbagging the
|
||
|
Levee
|
||
|
|
||
|
I may volunteer or not but in either case, my home will
|
||
|
be saved just like everyone else's.
|
||
|
|
||
|
b) BI
|
||
|
|
||
|
BI is the benefit that the individual receives directly
|
||
|
from his action without regard to the group benefit. An
|
||
|
example follows.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) Contribution to Public Television
|
||
|
|
||
|
A public spirited individual contributes $25 to Public
|
||
|
Television and receives a Viewer's guide. The guide is an
|
||
|
immediate and significant benefit above and independent of
|
||
|
the group benefits received from being able to watch the
|
||
|
station.
|
||
|
|
||
|
c) C
|
||
|
|
||
|
C is the cost to the individual for performing a
|
||
|
particular action. For example, C would include the cost of
|
||
|
driving to the polling booth for the voter. C can be quite
|
||
|
small or even zero. Again, I must emphasize that BG usually
|
||
|
has little or no dependence on C.
|
||
|
|
||
|
C should always be evaluated in a marginal sense. That
|
||
|
is, what additional return will I get for this additional
|
||
|
contribution? For example, a minimum contribution of $25 may
|
||
|
get me coverage from the local volunteer fire department -
|
||
|
an excellent investment. An additional $25 contribution may
|
||
|
provide for a very slight improvement to service but the
|
||
|
return on this marginal investment is very poor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. The "Holistic" effects
|
||
|
|
||
|
An aspect of the extended VP, more common than not, is
|
||
|
the situation in which the return to the group exceeds the
|
||
|
contribution of the sum of the individuals. Of course, this
|
||
|
is the basis for the overwhelming desire of most responsible
|
||
|
citizens to have individuals contribute to the common good.
|
||
|
The return we get from everyone or nearly everyone voting
|
||
|
far exceeds the cost of the sum of the individual efforts.
|
||
|
|
||
|
So, while group efforts can and often do result in a
|
||
|
return less than the investment, most reasonable group
|
||
|
efforts are characterized by the holistic effect, creating
|
||
|
the diabolical condition of the VP.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. Impact of Infinite Vs Finite payoff
|
||
|
|
||
|
Cooperative efforts can be classified into two distinct
|
||
|
types: those that have finite return and therefore the
|
||
|
return to an individual is diminished by the return given to
|
||
|
other individuals and those in which the return to the
|
||
|
individual is the same regardless of the benefits it
|
||
|
provides to other individuals. And example of this type of
|
||
|
reward would be the repair of the levee that saves the town.
|
||
|
That my neighbor's house is saved does not impact my benefit
|
||
|
of having my house saved.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
This is of significance since in the "infinite payoff"
|
||
|
case, freeloaders present no cost to the contributors. If
|
||
|
you contribute to Public Radio, it doesn't cost you anymore
|
||
|
if I, a non-contributor, also listen to it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
However, whether the payoff is infinite or not does not
|
||
|
change the basic paradox. The contributor is still presented
|
||
|
with the problem that the contribution exceeds the return.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. The impact of Discreet results
|
||
|
|
||
|
Many phenomena such as elections have a result that is
|
||
|
binary in nature. The result is either true or false
|
||
|
depending on a value reaching a minimum value. A politician
|
||
|
is elected only if he receives a majority of the votes. This
|
||
|
has particular impact on the phenomena of the VP in that it
|
||
|
is highly unlikely that one vote will have any effect on the
|
||
|
outcome. In fact, the number of votes can vary over a wide
|
||
|
range without changing the outcome.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This situation is best illustrated by a simple
|
||
|
experiment. Suppose that you had a balance scale with the
|
||
|
balance pans filled with marbles with a sensitivity such
|
||
|
that a one marble difference caused the scale indicator to
|
||
|
go against its stop. If an equal number of marbles is in
|
||
|
each pan, then the scale indicator is at center. Otherwise,
|
||
|
the pointer is either at the left or right stop.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suppose there are a few more marbles in one pan than
|
||
|
the other (few being more than 2). I can remove a marble
|
||
|
from either pan and nothing happens. Or I can transfer a
|
||
|
marble from one pan to the other and still nothing happens.
|
||
|
This example perfectly illustrates the VP for the situation
|
||
|
where the results are binary.
|
||
|
|
||
|
a) "But my vote might break the tie"
|
||
|
|
||
|
It is difficult for people to understand what an
|
||
|
incredibly small chance there is of a major election ending
|
||
|
in a tie.5
|
||
|
|
||
|
The probability of a tie in a state election is
|
||
|
infinitesimally small. And, if the election ends in a near
|
||
|
tie, a recount will be called for anyway! National elections
|
||
|
do not end in ties.
|
||
|
|
||
|
b) The Wasted Vote Myth
|
||
|
|
||
|
A better understanding of the VP might put to bed the
|
||
|
specious argument heard so often in the last election that,
|
||
|
"I really would like to vote for Perot, but I realize that
|
||
|
my vote would be wasted (since he is not likely to get
|
||
|
enough votes to win) so I will vote for Clinton". This bit
|
||
|
of choice reasoning, apparently used by millions of voters,
|
||
|
likely made a major impact on the vote count in the last
|
||
|
election. Note the fallacies: (1) Since no particular
|
||
|
individual's vote will impact the election results, that
|
||
|
individual would receive greater satisfaction by voting
|
||
|
their "conscience". (2) The fact that many people considered
|
||
|
a vote for Perot as being wasted and therefore switched
|
||
|
their vote to another candidate significantly impacted the
|
||
|
vote count for Perot and conceivably caused him to lose. We
|
||
|
will never know.
|
||
|
|
||
|
5. The Impact of Large size with some randomness
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the real world, randomness is the rule rather than
|
||
|
the exception. When the number of things in a collection is
|
||
|
very large, the addition or removal of one of these things
|
||
|
may be less than the random variation of the quantity. This
|
||
|
would make it undetectable.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There are situations in which the impact of one event
|
||
|
is just insignificant compared to the normal random
|
||
|
variations. The amount of water I use to take a shower is
|
||
|
less than the normal variations of the volume of water in
|
||
|
the reservoir. Therefore, my taking of a shower,
|
||
|
practically, has no impact on the water situation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
6. A change so small it cannot be detected
|
||
|
|
||
|
While random variations can make detection impossible
|
||
|
for one event, another factor is involved in the detection:
|
||
|
the sensitivity of the detector. Even if there was no random
|
||
|
variation of the water volume in the reservoir, no means of
|
||
|
measuring the volume is sensitive enough to detect the usage
|
||
|
of one shower by one individual.
|
||
|
|
||
|
But we are not in general talking about some device
|
||
|
that does detection - we are talking about human beings. If
|
||
|
the event is not detectable by humans, then it is likely of
|
||
|
no practical significance. The rock star on the stage cannot
|
||
|
detect whether I clap or not. Most humans cannot detect if I
|
||
|
say "aye" or nothing in a voice vote of 50 or so people.
|
||
|
|
||
|
7. Impact of group size
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Voter's Paradox seems to mostly occur when there
|
||
|
are large numbers of anonymous members in a group. Those two
|
||
|
factors -group size and anonymity - need to be examined more
|
||
|
carefully.
|
||
|
|
||
|
a) The Size of the Group
|
||
|
|
||
|
A thoughtful person upon first examining the VP might
|
||
|
speculate that the paradox results from the sheer size of
|
||
|
the group. "My vote doesn't count because there are so many
|
||
|
voters, the situation makes my vote insignificant".
|
||
|
|
||
|
So, how many votes does it take to make your vote
|
||
|
insignificant?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Regardless of how small the number, your vote only
|
||
|
counts when there is a tie, plus or minus one vote. Consider
|
||
|
that there are 4 voters and you are one of them. If you did
|
||
|
not vote and A got 2 votes and B got 1 then your vote could
|
||
|
have caused a tie if you voted for B or done no good if you
|
||
|
voted for A. If you didn't vote at all, then A wins.
|
||
|
Regardless of the number of votes, this situation obviously
|
||
|
prevails.
|
||
|
|
||
|
b) Anonymity
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) The Psychological Cost/Benefits
|
||
|
|
||
|
BI, the direct benefit to the individual and C, the
|
||
|
cost to the individual contain components that we will call
|
||
|
"psychological rewards" (BIP) or punishment (CP). For most
|
||
|
individuals, BIP and/or CP are very powerful components in
|
||
|
the cost/benefit equation. In fact, the factors account for
|
||
|
most of the "irrational" but good behavior that civilization
|
||
|
depends upon to exist!
|
||
|
|
||
|
Let's look at an example. Suppose your church wants to
|
||
|
add a new audio/video room that will provide free access to
|
||
|
educational materials. They wish to do this by means of
|
||
|
contributions. How do you think the results would compare
|
||
|
between allowing the members to contribute anonymously or to
|
||
|
contribute to a basket being passed while all are sitting in
|
||
|
their pews? I'm afraid anonymous contributions would not do
|
||
|
very well at all.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Given that there are enormous social pressures to "do
|
||
|
the right thing", what is the effect of anonymity in the
|
||
|
group? It practically nullifies any "do-good" activity. If I
|
||
|
contribute to a cause and the contribution is anonymous,
|
||
|
then these psychological forces are not at play. Other
|
||
|
factors, particularly guilt must account for this behavior.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(2) Behavior and the size of the group
|
||
|
|
||
|
The understanding that anonymity nullifies the
|
||
|
psychological pressures to "do the right thing", then
|
||
|
explains why people in small towns act in socially desirable
|
||
|
ways and people in big cities typically do not. As long as
|
||
|
most people in your group are fully aware of your actions,
|
||
|
you will most likely act responsibly with regard to both
|
||
|
personal and group activities.6
|
||
|
|
||
|
(3) Freeloaders
|
||
|
|
||
|
If the logic presented so far in this essay is sound -
|
||
|
especially the fact that a single individual's actions are
|
||
|
of no consequence to the outcome and there is anonymity -
|
||
|
then society will most likely have a problem with "free
|
||
|
riders". And of course it does with enormous costs in money,
|
||
|
time and security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
While some actions are more sinister than others, we
|
||
|
all freeload to some extent. We cheat Sears by taking back a
|
||
|
product for exchange or refund when we did the damage. Why
|
||
|
not? Sears is a big corporation and one return will not make
|
||
|
any difference. Besides, they don't know me from Adam. Of
|
||
|
course, I wouldn't even think of doing this to someone that
|
||
|
knows me personally.
|
||
|
|
||
|
We cheat the insurance companies and the health plans
|
||
|
that our dollars collectively support.
|
||
|
|
||
|
We take advantage of every benefit from the government
|
||
|
that we can whether we are justified or not.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the view of some, more sinister examples are the
|
||
|
cheating on welfare and the wasting of public funds and the
|
||
|
goofing off by government employees.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Freeriding is a rational action when the "benefit-cost"
|
||
|
value is positive. Public programs provided by the
|
||
|
government, insurance companies and health plans provide
|
||
|
great benefits compared to the cost to the free rider.
|
||
|
Society can increase the cost to the potential freerider by
|
||
|
changing the mental make-up of the individuals or by
|
||
|
increased controls and punishments. It is most important to
|
||
|
realize that these increased costs to the freerider usually
|
||
|
also greatly increase the cost of the benefits to everyone
|
||
|
else.
|
||
|
|
||
|
An interesting aspect of the freeloader phenomena is
|
||
|
that the freeloader can not exist without the contributions
|
||
|
of those who do not freeload. The hippie living on welfare
|
||
|
and using the public medical facilities depends on the
|
||
|
existence of the straight people that they hold in contempt.
|
||
|
That is, "without the host, the parasite dies".
|
||
|
|
||
|
8. But what if everyone did that?
|
||
|
|
||
|
When most people hear the argument for the VP the first
|
||
|
time, the most common reaction is, "But what if everyone did
|
||
|
that?". Obviously, if everyone declined to vote, democracy
|
||
|
would fail. Still the argument is specious. The impact of
|
||
|
"everyone doing it" would radically change the analysis of
|
||
|
any logical discussion. What if everyone decided to withdrew
|
||
|
their money from the bank? What if everyone decided to quit
|
||
|
buying new cars? What if everyone decided to not go to work
|
||
|
tomorrow? What if everyone decided to read this article?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thousands of examples can be given in which a certain
|
||
|
action is harmless when committed by you and me but becomes
|
||
|
a disaster if "everyone does it". Like I said, a specious
|
||
|
argument.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Consider another case: let us say the Red Cross
|
||
|
broadcasts a mass appeal for more blood as a result of needs
|
||
|
coming from some disaster. What if you didn't feel quite up
|
||
|
to giving blood at this time? Would their appeal fail? Of
|
||
|
course not. But what if everyone followed your example?
|
||
|
|
||
|
While most people clearly understand the above
|
||
|
arguments for the cases presented, they seem to have
|
||
|
difficulty understanding the ramifications of other problems
|
||
|
that are characterized by the same phenomena - the classic
|
||
|
example being voting in a national election. Your vote in a
|
||
|
national election has even less impact on the results of
|
||
|
that election than the sale of one share of IBM stock would
|
||
|
have on the price of IBM stock! And far less impact than
|
||
|
your withholding of a pint of blood from the Red Cross.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
III. Examples
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
A. Cutting off my nose to spite my face
|
||
|
|
||
|
Should I refuse to buy shoes made in China that I can
|
||
|
get much cheaper than USA manufactured shoes even though I
|
||
|
dislike China's human rights policy? Should I avoid buying
|
||
|
Willie Nelson's albums because he is an alleged tax cheat
|
||
|
even though I really like his music? Should I avoid buying
|
||
|
products at Walmart's, that save me a lot of money, because
|
||
|
some clerk got nasty with me once?
|
||
|
|
||
|
To take any of these actions causes me to lose the
|
||
|
direct and substantial benefits while having no significant
|
||
|
impact on the problems I dislike.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I will keep buying Willie's albums.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
IV. Ramifications
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
What are the consequences of the VP? How does it impact
|
||
|
our daily lives? The impact is enormous.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A. Crime
|
||
|
|
||
|
If you have followed the above arguments and accept the
|
||
|
logic, you should have no problem accepting the conclusion
|
||
|
that most crime is a result of the VP as defined in this
|
||
|
essay. That is, crime is usually committed based on the
|
||
|
individual's assessment that the benefit will exceed the
|
||
|
cost. It would seem reasonable that crime will increase if
|
||
|
either the benefit is increased or the cost is decreased.
|
||
|
Most likely, the large increase in crime our society is now
|
||
|
experiencing is a result of the decrease in cost to the
|
||
|
criminal. Some examples of the decreased cost are:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. Social acceptability of criminal activity
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the last few decades, in many communities, crime has
|
||
|
become more socially acceptable - even "cool". As we have
|
||
|
discussed earlier, social psychological pressures are very
|
||
|
powerful (enough to cause a person to sacrifice their life
|
||
|
rather than be seen as a coward, for instance). This
|
||
|
psychological good feeling of being looked up to by the
|
||
|
individual's peers far outweighs the potential future
|
||
|
destruction to the community that all will suffer from -
|
||
|
including the perpetrator.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. Decrease in expected punishment
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. Reduced expectation of actually being punished
|
||
|
|
||
|
B. Sex
|
||
|
|
||
|
Socially unacceptable sexual activity is on the
|
||
|
increase in spite of the widening of the definition of what
|
||
|
is acceptable. In particular, sexual activity by the young
|
||
|
and others in which the results present a burden to society
|
||
|
are on the increase. Much of this is a result of the VP
|
||
|
phenomena.
|
||
|
|
||
|
C. Politics
|
||
|
|
||
|
Politicians generally do what is in their own best
|
||
|
interests with often disastrous impacts on society in
|
||
|
general - even though they are a member of that society.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
D. Government
|
||
|
|
||
|
Government burden and suppression of individual rights
|
||
|
continues to increase since it benefits a few. Yet, we all
|
||
|
suffer from these infringements, including those that
|
||
|
benefit from it. Unfortunately, their direct reward exceeds
|
||
|
their losses from being a member of society.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
V. Ways to Remove the Paradox
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
A. Directly tying the return to the cost
|
||
|
|
||
|
The paradox goes away when a person is directly
|
||
|
rewarded or punished by their actions. For example, if a
|
||
|
device was placed on the water meter that would report any
|
||
|
use of the water during the times such use is prohibited,
|
||
|
then that individual could be punished.
|
||
|
|
||
|
B. Small Groups
|
||
|
|
||
|
As discussed above, we have few problems with the
|
||
|
freerider aspect of the VP when everyone in the group knows
|
||
|
each other.
|
||
|
|
||
|
C. Coercion and other outside inducements
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. Using the Government to do your dirty work
|
||
|
|
||
|
Most activist groups use the government to enforce
|
||
|
cooperation when it is obvious that voluntary cooperation
|
||
|
will not do the job.
|
||
|
|
||
|
a) Environmental Groups
|
||
|
|
||
|
Environmental groups know that there is little chance
|
||
|
of successful environmental voluntary action by the
|
||
|
population due to the problem of the VP. So they have the
|
||
|
government enforce their philosophy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
b) Funding of the arts
|
||
|
|
||
|
Those that would provide culture to the masses know
|
||
|
that the masses would not support this by any voluntary
|
||
|
sacrifice. So they use the force of law to give the masses
|
||
|
what they "need".
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
VI. Summary
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
In this article, the phenomena of the so-called
|
||
|
"Voter's Paradox" has been examined in detail. There are two
|
||
|
major aspects to this paradox, both of which present
|
||
|
enormous difficulties for a society based on social
|
||
|
interaction. First there is the problem that it seems to be
|
||
|
quite evident that certain scenarios requiring the
|
||
|
cooperation of all or most of the individuals in a group
|
||
|
would provide benefits for everyone far in excess of what
|
||
|
they would be able to do privately. Good examples are
|
||
|
elections, roads, water supplies, river levees and other
|
||
|
large investments. Yet, at the same time, it is obvious that
|
||
|
for a particular individual, his or her maximum return is
|
||
|
obtained by making no contribution - that is, freeriding.
|
||
|
For example, if the levee could possibly break, the
|
||
|
individual would be best served by not contributing to the
|
||
|
sandbagging at the main levee but instead working on
|
||
|
defenses around his own home.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The second major component of the "Voter's Paradox" is
|
||
|
that the contribution of the individual in large groups may
|
||
|
be absolutely or practically of no significance. On a
|
||
|
national election, one vote cannot possibly determine the
|
||
|
outcome of the election. If the levee broke because it was
|
||
|
shy 100 sandbags and I could only do 50, then my effort was
|
||
|
useless. If it didn't break because it had at least 50 more
|
||
|
than it needed, my contribution was useless.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A. Societal Problems resulting from the VP
|
||
|
|
||
|
Most of the major problems facing large societies can
|
||
|
be traced to the VP. Massive non-cooperation results in a
|
||
|
breakdown of many group activities that would be useful. The
|
||
|
massive growth of the welfare roles, crime, government
|
||
|
spending, government waste, and etc. are examples of
|
||
|
individuals maximizing their own return at the expense of
|
||
|
the group. The paradox is that they are acting rationally!
|
||
|
|
||
|
Solutions to these problems are difficult but possible.
|
||
|
However, solutions are beyond the scope of this article
|
||
|
which is devoted to explaining the theory of the paradox.
|
||
|
|
||
|
B. Many do cooperate and that is enough for success
|
||
|
in many situations
|
||
|
|
||
|
That society functions at all is a testimony to the
|
||
|
fact that a large part of society does "cooperate".
|
||
|
According to Hardin7, some experimental data indicates that
|
||
|
about one half of the participants cooperate. I suspect that
|
||
|
more cooperated in the past and less will in the future.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Another dilemma for society is that people are more
|
||
|
likely to cooperate and not do what is in their personal
|
||
|
best interest if they are ignorant and/or living lives
|
||
|
controlled by myths. An educated person is more likely to be
|
||
|
cognizant of the tradeoffs between self interest and group
|
||
|
interest.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Fortunately, it does not require 100 percent
|
||
|
cooperation for most group efforts to succeed. Many public
|
||
|
projects function with only a small percentage contributing.
|
||
|
Voting is a good example.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Success can also be achieved for group activities that
|
||
|
would fail if based on voluntary cooperation by invoking the
|
||
|
force of law. Environment groups have made much use of this
|
||
|
approach.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
VII. References
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hardin, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science,
|
||
|
|
||
|
162:1243-1248, 1968
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hardin, Russell, Collective Action, Johns Hopkins University
|
||
|
|
||
|
Press, Baltimore, 1982.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dawkins, Richard; The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford
|
||
|
|
||
|
University Press, 1976.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Axelrod, Robert; The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books,
|
||
|
|
||
|
New York, 1984.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Glance, Natalie and Huberman, Bernardo; Dynamics of social
|
||
|
|
||
|
dilemmas. Scientific American. March, 1994
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Diekmann, Andreas and Mitter, Petter, Editors; Paradoxical
|
||
|
|
||
|
Effects of Social Behavior - Essays in Honor of Anatol
|
||
|
|
||
|
Rapoport. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1986.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Poundstone, William; Prisoner's Dilemma.Doubleday, New York,
|
||
|
|
||
|
1992
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Glance, Natalie S.; Dynamics with Expectations , Doctoral
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dissertation at Stanford University, June 1993. This paper
|
||
|
|
||
|
and others related are located at the Internet site,
|
||
|
|
||
|
parc.xerox.com.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
_______________________________
|
||
|
|
||
|
1A discussion on the impact of the VP on society will
|
||
|
|
||
|
be contained in another paper by this author, now in
|
||
|
|
||
|
preparation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2Hardin, Russell; Collective Action, John Hopkins
|
||
|
|
||
|
University Press, Baltimore, 1982, Page 75
|
||
|
|
||
|
3Dawkins, Richard; The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford
|
||
|
|
||
|
University Press, 1976.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4Henson, H. Keith; "Memes Meta-Memes and Politics", (An
|
||
|
|
||
|
article available on the Internet. Use Archie to find.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
5Hardin, Russell, Page 60
|
||
|
|
||
|
6There are several papers located at the Internet site,
|
||
|
|
||
|
parc.xerox.com by Dr. Benardo Huberman and Dr. Natalie
|
||
|
|
||
|
Glance that discuss the effect of keeping organizational
|
||
|
|
||
|
size small to improve cooperation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
7Hardin, Russell, Page 29
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
uXu #219 Underground eXperts United 1994 uXu #219
|
||
|
Call LHD2 -> +1-818-546-2332
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|