4486 lines
201 KiB
Plaintext
4486 lines
201 KiB
Plaintext
![]() |
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
** **
|
||
|
** PPPPP I RRRRR AAAAA TTTTT EEEEE **
|
||
|
** P PP I R RR A A T E **
|
||
|
** PPP I RRR AAAAA T EEEEE **
|
||
|
** P I R R A A T E **
|
||
|
** P I R R A A T EEEEE **
|
||
|
**keepin' the dream alive **
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
-=> VOLUME 1, ISSUE 2, August, 1989 <=-
|
||
|
|
||
|
**** WELCOME ****
|
||
|
|
||
|
To the second issue of -=* PIRATE *=-!
|
||
|
Special thanks for getting this issue out go to:
|
||
|
Jedi
|
||
|
Hatchet Molly
|
||
|
Blade Runner
|
||
|
Chris Robin
|
||
|
Maxx Cougar
|
||
|
The California Zephyr
|
||
|
Taran King
|
||
|
Knight Lightening
|
||
|
Flint
|
||
|
Epios
|
||
|
Mikey Mouse
|
||
|
Jim Richards
|
||
|
Gene & Roger
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any comments, or if you want to contribute, most of us can
|
||
|
be reached at one of the following boards:
|
||
|
BOOTLEGGER'S >>> PIRATE HOME BOARD
|
||
|
RIPCO (Illinois)
|
||
|
SYCAMORE ELITE (815-895-5573)
|
||
|
THE UNDERGROUND (New Jersey)
|
||
|
GREAT ESCAPE (Chicago)
|
||
|
PACIFIC ALLIANCE (California)
|
||
|
BITNET ADDRESS (Chris Robin): TK0EEE1@NIU.BITNET
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dedicated to sharing knowledge, gossip, information, and tips
|
||
|
for warez hobbyists.
|
||
|
|
||
|
** CONTENTS THIS ISSUE **
|
||
|
|
||
|
Phile 1. Introduction, editorial, and general comments
|
||
|
Phile 2. Whither the World of Pirates?
|
||
|
Phile 3. How to get things running
|
||
|
Phile 4. Sysops and the Law -- Sysops' Legal Liability
|
||
|
Phile 5. Hackers in the News
|
||
|
Phile 6. Illinois and Texas Computer Laws
|
||
|
Phile 7. Is Teleconnect Dangerous? They're after our rights!
|
||
|
Phile 8. Viruses
|
||
|
Phile 9. BBS NEWS: Review (ATLANTIS) and APPLE #s
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 1: EDITORS' CORNER *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here we go again with the second issue of *PIRATE*. Lots of
|
||
|
feedback from the last issue, and some good suggestions.
|
||
|
The legal stuff seemed to be the most popular, so we'll try
|
||
|
to expand and upgrade it. Biggest criticism was the
|
||
|
emphasis on IBM, so we'll try to keep the contributions
|
||
|
relevant to all systems and to spread around the specific
|
||
|
topics about equally between them.
|
||
|
|
||
|
We've been asked about our assessment of the virus risk to
|
||
|
pirates. In our view, it's pretty slight. VIRUSES ARE REAL! But
|
||
|
there isn't cause yet for paranoia, and it seems that many of the
|
||
|
so-called "viruses" are user-related, not nasty bugs. But,
|
||
|
because we take viruses seriously, we've included a phile with
|
||
|
some virus information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Seems to be the season for board crashes. Home board went down
|
||
|
for a bit, and so did a few of those where we hang out. A bunch
|
||
|
of regional and local boards also bit the dust. So, keep stuff
|
||
|
backed up, gang...assume that yours is next!
|
||
|
|
||
|
A few changes in this issue...the articles are in phile form so
|
||
|
they can be uploaded individually to other boards. We've also
|
||
|
tried to keep the issue a bit shorter, to about 2,000 lines. So,
|
||
|
zip it up and upload to your favorite boards, and leave a message
|
||
|
where you can. THE UNDERGROUND has been down for a while,
|
||
|
but is back up and upgraded. GREAT ESCAPE is back up, as is
|
||
|
PAC-ALLIANCE. All are looking better than ever.
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------
|
||
|
MORE TIPS
|
||
|
---------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Last issue we published a few basic tips for uploading. A few
|
||
|
of them bear repeating:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. BE SURE ANY PROGRAM YOU UPLOAD IS COMPLETE!
|
||
|
Nothing is more lame than to upload a partial program.
|
||
|
Copy a program from the original disks, is possible, using
|
||
|
a *good* copy program. Then, zip it, and unzip it and install
|
||
|
it to be sure it works. If there is a trick to installation or
|
||
|
running, add a short zip phile. BE SURE THE PROGRAM WORKS!
|
||
|
Then, make sure you add a zip phile comment to each zip phile
|
||
|
describing the disk ("program disk, 1/5"; "drivers, 2/5").
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. DON'T GIVE OUT THE NUMBER OF YOUR FAVORITE PIRATE BOARD
|
||
|
WITHOUT THE SYSOP'S PERMISSION.
|
||
|
Some sysops like publicity. But, elite boards may not want a
|
||
|
bunch of new callers. Most boards ask for names of other boards
|
||
|
you're on, so if you leave the name, be sure you ask the sysop
|
||
|
if it's ok to also leave the number. We know some elite sysops
|
||
|
who will bump a user who gives out the number without permission.
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. DON'T ACT LIKE AN IDIOT.
|
||
|
One sure way to tell if users will be lamers is if they say
|
||
|
something like "Hey, dude, I'm a pirate, and want complete
|
||
|
access or I'll crash your board." Cool. Real cool, dude. Like,
|
||
|
I mean, wow, ya know? Right, like, ok, here's all the philes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. DON'T BE A LEECH!
|
||
|
Nothing is worse than seeing 25 calls a day and no new warez or
|
||
|
messages. When you log on, READ THE BULLETINS AND MESSAGES, and
|
||
|
contribute something, even if it's only a tip, some info, or a
|
||
|
swap list. If anything is going on in your area--hacker busts,
|
||
|
new boards, media stuff on law or related activities, post it (be
|
||
|
sure to give the date and pages of the newspaper so others can
|
||
|
check it out). Some boards (RIPCO, SYCAMORE ELITE, GROUND ZERO)
|
||
|
there are gphile sections for articles. So, take the time to type
|
||
|
out the story (or transcribe from tape if it's tv or radio) and
|
||
|
upload as .zip or gphile. (Be sure to do this in ascii format).
|
||
|
Or, send to CHRIS ROBIN on bitnet and s/he (are you male or
|
||
|
femme, Chris?) will do the rest.
|
||
|
|
||
|
5. KNOW THE BOARD YOU'RE CALLING!
|
||
|
As silly as it sounds, it's not uncommon, especially for new
|
||
|
pholks, to try upload an IBM program to an Apple board, or wonder
|
||
|
why a commodore game won't work on a non-commodore system.
|
||
|
Also, be sure that if a game or program you upload has
|
||
|
special requirements, such as a math co-processor or a VGA
|
||
|
screen or a joy-stick, to note this in the description and
|
||
|
put a zip comment in philes. Don't be afraid to add a
|
||
|
README.1ST note to explain glitches to others.
|
||
|
|
||
|
6. ERASE IDENTIFYING ID NUMBERS. If you upload a registered
|
||
|
program, try to get into it to erase any identification data or
|
||
|
serial numbers. Either use a "search" program capable of finding
|
||
|
text in a phile, or use a program like Magellan to search for the
|
||
|
identifying text.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thanks to contributors who have sent philes and other
|
||
|
suggestions. Much of the info has apparently come from screen
|
||
|
dumps from other boards. We will try to acknowledge these boards
|
||
|
when possible, so if you send info, be sure to include the name
|
||
|
of the board or the source, so we don't look like a bunch of
|
||
|
rip-off artists.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here's something that might help in communicating on BBSs. EPIOS
|
||
|
got it from the Public Brand Software catalog for IBM, which says
|
||
|
it was put together by Scott Fahlman with help from other
|
||
|
partici-pants on FIDONET.
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-) humorous; joking
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-( sad
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-') tongue in cheek
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-() shout
|
||
|
|
||
|
;-) say no more; nudge nudge
|
||
|
|
||
|
=:-() scares me, too
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-! foot in mouth
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-$ put your money where your mouth is
|
||
|
|
||
|
o:-) don't blame me, I'm innocent
|
||
|
|
||
|
%-/ don't blame me, I'm hung over
|
||
|
|
||
|
<:-) don't blame me, I'm a dunce
|
||
|
|
||
|
C:-) blame me, I'm an egghead
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-)8 sent by a gentleman
|
||
|
|
||
|
8:-) sent by a little girl
|
||
|
|
||
|
(8-) sent by an owl
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-)====== sent by a giraffe
|
||
|
|
||
|
(-:|:-) sent by siamese twins
|
||
|
|
||
|
d:-) I like to play baseball
|
||
|
|
||
|
q:-) I am a baseball catcher
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-| I can play the harmonica
|
||
|
|
||
|
:-8 I just ate a pickle
|
||
|
|
||
|
Turn them sideways.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 2: THE CHANGING PIRATE WORLD *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
There've been some complaints this summer about the changes in
|
||
|
pirate boards. The following was snatched and sent to us from one
|
||
|
of the best boards in the country. We've been complaining about
|
||
|
lamerz for a long while, and it seems they are taking over.
|
||
|
We've shared this with some other sysops, and they pretty much
|
||
|
agree that kids, which is a state of mind, not an age, have
|
||
|
pretty much moved in to tie up lines. Seems there's not a lot of
|
||
|
ideas on what to do about upgrading the quality of losers, so we
|
||
|
thought we'd toss this out for some discussion.
|
||
|
* * *
|
||
|
|
||
|
S1: I'm almost ready to quit. Things have not been that
|
||
|
great with us and the competition is doing pretty good.
|
||
|
Lost a lot of good users. Now all I ever get are losers or
|
||
|
leeches. Getting kinda fed up I guess. . . . Well I and a
|
||
|
few of the other sysops I know have, it's all going to the
|
||
|
kiddies now, we have seen at least 30-35 new local pirate
|
||
|
boards and about 100 or so new pirate boards nationally
|
||
|
spring up within the last few months, and they are all
|
||
|
pretty much 15 and 16 year olds who run things pretty shabby
|
||
|
in our minds. They have hurt many boards including us for
|
||
|
competition of callers. You will start to see many old
|
||
|
timers like us go by the wayside for awhile while they clean
|
||
|
up, then maybe later on, we might all come back like we did
|
||
|
a few years ago when the smoke clears.
|
||
|
|
||
|
S2: Yeh, the number of "kiddie Klubs" grows as the ease of
|
||
|
getting modem/pc gets more popular, but those I've hit have
|
||
|
been so fuckin' lame!!! Mostly the games, which is fine, but
|
||
|
the way that other stuff, what little there is, is
|
||
|
uploaded--like, just collapsing a hugh file into a single
|
||
|
data set and uploading. God!
|
||
|
|
||
|
S1: Get used to it, thats what you will find on most of
|
||
|
them from now on, as we old guys start to fold our tents up.
|
||
|
Many of my friends have been saying that when mine and 1 or
|
||
|
2 other boards they call go, that might be the end of their
|
||
|
calling days for business stuff.
|
||
|
|
||
|
S2: Yeh, it gets depressing to call some board, struggle
|
||
|
for the access and find there's nothing there. Damn. From
|
||
|
the guys I've talked to, they also bitch about the time, the
|
||
|
new stuff coming out and how hard it is to keep on top of it
|
||
|
all....but these guys are the "neurotic collectors, " and
|
||
|
not much into using it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
S1: Thats right, and they usually don't support you after
|
||
|
they get what they are looking for. Thats what has hurt us.
|
||
|
We had some great guys for awhile that kept supporting us
|
||
|
until they got all the stuff they wanted, then they said
|
||
|
adios. Plus the pcp cap has hurt...
|
||
|
|
||
|
S2: Isn't there a law against lamerz, or has that been
|
||
|
protected by the constitution? I haven't pulled down
|
||
|
anything good since school let out in the spring and my
|
||
|
original disk sources moved home for the summer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
S1: Yep, most of these new pirate boards are guys back from
|
||
|
Illinois U that ran campus boards, so they all started up
|
||
|
for the summer and have been murdering the good boards with
|
||
|
their instant access and easy files deals. They have been
|
||
|
having giant leech parties and all. If I go down, it would
|
||
|
be for quite awhile I guess, maybe a year or so, depends on
|
||
|
how things are I guess. I really hate to, but things are so
|
||
|
slow, I just can't see wasting the electricity when it goes
|
||
|
unused all day.
|
||
|
|
||
|
S1: Well, maybe come the fall, it'll pick up, 'because it does
|
||
|
seem to be slow all over on nat'l boards....but you're right
|
||
|
about the kids going home and opening up boards---at least a
|
||
|
half-dozen from our school did, but these were guys who
|
||
|
leeched from boards here, and my guess is will try to leech
|
||
|
some more when they get home...take the money and run type
|
||
|
thing... interests me, they usally just tell me how great
|
||
|
they are and that whoever they mention can vouch for them
|
||
|
even though they mention they aren't into files or calling
|
||
|
BBS's that much. So you can see why I'm a bit hesitant in
|
||
|
granting them access, besides they never read what I put up
|
||
|
for new user access either, so they waste both of our time.
|
||
|
Now I just usually give access to users here I have talked
|
||
|
to about a guy who applies first before I go any farther.
|
||
|
Thats how I can tell that they are either kids or losers
|
||
|
since they don't know the ropes, it always glares out of
|
||
|
what they type when I read these things, comes from years of
|
||
|
experience sifting thru all this BS. When I find one that
|
||
|
looks like a winner, it's like a needle in a haystack,
|
||
|
happens only once in a long while or wait.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Yes and it pisses me off very much. As soon as I reopened
|
||
|
membership about 6 months ago after 2 great years of none of
|
||
|
that BS, all of a sudden I'm getting losers constantly tying
|
||
|
up my line each day recalling for access and it has been
|
||
|
irritating me a lot. Thats why the number has to be changed
|
||
|
at my expense.
|
||
|
Would go would it be, they'd just tie up the line from guys
|
||
|
who were willing to upload instead of download, everyone
|
||
|
who is willing to pay, is new and has nothing, or isn't on
|
||
|
any good boards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
No this is like CB's. You can get away with anything as
|
||
|
long as your parents don't know about it and you are
|
||
|
anonymous from the law. I'm afraid it's a plague that will
|
||
|
haunt BBS's for awhile unless enough of them start setting
|
||
|
up guidelines like I tried to do, and not give them access,
|
||
|
but as you can see, it doesn't work, when most of the boards
|
||
|
are kids anyways.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Yeh. Well, maybe they'll grow up, except there always seems
|
||
|
to be more where they came from (grin)....well, it's maybe
|
||
|
time to get all the sysops of good boards together in a
|
||
|
union or something.
|
||
|
|
||
|
We have tried many times. It's a lost because.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Bummer. Can't think of any cheery words of wisdom....just
|
||
|
hang in there and hope they all get run over by drunken
|
||
|
white sox fans, or something.
|
||
|
|
||
|
They are drunken white sox fans. Yeh well we will hang
|
||
|
around at least a couple more weeks, then who knows.
|
||
|
|
||
|
OK---but if you go down, you'll be missed. You just don't
|
||
|
know it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
S1: Well maybe and maybe not, I know there are better boards
|
||
|
around, but if they are getting half of what we aren't then
|
||
|
maybe they will fade also. I hope not.
|
||
|
Like the Joni Mitchell song..."ya don't know what ya have
|
||
|
til it's gone." Well , Tell it to the losers. right?
|
||
|
|
||
|
S2: God, how far we've come in tek in just a few years. That's
|
||
|
impressive. Well, one thing the kids don't have going for
|
||
|
them is high tech and perseverance.
|
||
|
|
||
|
* * *
|
||
|
Old timers have seen a lot of changes in the pirate
|
||
|
world in the last two years. Let us know your gripes
|
||
|
and opinion.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 3: GETTING THINGS RUNNING *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
Assuming that whoever uploaded a program is reasonably
|
||
|
responsible, the next thing is to get the program running. A lot
|
||
|
of sysops have to deal with angry users who often claim a program
|
||
|
doesn't work if they can't get it running the first try. Too
|
||
|
often this failure is caused by impatience or inexperience. In
|
||
|
future issues, we will provide a few tips as they are forwarded
|
||
|
to us, so if you have a program that requires some tricky
|
||
|
maneuvers, pass along the info to us. We'll start out with some
|
||
|
of the simplest techniques, so some of this may seem basic to a
|
||
|
lot of you. But we've found a lot of folks who didn't know this
|
||
|
kind of stuff, so we'll start out simple.
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. LOOK FOR "README" FILES. Any real pirate will stick in a text
|
||
|
file that will provide tips on getting a program running. If a
|
||
|
game has been cracked, there is often a separate *.bat program
|
||
|
required to start it. If it's a complex utility, such as SPSSPC
|
||
|
or ALDUS, sometimes there are tricks to installation that have
|
||
|
been provided. So, simple as it sounds, look for some
|
||
|
instructions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS: Many programs have installation
|
||
|
instructions that should be followed. Many can't be run just by
|
||
|
dumping into one humungous directory and then run. So, you may
|
||
|
have to take each zip phile, copy it to a floppy, then run the
|
||
|
installation from Drive A. This may sound obvious, but you'd be
|
||
|
surprised how many novices don't bother to do this. THIS IS ALSO
|
||
|
WHY IT'S SO IMPORTANT TO UPLOAD FILES EXACTLY AS THEY COME OF THE
|
||
|
ORIGINAL DISK AND KEEP THE ZIP PHILES IN SEQUENCE. IF YOU ARE
|
||
|
GOING TO UPLOAD A PROGRAM, DON'T JUST DUMP INTO A DIRECTION AND
|
||
|
THEN ZIP IT FOR UPLOADING!! Other users may not be able to run
|
||
|
it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. USE THE ESCAPE KEY. Some programs may tell you to install a
|
||
|
disk that you may not have, then appear to lock up or refuse to
|
||
|
respond if you do not put the right disk in. Sometimes this can
|
||
|
be gotten around by hitting the escape key a few times, and
|
||
|
installation will proceed as it should. For example, on user
|
||
|
indicated that her version of SPSS-PC 3.1 kept saying "place
|
||
|
diskette in drive g," and she had no drive g. She just put it in
|
||
|
A and hit the escape key a few times and the installation
|
||
|
conintued successfully.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. BE AWARE OF DATE TRAPS: Some programs will install without
|
||
|
any problem, but only run for 30 days. This is common when a
|
||
|
complete program is available for "trial use," and quits after a
|
||
|
certain amount of time. Sometimes lamerz will wait until the
|
||
|
time has run out, then upload the program they installed, which
|
||
|
won't be of use to anybody. Usually there will be a message like
|
||
|
"your free trial period has expired." One way around this is to
|
||
|
go into the program and change the date, using an convenient
|
||
|
editor (Magellan, xtpro, or anything else). We recommend a phile
|
||
|
manager type program, because you may have to search the files
|
||
|
individually to find the one with the date. But sometimes the
|
||
|
date phile is obvious (named something like date.dat). Another
|
||
|
way around this, if you don't mind having the date of your PC not
|
||
|
match the real date, is to keep the date fixed to a 30 day
|
||
|
period. Pick a date that's easy to remember (january 1) and every
|
||
|
few weeks re-set the date to january 1. Any time you have a
|
||
|
date-controlled program, reset the date to january 1 and install
|
||
|
it. You will have to change the date ever 30 days, and it's
|
||
|
primitive, but it does work for most programs. It's easier than
|
||
|
re-installing every 30 days.
|
||
|
|
||
|
5. MAKE SURE THE PROGRAM IS COMPATIBLE WITH YOUR PC. Again, this
|
||
|
seems obvious, but some programs require special stuff (screens,
|
||
|
286 chips), so it could be that you have just downloaded
|
||
|
something your PC can't handle.
|
||
|
|
||
|
6. BYPASS INSTALLATION. Sometimes you can't install a program,
|
||
|
but can actually run it. If you can't, or don't want to, install
|
||
|
a program, then try the directory dump and hit what you think
|
||
|
look like the right *.exe commands. There is often a "setup"
|
||
|
command that can be used in place of install, and a config.exe
|
||
|
phile that allows configuration to your machine requirements
|
||
|
(color, etc). Sometimes the program won't run as well as it
|
||
|
would when properly installed, but usually will run well enough
|
||
|
for most purposed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
7. BE ALERT FOR SPECIAL DIRECTORIES.
|
||
|
Some programs install philes in special directories, so if you
|
||
|
run a program from a dump without installing it, you could have
|
||
|
a problem running it. Usually you will get a message. For
|
||
|
example, if you dump a program called "gerbils" into a directory
|
||
|
called //ger//, and it requires a special directory for the help
|
||
|
philes, you might get an error message that says: "//ger//help
|
||
|
directory not found." So then you just go back in and creat the
|
||
|
proper directory, copy the philes you think belong in it to the
|
||
|
directory, and try again.
|
||
|
|
||
|
8. KEEP TRYING. Getting stuff running often takes a lot of
|
||
|
patience. It's often just a matter of luck, work, and some
|
||
|
intelligent guessing. So, keep trying. Not all machines work
|
||
|
alike, and what works on one may not work on others, so you may
|
||
|
have to just work at it by trial and error. Often, though, once
|
||
|
you get a few programs running and pick up some tricks and
|
||
|
shortcuts, other programs are a lot easier. Most pirates don't
|
||
|
use much of the stuff they snatch, and the challenge is to try to
|
||
|
get stuff running, not use it. So, ***HAVE PATIENCE AND KEEP
|
||
|
TRYING!!**
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
Some sysops are uptight enough about copyright software to
|
||
|
warn users how to spot it, presumably so they won't use it
|
||
|
or upload it. Here's a snatch from one of the largest boards in
|
||
|
the country warning users how to spot it. We thought it might
|
||
|
be of interest.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
What Files are Legal for Distribution on a BBS?
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Copyright (C) 1989 Exec-PC All Rights Reserved
|
||
|
|
||
|
From Exec-PC Multi-user BBS, 414-964-5160
|
||
|
Bob Mahoney, SYSOP
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Software that is a commercial product, sold in stores or via
|
||
|
mailorder, that does not contain a statement saying it is OK to
|
||
|
give copies to others is NOT legal for distribution on a BBS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Example: Lotus 1-2-3 is a commercial product, it is copyrighted,
|
||
|
and the copyright notice states you MAY NOT copy it for others.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Example: PC-Write (the Shareware version) is also copyrighted,
|
||
|
but the copyright statement clearly states you MAY make unlimited
|
||
|
copies for your friends.
|
||
|
|
||
|
TRICKS TO MAKE AN EDUCATED GUESS: Sometimes it is difficult to
|
||
|
guess whether or not some software or diskette is legal for BBS
|
||
|
distribution. There are a few obvious guidelines I use on the
|
||
|
Exec-PC BBS:
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is no documentation: Probably an illegal copy. A
|
||
|
Shareware author will always provide documentation with his
|
||
|
product. If he does not, nobody will be willing to make a
|
||
|
monetary contribution to his efforts. If the documentation takes
|
||
|
the form of a very short (one or two screen long) and sketchy
|
||
|
README file, be suspicious. The software is probably a hack
|
||
|
(illegal pirated copy) of a commercial product, and someone wrote
|
||
|
up a small hint file to help other pirates run the software.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The software is too good to be true: It probably IS too good to
|
||
|
be true! A good game, a good database, a good utility of any
|
||
|
type, requires at least dozens of hours to write. The really
|
||
|
good stuff requires thousands of hours to write, sometimes dozens
|
||
|
of MAN YEARS to write. Nobody is going to give this away for
|
||
|
free! If you get a copy of a game and it seems to good to be
|
||
|
true, I bet it is an illegal copy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The software does strange things to your disk drives: For
|
||
|
example, when it is run, the A: drive or B: drive spin for a
|
||
|
moment, even though there is no disk present. This sometimes
|
||
|
indicates the software is looking for a key disk, but someone has
|
||
|
modified the software so the key disk is not needed. This is
|
||
|
probably illegal software.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The software does not have an easy escape to DOS, no EXIT
|
||
|
command: This usually means the software is illegal, someone has
|
||
|
hacked it to make it run, but it was too difficult to add a
|
||
|
proper escape to DOS to the commercial product.
|
||
|
|
||
|
DON'T GET ME WRONG, I am making it sound as if ALL software is
|
||
|
illegal. This is not the case. It is usually very easy to
|
||
|
recognize a fine, legal package, since the author is proud of his
|
||
|
work and usually puts his name, his favorite BBS number, a
|
||
|
disclaimer, a Shareware notice, or some other hint into the
|
||
|
package. It may be as simple as an initial screen saying "This
|
||
|
is Shareware written by so-and-so, this is Shareware, if you like
|
||
|
it please send $XX to the following address", and other text of
|
||
|
that type.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If in doubt, ask the Sysop!
|
||
|
|
||
|
END OF INFO
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 4: SYSOPS' LIABILITY *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
** PIRATE reprints the following that arrived over the BITNET
|
||
|
lines. Following with our policy, it is printed exactly as
|
||
|
received. Only the date of the conference was removed. **
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*/ SYSLAW: THE SYSOPS LEGAL MANUAL CONFERENCE /*/
|
||
|
==================================================
|
||
|
Editors' Note: The following conference took place on GEnie.
|
||
|
The only changes we have made to any of this text is the format
|
||
|
and spelling errors. An additional note, I just finished
|
||
|
reading the book. It is interesting and I encourage all BBS
|
||
|
operators to purchase it. If you are interested contact: LLM
|
||
|
PRESS, 150 Broadway (Suite 607), New York, NY 10038. (212)
|
||
|
766-3785)
|
||
|
|
||
|
FORMAL CONFERENCE
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> Welcome to our formal conference with Jonathon
|
||
|
Wallace,
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Thanks very much for inviting me....
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> Can you tell us a little about yourself and your
|
||
|
book before we start?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> I am a lawyer in private practice in New York City
|
||
|
specializing in computer related matters including BBS law. I
|
||
|
am the co-author with Rees Morrison, of SYSLAW: The Sysop's
|
||
|
Legal Manual, and editor of The Computer Law Letter, a bimonthly
|
||
|
newsletter.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Mel] NIGHTDIVER> Jon, would you talk a bit about where free
|
||
|
speech stops and libel begins. We obviously want to be able to
|
||
|
criticize a product freely but I guess we have to stop at
|
||
|
calling the developer names or spreading rumors that he is going
|
||
|
bankrupt. Where does libel start? and what is the sysops
|
||
|
liability for allowing such messages to stand?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Libel varies from state to state. In many places
|
||
|
its a knowingly false statement. In others it may even be a
|
||
|
negligently false statement. The responsibility of a sysop is,
|
||
|
in my opinion about equivalent to the liability of a newspaper
|
||
|
publisher for a comment someone else makes in his paper.
|
||
|
Constitutional law says that a public figure can only recover
|
||
|
against a newspaper for a libel done with "actual malice".
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Mel] NIGHTDIVER> For our purposes who would you say is a
|
||
|
public figure a developer pushing his product? A publisher of
|
||
|
an online magazine? The sysop?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> There is no precise definition. Any of those
|
||
|
might be held to be a public figure, as would your town
|
||
|
councilman, but not your next door neighbor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Mel] NIGHTDIVER> I've heard the sysop's liability in libel
|
||
|
compared to a news stand's liability but that boggles my mind
|
||
|
because I never heard of a newsstand claiming a compilation
|
||
|
copyright. Would you comment on the sysop's position?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Ever since there have been BBS's, people have
|
||
|
debated whether a sysop is a publisher, a newsstand, a common
|
||
|
carrier, a bartender, etc. A sysop is NOT a common carrier
|
||
|
(obligated to carry all messages, can't control content) Nor is
|
||
|
a sysop a newsstand (too passive). I think a sysop is
|
||
|
essentially a sort of publisher. She has the right to edit and
|
||
|
control the contents of the BBS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> I've got a few questions, but I'll try not to hog
|
||
|
things for others. Awhile ago, I ran into a particularly nasty
|
||
|
"anarchy" BBS in New York. It offered files on everything from
|
||
|
literally how to poison people to "kitchen improvised plastic
|
||
|
explosives". Is offering info like this legal? Is there any
|
||
|
legal precedent?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Dave, the law says that "information doesn't kill
|
||
|
people.. people kill people." However distasteful, describing
|
||
|
how to make poisons is constitutionally protected speech.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Ralph] ST.REPORT> Evening Counselor, nice to see that
|
||
|
information is information and not murderous non-sense. My
|
||
|
question is, what recourse, if any does an individual have when
|
||
|
they find that certain information has been labeled "overly
|
||
|
informative" and has been censored as a result?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Ralph, if you mean censored by the sysop the user
|
||
|
really has no recourse. As I said, a sysop has the right to
|
||
|
edit, modify and delete the BBS's contents.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Ralph] ST.REPORT> I see, well a sysop was not the cause in
|
||
|
this situation....in fact the sysop was quite fair about the
|
||
|
entire matter... much more so than the individual.....I mean as
|
||
|
individual to individual.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Who censored the message, then?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Ralph] ST.REPORT> The message was deleted as a result of the
|
||
|
ensuing hulabaloo <-? voluntarily by me.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Ralph---The sysop is the final arbiter in such
|
||
|
cases. It is only censorship when the government intervenes to
|
||
|
prevent speech.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Ralph] ST.REPORT> I agree, in effect I censored myself to
|
||
|
avoid more controversy, I was looking for your opinion and I
|
||
|
thank you for your time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<BOB.PUFF> Yes I was wondering if you could comment on
|
||
|
self-maintaining BBSs that automatically validate uploaded
|
||
|
files. Is this illegal in itself, or could the sysop be in
|
||
|
trouble if a copyrighted file is up for a bit of time till he
|
||
|
realizes it?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Bob, there are no precise rules in this area yet.
|
||
|
My best guess is that the sysop has an obligation to exercise
|
||
|
due care. For that reason I would try and set things up so that
|
||
|
a pirated file would be discovered in under a couple of days.
|
||
|
Therefore, the idea of a self-validating BBS makes me nervous.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<BOB.PUFF> I see. right - but its that couple of days that the
|
||
|
file might be up. ok something to think about. thanks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<WP.DAVE> Jon, do you consider your SYSLAW book to apply much to
|
||
|
information service sysops, or is it 95% for the private BBS
|
||
|
operator?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> The book was written for the BBS sysop, but much
|
||
|
of what's in it applies equally to service sysops...e.g., the
|
||
|
discussion of copyright, libel, etc.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> Hi again. As I understand it, the libel law says
|
||
|
(basically) that to commit libel, you have to say something
|
||
|
false, know it's false, and do it with malice intended. First,
|
||
|
am I right? (*grin*) Second, does that apply different to public
|
||
|
figures vs. mere mortals?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Dave, the rules you stated are correct for a media
|
||
|
defendant (newspaper, etc.) libelling a public figure. If the
|
||
|
"libeller" is a private citizen, the states are free to hold you
|
||
|
to a mere negligence standard.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> Can you expand on "negligence"?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Yes a careless false statement, e.g. something you
|
||
|
didn't bother to verify.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<CRAIG.S.THOM> Along the lines of the self-validating
|
||
|
files...what if users upload copyrighted text into the message
|
||
|
bases? Song lyrics, documentation, that type of thing?
|
||
|
Messages are never held for validation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> I believe a sysop should arrange to read every new
|
||
|
message every 24 hours or so. If its a big message base, get
|
||
|
some assistant sysops to help. Of course, copyrighted text may
|
||
|
not be easy to recognize, but if you do recognize copyrighted
|
||
|
material it should be deleted unless its a fair use (e.g., brief
|
||
|
quote from a book or song, etc.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[John] JWEAVERJR> Can you comment on the differences between
|
||
|
the legal standards for libel and slander? And, in particular,
|
||
|
which category does this RTC (as a "printed record" of a live
|
||
|
conversation) fall?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Slander is spoken libel is written I am fairly
|
||
|
sure that all online speech will be classified as libel, not
|
||
|
slander. Frankly, I am more familiar with the libel standards,
|
||
|
which we have been discussing than with slander, where they
|
||
|
differ.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> I did come in a bit late, if this has already been
|
||
|
answered; where might I find your book, and what's it retail at?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> The book is $19 plus $2 p&h from LLM Press 150
|
||
|
Broadway, Suite 610, NY NY 10038.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> Okay back to libel. Are editors of magazines in
|
||
|
general held responsible for the content of their magazine, or
|
||
|
is the writer of a given article deemed libellous that's held
|
||
|
responsible? Or both?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Potentially both.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> The standards would depend on if the libeller
|
||
|
(sounds like a referee! grin) was a public figure or private
|
||
|
person, also? e.g., negligence vs. malice?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> The US Constitution imposes the standards we
|
||
|
discussed for media defendants, and leaves the states free to
|
||
|
make their own laws in all other cases.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> Since networks are interstate, which states' laws
|
||
|
applies?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Dave, thats something the courts will have to
|
||
|
settle. Magazines have been successfully sued in states where
|
||
|
they sold only a few copies.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Mel] NIGHTDIVER> I understand there have been some cases
|
||
|
regarding private messages in a BB as opposed to public
|
||
|
messages. Does that mean that if someone sends me Email here on
|
||
|
GEnie and I forward it to someone else, that I could be in
|
||
|
trouble?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Mel, we are getting into a whole new area here.
|
||
|
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) which protects
|
||
|
the privacy of email. In the case you described. There would
|
||
|
be no liability under ECPA, because the recipient of the message
|
||
|
has the right to make it public.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> I have a related question, Jonathon...are you
|
||
|
familiar with Thompson v. Predaina? (The case that never was...
|
||
|
*grin*)
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Yes, I read the pleadings, and have talked to and
|
||
|
been flamed by, Linda Thompson <grin>.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> Can you summarize the case a bit for the rest of us
|
||
|
and give us your opinion? (I happen to personally know both
|
||
|
parties... Linda was a friend of mine. Bob is a friend of mine.
|
||
|
Key word: "was") Everyone's been flamed by Linda Thompson.
|
||
|
*grin* Linda sued Bob under the ECPA claiming that he had
|
||
|
disclosed private messages and files of hers to the public. He
|
||
|
was not the recipient of the files or messages and, if the facts
|
||
|
as stated in the complaint are true, it seems as if there was a
|
||
|
technical ECPA violation. The case never went any further
|
||
|
because (I am told). Predaina declared bankruptcy (since you
|
||
|
know him, you can clarify if this turns out not to be the case).
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> Bob did declare bankruptcy, which was a wise move.
|
||
|
I didn't read the complaint, however, I also know that when
|
||
|
Linda (and Al) had a BBS, they were "guilty" of exactly what I
|
||
|
understood Bob did. (Allegedly)
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> I've often thought it was a too drastic move on
|
||
|
his part. Based on the information I had, I doubted the case
|
||
|
would have resulted in drastic damages, even if there was a
|
||
|
technical violation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The moral of the story: Don't disclose private mail of which you
|
||
|
are not the sender or recipient.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> I think it was very precautionary on Bob's part.
|
||
|
And, if I understand what happened, the case was dropped because
|
||
|
Linda was suing partially on the grounds of character defamation
|
||
|
which allowed Bob to dredge up some of Linda's rather tawdry
|
||
|
past, allegedly. (I don't think I'm spelling that right. It
|
||
|
looks wrong. :-) Thanks, Jonathon... I have a few more for
|
||
|
later... :-)
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DEB> Hi Jon, this is deb! Christensen, I take care of the
|
||
|
Commodore and Amiga areas here on GEnie. My question is an
|
||
|
unresolved one about copyrights and music. Are there any 'fair
|
||
|
use' guidelines which affect musical arrangements to computer
|
||
|
transcriptions which people upload and distribute for their
|
||
|
electronic friends?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Deb....The upload of a copyrighted song or image
|
||
|
in electronic form is a copyright violation. I have never yet
|
||
|
heard of a case of a court finding such an upload to be a "fair
|
||
|
use" mainly because courts haven't really yet dealt with the
|
||
|
issue of uploads at all. However, I think the argument for a
|
||
|
fair use is slim, considering that the standards of fair use
|
||
|
include whether the use....is commercial, and how much of the
|
||
|
work is copied. An upload to a commercial service of an entire
|
||
|
song or image, for download by people paying connect charges,
|
||
|
seems like a pretty clear copyright infringement.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DEB> So, a musician does not have a right to arrange music and
|
||
|
perform it for his friends? Is it the uploading that is a
|
||
|
violation or the computer arrangement for the performance?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> A private performance is not a copyright violation
|
||
|
but there is nothing private about an upload to a commercial
|
||
|
service with more than 100,000 users.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DEB> And to a public BBS?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Public BBS: I would say its the same thing, even
|
||
|
though not quite as commercial.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DEB> Aha, so it isn't anything to do with cost involved. It is
|
||
|
the actual transcription which is the problem? I *know*
|
||
|
digitized music is a problem but had always presumed we had the
|
||
|
same right to make an arrangement on a computer as we did on
|
||
|
paper. :-(
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Deb, I would say you do have the same right to
|
||
|
make an arrangement, just not to distribute it to other people.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<BOB.PUFF> What are the legalities of telephone companies
|
||
|
charging business rates for BBS telephone lines? I understand
|
||
|
they have either proposed it, or tried it in some places. Your
|
||
|
comments?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> It has happened a lot, but I understand in several
|
||
|
places concerted efforts to communicate with the telco got them
|
||
|
to back down. Not aware if anyone ever mounted a legal
|
||
|
challenge, though.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<BOB.PUFF> I see. I don't see how a bbs constitutes the charge,
|
||
|
but I guess there is a large grey area there.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> The telco's argument was that the BBS was
|
||
|
providing a quasi-commercial service. If you look at any BBS
|
||
|
list, you will see a proportion of company sponsored BBS's that
|
||
|
confuse the issue.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DOUG.W> Jon, earlier you stated that the recipient of EMail was
|
||
|
free to distribute that mail. Is there any way to ensure
|
||
|
privacy in EMail? Would a Copyright notice on each message
|
||
|
prevent further distribution?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> I assume you are asking if there is a way to keep
|
||
|
the recipient of a message from making it public.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DOUG.W> Yes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> The answer is not really. Putting a copyright
|
||
|
notice on might give many people pause, but suppose someone
|
||
|
violated that copyright, what are the damages?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> Got two for you. First, with BBS's and networks
|
||
|
being so (relatively) new, are there a large number of libel
|
||
|
cases of stuff going over the nets, as opposed to say magazine
|
||
|
cases? E.g., is it a growing practice? *grin*
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> I am only aware of one case of online libel, the
|
||
|
one discussed in my book, the Dun & Bradstreet case (and I guess
|
||
|
Thompson v. Predaina also included that element).
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> Second, do you find that judges and juries in such
|
||
|
cases (jury assuming a jury trial, of course) have a great deal
|
||
|
of "learning curve" to go through about networks? Most people I
|
||
|
know outside computers don't know a genie from a compuserve from
|
||
|
a hole in the wall. they can't imagine what the BBS world is
|
||
|
like. Does this make such a case tougher/easier on an attorney?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> I frequently will try a computer case to the
|
||
|
judge, waiving the jury demand less education to do but I
|
||
|
wouldn't necessarily do that if I were the defendant in a libel
|
||
|
case. Depends what part of the country you're in; in Manhattan,
|
||
|
you could probably get a jury that knew what a modem was.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<DAVESMALL> And if not, it would probably be prudent to try to
|
||
|
educate one vs. six ? Fair enough.. okay I'm done
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> It really depends on the circumstances..deciding
|
||
|
when to go for a jury also has to do with how much you need, and
|
||
|
can exploit, a sympathy factor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> I have one last question myself before we wrap
|
||
|
up.... (which is not intended as a pun with regard to my
|
||
|
question... *grin*) Shrink wrap licenses, are they enforceable?
|
||
|
Legal?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> There has been some disagreement on this but my
|
||
|
personal opinion is that the average shrink wrap license would
|
||
|
not stand up. It was never negotiated, never really agreed to
|
||
|
and can't convert what is obviously a sale into something else
|
||
|
any more than calling a car a plane will change it into one.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> However, if it is visible before the buyer actually
|
||
|
buys then can a presumption be made that they have read and
|
||
|
agreed?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> There are still other problems. The buyer hasn't
|
||
|
dealt with the publisher, but with a retailer. There is no
|
||
|
"privity" of contract.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> "privity" meaning... ?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> No direct contractual relationship between
|
||
|
publisher and purchaser, despite the fiction that the license
|
||
|
purpotts to create.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> Then a company who insists that this disk and this
|
||
|
software still belongs to them, you don't feel it is
|
||
|
enforceable?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> It would depend on the circumstances, but if you
|
||
|
buy an off the shelf product at Software to Go, in my opinion,
|
||
|
you have purchased the copy even if there is a shrink wrap
|
||
|
license that says you have only licensed it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> Interesting... another point of licensing... have
|
||
|
you read the Apple licensing agreement?
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> I read it some time ago, when the case started.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> It states that Mac ROMs can only be used in an
|
||
|
Apple machine. Although there is contention that the ROMs are
|
||
|
the heart of the machine, so whether they goest, so goest the
|
||
|
machine.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> Sorry, I thought you meant the Apple/Microsoft
|
||
|
license.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<[Holly] HS> For those of us who use an emulator, like Spectre
|
||
|
or Magic Sac, it could be an important point.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<JON.WALLACE> The question is a very tricky one. On the whole,
|
||
|
it would be....difficult to prevent a legitimate purchaser of a
|
||
|
ROM from doing anything he wanted with it, including sticking it
|
||
|
in another machine. But I haven't seen the license you refer
|
||
|
to.
|
||
|
|
||
|
========================================================================
|
||
|
(C) 1989 by Atari Corporation, GEnie, and the Atari Roundtables.
|
||
|
May be reprinted only with this notice intact. The Atari
|
||
|
Roundtables on GEnie are *official* information services of
|
||
|
Atari Corporation. To sign up for GEnie service, call (with
|
||
|
modem) 800-638-8369. Upon connection type HHH (RETURN after
|
||
|
that). Wait for the U#= prompt. Type XJM11877,GEnie and hit
|
||
|
RETURN. The system will prompt you for your information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 5: HACKERS IN THE NEWS *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here are some news stories that have come to us from various
|
||
|
sources. Some don't have the dates or papers, so if you send
|
||
|
anything in the future, be sure to but the actual source
|
||
|
including page numbers. A couple are a few years old, but we
|
||
|
judge them important enough to repeat. We suspect that some of
|
||
|
the providers of this stuff snatched them and didn't include the
|
||
|
names of people who did the work of transcribing, so thanks to
|
||
|
whoever originally uploaded them so others could share.
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
SOURCE: Chicago Tribune, July 27, 1989 (p. I-12)
|
||
|
(from -=*JEDI*=-)
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
****************************************************
|
||
|
* U.S. Indicts Cornel Graduate Student in Computer *
|
||
|
* Virus Case *
|
||
|
*****************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
WASHINGTON (AP)--A Cornell Univesity graduate student was
|
||
|
indicted Wednesday on a felony charge stemming from creation of a
|
||
|
computer "virus" that paralyzed as many as 6,000 computers last
|
||
|
fall.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Robert Tappan Morris, 24, who has been suspended from the
|
||
|
University for one year, was indicted by a federal grand jury in
|
||
|
Syracuse, N.Y., on a single count of accessing without
|
||
|
authorization at least four university and military computers.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The computer-crime indictment charged that the virus, which
|
||
|
spread acros a nationwide network of computers, prevented the
|
||
|
authorized use of those computers by universities and military
|
||
|
bases.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Justice Department said in a statement released in
|
||
|
Washington that Morris was the first person to be charged under a
|
||
|
provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 that
|
||
|
outlaws unauthorized access to computers by hackers. The
|
||
|
provision also makes it illegal to gain entry to a computer to
|
||
|
damage or destroy files.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The indictment comes after months of deliberations within the
|
||
|
Justice Department over whether to charge Morris with a felony or
|
||
|
a misdemeanor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Morris, of Arnold, Md., could face a five-year sentence and a
|
||
|
$240000 fine if convicted of the charge.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The law also provides for restitution of victims of a computer
|
||
|
crime, but prosecutors did not specify how much damage was caused
|
||
|
by the Nov. 2, 1988, incident that virtually shut down a
|
||
|
military-university computer network used to transmit
|
||
|
nonclassified data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
An industry group estimated that as much as $96 million worth
|
||
|
of damage was caused by the virus to 6,200 computers.
|
||
|
|
||
|
But a Cornell University commission, which criticized Morris'
|
||
|
actions as "reckless and impetuous," called this estimate
|
||
|
"grossly exaggerated" and "self-serving."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Officials said the virus did not erase any files of
|
||
|
electronically stored data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The electronic program Morris allegedly used is called a virus
|
||
|
because it spreads from computer to computer like a disease,
|
||
|
blocking access to data contained in the machines.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Defense attorney Thomas A. Gu idoboni (sic), said Morris "accepts
|
||
|
this event as a step toward the final resolution of this matter."
|
||
|
Morris "looks forward to his eventual vindication and his return
|
||
|
to a normal life," Guidoboni said.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As many as 6,000 university and military computers on the
|
||
|
nationwise ARPANET network were infected by the virus that the
|
||
|
Cornell University commission concluded was created by Morris.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Source unknown: A chicago paper in August>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
A 17-year-old Michigan boy has been charged with posting
|
||
|
stolen long-distance phone codes on a bulletin board system
|
||
|
operated in his home. Brent G. Patrick, alias (handle) "Shadow
|
||
|
Stalker" online, was arraigned this week on one count of
|
||
|
stealing or retaining a financial transaction device without
|
||
|
consent. Patrick was released on $2,500 bond, pending an Aug.
|
||
|
11 hearing. The youth faces a maximum of four years in prison
|
||
|
and a $2,000 fine if convicted. His BBS "Wizard Circle" has
|
||
|
been closed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
COMPUTERIST HELD WITHOUT BAIL
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Dec. 16)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A 25-year-old Californian who is described by a prosecutor as
|
||
|
"very, very dangerous" and someone who "needs to be kept away
|
||
|
from computers" has been ordered held without bail on charges he
|
||
|
illegally accessed systems at England's Leeds University and
|
||
|
Digital Equipment Corp.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Kevin David Mitnick of Panorama City, Calif., is a convicted
|
||
|
computer cracker who now is named in two new criminal fraud
|
||
|
complaints in federal court in Los Angeles.
|
||
|
|
||
|
US Magistrate Venetta Tassopulos granted the no-bail order late
|
||
|
yesterday after Assistant US Attorney Leon Weidman, acknowledging
|
||
|
it was unusual to seek detention in such cracking cases, said
|
||
|
that since 1982 Mitnick also had illegally accessed systems at
|
||
|
the L.A. police department, TRW Corp. and Pacific Telephone.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"He could call up and get access to the whole world," Weidman
|
||
|
said.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Catherine Gewertz of United Press International quoted Weidman
|
||
|
as saying Mitnick had served six months in juvenile hall for
|
||
|
stealing computer manuals from a Pacific Telephone office in the
|
||
|
San Fernando Valley and using a pay phone to destroy $200,000
|
||
|
worth of data in the files of a northern California company.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Later Mitnick also was convicted on charges he penetrated TRW's
|
||
|
system and altered credit information on several people,
|
||
|
including his probation officer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Weidman said Mitnick also used a ruse to obtain the name of the
|
||
|
police detective investigating him for cracking when he was a
|
||
|
student at Pierce College. Weidman said Mitnick telephoned the
|
||
|
dean at 3 a.m., identified himself as a campus security guard,
|
||
|
reported a computer burglary in process and asked for the name of
|
||
|
the detective investigating past break-ins.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In other episodes, Mitnick allegedly accessed police computers
|
||
|
and impersonated police officers and judges to gain information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The latest complaints against Mitnick charge he:
|
||
|
|
||
|
-:- Used a computer in suburban Calabasas, Calif., to access
|
||
|
the Leeds University system in England.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-:- Altered long-distance phone costs incurred by that activity
|
||
|
in order to cover his tracks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-:- Stole proprietary Digital Equipment software valued at more
|
||
|
than $1 million and designed to protect its data. Mitnick
|
||
|
allegedly stored the stolen data in a University of
|
||
|
Southern California computer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
MITNICK MAY BE 1ST TRIED UNDER NEW FEDERAL COMPUTER CRIME LAW
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Dec. 17) That 25-year-old California computerist being held
|
||
|
without bail on fraud charges may be the first person in the
|
||
|
nation to be prosecuted under a federal law against accessing
|
||
|
an interstate computer network for criminal purposes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As reported yesterday (GO OLT-28), a federal magistrate decided
|
||
|
on the unusual step of detaining Kevin David Mitnick of Panorama
|
||
|
City, Calif., without bail after Assistant US Attorney Leon
|
||
|
Weidman called Mitnick a "very, very dangerous" person who "needs
|
||
|
to be kept away from computers."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mitnick, who was convicted of computer fraud as a teen-ager, now
|
||
|
faces charges of causing $4 million in damage to a Digital
|
||
|
Equipment Corp. computer, stealin university computers in Los
|
||
|
Angeles and England. If convicted, he could receive up to 20
|
||
|
years in prison and a $500,000 fine.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Associated Press reports that the FBI, the district
|
||
|
attorney's office and the police just now are beginning to figure
|
||
|
out Mitnick and his alleged high-tech escapades. Says Detective
|
||
|
James K. Black, head of the L.A. police computer crime unit,
|
||
|
"He's several levels above what you would characterize as a
|
||
|
computer hacker. He started out with a real driving curiosity for
|
||
|
computers that went beyond personal computers. ... He grew with
|
||
|
the technology."
|
||
|
|
||
|
At 17 Mitnick served six months in a youth facility after being
|
||
|
convicted of cracking Pacific Bell's computer to alter telephone
|
||
|
bills, penetrate other computers and steal $200,000 worth of data
|
||
|
from a corporation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
****************************
|
||
|
****************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
TWO TEENS ACCUSED OF CRACKING PHONES -- WHILE IN THE JAILHOUSE
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Dec. 1) Two teen-agers in jail in San Jose, Calif., on
|
||
|
computer cracking charges hav lost their jailhouse phone
|
||
|
privileges. That's because authorities say the boys used a jail
|
||
|
phone to make illegal collect calls.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Police told United Press International they believe the two --
|
||
|
Jonathan Yaantis, 18, and Michael Torrell, 19, both believed to
|
||
|
be from Skagit County, Wash. -- made as many as three illegal
|
||
|
calls from the county jail.
|
||
|
|
||
|
UPI says the calls were made to a phone "bridge," or illegal
|
||
|
conference-call network used by phone "phreakers," and billed to
|
||
|
an unauthorized number in Virginia.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"The first of the calls was made just two days after they were
|
||
|
arrested," sa
|
||
|
|
||
|
Yaantis and Michael Torrell were arrested Nov. 2 by a San Jose
|
||
|
police office who spotted them at a phone booth near a
|
||
|
convenience store. He said they were operating a laptop computer
|
||
|
attached by wires with alligator clips to the phon wires. Police
|
||
|
said insulation had been stripped from the phone wires to allow
|
||
|
the connection.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Allegedly, one or both of the boys subsequently made calls from
|
||
|
the jail to the cracker network on Nov. 6 and 7, Flory said. He
|
||
|
added, "Their telephone privileges were cut off because we didn't
|
||
|
want to be accessories, since they a
|
||
|
|
||
|
The wire service says the pair is charged with several
|
||
|
felonies, including damaging the phone company's line, theft and
|
||
|
illegal use of phone card charge numbers and possession of a
|
||
|
device to avoid phone charges.
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
THE MAXFIELD STING
|
||
|
|
||
|
Presented by The Sensei -- Syndicate Investivations
|
||
|
Authors among the Private Sector BBS
|
||
|
201-366-4431
|
||
|
|
||
|
Aug. 31 1986
|
||
|
============================================================================
|
||
|
|
||
|
Intro: The Syndicate Investigation is a Subformation of The Syndicate
|
||
|
Syndicate Investigation gathers certain world events rather than Bell only
|
||
|
information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
============================================================================
|
||
|
|
||
|
The File:
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here is a dump from THE BOARD, a sting BBS run by John Maxfield and sponsored
|
||
|
by WDIV-TV in Detriot. After reading a message posted by Bill from RNOC I got
|
||
|
worried about a BBS I was on in 313. This is what I got when I went on one las
|
||
|
time.................
|
||
|
Good afternoon, Sally Ride.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Welcome to MIKE WENDLAND'S I-TEAM sting board!
|
||
|
(computer services provided by BOARDSCAN)
|
||
|
66 Megabytes strong.
|
||
|
|
||
|
300/1200 baud - 24 hours.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Three (3) lines = no busy signals!
|
||
|
Rotary hunting on 313-534-0400.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Board: General Information & BBS's
|
||
|
Message: 41
|
||
|
Title: YOU'VE BEEN HAD!
|
||
|
To: ALL
|
||
|
From: HI TECH
|
||
|
Posted: 8/20/86 12.08 hours
|
||
|
|
||
|
Greetings:
|
||
|
You are now on THE BOARD, a sting"
|
||
|
"sting" BBS operated by MIKE WENDLAND of the
|
||
|
WDIV-TV I-Team. The purpose? To demonstrate and document the extent of
|
||
|
criminal and potentially illegal hacking and telephone fraud activity by
|
||
|
the so-called "hacking community."
|
||
|
Thanks for your cooperation. In the past month and a half, we've
|
||
|
received all sorts of information from you implicating many of you
|
||
|
to credit card fraud, telephone billing fraud, vandalism and possible
|
||
|
break-ins to government or public safety computers. And the beauty of
|
||
|
this is we have your posts, your E-Mail and--- most importantly--- your
|
||
|
REAL names and addresses.
|
||
|
What are we going to do with it? Stay tuned to News 4. I plan a special
|
||
|
series of reports about our experiences with THE BOARD, which saw users
|
||
|
check in from coast-to-coast and Canada, users ranging in age from 12 to 48.
|
||
|
For our regular users, I have been known as High Tech, among other ID's.
|
||
|
John Maxfield of Boardscan served as our consultant and provided the
|
||
|
<CR> = more, any key = quit. >
|
||
|
|
||
|
HP2000 that this "sting" ran on. Through call forwarding and other
|
||
|
conveniences made possible by telephone technology, the BBS operated
|
||
|
remotely.
|
||
|
here in the Detroit area.
|
||
|
When will our reports be ready? In a few weeks. We now will be contacting
|
||
|
many of you directly, talking with law enforcement and security agents from
|
||
|
credit card companies and the telephone services.
|
||
|
It should be a hell of a series. Thanks for your help.
|
||
|
And don't bother trying any harassment. Remember, we've got YOUR real
|
||
|
names....
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mike Wendland
|
||
|
The I-team
|
||
|
WDIV, Detroit, MI.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<CR> = more, any key = quit. >
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Board: General Information & BBS's
|
||
|
Message: 42
|
||
|
Title: BOARDSCAN
|
||
|
To: ALL
|
||
|
From: T.R.
|
||
|
Posted: 8/20/86 12.54 hours
|
||
|
|
||
|
This is John Maxfield of Boardscan. Welcome! Please address all letter
|
||
|
bombs to Mike Wendland at WDIV-TV Detroit. This board was his idea.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Reaper (a.k.a. Cable Pair)
|
||
|
|
||
|
<CR> = more, any key = quit. >
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Board: General Information & BBS's
|
||
|
Message: 43
|
||
|
Title: BOARDSCAN
|
||
|
To: ALL
|
||
|
From: A.M.
|
||
|
Posted: 8/20/86 13.30 hours
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hey guys, he really had us for awhile, for any of you who posted illegal shit,
|
||
|
I just cant wait to see his little news article...cable pair, you have some so
|
||
|
If youve noticed, just *about* everything on the subboards is *legal*!!!so fuc
|
||
|
You wanna get nasty? Well go ahead, call my house! threaten me! haahaha so wha
|
||
|
bbs?
|
||
|
freedom of speech...you lose...
|
||
|
ax murderer
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Well if that isn't enough to fry your cakes I don't know what is. A final word
|
||
|
of caution to everyone. DON'T GIVE OUT YOUR REAL VOICE NUMBER TO ANYONE, EVEN
|
||
|
IF IT'S TO GET ACCESS TO THE BEST BBS IN THE WORLD!!!!
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
We all should have realized something was up when the instructions were
|
||
|
'HEL-5555.elite,3' as what hacker has enough access to an HP-3000 to run a BB
|
||
|
on it?!? I even tried to get on,but like somebody said,when I called,I got no
|
||
|
data,just a carrier.On all BBSs except this one,I use a pseudonym like
|
||
|
'Aloysius Smethley',or 'Waldo Snerd'!
|
||
|
No BBS has a good reason to have your REAL name & address.Your # maybe,but
|
||
|
they can always go to CN/A...
|
||
|
|
||
|
Actually,I can't wait until it hits the fan-I want to hear about the thousands
|
||
|
of amoral whiz kids with VIC-20s,running around,stealing millions,defrauding
|
||
|
the innocent,and probably even giving-secrets-to-the-Russians!!
|
||
|
|
||
|
/End of File//
|
||
|
|
||
|
============================================================================
|
||
|
|
||
|
Private Sector
|
||
|
Official 2600 Magazine Bulliten Board
|
||
|
201-366-4431
|
||
|
20 Megs / 24 Hrs a Day / 300-1200 Bps
|
||
|
|
||
|
Fed's win a around this time, but. . . .they could at least
|
||
|
get their terms straight.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
COMPUTER HACKER, 18,
|
||
|
GETS PRISON FOR FRAUD
|
||
|
(From Chicago Tribune, Feb 15, p. II-1)
|
||
|
|
||
|
An 18-year old computer hacker from the (Chicago) North
|
||
|
Side, convicted in the first tiral arising from the federal
|
||
|
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, was sentenced Tuesday to 9
|
||
|
months in a federal juvenile prison in South Dakota and fined
|
||
|
$10,000.
|
||
|
U.S. District Court Judge Paul Plunket also sentenced the
|
||
|
defendent, Herbert D. Zinn Jr., of 611 N. Artesian Ave., to
|
||
|
2 1/2 years of probation.
|
||
|
Zinn was convicted Jan. 23 of breaking into AT&T and U.S.
|
||
|
government computers in three states, illegally copying more than
|
||
|
$1.2 million worth of coputer software, and of illegally
|
||
|
publishing computer passwords on computer bulletin boards in
|
||
|
Chicago and Texas.
|
||
|
Computer bulletin boards are lists of public messes that any
|
||
|
computer operator can read or add to by dialing a phone numer and
|
||
|
plugging in his computer.
|
||
|
"It is the government's view that what the defendant did is
|
||
|
the result of contacts with people in these pirate bulletin
|
||
|
boards," said Asasistant U.S. Atty. William J. Cook at the
|
||
|
sentencing hearing.
|
||
|
Cook labeled hackers who break into computers and share
|
||
|
private information with computer bulletin boards as "nothing
|
||
|
more than high-tech street gangs."
|
||
|
Evidence was presented that federal agents executing search
|
||
|
warrants in September on Zinn's home recovered 52 copyrighted AT&T
|
||
|
computer programs that had been stolen from Bell Laboratory
|
||
|
computers in Naperville and in Warren, N.J., as well as from U.S.
|
||
|
government computers in Burlington, N.C.
|
||
|
AT&T said the program had an estimated value of $1 million,
|
||
|
according to the secret service.
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------
|
||
|
SOURCE: Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1989 (p. II-4)
|
||
|
(from -=*JEDI*=-)
|
||
|
----------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
****************************************************
|
||
|
* WOMAN INDICTED AS COMPUTER HACKER MASTERMIND *
|
||
|
* (by John Camper) *
|
||
|
*****************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
A federal grand jury indicated Chicago woman Tuesday for
|
||
|
allegedly masterminding a nationwide ring of computer hackers
|
||
|
that stole more than $1.6 million of telephone and computer
|
||
|
service from various companies.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The indictment charges that Leslie Lynne Doucette, 35, of
|
||
|
6748 N. Ashland Ave, and 152 associates shared hundreds of stolen
|
||
|
credit card numbers by breaking into corporate "voicemail"
|
||
|
systems and turning them into computer bulletin boards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Voicemail is a computerized telephone answering machine.
|
||
|
After a caller dials the machine's number he punches more numbers
|
||
|
on his telephone to place messages in particular voicemail boxes
|
||
|
or retrieve messages already there.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The indictment charges that the hacker ring obtained more than
|
||
|
$9,531.65 of merchandise and $1,453 in Western Union money orders
|
||
|
by charging them to stolen bank credit card numbers.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It says the group used stolen computer passwords to obtain
|
||
|
$38,200 of voicemail servaice and stolen telephone credit card
|
||
|
numbers to run up more than $286,362 of telephone service.
|
||
|
|
||
|
But the biggest haul, more than $1,291,362, according to the
|
||
|
indictment, represented telephone service that was stolen through
|
||
|
the use of private branch exchange (BPX) "extender codes."
|
||
|
|
||
|
A PBX system provides internl telephone service within a
|
||
|
company. If a PBX system is equipped with an extender, a person
|
||
|
can call the PBX system, punch in a code, and dial long distance
|
||
|
at the expense of the company that owns the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The only corporate victims of the alleged fraud named in the
|
||
|
indictment are August Financial Corp. of Long Beach Calif., and
|
||
|
A-1 Beeper Service of Mobile, Ala.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Doucette has been held without bond in the Metropolitan
|
||
|
Correctional Center since May 24, when she was arested on a raid
|
||
|
on her apartment that netted 168 telephone credit card numbers
|
||
|
and 39 extender codes, federal authorities said. The indictment
|
||
|
does not name any members of the alleged ring, but authorities
|
||
|
said the investigation is continuing.
|
||
|
|
||
|
U.S. Atty. Anton R. Valukas said the indictment is the
|
||
|
nation's first involving abuse of voicemail.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"The proliferation of computer assisted telecommunications
|
||
|
and the increasing reliance on this equipment by American and
|
||
|
international business create a potential for serious harm," he
|
||
|
said.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Authorities said they discovered the scheme last December
|
||
|
after a Rolling Meadows real estate broker reported that hackers
|
||
|
had invaded his company' voicemail system and changed passwords.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Authorities said they traced the calls into the Rolling
|
||
|
Meadows voicemail system to telephones in private homes in
|
||
|
Chicago, Columbus, Ohio, and suburban Detroit, Atlanta and
|
||
|
Boston.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Checks on those phones led them to voicemail systems in
|
||
|
companies around the country, they said.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Source: NEWSWEEK -- date unknown>
|
||
|
|
||
|
As you are travelling the dark and misty swamp you come across
|
||
|
what appears to be a small cave. You light a torch and enter.
|
||
|
You have walked several hundred feet when you stumble into a
|
||
|
bright blue portal. . . With a sudden burst of light and a
|
||
|
loud explosion you are swept into . . . DRAGONFIRE . . .
|
||
|
Press Any Key if You Dare."
|
||
|
|
||
|
You have programmed your personal computer to dial into
|
||
|
Dragonfire, a computer bulletin board in Gainesville, Texas. But
|
||
|
before you get any information, Dragonfire demands your name,
|
||
|
home city and phone number. So, for tonight's tour of the
|
||
|
electronic wilderness you become Montana Wildhack of San
|
||
|
Francisco.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dragonfire, Sherwood Forest (sic), Forbidden Zone, Blottoland,
|
||
|
Plovernet, The Vault, Shadowland, PHBI and scores of other
|
||
|
computer bulletin boards are hangouts of a new generation of
|
||
|
vandals. These precocious teenagers use their electronic skills
|
||
|
to play hide-and-seek with computer and telephone security
|
||
|
forces. Many computer bulletin boards are perfectly legitimate:
|
||
|
they resemble electronic versions of the familiar cork boards in
|
||
|
supermarkets and school corridors, listing services and providing
|
||
|
information someone out there is bound to find useful. But this
|
||
|
is a walk on the wild side, a trip into the world of underground
|
||
|
bulletin boards dedicated to encouraging -- and making --
|
||
|
mischief.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The phone number for these boards are as closely guarded as a
|
||
|
psychiatrist's home telephone number. Some numbers are posted on
|
||
|
underground boards; others are exchanged over the telephone. A
|
||
|
friendly hacker provided Dragonfire's number. Hook up and you
|
||
|
see a broad choice of topics offered. For Phone Phreaks -- who
|
||
|
delight in stealing service from AT&T and other phone networks .
|
||
|
Phreakenstein's Lair is a potpourri of phone numbers, access
|
||
|
codes and technical information. For computer hackers -- who
|
||
|
dial into other people's computers -- Ranger's Lodge is
|
||
|
chock-full of phone numbers and passwords for government,
|
||
|
university and corporate computers. Moving through Dragonfire's
|
||
|
offerings, you can only marvel at how conversant these teen-agers
|
||
|
are with the technical esoterica of today's electronic age.
|
||
|
Obviously they have spent a great deal of time studying
|
||
|
computers, though their grammar and spelling indicate they
|
||
|
haven't been diligent in other subjects. You are constantly
|
||
|
reminded of how young they are.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Well it's that time of year again. School is back in session so
|
||
|
let's get those high school computer phone numbers rolling in.
|
||
|
Time to get straight A's, have perfect attendance (except when
|
||
|
you've been up all night hacking school passwords), and messing
|
||
|
up you worst teacher's paycheck."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Forbidden Zone, in Detroit, is offering ammunition for hacker
|
||
|
civil war --tips on crashing the most popular bulletin-board
|
||
|
software. There also are plans for building black, red and blue
|
||
|
boxes to mimic operator tones and get free phone service. And he
|
||
|
re are the details for "the safest and best way to make and use
|
||
|
nitroglycerine," compliments of Doctor Hex, who says he got it
|
||
|
"from my chemistry teacher."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Flip through the "pages." You have to wonder if this information
|
||
|
is accurate. Can this really be the phone number and password
|
||
|
for Taco Bell's computer? Do these kids really have the dial-up
|
||
|
numbers for dozens of university computers? The temptation is
|
||
|
too much. You sign off and have your computer dial the number
|
||
|
for the Yale computer. Bingo -- the words Yale University appear
|
||
|
on your screen. You enter the password. A menu appears. You
|
||
|
hang up in a sweat. You are now a hacker.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Punch in another number and your modem zips off the touch tones.
|
||
|
Here comes the tedious side of all of this. Bulletin boards are
|
||
|
popular. No vacancy in Bates Motel (named for Anthony Perkin's
|
||
|
creepy motel in the movie "Psycho"); the line is busy. So are
|
||
|
221 B. Baker Street, PHBI, Shadowland and The Vault, Caesar's
|
||
|
Palace rings and connects. This is different breed of board.
|
||
|
Caesar's Palace is a combination Phreak board and computer store
|
||
|
in Miami. This is the place to learn ways to mess up a
|
||
|
department store's anti-shoplifting system, or make free calls on
|
||
|
telephones with locks on the dial. Pure capitalism accompanies
|
||
|
such anarchy, Caesar's Palace is offering good deals on disc
|
||
|
drives, software, computers and all sorts of hardware. Orders
|
||
|
are placed through electronic mail messages.
|
||
|
|
||
|
'Tele-Trial': Bored by Caesar's Palace, you enter the number for
|
||
|
Blottoland, the board operated by one of the nation's most
|
||
|
notorious computer phreaks -- King Blotto. This one has been
|
||
|
busy all night, but it's now pretty late in Cleveland. The phone
|
||
|
rings and you connect. To get past the blank screen, type the
|
||
|
secondary password "S-L-I-M-E." King Blotto obliges, listing his
|
||
|
rules: he must have your real name, phone number, address,
|
||
|
occupation and interests. He will call and disclose the primary
|
||
|
password, "if you belong on this board." If admitted, do not
|
||
|
reveal the phone number or the secondary password, lest you face
|
||
|
"tele-trial," the King warns as he dismisses you by hanging up.
|
||
|
You expected heavy security, but this teenager's security is, as
|
||
|
they say, awesome. Computers at the Defense Department and
|
||
|
hundreds of businesses let you know when you've reached them.
|
||
|
Here you need a password just to find out what system answered
|
||
|
the phone. Then King Blotto asks questions -- and hangs up.
|
||
|
Professional computer-security experts could learn something from
|
||
|
this kid. He knows that ever since the 414 computer hackers were
|
||
|
arrested in August 1982, law-enforcement officers have been
|
||
|
searching for leads on computer bulletin boards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Do you have any ties to or connections with any law enforcement
|
||
|
agency or any agency which would inform such a law enforcement
|
||
|
agency of this bulletin board?"
|
||
|
|
||
|
Such is the welcoming message from Plovernet, a Florida board
|
||
|
known for its great hacker/phreak files. There amid a string of
|
||
|
valid VISA and MasterCard numbers are dozens of computer phone
|
||
|
numbers and passwords. Here you also learn what Blotto means by
|
||
|
tele-trial. "As some of you may or may not know, a session of
|
||
|
the conference court was held and the Wizard was found guilty of
|
||
|
some miscellaneous charges, and sentenced to four months without
|
||
|
bulletin boards." If Wizard calls, system operators like King
|
||
|
Blotto disconnect him. Paging through bulletin boards is a test
|
||
|
of your patience. Each board has different commands. Few are
|
||
|
easy to follow, leaving you to hunt and peck your way around. So
|
||
|
far you haven't had the nerve to type "C," which summons the
|
||
|
system operator for a live, computer-to-computer conversation.
|
||
|
The time, however, however has come for you to ask a few
|
||
|
questions of the "sysop." You dial a computer in Boston. It
|
||
|
answers and you begin working your way throughout the menus. You
|
||
|
scan a handful of dial- up numbers, including one for Arpanet,
|
||
|
the Defense Department's research computer. Bravely tap C and in
|
||
|
seconds the screen blanks and your cursor dances across the
|
||
|
screen.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hello . . . What kind of computer do you have?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Contact. The sysop is here. You exchange amenities and get
|
||
|
"talking." How much hacking does he do? Not much, too busy. Is
|
||
|
he afraid of being busted, having his computer confiscated like
|
||
|
the Los Angeles man facing criminal changes because his computer
|
||
|
bulletin board contained a stolen telephone-credit-card number?
|
||
|
"Hmmmm . . . No," he replies. Finally, he asks the dreaded
|
||
|
question: "How old are you?" "How old are YOU," you reply,
|
||
|
stalling. "15," he types. Once you confess and he knows you're
|
||
|
old enough to be his father, the conversation gets very serious.
|
||
|
You fear each new question; he probably thinks you're a cop. But
|
||
|
all he wants to know is your choice for president. The chat
|
||
|
continues, until he asks, "What time is it there?" Just past
|
||
|
midnight, you reply. Expletive. "it's 3:08 here," Sysop types.
|
||
|
"I must be going to sleep. I've got school tomorrow." The cursor
|
||
|
dances "*********** Thank you for Calling." The screen goes
|
||
|
blank.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Epilog:
|
||
|
|
||
|
A few weeks after this reporter submitted this article to
|
||
|
Newsweek, he found that his credit had been altered, his drivers'
|
||
|
licence revoked, and EVEN HIS Social Security records changed!
|
||
|
Just in case you all might like to construe this as a
|
||
|
'Victimless' crime. The next time a computer fouls up your
|
||
|
billing on some matter, and COSTS YOU, think about it!
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
This the follow-up to the previous article concerning the
|
||
|
Newsweek reporter. It spells out SOME of the REAL dangers to ALL
|
||
|
of us, due to this type of activity!
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
The REVENGE of the Hackers
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the mischievous fraternity of computer hackers, few things are
|
||
|
prized more than the veil of secrecy. As NEWSWEEK San Francisco
|
||
|
correspondent Richard Sandza found out after writing a story on
|
||
|
the electronic unnerving. Also severe.... Sandza's report:
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Conference!" someone yelled as I put the phone to my ear. Then
|
||
|
came a mind-piercing "beep," and suddenly my kitchen seemed full
|
||
|
of hyperactive 15-year-olds. "You the guy who wrote the article
|
||
|
in NEWSWEEK?" someone shouted from the depths of static, and
|
||
|
giggles. "We're going disconnect your phone," one shrieked.
|
||
|
"We're going to blow up your house," called another. I hung up.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Some irate readers write letters to the editor. A few call their
|
||
|
lawyers. Hackers, however, use the computer and the telephone,
|
||
|
and for more than simple comment. Within days, computer
|
||
|
"bulletin boards" around the country were lit up with attacks on
|
||
|
NEWSWEEK's "Montana Wildhack" (a name I took from a Kurt Vonnegut
|
||
|
character), questioning everything from my manhood to my prose
|
||
|
style. "Until we get real good revenge," said one message from
|
||
|
Unknown Warrior, "I would like to suggest that everyone with an
|
||
|
auto-l modem call Montana Butthack then hang up when he answers."
|
||
|
Since then the hackers of America have called my home at least
|
||
|
2000 times. My harshest critics communicate on Dragonfire, a
|
||
|
Gainesville, Texas, bulletin board where I am on teletrial, a
|
||
|
video-lynching in which a computer user with grievance dials the
|
||
|
board and presses charges against the offending party. Other
|
||
|
hackers -- including the defendant --post concurrences or
|
||
|
rebuttals. Despite the mealtime interruptions, all this was at
|
||
|
most a minor nuisance; some was amusing, even fun.
|
||
|
|
||
|
FRAUD: The fun stopped with a call from a man who identified
|
||
|
himself only as Joe. "I'm calling to warn you," he said. When I
|
||
|
barked back, he said, "Wait, I'm on your side. Someone has
|
||
|
broken into TRW and obtained a list of all your credit-card
|
||
|
numbers, your home address, social-security number and wife's
|
||
|
name and is posting it on bulletin boards around the country." He
|
||
|
named the charge cards in my wallet.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Credit-card numbers are a very hot commodity among some hackers.
|
||
|
To get one from a computer system and post it is the hacker
|
||
|
equivalent of making the team. After hearing from Joe I visited
|
||
|
the local office of the TRW credit bureau and got a copy of my
|
||
|
credit record. Sure enough, it showed a Nov. 13 inquiry by the
|
||
|
Lenox (Mass.) Savings Bank, an institution with no reason
|
||
|
whatever to ask about me. Clearly some hacker had used Lenox's
|
||
|
password to the TRW computers to get to my files (the bank has
|
||
|
since changed the password).
|
||
|
|
||
|
It wasn't long before I found out what was being done with my
|
||
|
credit-card numbers, thanks to another friendly hacker who tipped
|
||
|
me to Pirate 80, a bulletin board in Charleston, W.Va., where I
|
||
|
found this: "I'm sure you guys have heard about Richard Stza or
|
||
|
Montana Wildhack. He's the guy who wrote the obscene story about
|
||
|
phreaking in NewsWeek Well, my friend did a credit card check on
|
||
|
TRW . . . try this number, it' a VISA . . . Please nail
|
||
|
this guy bad . . . Captain Quieg.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Captain Quieg may himself be nailed. He has violated the Credit
|
||
|
Card Fraud Act of 1984 signed by President Reagan on Oct. 12.
|
||
|
The law provides a $10,000 fine and up to a 15-year prison term
|
||
|
for "trafficking" in illegally obtained credit-card account
|
||
|
numbers. He "friend" has committed a felony violation of the
|
||
|
California computer-crime law. TRW spokeswoman Delia Fernandex
|
||
|
said that TRW would "be more than happy to prosecute" both of
|
||
|
them.
|
||
|
|
||
|
TRW has good reason for concern. Its computers contain the
|
||
|
credit histories of 120 million people. Last year TRW sold 50
|
||
|
million credit reports on their customers. But these highly
|
||
|
confidential personal records are so poorly guarded that
|
||
|
computerized teenagers can ransack the files and depart
|
||
|
undetected. TRW passwords -- unlike many others -- often print
|
||
|
out when entered by TRW's customers. Hackers then look for
|
||
|
discarded printouts. A good source: the trash of banks and
|
||
|
automobile dealerships, which routinely do credit checks.
|
||
|
"Everybody hacks TRW," says Cleveland hacker King Blotto, whose
|
||
|
bulletin board has security system the Pentagon would envy.
|
||
|
"It's the easiest." For her her part, Fernandez insists that TRW
|
||
|
"does everything it can to keep the system secure
|
||
|
|
||
|
In my case, however, that was not enough. My credit limits would
|
||
|
hardly support big-time fraud, but victimization takes many
|
||
|
forms. Another hacker said it was likely that merchandise would
|
||
|
be ordered in my name and shipped to me -- just to harass me. I
|
||
|
used to use credit-card numbers against someone I didn't like,"
|
||
|
the hacker said. "I'd call Sears and have a dozen toilets
|
||
|
shipped to his house."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Meanwhile, back on Dragonfire, my teletrial was going strong.
|
||
|
The charges, as pressed my Unknown Warrior, include "endangering
|
||
|
all phreaks and hacks." The judge in this case is a hacker with
|
||
|
the apt name of Ax Murderer. Possible sentences range from exile
|
||
|
from the entire planet" to "kill the dude." King Blotto has taken
|
||
|
up my defense, using hacker power to make his first pleading: he
|
||
|
dialed up Dragonfire, broke into its operating system and
|
||
|
"crashed" the bulletin board, destroying all of its messages
|
||
|
naming me. The board is back up now, with a retrial in full
|
||
|
swing. But then, exile from the electronic underground looks
|
||
|
better all the time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 6: ILLINOIS AND TEXAS COMPUTER STATUTES *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
We're trying to collect as many anti-computer abuse statutes
|
||
|
as we can from each state. We're also looking for anti-piracy
|
||
|
laws and articles pass any complete texts along to us as you
|
||
|
can. A good place to upload text files like this is
|
||
|
PC-EXEC (414-964-5160) to make them widely available. Pass
|
||
|
them along to us as well.
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
+ ILLINOIS COMPUTER STATUTE +
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
(GPHILE FROM RIPCO)
|
||
|
This file is a copy of the law which was passed last September
|
||
|
and covers the description and penalties for "HACKING". It is of
|
||
|
course, written in legal gibberish so some of you who got out of
|
||
|
grammer school should be able to follow it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Full credit for this file goes to the SysOp of ORGASM! c1984.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
The following is the text of HOUSE BILL 3204, The Computer
|
||
|
Tresspass Act of 1984, Illinois. HB3204 Enrolled (Illinois,
|
||
|
Effective 18 September, 1984)
|
||
|
|
||
|
AN ACT to protect the public from electronic tresspass and
|
||
|
computer fraud.
|
||
|
|
||
|
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, represented
|
||
|
in the GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
|
||
|
|
||
|
SECTION 1. Section 16-9 of the "Criminal Code of 1961",
|
||
|
approved July 28, 1961, as amended, is amended to read as
|
||
|
follows:
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Ch. 38, par. 16-9)
|
||
|
Sec. 16-9. UNLAWFUL USE OF A COMPUTER. (a) As used in this
|
||
|
Section
|
||
|
Part-8:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. "COMPUTER" means an internally programmed, general
|
||
|
purpose digital device capable of automatically accepting data,
|
||
|
processing data and supplying the results of the operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. "COMPUTER SYSTEM" means a set of related, connected or
|
||
|
unconnected devices, including a computer and other devices,
|
||
|
including but not limited to data input and output and storage
|
||
|
devices, data communications circuits, and operating system
|
||
|
computer programs and data, that make the system
|
||
|
capable of performing the special purpose data processing tasks
|
||
|
for which it is specified.
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. "COMPUTER PROGRAM" means a series of coded instructions
|
||
|
or statements in a form acceptable to a computer to process data
|
||
|
in order to achieve a certain result.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. "TELECOMMUNICATION" means the transmission of information
|
||
|
in intrastate commerce by means of a wire, cable, glass,
|
||
|
microwave, satellite or electronic impulses, and any other
|
||
|
transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, or other
|
||
|
matter by electronic or other electromagnetic system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
5. "ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD" means any created information
|
||
|
stored in a data base or computer or computer system designed to
|
||
|
hold and display passwords or enter keys made available for the
|
||
|
use of gaining authorized entry to a computer of computer system
|
||
|
or access to telephone lines of telecommunications facilities.
|
||
|
|
||
|
6. "IDENTIFICATION CODES/PASSWORD SYSTEMS" means
|
||
|
confidential information that allows private protected access to
|
||
|
computer and computer systems.
|
||
|
|
||
|
7. "ACCESS" means to approach, instruct, communicate with,
|
||
|
store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, or otherwise make
|
||
|
use of any resources or a computer, computer system, or computer
|
||
|
network.
|
||
|
|
||
|
8. "COMPUTER NETWORK" means a set of two or more computer
|
||
|
systems that transmit data over communications circuits
|
||
|
connection time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
9. "DATA" means a representation of information, knowledge,
|
||
|
facts, concepts, or instructions which are being prepared or have
|
||
|
been prepared in a fomalized manner, and is intended to be stored
|
||
|
or processed, or is being stored or processed, in a computer,
|
||
|
computer system , or network, which shall be classified as
|
||
|
property: and which may be in any form, including but not limited
|
||
|
to, computer printouts, magnetic storage media, punch cards, or
|
||
|
stored in memory, of the computer, computer system, or network.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
10. "FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS" means, but is not limited to, any
|
||
|
check, cashiers check, draft, warrant, money order, certificate
|
||
|
of deposit, negotiable instrument, letter of credit, bill of
|
||
|
exchange, credit card, debit card, or marketable security, or any
|
||
|
computer system representation thereof.
|
||
|
|
||
|
11. "PROPERTY" means, but is not limited to, electronic
|
||
|
impulses, electronically produced data, information, financial
|
||
|
instruments, software or programs, in either machine or human
|
||
|
readable form, any other tangible item relating to a computer,
|
||
|
computer system, computer network, any copies thereof.
|
||
|
|
||
|
12. "SERVICES" means, but is not limited to, computer time,
|
||
|
data manipulation, and storage functions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(b) A person knowingly commits unlawful use of a computer
|
||
|
when he:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. Knowingly gains access to or obtains the use of a
|
||
|
computer system, or any part thereof, without the consent of the
|
||
|
owner (as defined in Section 15-2); or
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. Knowingly alters or destroys computer programs of data
|
||
|
without the consent of the owner (as defined in Section 15-2); or
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. Knowingly obtains use of, alters, damages or destroys a
|
||
|
computer system, or any part thereof, as a part of a deception
|
||
|
for the purpose of obtaining money, property, or services from
|
||
|
the owner of a computer system (as defined in Section 15-2); or
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. Knowingly accesses or causes to be accessed any computer,
|
||
|
computer system, or computer network for the purpose of (1)
|
||
|
devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud or (2)
|
||
|
obtaining money, property, or services by means of fraudulent
|
||
|
pretenses, representations, or promises.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
(c) SENTENCE:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. A person convicted of a violation of subsections (b) (1)
|
||
|
or (2) of this Section where the value of the use, alteration, or
|
||
|
destruction is $1,000.00 or less shall be guilty of a petty
|
||
|
offense.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. A person convicted of a violation of subsections (b) (1)
|
||
|
or (2) of ths section where the value of the use, alteration, or
|
||
|
destruction is more than 1,000.00 shall be guilty of a Class A
|
||
|
misdemeanor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. A person convicted of a violation of subsections (b) (3)
|
||
|
or (4) of this
|
||
|
Section where the value of the money, property, or services
|
||
|
obtained is $1,000.00 or less shall be guilty of a Class A
|
||
|
misdemeanor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. A person convicted of a violation of subsections (b) (3)
|
||
|
of (4) of this
|
||
|
Section where the value of the money, property, or services
|
||
|
obtained is more than $1,000.00 shall be guilty of a Class 4
|
||
|
felony.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
(d) CIVIL REMEDIES. Any aggrieved person shall have a right
|
||
|
of action in
|
||
|
the Circut Court against any person violating any of the
|
||
|
provisions of this Section and may recover for each violation:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. Liquidated damages of $5,000.00 or actual damages,
|
||
|
whichever is greater:
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. Reasonable attorney fees:
|
||
|
|
||
|
3 Such other relief, including an injunction, as the court
|
||
|
may deem appropriate.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Section 2. Section 79 of "AN ACT Concerning Public Utilities",
|
||
|
approved June 29, 1921, as amended, is amended to read as
|
||
|
follows:
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Ch. 111 2/3, par 83)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Sec. 79. It is hereby made the duty of the Commission to see that
|
||
|
the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of this State,
|
||
|
affecting public utilities, the enforcement of which is not
|
||
|
specifically vested in some other officer or tribunal, are
|
||
|
enforced and obeyed, and that violations thereof are promptly
|
||
|
prosecuted and penalties due the State therefor recovered and
|
||
|
collected, and to this end it may sue in the name of the people
|
||
|
of the State.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It shall be the duty of the Commission, at the direction and
|
||
|
discretion of the Chairman, to assemble and maintain an
|
||
|
Electronic Trespass Enforcement assistance Staff, consisting of
|
||
|
experts in computer systems, electronics, and other professional
|
||
|
disciplines to aid public utilities, businesses, individuals, and
|
||
|
law enforcement agencies in detecting and preventing electronic
|
||
|
trespass violations and enforcing the provisions of Section 16-9
|
||
|
of the "Criminal Code of 1961", approved July 28, 1961, as
|
||
|
amended or any other relevant statute.
|
||
|
|
||
|
No cause of action shall exist and no liability may be imposed,
|
||
|
either civil or criminal, against the State, the Chairman of the
|
||
|
Commission, or any of its members, or any employee of the
|
||
|
Commission, for any act or omission by them in performance of any
|
||
|
power or duty authorized by this Section, unless such act of
|
||
|
omission was performed in bad faith and with intent to injure a
|
||
|
particular person.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Section 3. This act takes effect upon becoming a law.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
(signed) Michael J. Madigan, Speaker, House of Representatives.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(signed) Philip J. Rock, President of the Senate
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
APPROVED: This 18th day of September, 1984 A.D.
|
||
|
(signed) James R. Thompson, Governer
|
||
|
|
||
|
** end **
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
+ TEXAS COMPUTER LAW +
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====***=====--------<
|
||
|
TEXAS COMPUTER LAW .
|
||
|
>--------=====***=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
Relating to the creation and prosecution of offenses involving
|
||
|
computers; providing penalties and an affirmative defense; adding
|
||
|
Chapter 33 to the Penal Code.
|
||
|
|
||
|
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
|
||
|
|
||
|
SECTION 1. Title 7, Penal Code, is amended by adding Chapter 33
|
||
|
to be read as follows:
|
||
|
|
||
|
CHAPTER 33. COMPUTER CRIMES
|
||
|
|
||
|
Section 33.02. BREACH OF COMPUTER SECURITY.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) uses a computer without the effective consent of the owner of
|
||
|
the computer or a person authorized to license access to the
|
||
|
computer and the actor knows that there exists a computer
|
||
|
security system intended to prevent him from making that use of
|
||
|
the computer; or (2) gains access to data stored or maintained by
|
||
|
a computer without the effective consent of the owner or license
|
||
|
of the data and the actor knows that there exists a computer
|
||
|
security system intended to prevent him from gaining access to
|
||
|
that data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(b) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or
|
||
|
knowingly gives a password, identifying code, personal
|
||
|
identification number or other confidential information about a
|
||
|
computer security system to another person without the effective
|
||
|
consent of the person employing their computer security system to
|
||
|
restrict the use of a computer or to restrict access to data
|
||
|
stored or maintained by a computer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Section 33.03. HARMFUL ACCESS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or
|
||
|
knowingly:
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) causes a computer to malfunction or interrupts the operation
|
||
|
of a computer without the effective consent of the owner of the
|
||
|
computer or a person
|
||
|
authorized to license access to the computer; or (2) alters,
|
||
|
damages, or destroys data or a computer program stored,
|
||
|
maintained or produced by a computer without the effective
|
||
|
consent of the owner or licensee of the data or computer program.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(b) An offense under this section is:
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) a Class B misdemeanor if the conduct did not cause any loss
|
||
|
or damage or i the value of the loss or damage caused by the
|
||
|
conduct is less than $200;
|
||
|
(2) a Class A misdemeanor if value of the loss or damage caused
|
||
|
by the conduct is $200 or more but less than $2,500; or (3) a
|
||
|
felony of the third degree if value of the loss or damage caused
|
||
|
by the conduct is $2,500 or more.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Section 33.04. DEFENSE. It is an affirmative defense to
|
||
|
prosecution under Section 33.02 and 33.03 of this code that the
|
||
|
actor was an officer, employee o agent of a communications common
|
||
|
carrier or an electric utility and committed the proscribed act
|
||
|
or acts in the course of employment while engaged in an activity
|
||
|
that is a necessary incident to the rendition of service or to
|
||
|
the protection of the rights or property of the communications
|
||
|
common carrier or electric utility.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Section 33.05. ASSISTANCE BY ATTORNEY GENERAL. The attorney
|
||
|
general, if requested to do so by a prosecuting attorney, may
|
||
|
assist the prosecuting attorney in the investigation or
|
||
|
prosecution of an offense under this chapter or of any other
|
||
|
offense involving the use of a computer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
SECTION 2. This act takes effect September 1, 1985
|
||
|
|
||
|
SECTION 3. The importance of this legislation and the crowded
|
||
|
condition of the calendars in both houses create an emergency and
|
||
|
an imperative public necessity that the constitutional rule
|
||
|
requiring bills to be read on three several days in each house be
|
||
|
suspended, and this rule is hereby suspended.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(SB 72 passed the Senate on March 11, 1985, by a voice vote. The
|
||
|
Senate then concurred in House amendment on May 25, 1985 by a
|
||
|
voice vote. The House passed the bill, with one amendment, on May
|
||
|
22, 1985: 138-0 with 6 abstentions.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====***=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
Section 33.01 DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) Communications
|
||
|
common carrier' means a person who owns or operates a telephone
|
||
|
system, in this state that includes equipment or facilities for
|
||
|
the conveyance, transmission or reception of communications and
|
||
|
who receives compensation from persons who use that system. (2)
|
||
|
Computer' means an electronic device that performs logical,
|
||
|
arithmetic, or memory functions by the manipulations of
|
||
|
electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input, output,
|
||
|
processing, storage or communication facilities that are
|
||
|
connected or related to the device. Computer' includes a network
|
||
|
of two or more computers that are interconnected to function or
|
||
|
communicate together. (3) Computer program' means an ordered set
|
||
|
of data representing coded instructions or statements that when
|
||
|
executed by a computer cause the computer to process data or
|
||
|
perform certain functions. (4) Computer security system' means
|
||
|
the design, procedures, or other measures that the person
|
||
|
responsible for the operation and use of a computer employs to
|
||
|
restrict the use of the computer to particular persons or uses
|
||
|
that the owner or licensee of data stored or maintained by a
|
||
|
computer in which the owner or licensee is entitled to store or
|
||
|
maintain the data employs to restrict access to the data. (5)
|
||
|
Data' means a representation of information, knowledge, facts
|
||
|
concepts, or instructions that is being prepared or has been
|
||
|
prepared in a formalized manner and is intended to be stored or
|
||
|
processed, is being stored o processed or has been stored or
|
||
|
processed in a computer. Data may be embodied in any form,
|
||
|
including but not limited to computer printouts, magnetic storage
|
||
|
media, and punchcards, or may be stored internally in the memory
|
||
|
of the computer. (6) Electric utility' has the meaning assigned
|
||
|
by Subsection (c), Section 3, Public Utility Regulatory Act
|
||
|
(Article 1446c, Vernon's Civil Statutes).
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 7: Teleconnect Wants Your Rights *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Lifeblood of the BBS world is the telephone line.
|
||
|
If teleco czars begin abusing their public trust by
|
||
|
deciding who we can or cannot call, it endangers not only
|
||
|
the BSS world, but fundamental freedoms of expression and
|
||
|
assembly. Sometimes individual bureaucrats screw up. They
|
||
|
make bad decisions, break agreements, or simply are
|
||
|
incompetent. No big deal. The danger comes when, by policy,
|
||
|
a national utility attempts to curtail or freedoms.
|
||
|
TELECONNECT, a long distance carrier out of Iowa, has done this.
|
||
|
The three contributions below illustrate how TELECONNECT
|
||
|
has attempted to bully some of its users. In the first,
|
||
|
TC attempted to block numbers to a bulletin board. In the
|
||
|
second, it monitored one its users and decided who that user
|
||
|
could and could not call. The third illustrates Teleconnects
|
||
|
arrogance.
|
||
|
|
||
|
BBS users tend to be a bit fragmented, and when we have a problem,
|
||
|
we deal with it individually. We should start banding together.
|
||
|
If you are having, or have had, a problem with your teleco
|
||
|
crowd, let us know. We will not print real names without
|
||
|
permission.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
BLOCKING OF LONG-DISTANCE CALLS
|
||
|
by Jim Schmickley
|
||
|
Hawkeye PC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
SUMMARY. This article describes the "blocking" by one
|
||
|
long-distance telephone company of access through their system to
|
||
|
certain telephone numbers, particularly BBS numbers. The
|
||
|
blocking is applied in a very arbitrary manner, and the company
|
||
|
arrogantly asserts that BBS SYSOPS and anyone who uses a computer
|
||
|
modem are "hackers."
|
||
|
|
||
|
The company doesn't really want to discuss the situation,
|
||
|
but it appears the following scenario occurred. The proverbial
|
||
|
"person or persons unknown" identified one or more "valid"
|
||
|
long-distance account numbers, and subsequently used those
|
||
|
numbers on one or more occasions to fraudulently call a
|
||
|
legitimate computer bulletin board system (BBS). When the
|
||
|
long-distance company discovered the fraudulent charges, they
|
||
|
"blocked" the line without bothering to investigate or contacting
|
||
|
the BBS System Operator to obtain his assistance. In fact, the
|
||
|
company did not even determine the SYSOP's name.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The long-distance carrier would like to pretend that the
|
||
|
incident which triggered the actions described in this article
|
||
|
was an isolated situation, not related to anything else in the
|
||
|
world. However, there are major principles of free, uninhibited
|
||
|
communications and individual rights deeply interwoven into the
|
||
|
issue. And, there is still the lingering question, "If one
|
||
|
long-distance company is interfering with their customers'
|
||
|
communications on little more than a whim, are other long-distant
|
||
|
companies also interfering with the American public's right of
|
||
|
free 'electronic speech'?"
|
||
|
|
||
|
CALL TO ACTION. Your inputs and protests are needed now to
|
||
|
counter the long-distance company's claims that "no one was hurt
|
||
|
by their blocking actions because nobody complained." Obviously
|
||
|
nobody complained for a long time because the line blocking was
|
||
|
carried out in such a manner that no one realized, until April
|
||
|
1988, what was being done.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Please read through the rest of this article (yes, it's
|
||
|
long, but you should find it very interesting) and judge for
|
||
|
yourself. Then, please write to the organizations listed at the
|
||
|
end of the article; insist that your right to telephone whatever
|
||
|
number you choose should not be impaired by the arbitrary
|
||
|
decision of some telephone company bureaucrat who really doesn't
|
||
|
care about the rights of his customers. Protest in the strongest
|
||
|
terms. And, remember: the rights you save WILL BE YOUR OWN!
|
||
|
|
||
|
SETTING THE SCENE. Teleconnect is a long-distance carrier
|
||
|
and telephone direct marketing company headquartered in Cedar
|
||
|
Rapids, Iowa. The company is about eight years old, and has a
|
||
|
long-distance business base of approximately 200,000 customers.
|
||
|
Teleconnect has just completed its first public stock offering,
|
||
|
and is presently (August 1988) involved in a merger which will
|
||
|
make it the nation's fourth-largest long-distance carrier. It is
|
||
|
a very rapidly-growing company, having achieved its spectacular
|
||
|
growth by offering long-distance service at rates advertised as
|
||
|
being 15% to 30% below AT&T's rates.
|
||
|
|
||
|
When Teleconnect started out in the telephone
|
||
|
interconnection business, few, if any, exchanges were set up for
|
||
|
"equal access", so the company set up a network of local access
|
||
|
numbers (essentially just unlisted local PABXs - private
|
||
|
automatic branch exchanges) and assigned a six-digit account
|
||
|
number to each customer. Later, a seventh "security" digit was
|
||
|
added to all account numbers. (I know what you're thinking -
|
||
|
what could be easier for a war-games dialer than to seek out
|
||
|
"valid" seven-digit numbers?) Teleconnect now offers direct
|
||
|
"equal access" dialing on most exchanges. But, the older access
|
||
|
number/account code system is still in place for those exchanges
|
||
|
which do not offer "equal access." And, that system is still
|
||
|
very useful for customers who place calls from their offices or
|
||
|
other locations away from home.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"BLOCKING" DISCOVERED. In early April 1988, a friend
|
||
|
mentioned that Teleconnect was "blocking" certain telephone lines
|
||
|
where they detected computer tone. In particular, he had been
|
||
|
unable to call Curt Kyhl's Stock Exchange BBS in Waterloo, Iowa.
|
||
|
This sounded like something I should certainly look into, so I
|
||
|
tried to call Curt's BBS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
CONTACT WITH TELECONNECT. Teleconnect would not allow my
|
||
|
call to go through. Instead, I got a recorded voice message
|
||
|
stating that the call was a local call from my location. A
|
||
|
second attempt got the same recorded message. At least, they
|
||
|
were consistent.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I called my Teleconnect service representative and asked
|
||
|
just what the problem was. After I explained what happened, she
|
||
|
suggested that it must be a local call. I explained that I
|
||
|
really didn't think a 70 mile call from Cedar Rapids to Waterloo
|
||
|
was a local call. She checked on the situation and informed me
|
||
|
that the line was being "blocked." I asked why, and she
|
||
|
"supposed it was at the customer's request." After being advised
|
||
|
that statement made no sense, she admitted she really didn't know
|
||
|
why. So, on to her supervisor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The first level supervisor verified the line was being
|
||
|
"blocked by Teleconnect security", but she couldn't or wouldn't
|
||
|
say why. Then, she challenged, "Why do you want to call that
|
||
|
number?" That was the wrong question to ask this unhappy
|
||
|
customer, and the lady quickly discovered that bit of information
|
||
|
was none of her business, And, on to her supervisor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The second level supervisor refused to reveal any
|
||
|
information of value to a mere customer, but she did suggest that
|
||
|
any line Teleconnect was blocking could still be reached through
|
||
|
AT&T or Northwestern Bell by dialing 10288-1. When questioned
|
||
|
why Teleconnect, which for years had sold its long-distance
|
||
|
service on the basis of a cost-saving over AT&T rates, was now
|
||
|
suggesting that customers use AT&T, the lady had no answer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I was then informed that, if I needed more information, I
|
||
|
should contact Dan Rogers, Teleconnect's Vice President for
|
||
|
Customer Service. That sounded good; "Please connect me." Then,
|
||
|
"I'm sorry, but Mr. Rogers is out of town, and won't be back
|
||
|
until next week." "Next week?" "But he does call in regularly.
|
||
|
Maybe he could call you back before that." Mr. Rogers did call
|
||
|
me back, later that day, from Washington, D.C. where he and some
|
||
|
Teleconnect "security people" were attending a conference on
|
||
|
telephone security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
TELECONNECT RESPONDS, A LITTLE. Dan Rogers prefaced his
|
||
|
conversation with, "I'm just the mouthpiece; I don't understand
|
||
|
all the technical details. But, our security people are blocking
|
||
|
that number because we've had some problems with it in the past."
|
||
|
I protested that the allegation of "problems" didn't make sense
|
||
|
because the number was for a computer bulletin board system
|
||
|
operated by a reputable businessman, Curt Kyhl.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mr. Rogers said that I had just given Teleconnect new
|
||
|
information; they had not been able to determine whose number
|
||
|
they were blocking. "Our people are good, but they're not that
|
||
|
good. Northwestern Bell won't release subscriber information to
|
||
|
us." And, when he got back to his office the following Monday,
|
||
|
he would have the security people check to see if the block could
|
||
|
be removed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The following Monday, another woman from Teleconnect called
|
||
|
to inform me that they had checked the line, and they were
|
||
|
removing the block from it. She added the comment that this was
|
||
|
the first time in four years that anyone had requested that a
|
||
|
line be unblocked. I suggested that it probably wouldn't be the
|
||
|
last time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In a later telephone conversation, Dan Rogers verified that
|
||
|
the block had been removed from Curt Kyhl's line, but warned that
|
||
|
the line would be blocked again "if there were any more problems
|
||
|
with it." A brief, non-conclusive discussion of Teleconnect's
|
||
|
right to take such action then ensued. I added that the fact
|
||
|
that Teleconnect "security" had been unable to determine the
|
||
|
identity of the SYSOP of the blocked board just didn't make
|
||
|
sense; that it didn't sound as if the "security people" were very
|
||
|
competent. Mr. Rogers then admitted that every time the security
|
||
|
people tried to call the number, they got a busy signal (and,
|
||
|
although Mr. Rogers didn't admit it, they just "gave up", and
|
||
|
arbitrarily blocked the line.) Oh, yes, the lying voice message,
|
||
|
"This is a local call...", was not intended to deceive anyone
|
||
|
according to Dan Rogers. It was just that Teleconnect could only
|
||
|
put so many messages on their equipment, and that was the one
|
||
|
they selected for blocked lines.
|
||
|
|
||
|
BEGINNING THE PAPER TRAIL. Obviously, Teleconnect was not
|
||
|
going to pay much attention to telephone calls from mere
|
||
|
customers. On April 22, Ben Blackstock, practicing attorney and
|
||
|
veteran SYSOP, wrote to Mr. Rogers urging that Teleconnect permit
|
||
|
their customers to call whatever numbers they desired. Ben
|
||
|
questioned Teleconnect's authority to block calls, and suggested
|
||
|
that such action had serious overlays of "big brother." He also
|
||
|
noted that "you cannot punish the innocent to get at someone who
|
||
|
is apparently causing Teleconnect difficulty."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Casey D. Mahon, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of
|
||
|
Teleconnect, replied to Ben Blackstock's letter on April 28th.
|
||
|
This response was the start of Teleconnect's seemingly endless
|
||
|
stream of vague, general allegations regarding "hackers" and
|
||
|
"computer billboards." Teleconnect insisted they did have
|
||
|
authority to block access to telephone lines, and cited 18 USC
|
||
|
2511(2)(a)(i) as an example of the authority. The Teleconnect
|
||
|
position was summed up in the letter:
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Finally, please be advised the company is willing to
|
||
|
'unblock' the line in order to ascertain whether or not illegal
|
||
|
hacking has ceased. In the event, however, that theft of
|
||
|
Teleconnect long distance services through use of the bulletin
|
||
|
board resumes, we will certainly block access through the
|
||
|
Teleconnect network again and use our authority under federal law
|
||
|
to ascertain the identity of the hacker or hackers."
|
||
|
|
||
|
THE GAUNTLET IS PICKED UP. Mr. Blackstock checked the cited
|
||
|
section of the U.S. Code, and discovered that it related only to
|
||
|
"interception" of communications, but had nothing to do with
|
||
|
"blocking". He advised me of his opinion and also wrote back to
|
||
|
Casey Mahon challenging her interpretation of that section of
|
||
|
federal law.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In his letter, Ben noted that, "Either Teleconnect is
|
||
|
providing a communication service that is not discriminatory, or
|
||
|
it is not." He added that he would "become upset, to say the
|
||
|
least" if he discovered that Teleconnect was blocking access to
|
||
|
his BBS. Mr. Blackstock concluded by offering to cooperate with
|
||
|
Teleconnect in seeking a declaratory judgment regarding their
|
||
|
"right" to block a telephone number based upon the actions of
|
||
|
some third party. To date, Teleconnect has not responded to that
|
||
|
offer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
On May 13th, I sent my own reply to Casey Mahon, and
|
||
|
answered the issues of her letter point by point. I noted that
|
||
|
even I, not an attorney, knew the difference between
|
||
|
"interception" and "blocking", and if Teleconnect didn't, they
|
||
|
could check with any football fan. My letter concluded:
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Since Teleconnect's 'blocking' policies are ill-conceived,
|
||
|
thoughtlessly arbitrary, anti-consumer, and of questionable
|
||
|
legality, they need to be corrected immediately. Please advise
|
||
|
me how Teleconnect is revising these policies to ensure that I
|
||
|
and all other legitimate subscribers will have uninhibited access
|
||
|
to any and all long-distance numbers we choose to call."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Casey Mahon replied on June 3rd. Not unexpectedly, she
|
||
|
brushed aside all my arguments. She also presented the first of
|
||
|
the sweeping generalizations, with total avoidance of specifics,
|
||
|
which we have since come to recognize as a Teleconnect trademark.
|
||
|
One paragraph neatly sums Casey Mahon's letter:
|
||
|
|
||
|
"While I appreciate the time and thought that obviously went
|
||
|
into your letter, I do not agree with your conclusion that
|
||
|
Teleconnect's efforts to prevent theft of its services are in any
|
||
|
way inappropriate. The inter-exchange industry has been plagued,
|
||
|
throughout its history, by individuals who devote substantial
|
||
|
ingenuity to the theft of long distance services. It is not
|
||
|
unheard of for an interexchange company to lose as much as
|
||
|
$500,000 a month to theft. As you can imagine, such losses, over
|
||
|
a period of time, could drive a company out of business."
|
||
|
|
||
|
ESCALATION. By this time it was very obvious that
|
||
|
Teleconnect was going to remain recalcitrant until some third
|
||
|
party, preferably a regulatory agency, convinced them of the
|
||
|
error of their ways. Accordingly, I assembled the file and added
|
||
|
a letter of complaint addressed to the Iowa Utilities Board. The
|
||
|
complaint simply asked that Teleconnect be directed to institute
|
||
|
appropriate safeguards to ensure that "innocent third parties"
|
||
|
would no longer be adversely affected by Teleconnect's arbitrary
|
||
|
"blocking" policies.
|
||
|
|
||
|
My letter of complaint was dated July 7th, and the Iowa
|
||
|
Utilities Board replied on July 13th. The reply stated that
|
||
|
Teleconnect was required to respond to my complaint by August
|
||
|
2nd, and the Board would then propose a resolution. If the
|
||
|
proposed resolution was not satisfactory, I could request that
|
||
|
the file be reopened and the complaint be reconsidered. If the
|
||
|
results of that action were not satisfactory, a formal hearing
|
||
|
could be requested.
|
||
|
|
||
|
After filing the complaint, I also sent a copy of the file
|
||
|
to Congressman Tom Tauke. Mr. Tauke represents the Second
|
||
|
Congressional District of Iowa, which includes Cedar Rapids, and
|
||
|
is also a member of the House Telecommunica-tions Subcommittee.
|
||
|
I have subsequently had a personal conversation with Mr. Tauke as
|
||
|
well as additional correspondence on the subject. He seems to
|
||
|
have a deep and genuine interest in the issue, but at my request,
|
||
|
is simply an interested observer at this time. It is our hope
|
||
|
that the Iowa Utilities Board will propose an acceptable
|
||
|
resolution without additional help.
|
||
|
|
||
|
AN UNRESPONSIVE RESPONSE. Teleconnect's "response" to the
|
||
|
Iowa Utilities Board was filed July 29th. As anticipated, it was
|
||
|
a mass of vague generalities and unsubstantiated allegations.
|
||
|
However, it offered one item of new, and shocking, information;
|
||
|
Curt Kyhl's BBS had been blocked for ten months, from June 6,
|
||
|
1987 to mid-April 1988. (At this point it should be noted that
|
||
|
Teleconnect's customers had no idea that the company was blocking
|
||
|
some of our calls. We just assumed that calls weren't going
|
||
|
through because of Teleconnect's technical problems.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect avoided putting any specific, or even relevant,
|
||
|
information in their letter. However, they did offer to whisper
|
||
|
in the staff's ear; "Teleconnect would be willing to share
|
||
|
detailed information regarding this specific case, and hacking in
|
||
|
general, with the Board's staff, as it has in the past with
|
||
|
various federal and local law enforcement agencies, including the
|
||
|
United States Secret Service. Teleconnect respectfully requests,
|
||
|
however, that the board agree to keep such information
|
||
|
confidential, as to do otherwise would involve public disclosure
|
||
|
of ongoing investigations of criminal conduct and the methods by
|
||
|
which interexchange carriers, including Teleconnect, detect such
|
||
|
theft."
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is no indication of whether anyone felt that such a
|
||
|
"confidential" meeting would violate Iowa's Open Meetings Law.
|
||
|
And, nobody apparently questioned why, during a ten-months long
|
||
|
"ongoing investigation", Teleconnect seemed unable to determine
|
||
|
the name of the individual whose line they were blocking. Of
|
||
|
course, whatever they did was justified because (in their own
|
||
|
words), "Teleconnect had suffered substantial dollar losses as a
|
||
|
result of the theft of long distance services by means of
|
||
|
computer 'hacking' utilizing the computer billboard which is
|
||
|
available at that number."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect's most vile allegation was, "Many times, the
|
||
|
hacker will enter the stolen authorization code on computer
|
||
|
billboards, allowing others to steal long distance services by
|
||
|
utilizing the code." But no harm was done by the blocking of the
|
||
|
BBS number because, "During the ten month period the number was
|
||
|
blocked, Teleconnect received no complaints from anyone claiming
|
||
|
to be the party to whom the number was assigned." The fact that
|
||
|
Curt Kyhl had no way of knowing his line was being blocked might
|
||
|
have had something to do with the fact that he didn't complain.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It was also pointed out that I really had no right to
|
||
|
complain since, "First, and foremost, Mr. Schmickley is not the
|
||
|
subscriber to the number." That's true; I'm just a long-time
|
||
|
Teleconnect customer who was refused service because of an
|
||
|
alleged act performed by an unknown third party.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Then Teleconnect dumped on the Utilities Board staff a copy
|
||
|
of a seven page article from Business Week Magazine, entitled "Is
|
||
|
Your Computer Secure?" This article was totally unrelated to the
|
||
|
theft of long-distance service, except for an excerpt from a
|
||
|
sidebar story about a West German hackers' club. The story
|
||
|
reported that, "In 1984, Chaos uncovered a security hole in the
|
||
|
videotex system that the German telephone authority, the Deutsche
|
||
|
Bundespost, was building. When the agency ignored club warnings
|
||
|
that messages in a customer's private electronic mailbox weren't
|
||
|
secure, Chaos members set out to prove the point. They logged on
|
||
|
to computers at Hamburger Sparkasse, a savings bank, and
|
||
|
programmed them to make thousands of videotex calls to Chaos
|
||
|
headquarters on one weekend. After only two days of this, the
|
||
|
bank owed the Bundespost $75,000 in telephone charges."
|
||
|
|
||
|
RESOLUTION WITH A RUBBER STAMP. The staff of the Iowa
|
||
|
Utilities Board replied to my complaint by letter on August 19th.
|
||
|
They apparently accepted the vague innuendo submitted by
|
||
|
Teleconnect without any verification; "Considering the illegal
|
||
|
actions reportedly to be taking place on number (319) 236-0834,
|
||
|
it appears the blocking was reasonable. However, we believe the
|
||
|
Board should be notified shortly after the blocking and
|
||
|
permission should be obtained to continue the blocking for any
|
||
|
period of time."
|
||
|
|
||
|
However, it was also noted that, "Iowa Code 476.20 (1)
|
||
|
(1987) states, 'A utility shall not, except in cases of
|
||
|
emergency, discontinue, reduce, or impair service to a community
|
||
|
or a part of a community, except for nonpayment of account or
|
||
|
violation of rules and regulations, unless and until permission
|
||
|
to do so is obtained from the Board." The letter further
|
||
|
clarified, "Although the Iowa Code is subject to interpretation,
|
||
|
it appears to staff that 'emergency' refers to a relatively short
|
||
|
time..."
|
||
|
|
||
|
CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE. Since it appeared obvious that the
|
||
|
Utilities Board staff had not questioned or investigated a single
|
||
|
one of Teleconnect's allegations, the staff's response was
|
||
|
absolutely astounding. Accordingly, I filed a request for
|
||
|
reconsideration on August 22nd.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Three points were raised in the request for reconsideration:
|
||
|
(1) The staff's evaluation should have been focused on the denial
|
||
|
of service to me and countless others of Teleconnect's 200,000
|
||
|
customers, and not just on the blocking of incoming calls to one
|
||
|
BBS. (2) The staff accepted all of Teleconnect's allegations as
|
||
|
fact, although not one bit of hard evidence was presented in
|
||
|
support of those allegations. (3) In the words of the staff's
|
||
|
own citation, it appeared that Teleconnect had violated Iowa Code
|
||
|
476.20 (1) (1987) continuously over a ten months' period, perhaps
|
||
|
as long as four years.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Since Teleconnect had dumped a seven page irrelevant
|
||
|
magazine article on the staff, it seemed only fair to now offer a
|
||
|
two page completely relevant story to them. This was "On Your
|
||
|
Computer - Bulletin Boards", from the June 1988 issue of
|
||
|
"Changing Times". This excellent article cited nine BBSs as
|
||
|
"good places to get started". Among the nine listed BBSs was
|
||
|
Curt Kyhl's "Stock Exchange, Waterloo, Iowa (319-236-0834)."
|
||
|
Even the geniuses at Teleconnect ought to be able to recognize
|
||
|
that this BBS, recommended by a national magazine, is the very
|
||
|
same one they blocked for ten months.
|
||
|
|
||
|
MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE RANCH. You are now up-to-date on the
|
||
|
entire story. Now, we are in the process of spreading the word
|
||
|
so that all interested people can contact the Iowa authorities so
|
||
|
they will get the message that this case is much bigger than the
|
||
|
blocking of one BBS. YOU can help in two ways:
|
||
|
|
||
|
First, upload this file to bulletin boards you call. Let's
|
||
|
get this message distributed to BBS and modem users across the
|
||
|
nation, because the threat is truly to communications across the
|
||
|
nation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Second, read the notice appended to this article, and ACT.
|
||
|
The notice was distributed at the last meeting of Hawkeye PC
|
||
|
Users' Group. If you are a Teleconnect customer, it is very
|
||
|
important that you write the agencies listed on the notice. If
|
||
|
you are not a Teleconnect customer, but are interested in
|
||
|
preserving your rights to uninhibited communications, you can
|
||
|
help the cause by writing to those agencies, also.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Please, people, write now! Before it is too late!
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
T E L E C O N N E C T C U S T O M E R S = = =
|
||
|
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
If you are user of Teleconnect's long distance telephone
|
||
|
service, you need to be aware of their "blocking" policy:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect has been "lashing out" against the callers
|
||
|
of bulletin boards and other "computer numbers" by blocking
|
||
|
access of legitimate subscribers to certain phone numbers to
|
||
|
which calls have been made with fraudulent Teleconnect charge
|
||
|
numbers. Curt Kyhl's Stock Exchange Bulletin Board in
|
||
|
Waterloo has been "blocked" in such a manner. Teleconnect
|
||
|
representatives have indicated that other "computer numbers"
|
||
|
have been the objects of similar action in the past, and that
|
||
|
they (Teleconnect) have a "right" to continue such action in
|
||
|
the future.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Aside from the trampling of individual rights guaranteed
|
||
|
by the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, this
|
||
|
arbitrary action serves only to "punish the innocent"
|
||
|
Teleconnect customers and bulletin board operators, while
|
||
|
doing absolutely nothing to identify, punish, or obtain
|
||
|
payment from the guilty. The capping irony is that
|
||
|
Teleconnect, which advertises as offering significant savings
|
||
|
over AT&T long-distance rates, now suggests to complaining
|
||
|
customers that the blocked number can still be dialed through
|
||
|
AT&T.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Please write to Teleconnect. Explain how long you have
|
||
|
been a customer, that your modem generates a significant
|
||
|
amount of the revenue they collect from you, and that you
|
||
|
strongly object to their abritrarily deciding what numbers
|
||
|
you may or may not call. Challenge their "right" to
|
||
|
institute a "blocking" policy and insist that the policy be
|
||
|
changed. Send your protests to:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect Company Mr. Dan Rogers, Vice
|
||
|
President
|
||
|
for Customer Service 500 Second Avenue,
|
||
|
S.E. Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401
|
||
|
|
||
|
A complaint filed with the Iowa Utilities Board has been
|
||
|
initially resolved in favor of Teleconnect. A request for
|
||
|
reconsideration has been filed, and the time is NOW for YOU
|
||
|
to write letters to the State of Iowa. Please write NOW to:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mr. Gerald W. Winter, Supervisor, Consumer
|
||
|
Services
|
||
|
Iowa State Utilities Board Lucas State
|
||
|
Office Building Des Moines, Iowa 50319
|
||
|
|
||
|
And to:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mr. James Maret Office of the Consumer
|
||
|
Advocate Lucas State Office Building Des
|
||
|
Moines, Iowa 50319
|
||
|
|
||
|
Write now. The rights you save WILL be your own.
|
||
|
|
||
|
August 28,1988
|
||
|
|
||
|
After filing a request for reconsideration of my complaint,
|
||
|
I received a reply from the Iowa State Utilities Board which
|
||
|
said, in part:
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Thank you for your letter dated August 22, 1988, with additional
|
||
|
comments concerning your complaint on the blocking of access to
|
||
|
certain telephone numbers by Teleconnect.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"To ensure that the issues are properly investigated, we are
|
||
|
forwarding your comments to the company and requesting a response
|
||
|
by September 15, 1988."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Again, this is a very large issue. Simply stated, it is:
|
||
|
Does ANY telephone company have the right to "block" (or refuse
|
||
|
to place) calls to ANY number on the basis of unsubstantiated,
|
||
|
uninvestigated charges of "telephone fraud", especially when the
|
||
|
alleged fraud was committed by a third party without the
|
||
|
knowledge of the called party? In the specific case, the
|
||
|
question becomes; Can a long distance carrier refuse to handle
|
||
|
calls to a BBS solely because some unknown crook has placed
|
||
|
fraudulently-charged calls to that BBS?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Read BLOCKERS.ARC, and then make YOUR voice be heard by
|
||
|
lodging protests with the agencies listed in that file.
|
||
|
Incidentally, when you write, please cite file number C-88-161.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If you have any additional information which might be
|
||
|
helpful in this battle, please let me know. I check the
|
||
|
following BBSs very regularly:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hawkeye RBBS, Ben Blackstock, SYSOP 319-363-3314
|
||
|
($15/year) The Forum, John Oren, SYSOP
|
||
|
319-365-3163 (Register Free)
|
||
|
|
||
|
You can also send info to me via U.S. Mail to:
|
||
|
|
||
|
7441 Commune Court, N.E. Cedar Rapids, Iowa
|
||
|
52402
|
||
|
|
||
|
I hope that, by this time, you realize how significant this
|
||
|
battle is for all of us. If we lose, it opens the door for
|
||
|
telephone companies to dictate to us just who we can (or cannot)
|
||
|
call, especially with modems. We CAN'T let that happen! And,
|
||
|
thanks for your support.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Jim Schmickley
|
||
|
Hawkeye PC Users' Group
|
||
|
Cedar Rapids, Iowa
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Reprinted with permisson from author)
|
||
|
|
||
|
17 November, 1988
|
||
|
Customer Service
|
||
|
Teleconnect
|
||
|
P.O. Box 3013
|
||
|
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-9101
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dear Persons:
|
||
|
|
||
|
I am writing in response to my October Teleconnect bill, due 13
|
||
|
November, for $120.76. As you can see, it has not yet been paid,
|
||
|
and I would hope to delay payment until we can come to some equi-
|
||
|
table resolution of what appears to be a dispute. The records
|
||
|
should show that I have paid previous bills responsibly. Hence,
|
||
|
this is neither an attempt to delay nor avoid payment.
|
||
|
My account number is: 01-xxxx-xxxxxx. My user phone is: 815-xxx-
|
||
|
xxxx. The phone of record (under which the account is regis-
|
||
|
tered) is: 815-xxx-xxxx.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If possible, you might "flag" my bill so I will not begin receiv-
|
||
|
ing dunning notices until we resolve the problem.
|
||
|
I have several complaints. One is the bill itself, the other is
|
||
|
the service. I feel my bill has been inflated because of the poor
|
||
|
quality of the service you provide to certain areas of the coun-
|
||
|
try. These lines are computer lines, and those over which the
|
||
|
dispute occurs are 2400 baud lines. Dropping down to 1200 baud
|
||
|
does not help much. As you can see from my bill, there are numer-
|
||
|
ous repeat calls made to the same location within a short period
|
||
|
of time. The primary problems occured to the following loca-
|
||
|
tions:
|
||
|
1. Highland, CA 714-864-4592
|
||
|
2. Montgomery, AL 205-279-6549
|
||
|
3. Fairbanks, AK 907-479-7215
|
||
|
4. Lubbock, TX 806-794-4362
|
||
|
5. Perrine, FL 305-235-1645
|
||
|
6. Jacksonville, FL 904-721-1166
|
||
|
7. San Marcos, TX 512-754-8182
|
||
|
8. Birmingham, AL 205-979-8409
|
||
|
9. N. Phoenix, AZ 602-789-9269
|
||
|
|
||
|
The problem is simply that, to these destinations, Teleconnect
|
||
|
can simply not hold a line. AT&T can. Although some of these des-
|
||
|
tinations were held for a few minutes, generally, I cannot depend
|
||
|
on TC service, and have more recently begun using AT&T instead.
|
||
|
Even though it may appear from the records that I maintained some
|
||
|
contact for several minutes, this time was useless, because I
|
||
|
cold not complete my business, and the time was wasted. An equi-
|
||
|
table resolution would be to strike these charges from my bill.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I would also hope that the calls I place through AT&T to these
|
||
|
destinations will be discounted, rather than pay the full cost.
|
||
|
I have enclosed my latest AT&T bill, which includes calls that I
|
||
|
made through them because of either blocking or lack of quality
|
||
|
service. If I read it correctly, no discount was taken off. Is
|
||
|
this correct?
|
||
|
|
||
|
As you can see from the above list of numbers, there is a pattern
|
||
|
in the poor quality service: The problem seems to lie in Western
|
||
|
states and in the deep south. I have no problem with the midwest
|
||
|
or with numbers in the east.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I have been told that I should call a service representative when
|
||
|
I have problems. This, however, is not an answer for several rea-
|
||
|
sons. First, I have no time to continue to call for service in
|
||
|
the middle of a project. The calls tend to be late at night, and
|
||
|
time is precious. Second, on those times I have called, I either
|
||
|
could not get through, or was put on hold for an indeterminable
|
||
|
time. Fourth, judging from comments I have received in several
|
||
|
calls to Teleconnect's service representatives, these seem to be
|
||
|
problems for which there is no immediate solution, thus making
|
||
|
repeated calls simply a waste of time. Finally, the number of
|
||
|
calls on which I would be required to seek assistance would be
|
||
|
excessive. The inability to hold a line does not seem to be an
|
||
|
occasional anomaly, but a systematic pattern that suggests that
|
||
|
the service to these areas is, indeed, inadequate.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A second problem concerns the Teleconnect policy of blocking cer-
|
||
|
tain numbers. Blocking is unacceptable. When calling a blocked
|
||
|
number, all one receives is a recorded message that "this is a
|
||
|
local call." Although I have complained about this once I learned
|
||
|
of the intentional blocking, the message remained the same. I
|
||
|
was told that one number (301-843-5052) would be unblocked, and
|
||
|
for several hours it was. Then the blocking resumed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A public utility simply does not have the right to determine who
|
||
|
its customers may or may not call. This constitutes a form of
|
||
|
censorship. You should candidly tell your customers that you must
|
||
|
approve of their calls or you will not place them. You also have
|
||
|
the obligation to provide your customers with a list of those
|
||
|
numbers you will not service so that they will not waste their
|
||
|
time attempting to call. You might also change the message that
|
||
|
indicates a blocked call by saying something "we don't approve of
|
||
|
who you're calling, and won't let you call."
|
||
|
|
||
|
I appreciate the need to protect your customers. However, block-
|
||
|
ing numbers is not appropriate. It is not clear how blocking aids
|
||
|
your investigation, or how blocking will eliminate whatever prob-
|
||
|
lems impelled the action. I request the following:
|
||
|
1. Unblock the numbers currently blocked.
|
||
|
2. Provide me with a complete list of the numbers you are
|
||
|
blocking
|
||
|
3. End the policy of blocking.
|
||
|
I feel Teleconnect has been less than honest with its customers,
|
||
|
and is a bit precipitous in trampling on rights, even in a worthy
|
||
|
attempt to protect them from abuses of telephone cheats. How-
|
||
|
ever, the poor quality of line service, combined with the appar-
|
||
|
ent violation of Constitutional rights, cannot be tolerated.
|
||
|
Those with whom I have spoken about this matter are polite, but
|
||
|
the bottom line is that they do not respond to the problem. I
|
||
|
would prefer to pay my bill only after we resolve this.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Cheerfully,
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Name removed by request)
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*/ ST*ZMAG SPECIAL REPORT - by Jerry Cross /*/
|
||
|
(reprinted from Vol. #28, 7 July, 1989)
|
||
|
===============================================
|
||
|
TELECONNECT CALL BLOCKING UPDATE
|
||
|
Ctsy (Genesee Atari Group)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Background
|
||
|
==========
|
||
|
|
||
|
At the beginning of last year one of my bbs users uploaded a
|
||
|
file he found on another bbs that he thought I would be
|
||
|
interested in. It detailed the story of an Iowa bbs operator
|
||
|
who discovered that Teleconnect, a long distance carrier, was
|
||
|
blocking incoming calls to his bbs without his or the callers
|
||
|
knowledge.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As an employee of Michigan Bell I was very interested. I could
|
||
|
not understand how a company could interfere with the
|
||
|
transmissions of telephone calls, something that was completely
|
||
|
unheard of with either AT&T or Michigan Bell in the past. The
|
||
|
calls were being blocked, according to Teleconnect public
|
||
|
relations officials, because large amounts of fraudulent calls
|
||
|
were being placed through their system. Rather than attempting
|
||
|
to discover who was placing these calls, Teleconnect decided to
|
||
|
take the easy (and cheap) way out by simply block access to the
|
||
|
number they were calling. But the main point was that a long
|
||
|
distance company was intercepting phone calls. I was very
|
||
|
concerned.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I did some investigating around the Michigan area to see what
|
||
|
the long distance carriers were doing, and if they, too, were
|
||
|
intercepting or blocking phone calls. I also discovered that
|
||
|
Teleconnect was just in the process of setting up shop to serve
|
||
|
Michigan. Remember, too, that many of the former AT&T customers
|
||
|
who did not specify which long distance carrier they wanted at
|
||
|
the time of the AT&T breakup were placed into a pool, and
|
||
|
divided up by the competing long distance companies. There are
|
||
|
a number of Michigan users who are using certain long distance
|
||
|
carriers not of their choice.
|
||
|
|
||
|
My investigation discovered that Michigan Bell and AT&T have a
|
||
|
solid, computer backed security system that makes it unnecessary
|
||
|
for them to block calls. MCI, Sprint, and a few other companies
|
||
|
would not comment or kept passing me around to other
|
||
|
departments, or refused to comment about security measures.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I also discussed this with Michigan Bell Security and was
|
||
|
informed that any long distance company that needed help
|
||
|
investigating call fraud would not only receive help, but MBT
|
||
|
would actually prepare the case and appear in court for
|
||
|
prosecution!
|
||
|
|
||
|
My calls to Teleconnect were simply ignored. Letters to the
|
||
|
public service commission, FCC, and other government departments
|
||
|
were also ignored. I did, however, get some cooperation from
|
||
|
our U.S. Representative Dale Kildee, who filed a complaint in my
|
||
|
name to the FCC and the Interstate Commerce Commission. What
|
||
|
follows is their summary of an FCC investigation to Mr. Kildee's
|
||
|
office.
|
||
|
|
||
|
----
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dear Congressman Kildee:
|
||
|
|
||
|
This is in further response to your October 18, 1988 memorandum
|
||
|
enclosing correspondence from Mr. Gerald R. Cross, President of
|
||
|
the Genesee Atari Group in Flint, Michigan concerning a reported
|
||
|
incidence of blocking calls from access to Curt Kyhl's Stock
|
||
|
Exchange Bulletin Board System in Waterloo, Iowa by Teleconnect,
|
||
|
a long distance carrier. Mr. Cross, who also operates a
|
||
|
bulletin board system (bbs), attaches information indicating
|
||
|
that Teleconnect blocked callers from access via its network to
|
||
|
Mr. Kyhl's BBS number in an effort to prevent unauthorized use
|
||
|
of its customers' long distance calling authorization codes by
|
||
|
computer "hackers". Mr. Cross is concerned that this type of
|
||
|
blocking may be occurring in Michigan and that such practice
|
||
|
could easily spread nationwide, thereby preventing access to
|
||
|
BBSs by legitimate computer users.
|
||
|
|
||
|
On November 7, 1988, the Informal Complaints Branch of the
|
||
|
Common Carrier Bureau directed Teleconnect to investigate Mr.
|
||
|
Cross' concerns and report the results of its investigation to
|
||
|
this Commission. Enclosed, for your information, is a copy of
|
||
|
Teleconnect's December 7, 1988 report and its response to a
|
||
|
similar complaint filed with this Commission by Mr. James
|
||
|
Schmickley. In accordance with the commission's rules, the
|
||
|
carrier should have forwarded a copy of its December 7, 1988
|
||
|
report to Mr. Cross at the same time this report was filed with
|
||
|
the Commission. I apologize for the delay in reporting the
|
||
|
results of our investigation to your office.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect's report states that it is subject to fraudulent use
|
||
|
of its network by individuals who use BBSs in order to
|
||
|
unlawfully obtain personal authorization codes of consumers.
|
||
|
Teleconnect also states that computer "hackers" employ a series
|
||
|
of calling patterns to access a carrier's network in order to
|
||
|
steal long distance services. The report further states that
|
||
|
Teleconnect monitors calling patterns on a 24 hour basis in an
|
||
|
effort to control, and eliminate when possible, code abuse. As
|
||
|
a result of this monitoring, Teleconnect advises that its
|
||
|
internal security staff detected repeated attempts to access the
|
||
|
BBS numbers in question using multiple seven-digit access codes
|
||
|
of legitimate Teleconnect customers. These calling patterns,
|
||
|
according to Teleconnect, clearly indicated that theft of
|
||
|
telecommunications services was occurring.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The report states that Teleconnect makes a decision to block
|
||
|
calls when the estimated loss of revenue reaches at least $500.
|
||
|
Teleconnect notes that blocking is only initiated when signs of
|
||
|
"hacking" and other unauthorized usage are present, when local
|
||
|
calls are attempted over its long distance network or when a
|
||
|
customer or other carrier has requested blocking of a certain
|
||
|
number. Teleconnect maintains that blocking is in compliance
|
||
|
with the provisions of Section A.20.a.04 of Teleconnect's Tariff
|
||
|
F.C.C. No. #3 which provides that service may be refused or
|
||
|
disconnected without prior notice by Teleconnect for fraudulent
|
||
|
unauthorized use. The report also states that Teleconnect
|
||
|
customers whose authorizations codes have been fraudulently used
|
||
|
are immediately notified of such unauthorized use and are issued
|
||
|
new access codes. Teleconnect further states that while an
|
||
|
investigation is pending, customers are given instructions on
|
||
|
how to utilize an alternative carrier's network by using "10XXX"
|
||
|
carrier codes to access interstate or intrastate communications
|
||
|
until blocking can be safely lifted.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect maintains that although its tariff does not require
|
||
|
prior notice to the number targeted to be blocked, it does, in
|
||
|
the case of a BBS, attempt to identify and contact the Systems
|
||
|
Operator (SysOp), since the SysOp will often be able to assist
|
||
|
in the apprehension of an unauthorized user. The report states
|
||
|
that with regard to Mr. Kyle's Iowa BBS, Teleconnect was unable
|
||
|
to identify Mr. Kyle as the owner of the targeted number because
|
||
|
the number was unlisted and Mr. Kyhl's local carrier was not
|
||
|
authorized to and did not release any information to Teleconnect
|
||
|
by which identification could be made. The report also states
|
||
|
that Teleconnect attempted to directly access the BBS to
|
||
|
determine the identity of the owner but was unable to do so
|
||
|
because its software was incompatible with the BBS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect states that its actions are not discriminatory to
|
||
|
BBSs and states that it currently provides access to literally
|
||
|
hundreds of BBSs around the country. The report also states
|
||
|
that Teleconnect's policy to block when unauthorized use is
|
||
|
detected is employed whether or not such use involves a BBS.
|
||
|
Teleconnect advises that when an investigation is concluded or
|
||
|
when a complaint is received concerning the blocking, the
|
||
|
blocking will be lifted, as in the case of the Iowa BBS.
|
||
|
However, Teleconnect notes that blocking will be reinstated if
|
||
|
illegal "hacking" recurs.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect advises that it currently has no ongoing
|
||
|
investigations within the State of Michigan and therefore, is
|
||
|
not presently blocking any BBSs in Michigan. However,
|
||
|
Teleconnect states that it is honoring the request of other
|
||
|
carriers and customers to block access to certain numbers.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Branch has reviewed the file on this case. In accordance
|
||
|
with the Commission's rules for informal complaints it appears
|
||
|
that the carrier's report is responsive to our Notice.
|
||
|
Therefore, the Branch, on its own motion, is not prepared to
|
||
|
recommend that the Commission take further action regarding this
|
||
|
matter. --------
|
||
|
|
||
|
This letter leaves me with a ton of questions. First, lets be
|
||
|
fair to Teleconnect. Long distance carriers are being robbed of
|
||
|
hundreds of thousands of dollars annually by "hackers" and must
|
||
|
do something to prevent it. However, call blocking is NOT going
|
||
|
to stop it. The "hacker" still has access to the carrier
|
||
|
network and will simply start calling other numbers until that
|
||
|
number, too, is blocked, then go on to the next. The answer is
|
||
|
to identify the "hacker" and put him out of business.
|
||
|
Teleconnect is taking a cheap, quick fix approach that does
|
||
|
nothing to solve the problem, and hurts the phone users as a
|
||
|
whole.
|
||
|
|
||
|
They claim that their customers are able to use other networks
|
||
|
to complete their calls if the number is being blocked. What if
|
||
|
other networks decide to use Teleconnect's approach? You would
|
||
|
be forced to not only keep an index of those numbers you call,
|
||
|
but also the long distance carrier that will let you call it!
|
||
|
Maybe everyone will block that number, then what will you do?
|
||
|
What if AT&T decided to block calls? Do they have this right
|
||
|
too?
|
||
|
|
||
|
And how do you find out if the number is being blocked? In the
|
||
|
case of Mr. Kyhl's BBS, callers were given a recording that
|
||
|
stated the number was not in service. It made NO mention that
|
||
|
the call was blocked, and the caller would assume the service
|
||
|
was disconnect. While trying to investigate why his calls were
|
||
|
not going through, Mr. James Schmickley placed several calls to
|
||
|
Teleconnect before they finally admitted the calls were being
|
||
|
blocked! Only after repeated calls to Teleconnect was the
|
||
|
blocking lifted. It should also be noted that Mr. Kyhl's bbs is
|
||
|
not a pirate bbs, and has been listed in a major computer
|
||
|
magazine as one of the best bbs's in the country.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As mentioned before, MBT will work with the long distance
|
||
|
carriers to find these "hackers". I assume that the other local
|
||
|
carriers would do the same. I do not understand why Teleconnect
|
||
|
could not get help in obtaining Mr. Kyhl's address. It is true
|
||
|
the phone company will not give out this information, but WILL
|
||
|
contact the customer to inform him that someone needs to contact
|
||
|
him about possible fraud involving his phone line. If this
|
||
|
policy is not being used, maybe the FCC should look into it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Call blocking is not restricted to BBSs, according to
|
||
|
Teleconnect. They will block any number that reaches a $500
|
||
|
fraud loss. Lets say you ran a computer mail order business and
|
||
|
didn't want to invest in a WATTS line. Why should an honest
|
||
|
businessman be penalized because someone else is breaking the
|
||
|
law? It could cost him far more the $500 from loss of sales
|
||
|
because of Teleconnect's blocking policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Teleconnect also claims that "they are honoring the request of
|
||
|
other carriers and customers to block access to certain
|
||
|
numbers". Again, MBT also has these rules. But they pertain to
|
||
|
blocking numbers to "certain numbers" such as dial-a-porn
|
||
|
services, and many 900- numbers. What customer would ever
|
||
|
request that Teleconnect block incoming calls to his phone?
|
||
|
|
||
|
And it is an insult to my intelligence for Teleconnect to claim
|
||
|
they could not log on to Mr. Kyhl's BBS. Do they mean to say
|
||
|
that with hundreds of thousands of dollars in computer
|
||
|
equipment, well trained technicians, and easy access to phone
|
||
|
lines, that they can't log on to a simple IBM bbs? Meanwhile,
|
||
|
here I sit with a $50 Atari 800xl and $30 Atari modem and I have
|
||
|
no problem at all accessing Mr. Kyhl's bbs! What's worse, the
|
||
|
FCC (the agency in charge of regulating data transmission
|
||
|
equipment), bought this line too! Incredible!!!
|
||
|
|
||
|
And finally, I must admit I don't have the faintest idea what
|
||
|
Section A.20.a.04 of Teleconnect's Tariff F.C.C. No. 3 states,
|
||
|
Walk into your local library and ask for this information and
|
||
|
you get a blank look from the librarian. I know, I tried!
|
||
|
However, MBT also has similar rules in their tariffs.
|
||
|
Teleconnect claims that the F.C.C. tariff claims that "service
|
||
|
may be refused or disconnected without prior notice by
|
||
|
Teleconnect for fraudulent, unauthorized use". This rule, as
|
||
|
applied to MBT, pertains ONLY to the subscriber. If an MBT
|
||
|
customer were caught illegally using their phone system then MBT
|
||
|
has the right to disconnect their service. If a Teleconnect
|
||
|
user wishes to call a blocked number, and does so legally, how
|
||
|
can Teleconnect refuse use to give them service? This appears
|
||
|
to violate the very same tarriff they claim gives them the right
|
||
|
to block calls!
|
||
|
|
||
|
I have a few simple answers to these questions. I plan, once
|
||
|
again, to send out letters to the appropriate agencies and
|
||
|
government representatives, but I doubt they will go anywhere
|
||
|
without a mass letter writing campaign from all of you. First,
|
||
|
order that long distance companies may not block calls without
|
||
|
the consent of the customer being blocked. Every chance should
|
||
|
be given to him to assist in identifying the "hacker", and he
|
||
|
should not be penalized for other people's crimes. There should
|
||
|
also be an agency designated to handle appeals if call blocking
|
||
|
is set up on their line. Currently, there is no agency, public
|
||
|
service commission, or government office (except the FCC) that
|
||
|
you can complain to, and from my experience trying to get
|
||
|
information on call blocking I seriously doubt that they will
|
||
|
assist the customer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Next, order the local phone carriers to fully assist and give
|
||
|
information to the long distance companies that will help
|
||
|
identify illegal users of their systems. Finally, order the
|
||
|
Secret Service to investigate illegal use of long distance
|
||
|
access codes in the same manner that they investigate credit
|
||
|
card theft. These two crimes go hand in hand. Stiff fines and
|
||
|
penalties should be made mandatory for those caught stealing
|
||
|
long distance services.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If you would like further information, or just want to discuss
|
||
|
this, I am available on Genie (G.Cross) and CompuServe
|
||
|
(75046,267). Also, you can reach me on my bbs (FACTS,
|
||
|
313-736-4544). Only with your help can we put a stop to call
|
||
|
blocking before it gets too far out of hand.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 8: VIRUSES *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
There has been a lot of concern about viruses, even though
|
||
|
they still seem to be relatively rare. Forewarned is forearmed,
|
||
|
as they say, and we've come across a pretty useful anti-virus
|
||
|
newsletter called VIRUS-L that gives info on all the latest
|
||
|
bugs, vaccines, and general gossip. It's called VIRUS-L, and
|
||
|
we've found it helpful, so we've extracted some of the best
|
||
|
of the stuff and passed it along. Thanks to FLINT (of the
|
||
|
UNDERGROUND) and CHRIS ROBIN for pulling some of the stuff
|
||
|
together.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
* * *
|
||
|
VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
|
||
|
virus issues; comp.virus is a non-digested Usenet counterpart.
|
||
|
Discussions are not limited to any one hardware/software platform -
|
||
|
diversity is welcomed. Contributions should be relevant, concise,
|
||
|
polite, etc., and sent to VIRUS-L@IBM1.CC.LEHIGH.EDU. Information on
|
||
|
accessing anti-virus, document, and back-issue archives is distributed
|
||
|
periodically on the list. Administrative mail (comments, suggestions,
|
||
|
and so forth) should be sent to me at: krvw@SEI.CMU.EDU.
|
||
|
- Ken van Wyk
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Wed, 06 Sep 89 11:54:00 -0400
|
||
|
From: Peter W. Day <OSPWD%EMUVM1.BITNET@IBM1.CC.Lehigh.Edu>
|
||
|
Subject: Re: Appleshare and viruses
|
||
|
|
||
|
>Date: 04 Sep 89 01:18:53 +0000
|
||
|
>From: gilbertd@silver.bacs.indiana.edu (Don Gilbert)
|
||
|
>Subject: Appleshare and viruses ?
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
>What are the conditions under which current Mac viruses can
|
||
|
>infect files on Appleshare volumes?
|
||
|
|
||
|
I have not attempted to infect any files with a virus, whether on an
|
||
|
AppleShare volume or otherwise, but based on what I know about
|
||
|
Macintosh, AppleShare and viruses, here is what I think is true.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A Mac virus can infect a file only if it can write to the file, no matter
|
||
|
where the file is located. A micro cannot access an AppleShare volume
|
||
|
directly: it must ask the server to access the AppleShare volume on its
|
||
|
behalf. As a result, the server can enforce access privileges.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Access privileges apply only to FOLDERS. For the benefit of other
|
||
|
readers, the privileges are See Files, See folders and Make Changes.
|
||
|
They apply individually to the owner, a group, and everyone.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I experimented writing directly to files and folders on an AppleShare
|
||
|
volume using Microsoft Word, typing the explicit file path in a
|
||
|
Save As... dialog box. For a file to be changeable, the volume and
|
||
|
folders in the file path must have See Folders privilege, and the final
|
||
|
folder must have See Files and Make Changes privilege. The virus would
|
||
|
probably need to search for files to infect, and would only find files
|
||
|
along paths with See Folders privs for the volume and folders in the
|
||
|
path, and See Files in the final folder.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Macintoshes used with shared files are subject to trojans, and the trojan
|
||
|
could be infected with a virus. Consider the following scenario: A user
|
||
|
has a private folder on a volume shared with others using (say)
|
||
|
AppleShare. The volume has a folder containing a shared application
|
||
|
named, say, Prog1, and the folder has everyone See Files and
|
||
|
See Folders but not Make Changes (i.e. it is read-only). The user makes
|
||
|
a private copy of Prog1, and later runs a virus-infected program locally
|
||
|
while the shared volume is mounted, and the copy of Prog1 becomes
|
||
|
infected. The user now makes his AppleShare folder sharable (See Files,
|
||
|
See Folders) to everyone (so that someone can copy a file he has,
|
||
|
say). Another user double-clicks on a document created by Prog1,
|
||
|
and the Mac Finder happens to find the infected copy of Prog1 before
|
||
|
finding the other copy. As a result, the second user's files become
|
||
|
infected.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thus I recommend that private folders be readable only by the owner as a
|
||
|
matter of policy. Allowing everyone Make Changes creates drop folders
|
||
|
so that users can exchange files. Drop Folders are safe enough in that
|
||
|
AppleShare does not allow you to overwrite a file when you only have
|
||
|
Make Changes priv. However, users should be told to run a virus check
|
||
|
on any files that others drop in their folders.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 04 Sep 89 16:41:39 +0000
|
||
|
From: jwright@atanasoff.cs.iastate.edu (Jim Wright)
|
||
|
Subject: New Amiga virus ?
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
This was recently posted to comp.sys.amiga...
|
||
|
|
||
|
In article <716@mathrt0.math.chalmers.se> d8forma@dtek.chalmers.se (Martin Fors
|
||
|
sen) writes:
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| Last night a friend called me, since he suspected he had a virus.
|
||
|
| I gladly grabbed my copy of VirusX (3.20) and drove over, but VirusX
|
||
|
| reported no virus. However I saw the text from the virus myself, and
|
||
|
| a closer look at the diskette showed that the file c/addbuffers had grown,
|
||
|
| furthermore a file with a blank name had appeared in devs.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| The main symptom of this virus is that every fourth time you reboots the tex
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| A Computer virus is a disease
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| Terrorism is a transgession
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| Software piracy is a crime
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| this is the cure
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| BGS9 Bundesgrensschutz sektion 9
|
||
|
| sonderkommando "EDV"
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| On this disk the virus had replaced the file c/addbuffers, the size of this
|
||
|
| new file was 2608 bytes. The above text is encoded in the program, but the
|
||
|
| graphics.library :-) The orginal addbuffers command was stored in a "blank"
|
||
|
| file in the devs directory.
|
||
|
| The addbuffers command was the second in the startup sequence on this disk.
|
||
|
| I think the virus looks in the startup-sequence for somthing (probably
|
||
|
| files to infect), since I found the string sys:s/startup-sequence coded
|
||
|
| in the virus.
|
||
|
| I don't know if this virus does any damage, but the person first infected
|
||
|
| hasn't noticed anything.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| The questions I now ask me is:
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| Is this a known virus?
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| and if the answer is no,
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| What is Steve Tibbets mail adress?
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| MaF
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
| Chalmers |USENET:d8forma@dtek.chalmers.se | " Of course I'm not lost,
|
||
|
| University |SNAIL: Martin Forssen | I just haven't pinpointed
|
||
|
| of | Marielundsgatan 9 | exactly where we are at the
|
||
|
| Technology |SWEDEN 431 67 Molndal | moment " (David Eddings)
|
||
|
|
||
|
- --
|
||
|
Jim Wright
|
||
|
jwright@atanasoff.cs.iastate.edu
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Fri, 01 Sep 00 11:51:00 -0400
|
||
|
From: Bob Babcock <PEPRBV%CFAAMP.BITNET@IBM1.CC.Lehigh.Edu>
|
||
|
Subject: Re: Is this a virus? (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
>When I copy some
|
||
|
>files to a floppy but I misput a write protected diskette, I find the
|
||
|
>error massage "retry, ...". At this time, if I answer "r" to the
|
||
|
>massage and puting a non-protected diskette, then the FAT and
|
||
|
>DIRECTORY of the protected diskette is transfered to the second non
|
||
|
>protected diskette(and the files that I copied to). Is this a DOS's
|
||
|
>bug or a virus?
|
||
|
|
||
|
This is a known behavior of MS-DOS. The directory and FAT have
|
||
|
already been read before the write protect error is sensed, and
|
||
|
when you say retry, DOS doesn't know that you have changed disks,
|
||
|
so it doesn't reread the directory info.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Fri, 01 Sep 89 16:55:59 -0500
|
||
|
From: Joe Simpson <JS05STAF@MIAMIU.BITNET>
|
||
|
Subject: Re: is this a virus? (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
In response to the question about the FAT from a locked disk being
|
||
|
written to another disk this is a feature of MS-DOS, not a virus.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Another chilling scenario conserns running an application such as a
|
||
|
word processor, opening a document, exchangeing data diskettes, and
|
||
|
saving a "backup" of the file. This often hoses the "backup" disk and
|
||
|
sometines affects the origional file.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 01 Sep 89 15:41:00 -0400
|
||
|
From: "Damon Kelley; (RJE)" <damon@umbc2.umbc.edu>
|
||
|
Subject: Kim's question concerning FATs (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
In response to Kim:
|
||
|
I'm no expert at MS-DOS or software-stuff, but I've been poking
|
||
|
around in my computer's memory long enough to believe that what you
|
||
|
are describing may be normal with MS-DOS. Often I see that within
|
||
|
memory, data stays in its assigned spot until something moves or
|
||
|
writes over it. I notice this effect with a certain software
|
||
|
word-processing/graphing/spreadsheet package I have. Sometimes when I
|
||
|
am retreiving data with my package, I place a data disk first before
|
||
|
putting in the main program disk. The program needs to do something
|
||
|
with the disk with the main program first, so the package asks for the
|
||
|
main program disk. Whe the directory pops up for the main program
|
||
|
disk, it shows a conglomeration of the files on the curent disk PLUS
|
||
|
the files that were on the removed data disk and some random garbage.
|
||
|
Nothing grave has happened to my files with this package (It came with
|
||
|
my computer. It wasn't PD/Shareware, either.), so I feel that this
|
||
|
may be either a DOS bug (not writing over completely the FAT) or
|
||
|
something normal. Of course, I've never really had an opportunity to
|
||
|
look at the directory track on any disks, so I can't confirm that this
|
||
|
is absolutely true. I can find out. Has anyone out there found mixed
|
||
|
FATs affecting the performance of their disks?
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 89 14:41:53 -0000
|
||
|
From: LBA002%PRIME-A.TEES-POLY.AC.UK@IBM1.CC.Lehigh.Edu
|
||
|
Subject: nVIR A and nVIR B explained (Mac)
|
||
|
|
||
|
I spotted this in the August issue of Apple2000 (a UK Mac user
|
||
|
group magazine.) It first appeared on the Infomac network and the
|
||
|
author is John Norstad of Academic Computing & Network Services,
|
||
|
Northwestern University (hope it's OK with you to reproduce this
|
||
|
John?) It may be old-hast to all the virus experts but I found it
|
||
|
interesting & informative.
|
||
|
|
||
|
nVIR A & B
|
||
|
|
||
|
There has been some confusion over exactly what the nVIR A & nVIRB
|
||
|
viruses actually do. In fact, I don't believe the details have
|
||
|
ever been published. I just finished spending a few days
|
||
|
researching the two nVIR viruses. This report presents my
|
||
|
findings. As with all viruses, nVIR A & B replicate. When you
|
||
|
run an infected application on a clean system the infection
|
||
|
spreads from the application to the system file. After rebooting
|
||
|
the infection in turn spreads from the system to other
|
||
|
applications, as they are run. At first nVIR A & B only
|
||
|
replicate. When the system file is first infected a counter is
|
||
|
initialized to 1000. The counter is decremented by 1 each time
|
||
|
the system is booted, and it is decremented by 2 each time an
|
||
|
infected application is run. When the counter reaches 0 nVIR A
|
||
|
will sometimes either say "Don't Panic" (if MacinTalk is
|
||
|
installed in the system folder) or beep (if MacinTalk is not
|
||
|
installed in the system folder.) This will happen on a system
|
||
|
boot with a probability of 1/16. It will also happen when an
|
||
|
infected application is launched with a probability of 31/256. In
|
||
|
addition when an infected application is launched nVIR A may say
|
||
|
"Don't Panic" twice or beep twice with a probability of 1/256.
|
||
|
When the counter reaches 0 nVIR B will sometimes beep. nVIR B
|
||
|
does not call MacinTalk. The beep will happen on a system boot
|
||
|
with a probability of 1/8. A single beep will happen when an
|
||
|
infected application is launched with a probability of 15/64. A
|
||
|
double beep will happen when an application is launched with a
|
||
|
probability of 1/64. I've discovered that it is possible for
|
||
|
nVIRA and nVIRB to mate and sexually reproduce, resulting in new
|
||
|
viruses combining parts of their parents. For example if a
|
||
|
system is infected with nVIRA and if an application infected with
|
||
|
nVIRB is tun on that system, part of the nVIRB infection is
|
||
|
replaced by part of the nVIRA infection from the system. The
|
||
|
resulting offspring contains parts from each of its parents, and
|
||
|
behaves like nVIRA. Similarly if a system is infected with nVIRB
|
||
|
and if an application infected with nVIRA is run on that system,
|
||
|
part of the nVIRA infection in the application is replaced by
|
||
|
part of the nVIRB infection from the system. The resulting
|
||
|
offspring is very similar to its sibling described in the
|
||
|
previous paragraph except that it has the opposite "sex" - each
|
||
|
part is from the opposite parent. it behaves like nVIRB. These
|
||
|
offspring are new viruses. if they are taken to a clean system
|
||
|
they will infect that system, which will in turn infect other
|
||
|
applications. The descendents are identical to the original
|
||
|
offspring. I've also investigated some of the possibly incestual
|
||
|
matings of these two kinds of children with each other and with
|
||
|
their parents. Again the result is infections that contain
|
||
|
various combinations of parts from their parents.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Hot stuff!)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Rgds,
|
||
|
|
||
|
Iain Noble
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Tue, 29 Aug 89 16:05:44 +0300
|
||
|
From: Y. Radai <RADAI1@HBUNOS.BITNET>
|
||
|
Subject: PC virus list; Swap virus; Israeli virus; Disassemblies
|
||
|
|
||
|
For several reasons, one of which is very irregular receipt of
|
||
|
VIRUS-L, I've been out of touch with it for several weeks now. So
|
||
|
please forgive me if some of the postings referred to below are a few
|
||
|
weeks old.
|
||
|
|
||
|
PC Virus List
|
||
|
-------------
|
||
|
Lan Nguyen asks whether a list of PC viruses, incl. date first dis-
|
||
|
covered and source(s), exists. I will soon be submitting to VIRUS-L a
|
||
|
considerably updated version of the list I first posted on May 16.
|
||
|
Meanwhile, Lan, I'm sending you my list as it currently stands (29
|
||
|
viruses, 70 strains).
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Swap Virus
|
||
|
--------------
|
||
|
Yuval Tal writes:
|
||
|
>I don't think that it is so important how we call the virus. I've
|
||
|
>decided to call it the swap virus becuase the message "The Swapping-
|
||
|
>Virus...' appears in it! ....... I think that calling it "The
|
||
|
>Dropping Letter Virus" will be just fine.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Well, "The Dropping Letter Virus" would be a poor choice since (as I
|
||
|
mentioned in an earlier posting) this also describes the Cascade and
|
||
|
Traceback viruses.
|
||
|
Yuval has explained that he originally called it the Swap virus
|
||
|
because it writes the following string into bytes B7-E4 of track 39,
|
||
|
sector 7 (if sectors 6 and 7 are empty):
|
||
|
The Swapping-Virus. (C) June, 1989 by the CIA
|
||
|
However, he has not publicly explained how the words SWAP VIRUS FAT12
|
||
|
got into the boot sector of some of the diskettes infected by this
|
||
|
virus, so let me fill in the details. As David Chess and John McAfee
|
||
|
both pointed out quite correctly, these words are not part of the
|
||
|
virus. What happened was that Yuval wrote a volume label SWAP VIRUS
|
||
|
onto each infected diskette for identification. Had his system been
|
||
|
DOS 3 the label would have been written only into the root directory.
|
||
|
But since he was apparently using DOS 4, it was also written into
|
||
|
bytes 2Bh-35h of the boot sector. (That still leaves the string FAT12
|
||
|
in bytes 36h-3Ah to be explained. Under DOS4, the field 36h-3Dh is
|
||
|
supposed to be "reserved". Anyone got any comments on that?) So
|
||
|
although I didn't know at the time that the words SWAP VIRUS came from
|
||
|
Yuval, it seems that my (and his original) suggestion to call it the
|
||
|
Swap virus is still the best choice.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Israeli/Friday-13/Jerusalem Virus
|
||
|
-------------------------------------
|
||
|
In response to a query from Andrew Berman, David Rehbein gave a
|
||
|
quite accurate description of the virus, except for one small point:
|
||
|
>(It will infect and replicate itself in ANY executible, no matter
|
||
|
>the extension..check especially .OVL and .SYS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
To the best of my knowledge, no strain of this virus (or, for that
|
||
|
matter, of any other virus that I know of) infects overlay or SYS
|
||
|
files.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Andrew Berman writes concerning this virus:
|
||
|
> She think's
|
||
|
>she's cleaned it out by copying only the source codes to new disks,
|
||
|
>zapping the hard drives, and recompiling everything on the clean hard
|
||
|
>disks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It's a pity that so many people try to eradicate the virus by such
|
||
|
difficult means when (as has been mentioned on this list and else-
|
||
|
where) there is a file named UNVIR6.ARC on SIMTEL20 (in <MSDOS.TROJAN-
|
||
|
PRO>) containing a program called UNVIRUS which will easily eradicate
|
||
|
this virus and 5-6 others as well, plus a program IMMUNE to prevent
|
||
|
further infection.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Disassembling of Viruses
|
||
|
------------------------
|
||
|
In response to a posting by Alan Roberts, David Chess replied:
|
||
|
|
||
|
>I think it's probably a Good Thing if at least two or three people do
|
||
|
>independant disassemblies of each virus, just to make it less likely
|
||
|
>that something subtle will be missed. I know my disassemblies (except
|
||
|
>the ones I've spent lots of time on) always contain sections marked
|
||
|
>with vaguenesses like "Does something subtle with the EXE file header
|
||
|
>here". .... I probably tend to lean towards "the more the merrier"!
|
||
|
|
||
|
I can appreciate David's point. However, I would like to point out
|
||
|
that the quality of (commented) disassemblies differs greatly from one
|
||
|
person to another. As Joe Hirst of the British Computer Virus Re-
|
||
|
search Centre writes (V2 #174):
|
||
|
>Our aim will be to produce disassemblies which cannot be improved upon.
|
||
|
|
||
|
And this isn't merely an aim. In my opinion, his disassemblies are an
|
||
|
order of magnitude better than any others I've seen. He figures out
|
||
|
and comments on the purpose of *every* instruction, and vagueness or
|
||
|
doubt in his comments is extremely rare.
|
||
|
What I'm suggesting is this: If you have the desire, ability, time
|
||
|
and patience to disassemble a virus yourself, then have fun. But
|
||
|
unless you're sure it's a brand new virus, you may be wasting your
|
||
|
time from the point of view of practical value to the virus-busting
|
||
|
community. And even if you are sure that it's a new virus, take into
|
||
|
account that there are pros like Joe who can probably do the job much
|
||
|
better than you.
|
||
|
So what about David's point that any given disassembler may miss
|
||
|
something subtle? Well, I'm not saying that Joe Hirst should be the
|
||
|
*only* person to disassemble viruses. Even he is only human, so there
|
||
|
should be one or two other good disassemblers to do the job indepen-
|
||
|
dently. But no more than 1 or 2; I can't accept David's position of
|
||
|
"the more the merrier".
|
||
|
Btw, disassemblers don't always get the full picture. Take, for
|
||
|
example, the Merritt-Alameda-Yale virus, of which I have seen three
|
||
|
disassemblies. They all mentioned that the POP CS instruction is
|
||
|
invalid on 286 machines, yet none of them mentioned the important fact
|
||
|
that when such a machine hangs the virus has already installed itself
|
||
|
in high RAM and hooked the keyboard interrupt, so that the infection
|
||
|
can spread if a warm boot is then performed! That fact seems to have
|
||
|
been noticed only by ordinary humans.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Y. Radai
|
||
|
Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 89 08:36:01 -0700
|
||
|
From: portal!cup.portal.com!Alan_J_Roberts@Sun.COM
|
||
|
Subject: V-REMOVE (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The HomeBase group is releasing a new disinfector program that is
|
||
|
able to remove all known viruses, repair all infected COM files, repair most
|
||
|
infected EXE files, replace infected partition tables and boot sectors, and
|
||
|
generally make life easier for people with infected IBM PCs. Our previous
|
||
|
practice of releasing one disinfector program per virus has given us a
|
||
|
terrific maintenance headache, and so V-REMOVE (which does them all) is our
|
||
|
next step on the path. What we need now are beta testers with Large virus
|
||
|
libraries. Interested parties please contact John McAfee or Colin Haynes at
|
||
|
408 727 4559.
|
||
|
Alan
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 25 Aug 89 22:42:33 +0000
|
||
|
From: trebor@biar.UUCP (Robert J Woodhead)
|
||
|
Subject: Re: Locking Macintosh disks
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
DANIEL%NCSUVM.BITNET@IBM1.CC.Lehigh.Edu (Daniel Carr) writes:
|
||
|
|
||
|
>i bet this question has been asked before, so please excuse me, but
|
||
|
>is it possible for a virus to infect a locked macintosh disk?
|
||
|
|
||
|
If the diskette is hardware locked (ie: the little slide is slid so
|
||
|
that you can see a hole) then the hardware won't write onto that
|
||
|
disk, so if you stick it into an infected machine it won't get
|
||
|
infected. If, on the other hand, files on an unlocked disk are
|
||
|
locked in _software_, they may be fair game to a persnickety virus.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Fri, 25 Aug 89 07:45:00 -0400
|
||
|
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.ARPA
|
||
|
Subject: (Hardware) Destructive Virus (Story)
|
||
|
|
||
|
>Does anyone on the list have some information about an alleged virus
|
||
|
>that caused monitors on either older PCs, Ataris, or Amigas (I forgot which
|
||
|
>platform....
|
||
|
|
||
|
The story is apocryphal. Roots are as follows:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. Anything a computer can be programmed to do, a virus can do. Thus,
|
||
|
if a computer can be programmed for behavior that will damage the
|
||
|
hardware, then it can be destroyed by a virus.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. Early IBM PC Monochrome Adapter had a flaw under which a certain set
|
||
|
of instructions could interfere with the normal sweep circuit operation,
|
||
|
causing camage to the monitor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. Based upon this combination of facts, there has been speculation
|
||
|
about the possibility of a virus exploiting this, or similar, flaws.
|
||
|
Much of it has been in this list.
|
||
|
|
||
|
To my knowledge, no such virus has ever been detected. The number of
|
||
|
such PCs is vanishingly small but larger than the ones that such a virus
|
||
|
might find. Those that exist are so old that a monitor failure would be
|
||
|
attributed to old age. A virus would likely go unnoticed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Of course, it is a little silly to build a computer such that it can be
|
||
|
programmed to perform hardware damaging behavior. Such damage is likely
|
||
|
to occur by error. That is how the flaw in the IBM's was discovered.
|
||
|
|
||
|
William Hugh Murray, Fellow, Information System Security, Ernst & Young
|
||
|
2000 National City Center Cleveland, Ohio 44114
|
||
|
21 Locust Avenue, Suite 2D, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Fri, 25 Aug 89 08:19:02 -0400
|
||
|
From: dmg@lid.mitre.org (David Gursky)
|
||
|
Subject: Infecting applications on locked Mac disks...
|
||
|
|
||
|
No. If the write-protect mechanism is working properly, any software operation
|
||
|
will be unable to change the contents of the disk. If the write-protect
|
||
|
mechanism is somehow faulty, all bets are off. Note: The write-protect
|
||
|
mechanism on Mac disks is done in hardware.
|
||
|
|
||
|
David Gursky
|
||
|
Member of the Technical Staff, W-143
|
||
|
Special Projects Department
|
||
|
The MITRE Corporation
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 89 17:05:47 -0700
|
||
|
From: Steve Clancy <SLCLANCY@UCI.BITNET>
|
||
|
Subject: vaccine source (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
I would like to offer our bulletin board system once again to the
|
||
|
readers of Virus-L as a source of VIRUSCAN and other
|
||
|
"vaccine/scanner" programs that are occasionally mentioned here.
|
||
|
I attempt to keep up with the most recent versions I can locate
|
||
|
of the various programs, and usually also have the current
|
||
|
version of the Dirty Dozen trojan horse/list.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Wellspring RBBS is located in the Biomedical Library of the
|
||
|
University of California, Irvine (U.S.A). Numbers and settings
|
||
|
are as follows:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Line # 1 - (714) 856-7996 300-9600 (HST) N81 - 24 hours
|
||
|
Line # 2 - (714) 856-5087 300-1200 baud N81 - Evenings & Weekends
|
||
|
|
||
|
Callers from Virus-L should use the following passwords to allow
|
||
|
immediate access to downloading of files:
|
||
|
|
||
|
First name Last name Password
|
||
|
---------- --------- --------
|
||
|
VL1 BITNET BIT1
|
||
|
|
||
|
VL2 BITNET BIT2
|
||
|
|
||
|
All files are located in the VIR files directory. The system
|
||
|
uses standard RBBS commands.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I attempt to get my files from the original source whenever possible.
|
||
|
|
||
|
% Steve Clancy, Biomedical Library % WELLSPRING RBBS %
|
||
|
% University of California, Irvine % 714-856-7996 300-9600 24hrs%
|
||
|
% P.O. Box 19556 % 714-856-5087 300-1200 %
|
||
|
% Irvine, CA 92713 U.S.A. % %
|
||
|
% SLCLANCY@UCI % "Are we having fun yet?" %
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 89 13:45:10 -0700
|
||
|
From: fu@unix.sri.com (Christina Fu)
|
||
|
Subject: Antidotes for the DATACRIME family (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Recently, I have had a chance to investigate the 1280, 1168 and
|
||
|
DATACRIME II viruses, and found some interesting differences between
|
||
|
the first two versions and DATACRIME II. As a result, I have
|
||
|
developed an antidote for both 1280 and 1168, and an antidote for the
|
||
|
DATACRIME II. Among the differences between these viruses, the most
|
||
|
significant one for developing antidotes is that the DATACRIME II
|
||
|
virus generates a mutually exclusive signature set than the other two.
|
||
|
Because of the said difference, the antidote for the 1280 and 1168
|
||
|
becomes a de-antidote for the DATACRIME II, and vice versa. Which
|
||
|
means, if a file is infected with either 1280 or 1168, it is still
|
||
|
vulnerable of contracting DATACRIME II, and vice versa (this situation
|
||
|
does not exist between 1280 and 1168, however). If we view these
|
||
|
viruses as two different strains, then these antidotes make more
|
||
|
sense, otherwise, they can be useless.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Another interesting thing is that the DATACRIME II purposely
|
||
|
avoids infecting files with a "b" as the second character in the name
|
||
|
(such as IBMBIO.COM and IBMDOS.COM), while the other two avoids to
|
||
|
infect files with a "d" as the seventh character in the name (such as
|
||
|
COMMAND.COM), and aside from that, the DATACRIME II virus can also
|
||
|
infect EXE files, unlike the other two.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I am looking into providing them to the public free of charge (I
|
||
|
do not claim responsibility or ask for donation). Any interested
|
||
|
archive sites please let me know.
|
||
|
|
||
|
By the way, I need a sample disclaimer for programs distributed in
|
||
|
this manner.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 89 13:36:00 -0400
|
||
|
From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.ARPA
|
||
|
Subject: Hygeine Questions
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
>1) Is the possibility of virus infection limited to executable
|
||
|
> programs (.com or .exe extensions)? Or can an operating system be
|
||
|
> infected from reading a document file or graphic image?
|
||
|
|
||
|
While a virus must succeed in getting itself executed, there are a
|
||
|
number of solutions to this problem besides infecting .exe and .com.
|
||
|
While it will always be sufficient for a virus to dupe the user, the
|
||
|
most successful ones are relying upon bootstrap programs and loaders
|
||
|
to get control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>2) Are there generic "symptoms" to watch for which would indicate a
|
||
|
virus?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any unusual behavior may signal the presence of a virus. Of course
|
||
|
most such unusual behavior is simply an indication of user error.
|
||
|
Since there is not much satisfaction to writing a virus if no one
|
||
|
notices, most are not very subtle. However, the mandatory behavior
|
||
|
for a successful virus is to write to shared media, e.g., floppy,
|
||
|
diskette, network, or server. (While it may be useful to the virus or
|
||
|
disruptive to the victim to write to a dedicated hard disk, this is
|
||
|
not sufficient for the success of the virus.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
>3) Any suggestions on guidelines for handling system archiving
|
||
|
> procedures so that an infected system can be "cleaned up"?
|
||
|
|
||
|
WRITE PROTECT all media. Preserve vendor media indefinitely. Never
|
||
|
use the backup taken on one system on any other. Be patient when
|
||
|
recovering; be careful not to reinfect. (Computer viruses are
|
||
|
persistent on media.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Quarantine systems manifesting strange behavior. Never try to
|
||
|
reproduce symptoms on a second machine. Never share media
|
||
|
gratuitously. (Note that most PC viruses are traveling on shared
|
||
|
MEDIA rather than on shared PROGRAMS.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
____________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
William Hugh Murray 216-861-5000
|
||
|
Fellow, 203-966-4769
|
||
|
Information System Security 203-964-7348 (CELLULAR)
|
||
|
ARPA: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER
|
||
|
Ernst & Young MCI-Mail: 315-8580
|
||
|
2000 National City Center TELEX: 6503158580
|
||
|
Cleveland, Ohio 44114 FAX: 203-966-8612
|
||
|
Compu-Serve: 75126,1722
|
||
|
INET: WH.MURRAY/EWINET.USA
|
||
|
21 Locust Avenue, Suite 2D DASnet: [DCM1WM]WMURRAY
|
||
|
New Canaan, Connecticut 06840 PRODIGY: DXBM57A
|
||
|
- --------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Fri, 18 Aug 89 19:07:11 -0500
|
||
|
From: Christoph Fischer <RY15%DKAUNI11.BITNET@IBM1.CC.Lehigh.Edu>
|
||
|
Subject: NEW VIRUS DICOVERED AND DISASSEMBLED
|
||
|
|
||
|
We just finished to disassemble a new virus, it was sent to us by the
|
||
|
university of Cologne. We haven't found any clue that this virus showed
|
||
|
up before.
|
||
|
Here are the facts we found:
|
||
|
0. It works on PC/MS-DOS ver. 2.0 or higher
|
||
|
1. It infects COM files increasing them by 1206 to 1221 bytes
|
||
|
(placing the viruscode on a pragraph start)
|
||
|
2. It infects EXE files in two passes: After the first pass the EXE
|
||
|
file is 132 bytes longer; after the second pass its size increased
|
||
|
by an aditional 1206 to 1221 bytes (see 1.)
|
||
|
3. The virus installs a TSR in memory wich will infect executable
|
||
|
files upon loading them (INT 21 subfunction 4B00) using 8208 bytes
|
||
|
of memory
|
||
|
4. The only "function" we found, was an audible alarm(BELL character)
|
||
|
whenever another file was successfully infected.
|
||
|
5. It infects COM files that are bigger than 04B6h bytes and smaller
|
||
|
than F593h bytes and start with a JMP (E9h)
|
||
|
6. It infects EXE files if they are smaller than FDB3 bytes (no
|
||
|
lower limit)
|
||
|
7. It opens a file named "VACSINA. " without checking the return
|
||
|
value. At the end it closes this file without ever touching it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The facts 4 and 7 make us belive it is a "Beta-Test" virus that might
|
||
|
have escaped prematurely by accident.
|
||
|
The word VACSINA is really odd beause of its spelling. All languages I
|
||
|
checked (12) spell it VACC... only Norwegians write VAKSINE. Has anybod
|
||
|
an idea?
|
||
|
We produced an desinfectant and a guardian.
|
||
|
The PC room at Cologne (28 PCs) was also infected by DOS62 (Vienna)|
|
||
|
We call the virus VACSINA because of the unique filename it uses|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Chris & Tobi & Rainer
|
||
|
*****************************************************************
|
||
|
* TORSTEN BOERSTLER AND CHRISTOPH FISCHER AND RAINER STOBER *
|
||
|
* Micro-BIT Virus Team / University of Karlsruhe / West-Germany *
|
||
|
* D-7500 Karlsruhe 1, Zirkel 2, Tel.: (0)721-608-4041 or 2067 *
|
||
|
* E-Mail: RY15 at DKAUNI11.BITNET or RY12 at DKAUNI11.BITNET *
|
||
|
*****************************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 89 11:46:06 -0400
|
||
|
From: "Computer Emergency Response Team" <cert@SEI.CMU.EDU>
|
||
|
Subject: CERT Internet Security Advisory
|
||
|
|
||
|
Many computers connected to the Internet have recently experienced
|
||
|
unauthorized system activity. Investigation shows that the activity
|
||
|
has occurred for several months and is spreading. Several UNIX
|
||
|
computers have had their "telnet" programs illicitly replaced with
|
||
|
versions of "telnet" which log outgoing login sessions (including
|
||
|
usernames and passwords to remote systems). It appears that access
|
||
|
has been gained to many of the machines which have appeared in some of
|
||
|
these session logs. (As a first step, frequent telnet users should
|
||
|
change their passwords immediately.) While there is no cause for
|
||
|
panic, there are a number of things that system administrators can do
|
||
|
to detect whether the security on their machines has been compromised
|
||
|
using this approach and to tighten security on their systems where
|
||
|
necessary. At a minimum, all UNIX site administrators should do the
|
||
|
following:
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Test telnet for unauthorized changes by using the UNIX "strings"
|
||
|
command to search for path/filenames of possible log files. Affected
|
||
|
sites have noticed that their telnet programs were logging information
|
||
|
in user accounts under directory names such as "..." and ".mail".
|
||
|
|
||
|
In general, we suggest that site administrators be attentive to
|
||
|
configuration management issues. These include the following:
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Test authenticity of critical programs - Any program with access to
|
||
|
the network (e.g., the TCP/IP suite) or with access to usernames and
|
||
|
passwords should be periodically tested for unauthorized changes.
|
||
|
Such a test can be done by comparing checksums of on-line copies of
|
||
|
these programs to checksums of original copies. (Checksums can be
|
||
|
calculated with the UNIX "sum" command.) Alternatively, these
|
||
|
programs can be periodically reloaded from original tapes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Privileged programs - Programs that grant privileges to users (e.g.,
|
||
|
setuid root programs/shells in UNIX) can be exploited to gain
|
||
|
unrestricted access to systems. System administrators should watch
|
||
|
for such programs being placed in places such as /tmp and /usr/tmp (on
|
||
|
UNIX systems). A common malicious practice is to place a setuid shell
|
||
|
(sh or csh) in the /tmp directory, thus creating a "back door" whereby
|
||
|
any user can gain privileged system access.
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Monitor system logs - System access logs should be periodically
|
||
|
scanned (e.g., via UNIX "last" command) for suspicious or unlikely
|
||
|
system activity.
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Terminal servers - Terminal servers with unrestricted network access
|
||
|
(that is, terminal servers which allow users to connect to and from
|
||
|
any system on the Internet) are frequently used to camouflage network
|
||
|
connections, making it difficult to track unauthorized activity.
|
||
|
Most popular terminal servers can be configured to restrict network
|
||
|
access to and from local hosts.
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Passwords - Guest accounts and accounts with trivial passwords
|
||
|
(e.g., username=password, password=none) are common targets. System
|
||
|
administrators should make sure that all accounts are password
|
||
|
protected and encourage users to use acceptable passwords as well as
|
||
|
to change their passwords periodically, as a general practice. For
|
||
|
more information on passwords, see Federal Information Processing
|
||
|
Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 112, available from the National
|
||
|
Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce,
|
||
|
Springfield, VA 22161.
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Anonymous file transfer - Unrestricted file transfer access to a
|
||
|
system can be exploited to obtain sensitive files such as the UNIX
|
||
|
/etc/passwd file. If used, TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol -
|
||
|
which requires no username/password authentication) should always be
|
||
|
configured to run as a non-privileged user and "chroot" to a file
|
||
|
structure where the remote user cannot transfer the system /etc/passwd
|
||
|
file. Anonymous FTP, too, should not allow the remote user to access
|
||
|
this file, or any other critical system file. Configuring these
|
||
|
facilities to "chroot" limits file access to a localized directory
|
||
|
structure.
|
||
|
|
||
|
o Apply fixes - Many of the old "holes" in UNIX have been closed.
|
||
|
Check with your vendor and install all of the latest fixes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If system administrators do discover any unauthorized system activity,
|
||
|
they are urged to contact the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 89 20:36:50 +0300
|
||
|
From: "Yuval Tal (972)-8-474592" <NYYUVAL@WEIZMANN.BITNET>
|
||
|
Subject: Swapping Virus (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
+------------------------------------------------------+
|
||
|
| The "Swapping" virus |
|
||
|
+------------------------------------------------------+
|
||
|
| |
|
||
|
| Disassembled on: August, 1989 |
|
||
|
| |
|
||
|
| Disassembled by: Yuval Tal |
|
||
|
| |
|
||
|
| Disassembled using: ASMGEN and DEBUG |
|
||
|
| |
|
||
|
+------------------------------------------------------+
|
||
|
|
||
|
Important note: If you find *ANYTHING* that you think I wrote
|
||
|
incorrectly or is-understood something, please let me know ASAP.
|
||
|
You can reach me:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Bitnet: NYYUVAL@WEIZMANN
|
||
|
InterNet: NYYUVAL%WEIZMANN.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
|
||
|
|
||
|
This text is divided into theree parts:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1) A report about the Swap Virus.
|
||
|
2) A disassembly of the Swap Virus.
|
||
|
3) How to install this virus?
|
||
|
|
||
|
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
-
|
||
|
R E P O R T
|
||
|
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
-
|
||
|
|
||
|
Virus Name..............: The Swap Virus
|
||
|
Attacks.................: Floppy-disks only
|
||
|
Virus Detection when....: June, 1989
|
||
|
at......: Israel
|
||
|
Length of virus.........: 1. The virus itself is 740 bytes.
|
||
|
2. 2048 bytes in RAM.
|
||
|
Operating system(s).....: PC/MS DOS version 2.0 or later
|
||
|
Identifications.........: A) Boot-sector:
|
||
|
1) Bytes from $16A in the boot sector are:
|
||
|
31 C0 CD 13 B8 02 02 B9 06 27 BA 00 01 CD 13
|
||
|
9A 00 01 00 20 E9 XX XX
|
||
|
2) The first three bytes in the boot sector are:
|
||
|
JMP 0196 (This is, if the boot sector was
|
||
|
loaded to CS:0).
|
||
|
B) FAT: Track 39 sectors 6-7 are marked as bad.
|
||
|
C) The message:
|
||
|
"The Swapping-Virus. (C) June, by the CIA"
|
||
|
is located in bytes 02B5-02E4 on track 39,
|
||
|
sector 7.
|
||
|
Type of infection.......: Stays in RAM, hooks int $8 and int $13.
|
||
|
A diskette is infected when it is inserted into the
|
||
|
drive and ANY command that reads or writes from/to
|
||
|
the diskette is executed. Hard disks are NOT infected
|
||
|
!
|
||
|
Infection trigger.......: The virus starts to work after 10 minutes.
|
||
|
Interrupt hooked........: $8 (Timer-Tick - Responsible for the letter dropping)
|
||
|
$13 (Disk Drive - Infects!)
|
||
|
Damage..................: Track 39 sectors 6-7 will be marked as bad in the
|
||
|
FAT.
|
||
|
Damage trigger..........: The damage is done whenever a diskette is infected.
|
||
|
Particularities.........: A diskette will be infected only if track 39 sectors
|
||
|
6-7 are empty.
|
||
|
|
||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||
|
| BitNet: NYYUVL@WEIZMANN CSNet: NYYUVAL@WEIZMANN.BITNET |
|
||
|
| InterNet: NYYUVAL%WEIZMANN.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU |
|
||
|
| |
|
||
|
| Yuval Tal |
|
||
|
| The Weizmann Institute Of Science "To be of not to be" -- Hamlet |
|
||
|
| Rehovot, Israel "Oo-bee-oo-bee-oo" -- Sinatra |
|
||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Mon, 14 Aug 89 10:18:16 +0100
|
||
|
From: J.Holley@MASSEY.AC.NZ
|
||
|
Subject: Marijuana Virus wreaks havoc in Australian Defence Department (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
[Ed. This is from RISKS...]
|
||
|
|
||
|
Quoted from The Dominion, Monday August 14 :
|
||
|
|
||
|
A computer virus call marijuana has wreaked havoc in the Australian
|
||
|
Defence Department and New Zealand is getting the blame.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Data in a sensitive security area in Canberra was destroyed and when
|
||
|
officers tried to use their terminals a message appeared : "Your PC is
|
||
|
stoned - Legalise marijuana".
|
||
|
|
||
|
Viruses are [guff on viruses] The New Zealand spawned marijunana has
|
||
|
managed to spread itself widely throughout the region.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Its presence in Australia has been known for the past two months. The
|
||
|
problem was highlighted two weeks ago when a Mellbourne man was
|
||
|
charged with computer trespass and attempted criminal damage for
|
||
|
allegedly loading it into a computer at the Swinbourne Institute of
|
||
|
Technology.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The virus invaded the Defence Department earlier this month - hitting
|
||
|
a security division repsonsible for the prevention of computer viruses.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A director in the information systems division, Geoff Walker said an
|
||
|
investigation was under way and the infection was possibly an
|
||
|
embarrassing accident arising from virus prevention activities.
|
||
|
|
||
|
New personal computers installed in the section gobbled data from
|
||
|
their hard disk, then disabled them.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Initially it was believed the virus was intoduced by a subcontractor
|
||
|
installing the new computer system but that possibility has been ruled out.
|
||
|
|
||
|
One more outlandish theory suggested New Zealnd, piqued at its
|
||
|
exclusion from Kangaroo 89 military exercises under way in northern
|
||
|
Australia, was showing its ability to infiltrate the Canberra citadel.
|
||
|
|
||
|
New Zealand was not invited to take part in Kangaroo because of United
|
||
|
States' policy of not taking part in exercises with New Zealand forces
|
||
|
since Labour's antinuclear legislation. However, New Zealand observers
|
||
|
were invited.
|
||
|
|
||
|
New Zealand Defence Department spokesmand Lieutenant Colonel Peter Fry
|
||
|
categorically denied the claim. "It would be totally irresponsible to
|
||
|
do this kind of thing."
|
||
|
|
||
|
In fact, New Zealand's Defence Department already had problems with
|
||
|
the virus, he said.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Mon, 14 Aug 89 18:12:37 -0700
|
||
|
From: portal!cup.portal.com!Alan_J_Roberts@Sun.COM
|
||
|
Subject: Posting VIRUSCAN (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
In yesterday's Virus-L, Jim Wright stated:
|
||
|
>(Posting VIRUSCAN to comp.binaries)... is not a good idea. Since it is
|
||
|
>frequently updated it would be long out of date by the time it got through
|
||
|
>c.b.i.p.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I'd like to point out that, while ViruScan is indeed updated as
|
||
|
soon as a new virus is discovered, even the first version of ViruScan
|
||
|
is still statistically current. We need to differentiate between the
|
||
|
NUMBER of viruse out there and the statistical PROBABILITY of
|
||
|
infection from any given virus. Viruses are not created on one day
|
||
|
and the next become major infection problems. It take many months,
|
||
|
and in some cases - years, before a given virus becomes a
|
||
|
statistically valid threat to the average computer user. A case in
|
||
|
point is the Jerusalem virus. It's nearly 2 years old and was first
|
||
|
reported in the States (other than by a researcher) in February of
|
||
|
1988. In August of '88 the reported infection rate was 3 infections
|
||
|
per week. In July of '89, the rate was over 30 reports per day.
|
||
|
Today the Jerusalem virus is a valid threat. Another more current
|
||
|
case is the Icelandic virus. It's over 2 months old and we've had no
|
||
|
reported infections in the U.S.
|
||
|
Given even the limited information we have about virus
|
||
|
epidemiology, any product that can identify 99% of the infection
|
||
|
ocurrences today, will be able to identify close to the same
|
||
|
percentage 5 to 6 months from now, irrespective of the number of new
|
||
|
viruses created in the interim. For those that insist on the 100%
|
||
|
figure, I suggest you bite the bullet and download the current version
|
||
|
of ViruScan from HomeBase every month.
|
||
|
|
||
|
P.S. Some people have suggested that the CVIA statistics are
|
||
|
inaccurate or incomplete. The numbers come from a reporting network
|
||
|
composed of member companies. These companies include such
|
||
|
multinationals as Fujitsu, Phillips N.A., Amdahl, Arthur Anderson and
|
||
|
Co., the Japan Trade Center, Weyerhauser, Amex Assurance and others
|
||
|
whose combined PC base, either internal or through client
|
||
|
responsibility, totals over 2 million computers. It is highly
|
||
|
unlikely that a major virus problem could exist and not be reported by
|
||
|
one or another of these agencies.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Sun, 13 Aug 89 09:48:20 -0700
|
||
|
From: portal!cup.portal.com!Charles_M_Preston@Sun.COM
|
||
|
Subject: Viruscan test (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
For the past couple weeks I have been testing the latest
|
||
|
versions of John McAfee's virus scanning program, Viruscan,
|
||
|
downloaded as SCANV29.ARC, SCANV33.ARC, etc., and very briefly
|
||
|
the resident version archived as SCANRES4.ARC.
|
||
|
|
||
|
While I have not completed the testing protocol with each
|
||
|
virus, perhaps an interim report will be of interest.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The testing protocol is:
|
||
|
1. Scan a disk containing a copy of a virus in some form;
|
||
|
2. Have the virus infect at least one other program (for
|
||
|
.COM and .EXE infectors) or disk (for boot infectors)
|
||
|
so Viruscan must locate the virus signature as it would
|
||
|
normally be found in an infected machine;
|
||
|
3. Modify the virus in the most common ways people change
|
||
|
them (cosmetic changes to ASCII text messages or small
|
||
|
modifications to the code and try Viruscan again.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Step 2 arises from testing another PC anti-virus product
|
||
|
which was supposed to scan for viruses. When I found that it
|
||
|
would not detect a particular boot virus on an infected floppy,
|
||
|
I asked the software vendor about it. I was told that it would
|
||
|
detect a .COM program which would produce an infected disk - not
|
||
|
useful to most people with infected disks, the common way this
|
||
|
virus is seen Even though the viruses tested are not technically
|
||
|
self-mutating, my intent is to test Viruscan against later
|
||
|
generation infections, as they would be found in a normal
|
||
|
computing environment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Naturally, there is a problem knowing which virus is actually
|
||
|
being found, since they go under different names and are
|
||
|
frequently modified. The viruses are currently identified by
|
||
|
their length, method of infection, symptoms of activity or
|
||
|
trigger, and any imbedded text strings, based on virus
|
||
|
descriptions from a variety of sources. These include Computers &
|
||
|
Security journal, and articles which have been on Virus-L, such
|
||
|
as Jim Goodwin's descriptions modified by Dave Ferbrache, and
|
||
|
reports by Joe Hirst from the British Computer Virus Research
|
||
|
Centre.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is a proposal for checksumming of viruses in the June
|
||
|
Computers & Security, which would allow confirmation that a found
|
||
|
virus is the identical one already disassembled and described by
|
||
|
someone. In the meantime, identification has been made as
|
||
|
mentioned.
|
||
|
|
||
|
So far, Viruscan has detected the following viruses:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Boot infectors - Brain, Alameda/Yale, Ping-Pong, Den Zuk,
|
||
|
Stoned, Israeli virus that causes characters to fall down
|
||
|
the screen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
.COM or .EXE infectors - Jerusalem -several versions
|
||
|
including sURIV variants, 1701-1704-several versions,
|
||
|
Lehigh, 1168, 1280, DOS62-Vienna, Saratoga, Icelandic,
|
||
|
Icelandic 2, April First, and Fu Manchu.
|
||
|
|
||
|
SCANV33 has a byte string to check for the 405.com virus, but
|
||
|
does not detect it. SCANV34 has been modified to allow proper
|
||
|
detection.
|
||
|
|
||
|
SCANRES 0.7V34, the resident version of Viruscan, correctly
|
||
|
detects the 405 virus when an infected program is run.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I have not had any false positives on other commercial or
|
||
|
shareware programs that have been scanned. Viruscan appears to
|
||
|
check for viruses only in reasonable locations for those
|
||
|
particular strains. If there is a virus that infects only .COM
|
||
|
files, and an infected file has a .VOM or other extension, it
|
||
|
will not be reported. Of course, it is not immediately
|
||
|
executable, either.
|
||
|
|
||
|
On the other side of the coin, if a disk has been infected by
|
||
|
a boot infector, and still has a modified boot record, it will be
|
||
|
reported by Viruscan. This is true even if the rest of the virus
|
||
|
code normally hidden in other sectors has been destroyed, thus
|
||
|
making the disk non-bootable and non infectious. This is a
|
||
|
desirable warning, however, since the boot record is not
|
||
|
original, and since other disks may be still infected.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Disclaimer: I am a computer security consultant and have been
|
||
|
working with PC and Macintosh microcomputer viruses and anti-
|
||
|
virus products for about 18 months. I have no obligation to John
|
||
|
McAfee except to report the outcome of the tests. I am a member
|
||
|
of the Computer Virus Industry Association, which is operated by
|
||
|
John McAfee.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Charles M. Preston 907-344-5164
|
||
|
Information Integrity MCI Mail 214-1369
|
||
|
Box 240027 BIX cpreston
|
||
|
Anchorage, AK 99524 cpreston@cup.portal.com
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 01 Aug 89 21:18:49 +0000
|
||
|
From: kelly@uts.amdahl.com (Kelly Goen)
|
||
|
Subject: Re: "Computer Condom" (from Risks digest)...
|
||
|
|
||
|
hahahahahahahahah!!!!!!! right chief just like swamp land in them thar
|
||
|
everglades... seriously though things will not improve until vendors
|
||
|
start going for protected mode and other tricks...I am talking about
|
||
|
386's and 68030's here... maybe something could be done in this area
|
||
|
with charge cars on a 286 but I doubt it... your need that virtual
|
||
|
8086 partition on the 386 to have any real safety and have to be
|
||
|
operating protected mode to take advantage of it(DESQVIEW 386,
|
||
|
THD386.sys etc) after that then there are still so many ways to get
|
||
|
in!!
|
||
|
cheers
|
||
|
kelly
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Thu, 03 Aug 89 12:15:52 -0500
|
||
|
From: kichler@ksuvax1.cis.ksu.edu (Charles Kichler)
|
||
|
Subject: New FTP source for anti-virals (PC) - Internet access required
|
||
|
|
||
|
The following files dealing with computer viruses are now available by
|
||
|
anonymous ftp (file transfer protocol) from 'hotel.cis.ksu.edu' [Ed.
|
||
|
IP number is 129.130.10.12] located in Computer Science Dept. at
|
||
|
Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS. The files have been and will
|
||
|
be collected in the future from reliable sources, although no warranty
|
||
|
is implied or stated. I will attempt to update the files as often as
|
||
|
possible. If anyone becomes aware of new updates or new anti-viral
|
||
|
programs, let me know. All files are in the /ftp/pub/Virus-L
|
||
|
sub-directory.
|
||
|
|
||
|
/ DETECT2.ARC.1 GREENBRG.ARC.1 VACCINE.ARC.1
|
||
|
./ DIRTYDZ9.ARC.1 IBMPAPER.ARC.1 VACCINEA.ARC.1
|
||
|
00-Index.doc DPROT102.ARC.1 IBMPROT.DOC.1 VACI13.ARC.1
|
||
|
ALERT13U.ARC.1 DPROTECT.ARC.1 INOCULAT.ARC.1 VCHECK11.ARC.1
|
||
|
BOMBCHEK.ARC.1 DPROTECT.CRC.1 MD40.ARC.1 VDETECT.ARC.1
|
||
|
BOMBSQAD.ARC.1 DVIR1701.EXE.1 NOVIRUS.ARC.1 VIRUS.ARC.1
|
||
|
CAWARE.ARC.1 EARLY.ARC.1 PROVECRC.ARC.1 VIRUSCK.ARC.1
|
||
|
CHECK-OS.ARC.1 EPW.ARC.1 READ.ME.FIRST VIRUSGRD.ARC.1
|
||
|
CHK4BOMB.ARC.1 F-PROT.ARC.1 SCANV30.ARC.1 pk36.exe
|
||
|
CHKLHARC.ARC.1 FILE-CRC.ARC.2 SENTRY02.ARC.1 pk361.exe
|
||
|
CHKSUM.ARC.1 FILECRC.ARC.2 SYSCHK1.ARC.1 uu213.arc
|
||
|
CHKUP36.ARC.1 FILETEST.ARC.1 TRAPDISK.ARC.1
|
||
|
CONDOM.ARC.1 FIND1701.ARC.1 TROJ2.ARC.1
|
||
|
DELOUSE1.ARC.1 FSP_16.ARC.1 UNVIR6.ARC.1
|
||
|
|
||
|
The current list only includes programs for MS/PC-DOS computers. I will
|
||
|
continue to expand the collection to include some worthwhile textual
|
||
|
documents and possible programs for other machines and operating systems.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The procedure is to first ftp to the hotel.cis.ksu.edu. [Ed. type:
|
||
|
ftp hotel.cis.ksu.edu (or ftp 129.130.10.12). Enter "anonymous"
|
||
|
(without the quotes) as a username and "your id" as a password.] Then
|
||
|
use 'cd pub/Virus-L'. Next get the files you would like. You will
|
||
|
need the 'pk361.exe' to expand the ARChived programs. Be sure to
|
||
|
place ftp in a binary or tenex mode [Ed. type "bin" at ftp> prompt].
|
||
|
Please note that the highly recommended VirusScan program
|
||
|
(SCANV30.ARC.1) is available.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If there are any questions, send mail to me and I will make every effort
|
||
|
to help you as soon as time allows.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 89 12:33:15 -0400
|
||
|
From: Barry D. Hassler <hassler@nap1.arpa>
|
||
|
Subject: Re: "Computer Condom" (from Risks digest)...
|
||
|
|
||
|
In article <0003.8907311200.AA25265@ge.sei.cmu.edu> dmg@lid.mitre.org (David Gu
|
||
|
rsky) writes:
|
||
|
>[From the Seattle Weekly, 5/3/89]
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
>PUT A CONDOM ON YOUR COMPUTER
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
>...
|
||
|
>Cummings, the company's president, says the system "stops all viruses" by
|
||
|
>monitoring the user network, the keyboard, and the program in use. He notes
|
||
|
>that the system is programmable to alter the parameters of its control on
|
||
|
>any given machine, but he guarantees that, "when programmed to your
|
||
|
>requirements, it will not allow viruses to enter."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Pardon me for my opinions (and lack of expertise in viral control), but I
|
||
|
think these types of products are dangerous to the purchaser, while most
|
||
|
likely being especially profitable for the seller. I just saw a copy of
|
||
|
this floating around to some senior management-types after being forwarded
|
||
|
several times, and dug up this copy to bounce my two cents off.
|
||
|
|
||
|
First of all, I don't see any method which can be guaranteed to protect
|
||
|
against all viruses (of course the "when programmed to your requirements"
|
||
|
pretty well covers all bases, doesn't it?). Naturally, specific viruses or
|
||
|
methods of attach can be covered with various types of watchdog
|
||
|
software/hardware, but I don't think it is possible to cover all the
|
||
|
avenues in any way.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- -----
|
||
|
Barry D. Hassler hassler@asd.wpafb.af.mil
|
||
|
System Software Analyst (513) 427-6369
|
||
|
Control Data Corporation
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 89 16:37:00 -0400
|
||
|
From: IA96000 <IA96@PACE.BITNET>
|
||
|
Subject: axe by sea (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
we have been testing various ways to help prevent a file from
|
||
|
becoming infected and have stunbled on an interesting fact.
|
||
|
|
||
|
system enhancement associates (the people who wrote arc) have also
|
||
|
released axe, a program compression utility. basically axe reads
|
||
|
a .exe or .com file, compresses it as much as possible, tacks a
|
||
|
dos loader on the front of the file and then saves the new file.
|
||
|
|
||
|
in many instances, the resulting file is from 15% to 50% smaller
|
||
|
than the original file and loads and runs just like a regular dos
|
||
|
file.
|
||
|
|
||
|
what is interesting is when a virus attacks an axe'd file. the virus
|
||
|
writes itself into the file as many viruses do. however, when you
|
||
|
next attempt to load and run the file, it will not load and locks
|
||
|
up the system. this is not because the viruys has taken control!
|
||
|
|
||
|
this happens because when an axed file is loaded, it is decompressed and
|
||
|
the checksum is compared to the original one generated when the file
|
||
|
was axed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I know axe was never designed to be anti-viral, but it sure works well
|
||
|
in this regard. since the file is actually in encrypted form on the
|
||
|
disk, it screws up the virus!
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 01 Aug 89 00:00:00 +0000
|
||
|
From: David M. Chess <CHESS@YKTVMV.BITNET>
|
||
|
Subject: Fixed-disk infectors (PC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Does anyone know of, or has anyone even heard credible rumors of,
|
||
|
any boot-sector virus that will infect the boot sector (master or
|
||
|
partition) of IBM-PC-type hard disks, besides the Bouncing Ball and
|
||
|
the Stoned? Those are the only two I seem to see that do that; am
|
||
|
I missing any? DC
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 01 Aug 89 21:23:30 +0000
|
||
|
From: kelly@uts.amdahl.com (Kelly Goen)
|
||
|
Subject: Re: message virus (was: Computer Virus Research)
|
||
|
|
||
|
we call those ansi 3.64 control sequences.... vt100 and other
|
||
|
terminals have similar if not exactly the same features... ansi.sys
|
||
|
implements a subset of ansi 3.64 without any protection the problem
|
||
|
has been known at various unix sites for years only now its starting
|
||
|
to show up on pc's because of the usage of ansi.sys and other programs
|
||
|
that recognize these sequences....
|
||
|
cheers
|
||
|
kelly
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 30 Jul 89 17:17:17 +0000
|
||
|
From: hutto@attctc.Dallas.TX.US (Jon Hutto)
|
||
|
Subject: message virus (was: Computer Virus Research)
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
redevined keys so as to when the sysop is in dos and hits a key, it starts
|
||
|
deleting files and directories. The worst thing about this is that people
|
||
|
have been able to do this for a long time. they are explained in the DOS
|
||
|
Technical Reference manual.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There are also rumors of a ZMODEM virus that spreads visa ZMODEM transfers,
|
||
|
a rumor.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 89 15:59:43 -0700
|
||
|
From: portal!cup.portal.com!Alan_J_Roberts@Sun.COM
|
||
|
Subject: Jerusalem Disinfector
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mark Zinzow asked if there were a public domain program that would restore
|
||
|
programs infected with the Jerusalem virus to their original, uninfected
|
||
|
condition. John McAfee's M-series programs have just been made shareware
|
||
|
(M-1 removes the Jerusalem from COM and EXE files and restores them), and the
|
||
|
programs are available on HomeBase - 408 988 4004.
|
||
|
Alan
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 89 23:18:17 -0400
|
||
|
From: dmg@lid.mitre.org (David Gursky)
|
||
|
Subject: "Computer Condom" (from Risks digest)...
|
||
|
|
||
|
[From the Seattle Weekly, 5/3/89]
|
||
|
|
||
|
PUT A CONDOM ON YOUR COMPUTER
|
||
|
|
||
|
Every worry that your computer might be hanging out in a network where it
|
||
|
will pick up some disgusting virus? Empirical Research Systems of Tacoma
|
||
|
suggests you supply it with one of their "computer condoms". This high-tech
|
||
|
prophylactic is a combination of hardware and software embodied in a
|
||
|
controller card that simply replaces the one already in the machine. Rick
|
||
|
Cummings, the company's president, says the system "stops all viruses" by
|
||
|
monitoring the user network, the keyboard, and the program in use. He notes
|
||
|
that the system is programmable to alter the parameters of its control on
|
||
|
any given machine, but he guarantees that, "when programmed to your
|
||
|
requirements, it will not allow viruses to enter."
|
||
|
|
||
|
The technology was developed through successful efforts to protect a group of
|
||
|
European banks from the massive virus that penetrated European computer
|
||
|
networks last autumn. "Naturally these became our first orders," Cummings
|
||
|
says. He has since picked up an additional 2500 firm orders in Europe, with
|
||
|
5000 more contingent on inspection of the product. In the United States, the
|
||
|
product has been reviewed by Boeing Computer Services and computer technicians
|
||
|
at the UW. It will be on the domestic market "early next autumn at a cost of
|
||
|
under $1000," Cummings says.
|
||
|
|
||
|
DG -- Pardon me while I laugh uncontrollably.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
In our computerviruslab we have been working on the problem of mutants
|
||
|
of several viruses. Initially we intended to make antiviruspackages more
|
||
|
secure. Since a single byte added or removed from the virus code will
|
||
|
cause most antiviruspackages to do erroneous repair attempts which might
|
||
|
result in even bigger harm than the virus itself will do. Furthermore
|
||
|
watertight identification leads to a better 'Epidemiology' of the
|
||
|
different virusstrains.
|
||
|
Thanks to the kind help of fellow virus researchers all over the world
|
||
|
we were able to obtain and tryout quite a few viruses and their mutants.
|
||
|
|
||
|
PROPOSAL
|
||
|
VIRUS IDENTIFICATION ALGORITHM
|
||
|
|
||
|
PURPOSE: Positive and secure identification of *known* viruses to
|
||
|
prevent repair attempts on files infected by unknown
|
||
|
mutants of a virus.
|
||
|
|
||
|
REPLACES: Identification by a unique string of code. (Which might
|
||
|
still be unaltered at the same offset in the code of a
|
||
|
new variant of the virus)
|
||
|
|
||
|
METHOD: 1. Identification of the *known* virusstrain by a unique
|
||
|
string or other feature (sUMsDos, (C)Brain, or the 1Fh
|
||
|
in the seconds of the filetime)
|
||
|
2. Relocation to segmentoffset 0 and possible decryption
|
||
|
of the viruscode. (This might be necessary for mutiple
|
||
|
parts of the virus)
|
||
|
3. Writing zero over sections that contain variant parts
|
||
|
like garbage from the last infection attempt or a time-
|
||
|
bomb counter.
|
||
|
4. Finally a CRC-sum is generated (maybe using more than
|
||
|
one polynominal)
|
||
|
|
||
|
If this signature matches the one calculated on the virus
|
||
|
code for which the removalalgorithm was designed it is
|
||
|
safe to apply this antivirusprogram.
|
||
|
|
||
|
IMPLEMENTATION: We have done a testimplementation in C and for 2
|
||
|
virusstrains (6 viruses yet). Our goal is to prepare a
|
||
|
toolset for quick addition of new variants to the set
|
||
|
identifyable viruses.
|
||
|
|
||
|
ADVANTAGE: Antivirus tools can identify exactly a specific virus
|
||
|
without encorporating full or partial viruscode in the
|
||
|
antivirusprogram. (This would be a security risk if done
|
||
|
in comercial or PD software)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any comments sugestions welcome respond to VIRUS-L or directly
|
||
|
we will summarize to the list|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Currently we are also working on virus behavior in networks. For this
|
||
|
we have setup a 4 machine Novell network. (PS2/80, PS2/60, Atari386,
|
||
|
and a good old PC-XT). Here also any sugestions and help are welcome|
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************************
|
||
|
* Christoph Fischer and Torsten Boerstler *
|
||
|
* Micro-BIT Virus Center / University of Karlsruhe / West-Germany *
|
||
|
* D-7500 Karlsruhe 1, Zirkel 2, Tel.: (0)721-608-4041 or 2067 *
|
||
|
* E-Mail: RY15 at DKAUNI11.BITNET or RY12 at DKAUNI11.BITNET *
|
||
|
*******************************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
* PHILE 9: AT THE BOARDS: REVIEW AND APPLE LIST *
|
||
|
*******************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
<<<<< REVIEW: ATLANTIS (215-464-4770) >>>>>
|
||
|
(By "Roger." "Gene" is on vacation 'til next issue)
|
||
|
|
||
|
ATLANTIS, in Pennsylvania, is one of the best anarchist boards
|
||
|
around. Its gphiles aren't as good as those of some of the top
|
||
|
boards, like RIPCO and some others, but it's still ranking up
|
||
|
there as a pretty cool national board. Its users are from all
|
||
|
over the country, so you get a good mix. It was running apple
|
||
|
last time we checked, but is usually busy, so you have to be
|
||
|
patient.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The chat runs from lame highschool kid stuff like "why I hate
|
||
|
algebra" to fairly sophisticated technical stuff. Deepdiver tries
|
||
|
to keep stuff organized and under control, and does a decent job.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The warez aren't all that hot, but if you're patient and hang
|
||
|
around, you might be able to pull down some interesting goods.
|
||
|
The text philes are its strength. There's all kinds of goodies on
|
||
|
pyro-technics, and other junk that most of us learned in 11th
|
||
|
grade chemistry that some idiots still like to mess around with.
|
||
|
We don't go for all this rah-rah razzle dazzle silly shit, 'cause
|
||
|
it's too dangerous. A couple of high schoolers blew themselves up
|
||
|
a while back, and it was claimed that they got the idea for it
|
||
|
from these kinds of anarchists boards, and there was some
|
||
|
pressure in some places around the country to crack down on some
|
||
|
of it, but not with a lot of success.
|
||
|
|
||
|
So, if you're looking for a decent board, this one gets a "THUMBS
|
||
|
UP" from gene and roger, but thumbs down for any lamer who tries
|
||
|
anything fancy by trying to be a closet rambo demolitions pro.
|
||
|
They only take applications on the first five days of each month,
|
||
|
tho, so you might not get on right away.
|
||
|
|
||
|
>--------=====END=====--------<
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here's some apple boards passed on to us. Thanks to the gang
|
||
|
at HILL OF TARA (815-727-4020) who collected them. Most are
|
||
|
apparently still up, and some are elite. Have fun!
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-------------------------------------
|
||
|
Hill of Tara (815) 727-4020
|
||
|
Dark Castle (815) 729-0188
|
||
|
MISTY MT. (205) 979-8409
|
||
|
BASSLOPE (317) 353-9638
|
||
|
The ROCK (IBM) (307) 362-8299
|
||
|
Night Shade (815) 439-1264
|
||
|
Sherwood Forest (815) 436-5610
|
||
|
Havoc House (319) 364-8574
|
||
|
ALCATRAZ (815) 722-6710
|
||
|
X.A. System (815) 756-9567
|
||
|
Revelations BBS (815) 727-3398
|
||
|
The Petri Dish (815) 725-9399
|
||
|
The Dungeon (815) 942-4438
|
||
|
DATA III (901) 424-6787
|
||
|
Off the Wall (319) 354-7959
|
||
|
Remote Control <Tke> (815) 942-8228
|
||
|
The Silver Tongue (312) 759-1916
|
||
|
Pro Carolina (803) 776-3936
|
||
|
Killer BBS (818) 967-0781
|
||
|
WHIZ (815) 467-2167
|
||
|
Sethanon Elite (313) 661-9359
|
||
|
The Informant (907) 479-7215
|
||
|
The Keep (704) 864-4592
|
||
|
TEAM.EFFORT (715) 423-6454
|
||
|
The Revelations (604) 929-1615
|
||
|
LORD OF THE EVIL DOMINIO (815) 723-2522
|
||
|
The Tower of Palanthas (805) 255-0214
|
||
|
The Phone Co. BBS (901) 767-1801
|
||
|
QuestHaven BBS (815) 544-3648
|
||
|
SYCAMORE ELITE (815) 895-5573
|
||
|
Atom's Apple (815) 942-6755
|
||
|
THE bandit's Castle (815) 758-5040
|
||
|
New Beginnings (617) 648-5874
|
||
|
|
||
|
Caddy Shack................(201) 920-2353 1200 PC SYS
|
||
|
The Magic Bag..............(201) 988-9489 1200 PC SYS
|
||
|
ProDOS News................(203) 783-9597 2400
|
||
|
Pokey's Place..............(204) 253-1342 1200
|
||
|
Infonet II.................(204) 661-2138 1200
|
||
|
NorthStar..................(204) 661-8337 1200
|
||
|
DOS........................(204) 832-5397 2400
|
||
|
SchoolNet..................(204) 889-3584 2400
|
||
|
The A.P.P.L.E. Crate.......(206) 251-0543 1200 PC
|
||
|
The Bull Board.............(213) 473-3128 1200 PC SYS
|
||
|
North Texas BBS............(214) 221-8876 300 PC
|
||
|
Syndey Austrailia..........(214) 241-4378 1200 PC
|
||
|
Peripherals Plus...........(214) 424-2001 2400 PC SYS
|
||
|
The Intermission...........(214) 612-1233 1200 PC
|
||
|
The Thieves' Guild.........(214) 661-2051 1200 PC
|
||
|
The Darkened Lantern.......(214) 758-4215 1200 PC
|
||
|
Texas Trading Post.........(214) 785-4997 1200 PC
|
||
|
Information Unlimited II...(215) 250-0341 1200 PC
|
||
|
Phoenix Systems............(215) 398-4983 2400 PC
|
||
|
Tower of High Sorcery......(215) 934-6274 1200 PC
|
||
|
Clound Nine BBS............(216) 650-2989 2400 PC
|
||
|
The AppleTree..............(216) 758-7617 1200 PC After 5pm wk-24hrs wke
|
||
|
Capitol Apple..............(301) 498-8140 1200 SYS
|
||
|
The Razor's Edge...........(301) 561-6161 2400
|
||
|
The Inner World............(302) 323-0762 2400
|
||
|
The Whole Apple............(302) 734-1766 1200
|
||
|
Les-Com-Net................(303) 233-5824 1200 PC
|
||
|
The Night Shift............(303) 322-1544 1200 PC SYS
|
||
|
Aces High BBS..............(303) 329-6579 1200 PC
|
||
|
L & L Support..............(303) 420-3568 2400 PC
|
||
|
Dementia...................(303) 989-8470 1200 PC Denver Mensa
|
||
|
GEHS BBS...................(304) 645-6437 300
|
||
|
The RainForest.............(305) 434-4927 2400 $ NOT PC Pursuit Accesible!
|
||
|
The Chicken Ranch..........(305) 676-3873 1200 PC SYS
|
||
|
Space Frontiers............(305) 773-1251 1200 PC SYS
|
||
|
Dementia...................(309) 755-6684 1200
|
||
|
The Phoenix................(312) 798-9150 1200 PC
|
||
|
The Roger Park ABBS........(312) 973-2227 300 PC
|
||
|
Electronic Odyessy Elite...(313) 474-5795 2400 PC
|
||
|
The Emerald Forest.........(314) 351-6073 1200
|
||
|
The Racket Club #1.........(314) 725-0090 300
|
||
|
Country Courthouse #1......(314) 725-0711 1200
|
||
|
The Racket Club #2.........(314) 725-9555 1200
|
||
|
Country Courthouse #2......(314) 725-9600 300
|
||
|
The Boiler Room............(317) 743-6762 1200
|
||
|
MOM-<Linc>.................(318) 387-2298 300
|
||
|
Star <LINC> BBS............(318) 688-0522 1200
|
||
|
The Pilot Exchange.........(404) 669-0410 2400 PC
|
||
|
The DuckNet BBS............(405) 355-9678 2400
|
||
|
Polis......................(405) 366-7538 2400
|
||
|
Oklahoma On-Line...........(405) 672-7442 1200
|
||
|
|