1648 lines
74 KiB
Plaintext
1648 lines
74 KiB
Plaintext
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*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
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NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGICAL YOUTH
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N.A.S.T.Y.
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JOURNAL NUMBER 1
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N.A.S.T.Y. IS:
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THE RENEGADE HACKER
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PHANTOM
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KLUDGE
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JAMES BROWN
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DAMAGED SECTORZ
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CYBER LINK
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<Mailing Address:bbs.nasty@mudslide.spies.com>
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*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
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CONTENTS
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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1. What is N.A.S.T.Y. BY: THE RENEGADE HACKER!
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2. Obtaining a secure VMS Account BY: DAMAGED SECTORZ
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3. Defeating Security 3000 BY: MALEFACTOR
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4. X3 ITI Parameters BY: THE RENEGADE HACKER!
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5. Telco Information (PART 1) BY: THE RENEGADE HACKER!
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6. Equifax (CBI) Credit Information BY: KLUDGE/SCANTRONICS PUB.
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7. TRW Commercial Credit Reports BY: KLUDGE/SCANTRONICS PUB.
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8. Hack/Phreak News & Rumors
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Welcome to the first release of the NASTY Journal! We hope that new
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distribution of this Journal becomes a quarterly event. We also hope that
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this publication will help to make the Hack/Phreak world into what it used to
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be, a forum for open discussion on all topics with full freedom of
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information. In order to accomplish this feat and to put out more Journals we
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need people to submit articles.
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If you wish to submit articles for the next issue simply call our home base:
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REALM OF CHAOS
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516-466-8259
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OR
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MAIL US AT:
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bbs.nasty@mudslide.spies.com
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or
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bbs.kludge@mudslide.spies.com
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THE RENEGADE HACKER!
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(Writer/Editor)
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-+-
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==============================================================================
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( 1 ) WHAT IS N.A.S.T.Y.
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==============================================================================
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*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
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+ WHAT IS N.A.S.T.Y. +
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*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
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WRITTEN BY:
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THE RENEGADE HACKER!
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N.A.S.T.Y. - National Alliance of Superior Technological Youth, is a group
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which I founded a few months after the SUNDEVIL raids.
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N.A.S.T.Y.'s purpose is to educate the future hackers, to try and do what
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most say is impossible, which is to make the hack/phreak world into what it
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used to be.
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There was a time when there where hundreds of hack/phreak BBS'es, there
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were text files being written on a regular basis. Now there are less than
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10 truly hack/phreak BBS'es, and NO real text files being written.
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There was a time when people did not have to worry about having their
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boards taken down, their equipment seized and their rights violated. This was
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a time when the First Amendment was more than mere words and writing a text
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file was a fundamental American right!
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We will help anyone who wishes to run a hack/phreak board. Simply call
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N.A.S.T.Y.'s contact board, The Realm of Chaos at 516-466-8259 and mail user
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number 13 mail with:
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The boards name
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The boards number
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All new user login passwords
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I or another member will call and we will discuss possibilities for assisting
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your BBS.
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Remember, a hacker is not merely some geek behind a computer, he is a
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person dedicated to a certain way of life! A hacker is an explorer, one who
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seeks truth without worrying of the consequences of his actions. Since the
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dawn of man, the spirit of hacking has existed; from the first man with fire,
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to Christopher Columbus, to the first man to walk on the moon. Those captured
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the true spirit of hacking, for if man would have blindly follow the accepted
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rules such as not to attempt to go explore the world because it was flat, or
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not to attempt to go to the moon, were would we be today? Hackers have always
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valiantly faced opposition, oppression and condemnation; it's nothing new.
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==============================================================================
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( 2 ) OBTAINING A SECURE VMS ACCOUNT
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==============================================================================
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%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%
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- -
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% Obtaining A Secure %
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- VMS Account -
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% %
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-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-%-
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By:
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-Damaged Sectorz
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Introduction:
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Have you ever gotten into a VAX/VMS (Virtual Memory System) system and you
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go roaming around only to have the System Operator turns around and kicking
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you off, or change the password to the account that you had? If so, this
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article will help you elude the System Operator while you explore the system
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to its fullest.
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First, we are not going to create any new accounts because the System
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Operator will more than likely notice new accounts appearing on the system.
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One way to keep an account(s) on the system is to scan through the
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'SYSUAF.DAT' for disabled accounts and revive them. The only bad part about
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this is that you must have an account that has system privileges in order
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to access the UAF file. If your account happens to have those privileges
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then do the following:
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"$ Set Def Sys$System <CR>"
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This will take you to the System area of the hard disk. In this area all
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files that the system needs to run itself are stored here. In this directory
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you will need to run the 'Authorize' utility, by typing the following:
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"$ run authorize"
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You will be prompted with:
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"UAF>"
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In this area you can request help on all 'Authorize' commands but this
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file will explain most of the fields in a UAF record and how to modify it to
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your
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needs.
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The first thing you need to do is list all of the users in the
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'SYSUAF.DAT' file. At the UAF prompt type the following:
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"UAF> List/Full"
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This will create a file with a full report of all the information
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contained within the UAF as follows:
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%UAF-I=LSTMSG1, writing listing file
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%UAF-I-LSTMSG2, Listing file SYSUAF.LIS complete
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Next type "exit" to get out of the 'Authorize' utility, and either
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download or otherwise capture all of the accounts out of the file called
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'SYSUAF.LIS'. After you have done this, scan through the list for people who
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are 'DISUSERS'. If you are lazy then use the help command for more
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information on the 'search' command. This is not recommended because, if
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accounting is on, chances are more than likely that the System Operator will
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notice the 'search' command.
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After you have found several disabled accounts, execute the 'Authorize'
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utility again. To list the disabled user you wish to modify type:
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"show <username>"
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This will show the user.
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The following is an example of a UAF field for a user:
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Username: JOHN Owner: SYSTEM MANAGER
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Account: SYSTEM UIC: [700,101] ([SYSTEM,DUDE])
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CLI: DCL Tables: DCLTABLES
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Default: DUA0:[USERS.DUDE]
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LGICMD: LOGIN
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Login Flags:
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Primary Days: Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri
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Secondary Days: Sat Sun
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No Access Restrictions
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Expiration: (none) Pwdminimun: 6 Login Fails:
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Pwdlifetime: 180 00:00 Pwdchange: 29-JAN-1990 09:26
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LastLogin: 7-FEB-1990 11:16 (interactive), (none) (non-interactive)
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MaxJobs: 0 Fillm: 40 Bytlm: 32769
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Maxacctjobs: 0 Shrfillm: 0 Pbytlm: 0
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Maxdetach: 0 BIOlm: 18 JTquota: 1024
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Prclm: 10 DIOlm: 18 WSdef: 256
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Prio: 4 ASTlm: 24 WSquo: 512
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Queprio: 0 TQElm: 20 WSextent: 2048
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CPU: Enqlm: 200 Pgflquo: 20480
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Authorized Privileges:
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TMPMBX NETMBX
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Default Privileges:
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TMPMBX NETMBX
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Most users on the system only have 'TMPMBX' (temporary mailbox) and
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'NETMBX' (network mailbox) privileges. Do the following to enable your new
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user to have its own system privileges:
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UAF>Modify <user> /FLAGS=NoDisUser <--Changes to enabled user
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UAF>Modify <user> /FLAGS=NOCAPTIVE <--Makes sure user is not in a shell
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UAF>Modify <user> /FLAGS=NOAUDIT <--Turns off Auditing features
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UAF>Modify <user> /PRIVILEGES=ALL <--Grants all privileges
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UAF>Modify <user> /PASSWORD=newpasswd <--changes password
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This should set your disabled account to an account with full privileges.
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I hope this file has been helpful. Although it does not cover all the
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ways of securing access on a VAX/VMS it does show one of the many. Look
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forward to more files on the VMS Operating System.
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Happy Hacking,
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Damaged-
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===============================================================================
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( 3 ) DEFEATING SECURITY 3000
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===============================================================================
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[<5B><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>]
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[ ]
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[ Identifying, Defeating, and Manipulating Security 3000 ]
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[ ]
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[ Written By: ]
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[ ]
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[ Malefactor ]
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[ ]
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[<5B><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>]
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[Prelude]
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The MPE series operating system run on the HP3000 is a very powerful and
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versatile operating system. When this OS is coupled with VEsoft's Security
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3000 the result is a virtually impregnable system. This rule however only
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applies to those who know how to use it, and implement all of its features.
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The actual percentage of individuals properly utilizing Security 3000 is 0%. I
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have never seen it implemented fully, and probably never will.
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[Identifying Security 3000]
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Security 3000 can be identified by numerous error messages that are
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associated with it. The following is a listing of some of the more common
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error messages. I would also like to state that I will only address those
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security features that occur most commonly in the Defeating Security 3000
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section because, as stated before, Security 3000 is almost never used to its
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full potential.
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The following messages are displayed after login:
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You are not allowed to logon today
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This user is not passworded
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You are not allowed to logon to this device
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You are not allowed to logon to this terminal
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You are not allowed to logon now
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[Defeating Security 3000]
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When creating a user on a system running Security 3000 you must do this
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quite differently than normal. You must first create the user then add it into
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the user database. For example:
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NEWUSER MALEFACTOR.SYS;HOME=GROUP;PASS=PASSWORD;CAP=CAPABILITY LIST
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RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,ADD
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{Now we get a menu}
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SECURITY/ADD Version 2.1.2 (c) 1981 by VESOFT, Inc. Type '?' for help
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Enter user id: Malefactor <User Name, self-explanatory>
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Enter account: SYS <Account Name, self-explanatory>
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Enter session name: @ <Allows logons w/any Session Name>
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Enter user's real name: <Yeah, right>
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Enter permitted terminal numbers: <Leave Blank>
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Enter day of week access restrictions: <Leave Blank>
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Enter time of day access restrictions: <Leave Blank>
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Enter the menu file name: <Leave Blank>
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Enter Y if the user is to have Security/3000 passwords;
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N if the user is not to have Security/3000 passwords;
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A if the user is to have passwords, but should enter the
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correct passwords himself the first time he logs on.
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Your selection (Y/N/A)? N
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*** User has been added. **
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Enter the menu file name:
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This puts the user into a menu you devise and that he can't escape from.
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Whenever a pesky operator kicks me off and deletes my account I like to
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force him into this where he is stuck. The format is menuname.group.account.
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This also has other far-reaching applications. If you wanted to run a BBS on
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an HP3000 and naturally you wouldn't want the world to have access to the shell
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you could simply pop them into the menu. It has a lot of applications which I
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won't even begin to go into, just experiment and learn.
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[Manipulating Security 3000]
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The first thing you want to do when you logon to an HP3000 running Security
|
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3000 is to look at what security features they have up and running. You do
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this by typing:
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:list securcon.pub.security
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{Special Note: Not all HP3000s have a List UDC added the command may be
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Listtext, QEDIT, QUAD, etc... In most cases however just do the following as
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a last resort:
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:File infile=securcon.pub.security
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run prose.qlib.robelle
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This should work on most systems if they have Robelle software which is as
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common as DBEDIT. However, if this fails another try might be to:
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:LISTF @.UTIL.SYS,1
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Any file here that is listtext, listfile, etc, should work. A few systems
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put files in here.
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Now when you view this file you will get a listing of data which is different
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for every HP3000. I will not even attempt to explain all of the data items,
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but I will explain the more common ones.
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$LOG LOGON USER LOGGING IS IMPLEMENTED
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$VEPROFILE SECURITY 3000'S PASSWORDS ARE ENFORCED (MORE LATER)
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$MPE OBSOL MPE PASSWORDS ARE TO BE OBSOLETED AND REPLACED W/SEC3000 PW
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$MPE U OBS=DAYS SET PASSWORD CHANGE EVERY X DAYS
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$TERM DEACTIVATE TERMINAL SHUTDOWN DUE TO VICIOUS HACKERS (X BAD ATTEMPTS)
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A little information on Security 3000 passwords: they are encrypted and
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cannot be seen even by a user with SM privileges. Also, multiple passwords
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can be assigned to a user as opposed to just one. The Security 3000 passwords
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are entered via the logon.pub.security file, but more on that later. For now
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it will suffice for you to know the Security 3000 passwords are difficult to
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crack if set up correctly (which is never the case). The Security 3000
|
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password can force special character selection (i.e. 32h3hj2#, etc.)
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Most intelligent system operators who implement this function use different
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password request strings, but some don't due to stupidity. The second point of
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concern is the built-in help features. To access the Security 3000 help just
|
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type:
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:run logon.pub.security,help
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The help is set up in successive frames as it common on the HP3000. What this
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means to you is that by hitting return after typing a second help in the help
|
|||
|
section will get you the next frame of information and so on until there is no
|
|||
|
more help available. An on-line manual which will come out to about 450,000
|
|||
|
bytes or so.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
[Creating a Global Account]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is something that shouldn't really be executed. On the HP3000 running
|
|||
|
security 3000 you can create a GLOBAL ACCOUNT: an account that can log into
|
|||
|
any user and any account without entering a password.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To do this type:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,ADD
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Enter user id: @
|
|||
|
Enter account: @
|
|||
|
Enter session name: maint
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This will allow the session maint to logon to any user, any account regardless
|
|||
|
of password. This is how System Operators can bypass the encrypted Security
|
|||
|
3000 passwording. This is an extremely powerful account and should not be
|
|||
|
abused. I would also like to stress that this account does *NOT* bypass
|
|||
|
the MPE passwords. However the MPE passwords can be pulled quite easily by
|
|||
|
doing either a:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:LISTACCT
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
or on MPE XL:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:LISTACCT ;PASS
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
As for user, passwords the only ones needed can be pulled by:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:LISTUSER MGR.@
|
|||
|
:LISTUSER MANAGER.@
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Now you have total control of the entire operating system.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
[Bypassing Most Features]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
I am not going to totally explain how to bypass all features in detail
|
|||
|
since most features can be bypassed via this way.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,CHANGE
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This menu is self-explanatory and would be redundant to explain. This is
|
|||
|
how you can bypass the following features.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Time of Day Access Restrictions
|
|||
|
Day of Week Access Restrictions
|
|||
|
Terminal Type
|
|||
|
Menu Lock
|
|||
|
Session Names
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Simply change the entry that restricts you to a blank and remove it or in
|
|||
|
the case of session names use the global variable '@'.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
[Bypassing Logon to Unpassworded Accounts]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is most useful and will be explained in detail how to gain SM privs
|
|||
|
on a HP3000 running Security 3000. The following account is our target:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
FIELD.SUPPORT
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Many system administrators know this account carries SM privs, but
|
|||
|
don't worry about it because no one can logon to it. The reason no one
|
|||
|
can logon is because it is *NOT* passworded. And under Security 3000
|
|||
|
unpassworded SM privileged accounts can't logon. So how do I get there?
|
|||
|
This is very simple. There are two possible accounts to hack in order to
|
|||
|
bypass this feature:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
MANAGER.SUPPORT
|
|||
|
or
|
|||
|
MGR.SUPPORT
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One of these accounts if present carries AM privilege. This means either
|
|||
|
of those accounts can be used to place a password on the FIELD.SUPPORT account
|
|||
|
thus giving you SM privilege. This is a nice trick since usually the
|
|||
|
MGR.SUPPORT account can login and is hardly ever passworded.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
[Security 3000 User Logging]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To get to the Security 3000 user log type the following...
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,LISTLOG
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This will list the log with the options you specify. The options you
|
|||
|
specify are directed in pseudo-boolean code. Using the AND, NOT, OR
|
|||
|
operators. For example:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To eliminate the Security 3000 log type the following...
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,CLEARLOG
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
However if you decide to erase the log the System Operator will notice
|
|||
|
that their log is missing. The only time you should ever erase a system log
|
|||
|
is as a last resort, in a life-threatening situation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A final point: LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,XXXX is a file and XXXX is the entry point
|
|||
|
to that file. There are others which are self-explanatory. For a complete
|
|||
|
listing of user profiles:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
:RUN LOGON.PUB.SECURITY,LISTUSER
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Additional information is stored in:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
LOG20.DATA.SECURITY (Security 3000 Logfile)
|
|||
|
LOGOFF.DATA.SECURITY (Logoff configuration file)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
and of course
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SECURITY.DOC.SECURITY (The Security 3000 Operational Manual)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Malefactor
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
( 4 ) X.3 ITI PARAMETERS
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
|
|||
|
+ X.3 ITI Parameters +
|
|||
|
* ------------------ *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* INFORMATION *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* SUPPLIED BY: *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* THE RENEGADE HACKER *
|
|||
|
+ ------------------- +
|
|||
|
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Parameter Description
|
|||
|
--------- -----------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 National Options Marker
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter serves to mark the division between International
|
|||
|
(X.3) parameters and Network Dependent (e.g., Telenet) parameters
|
|||
|
in an X.28 or X.29 parameters list. All parameters preceding the
|
|||
|
marker are X.3, and those following are Network Dependent. Values
|
|||
|
may be:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 CCITT specified value
|
|||
|
33 Telenet permitted value
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Telenet accepts either value. Whenever possible, the CCITT
|
|||
|
specified value of zero should be used.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1 Escape to Command Level
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter allows the terminal to initiate an escape from Data
|
|||
|
Transfer Mode, in order to send a command to the PAD. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 Escape not possible
|
|||
|
1 Escape possible (default)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2 Echo
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter provides for all characters received from the
|
|||
|
terminal to be transmitted back to the terminal, as well as being
|
|||
|
interpreted and forwarded by the PAD to the remote DTE.
|
|||
|
Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No echo
|
|||
|
1 Echo (default)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
3 Data Forwarding
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter allows the PAD to recognize defined character(s)
|
|||
|
received from the terminal as an indication to complete assembly
|
|||
|
of characters to forward a DATA packet to the remote DTE. Values
|
|||
|
may be OR-ed together (e.g., value of 3=1+2=Alphanumerics plus
|
|||
|
Carriage Return)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No signal
|
|||
|
1 Alphanumerics
|
|||
|
2 Carriage Return (Default)
|
|||
|
4 Escape
|
|||
|
8 Editing Characters
|
|||
|
16 Terminators
|
|||
|
32 Form Effectors
|
|||
|
64 Control Characters
|
|||
|
128 Other Characters (Not valid according to CCITT
|
|||
|
recommendations)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
4 Idle Timer
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Should the interval between successive characters received from
|
|||
|
the terminal exceed the selected Idle Timer delay, the PAD will
|
|||
|
terminate assembly of characters and forward a DATA packet to the
|
|||
|
remote DTE. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 Timer disabled
|
|||
|
n multiples of 50 ms. (.05 seconds), where 1<=n<=255. n=1
|
|||
|
n=1 and n=2 not recommended. (Default is 80, 4 seconds)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
5 Auxiliary Device Control
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter enables flow control between the PAD and the
|
|||
|
terminal. The PAD uses the XON and XOFF characters (decimal 17
|
|||
|
and 19) to indicate to the terminal whether or not it is ready to
|
|||
|
accept characters. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No use if XON/XOFF (default)
|
|||
|
1 Use XON/XOFF
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
6 Suppression of Service Signals
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter provides for the suppression of all messages sent by
|
|||
|
the PAD to the terminal. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 Signals not transmitted (messages not sent)
|
|||
|
1 Signals transmitted (messages sent) (Default)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
7 Break Options
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter specifies the action taken on receipt of a Break
|
|||
|
signal from the terminal. The only valid values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 Do nothing (Default)
|
|||
|
1 Send INTERRUPT Packet to Host
|
|||
|
2 Send RESET Packet to Host
|
|||
|
8 Escape to PAD Command Stat
|
|||
|
21 Flush-on-Break (Discard Output, Send Indication of Break
|
|||
|
and Send INTERRUPT)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
8 Discard Output
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This controls transmission of data to the terminal. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 Normal data delivery to the terminal (Default)
|
|||
|
1 Discard all output to the terminal
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
9 Carriage Return Padding
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter provides for automatic insertion by the PAD of null
|
|||
|
character padding after the transmission of a carriage return to
|
|||
|
the terminal. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No padding
|
|||
|
1-31 Number of character delays
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
10 Line Folding
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This provides for automatic insertion by the PAD of appropriate
|
|||
|
format effectors to prevent overprinting at the end of a terminal
|
|||
|
print line. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No line folding
|
|||
|
n Character per line before folding, where 1<=n<=255
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
11 Binary Speed
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter is set by the PAD when the terminal establishes a
|
|||
|
physical connection to the network. This allows the remote DTE
|
|||
|
or terminal user to examine the speed, as determined by the PAD.
|
|||
|
Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 110 bps
|
|||
|
1 134.5
|
|||
|
2 300
|
|||
|
3 1200
|
|||
|
4 600
|
|||
|
5 75
|
|||
|
6 150
|
|||
|
7 1800
|
|||
|
8 200
|
|||
|
9 100
|
|||
|
10 50
|
|||
|
11 75/1200
|
|||
|
12 2400
|
|||
|
13 4800
|
|||
|
14 9600
|
|||
|
15 19,200
|
|||
|
16 48,000
|
|||
|
17 56,000
|
|||
|
18 64,000
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
12 Flow Control of the PAD by the terminal
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This allows for flow control between the terminal and the PAD.
|
|||
|
The terminal indicates whether or not it is ready to accept
|
|||
|
characters from the PAD, via XON and XOFF characters. Values
|
|||
|
are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No use of XON/XOFF
|
|||
|
1 Use XON/XOFF
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
13 Linefeed Insertion
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter instructs the PAD to routinely insert a linefeed
|
|||
|
(LF) character into the data stream following each appearance of a
|
|||
|
carriage return (CR) character. Values may be OR-ed together:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No LF Insertion (TP4 Default)
|
|||
|
1 Insert LF after CR on output to the terminal
|
|||
|
2 Insert LF after CR on input from the terminal
|
|||
|
4 Insert LF after CR on echo to the terminal
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
14 Linefeed Padding
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter provides for automatic insertion by the PAD of null
|
|||
|
character padding after the transmission of a linefeed to the
|
|||
|
terminal. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 No padding
|
|||
|
1-15 null characters
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
15 Editing
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This parameter enables local editing of text within the PAD before
|
|||
|
transmission through the network. Note, if editing is enabled,
|
|||
|
transmission on timers is disabled. Values are:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
0 Editing disabled (Default)
|
|||
|
1 Editing enabled
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
16 Character Delete
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Parameter 16 specifies the editing character which causes the PAD
|
|||
|
to erase the previous character entered by the terminal. Parameter
|
|||
|
16 is only valid if editing is enabled. Default is 127.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
17 Line Delete
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Parameter 17 specifies the editing character which causes the PAD
|
|||
|
to erase the entire buffer. If data is forwarded on carriage
|
|||
|
return only, the buffer contains one line at a time. Parameter 17
|
|||
|
is only valid if editing is enabled. Default is 24.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
18 Line Display
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Parameter 18 specifies the editing character which causes the PAD
|
|||
|
to echo the entire buffer to the terminal. Parameter 18 is only
|
|||
|
valid if editing is enabled. Default is 18.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
( 5 ) TELCO INFORMATION (PART 1)
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* TELCO INFO PART 1 *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
INFORMATION SUPPLIED
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
BY:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
THE RENEGADE HACKER!
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
TRANSLATING ORDERS INTO ACTION
|
|||
|
------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When computers have to talk to one another, correct translation is as
|
|||
|
important as it is at the United Nations. This is because each machine
|
|||
|
speaks a different language. For both people and computer programs,
|
|||
|
translation means taking instructions in one language or format and converting
|
|||
|
them to another.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Putting instructions into a particular format is a primary activity in
|
|||
|
telephone companies. Changes in telephone services have to be put in a format
|
|||
|
that an electronic switch and its particular computer program can understand.
|
|||
|
This is done at the Recent Change Memory Administration Center (RCMAC). In
|
|||
|
these centers, translations are performed by personnel who process requests
|
|||
|
for changes in telephone services that come from the business offices in a
|
|||
|
variety of formats, and convert them into the languages used by the
|
|||
|
various types of electronic switches. As the number and type of switches
|
|||
|
continue to grow, too much personnel time is used up. Thousands of clerks
|
|||
|
are involved in hundreds of centers across the United States.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To solve this problem, the regional companies asked Bell Communications
|
|||
|
Research (BELLCORE) for a solution: a computer program that could take
|
|||
|
most of the orders as they come in and translate them automatically into the
|
|||
|
form needed by each type of switch. The result of this request was the MIZAR
|
|||
|
system, formerly called the Memory Management System. As it is implemented by
|
|||
|
clients, it will help relieve the buildup of clerical staff and make labor-
|
|||
|
intensive operations less costly and more efficient to provide.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Today's electronic switching systems, the result of specialized
|
|||
|
applications of computer technology, depend on software to preform
|
|||
|
functions like routing and completing calls.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The MIZAR system has a template, essentially an order blank, for each
|
|||
|
order type for each switch and version of that switch. This is the basic
|
|||
|
dictionary for translation: a big matrix or array of possible messages in
|
|||
|
each of the languages or formats used by the switches.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When a message is passed from the Facilities Assignment and Control
|
|||
|
System (FACS) it goes to the Work Manager, a dispatching system. The
|
|||
|
Work Manager provides both protocols and interfaces for the other systems,
|
|||
|
acting as a central communications point for the MIZAR, COSMOS (COmputer
|
|||
|
System for Mainframe OperationS) and FACS systems. It provides priority
|
|||
|
queueing and flow control, ensuring that the MIZAR system will not be
|
|||
|
flooded with more messages than it can handle at one time.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The MIZAR system then searches its memory for the appropriate template
|
|||
|
for both the switch and the message type. It begins as a clerk would, by
|
|||
|
filling in blanks step-by-step, automatically skipping over blanks that aren't
|
|||
|
relevant to the particular change being processed.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For example, one step may ask: "Is this order two-party?" In other words,
|
|||
|
does it involve a change affecting two phones? "If no, skip 20 lines and
|
|||
|
proceed to question 41." In this way, a template that may have 60 or 70 lines
|
|||
|
will be filled in with only six or seven entries in many cases. Using this
|
|||
|
process of elimination, the MIZAR system creates the proper translation for
|
|||
|
the service requested.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Not all messages are translated by the MIZAR system. For the more
|
|||
|
complex ones, the system calls on COSMOS to generate an appropriate
|
|||
|
translated message. After these messages are generated, they can be called
|
|||
|
up on a screen, where a clerk can swiftly check through them, comparing
|
|||
|
them with the initial request and ensuring that they are complete and
|
|||
|
accurate. In some cases, COSMOS will be unable to generate all of the
|
|||
|
necessary information, but the operators can easily intercept those messages
|
|||
|
and correct them before they are sent to the switch.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Once the orders are complete, they are sent off to a pending file
|
|||
|
together with their activation dates. The MIZAR system continuously scans
|
|||
|
this file, searching for messages that need to be activated. As it finds
|
|||
|
them, it sends them out to the appropriate switch. If the switch accepts
|
|||
|
the message and completes the change, the message is then sent to a history
|
|||
|
file for safekeeping. This feature has prevented the loss of essential
|
|||
|
change information when electronic switches have malfunctioned.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If for any reason the switch rejects the order as incorrectly formatted
|
|||
|
or otherwise in error, the change is put into a file for a clerk to review
|
|||
|
and determine what went wrong. The MIZAR system automatically carries out
|
|||
|
the first two steps that previously were done manually. It checks to verify
|
|||
|
with the switch that the order is incorrect, and it coordinates information on
|
|||
|
the rejected change with that on related changes to see if there are any
|
|||
|
conflicts.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
All service orders (SERVORDS) are logged into the MIZAR system's
|
|||
|
switch log (located in /tmp/swXX.out, where XX is the numeric code assigned
|
|||
|
by the MIZAR system to that switch). That is, if it was entered on the MIZAR
|
|||
|
system.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The MIZAR system has a number of significant benefits. It works with
|
|||
|
COSMOS, which reduces the amount of work that has to be done on the more
|
|||
|
complex orders. It also operates in four different modes: with or without
|
|||
|
COSMOS and with or without FACS so that the operating companies can
|
|||
|
choose what best suits their particular memory-administration needs.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Two other MIZAR features are notable. All three systems, the Work
|
|||
|
Manager, COSMOS and the MIZAR system, run on the same type of computer.
|
|||
|
This allows fewer computers to be used for backup. In addition,
|
|||
|
administrative activities, such as editing messages and initializing
|
|||
|
switches, are made easier by flexible, user friendly MIZAR programs.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The MIZAR system was first implemented in Pacific Bell's RCMAC
|
|||
|
in San Jose, California, in November 1985. This system relied solely on COSMOS
|
|||
|
for recent change messages. A second application, the first using FACS,
|
|||
|
occurred in Southwestern Bell's central RCMAC in St. Louis, Missouri, in
|
|||
|
February 1986. Today, close to a dozen clients are in the process of deploying
|
|||
|
the MIZAR software.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The MIZAR system will not magically eliminate staff needs in the various
|
|||
|
RCMACS. People will still be needed for reviewing complex orders and in some
|
|||
|
cases completing orders that COSMOS can't handle. But the MIZAR system can
|
|||
|
help reduce the overall work load.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The MIZAR system can help clients provide new services for customers. In
|
|||
|
many cases the customers can have "Instant Service," in which changes
|
|||
|
entered in the service-order processor terminals are processed automatically
|
|||
|
through FACS, COSMOS and the MIZAR system, implementing the changes at
|
|||
|
the switch almost as soon as the order-entry process is completed.
|
|||
|
Ultimately, new systems such as MIZAR system may help in making changes to
|
|||
|
the phone system as swift and automatic as dialing a phone number.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Information obtained from Bell Communications Research EXCHANGE. (BELLCORE
|
|||
|
EXCHANGE)
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
( 6 ) EQUIFAX (CBI) CREDIT INFORMATION
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* CREDIT BUREAU INCORPORATED *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* SERVICES *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* WRITTEN BY: *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* KLUDGE *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
* SCANTRONICS PUBLICATIONS *
|
|||
|
+ +
|
|||
|
*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There have been several files written on CBI/Equifax. Most have
|
|||
|
been written with the intent to show someone how to process inquiries on
|
|||
|
CBI. The purpose of this textfile is to allow the reader to understand
|
|||
|
the different parts of each type of report.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are currently five services available to customers. They
|
|||
|
include: Arcofile, Arcofile-Plus, Safe-Scan, DTEC and an On-Line Directory.
|
|||
|
Equifax Credit's system is available in all 50 states.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
THE ARCOFILE
|
|||
|
------------
|
|||
|
Extension: P2.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ARCOFILE
|
|||
|
* 001 Equifax Credit ATL 5505 P Tree Dunwoody RD STE 600 Atlanta GA
|
|||
|
30342 404/123-4567
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| This line is the Consumer Referral Message |
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* AAlred, John, A,,Gloria Since 08/15/72 FAD 04/10/90 FN-204
|
|||
|
9412, Peachtree, RD, Atlanta, GA, 30302, DAT RPTD 03/90
|
|||
|
410, Coosen, DR, San Jose, CA, 95119, CRT RPTD 01/90
|
|||
|
46, Kennedy, DR, Detroit, MI, Tape RPTD 03/88
|
|||
|
**** Also Known as-ALRED, JACK ****
|
|||
|
Sex-M,MAR-M,DEPS- 3, AGE-42,SSS-101-11-2131
|
|||
|
+----(Person's Identity)-----------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| SINCE-Date File Established FAD-Last Activity on file |
|
|||
|
| FN: For Equifax Credit Internal Use Only. |
|
|||
|
| Sex, Marital Status, Number of Defendants, Age or Birth, SS# |
|
|||
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ES-ENGR, Lockheed, Atlanta, GA, EMP 06/88 VER 02/90, $3500
|
|||
|
EF-ENGR, Central Power, San Jose, CA,,,, Left 05/87
|
|||
|
E2-ENGR, General Motors, Detroit, MI,,,, Left 05/78
|
|||
|
+----(This is the Employment Information)------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| ES-(Employment Subject) Position, Firm, Location |
|
|||
|
| Date-Employed, Date Verified, Monthly Salary. |
|
|||
|
| EF-(Employment Former) Position, Firm, Location, Date Left |
|
|||
|
| E2-(Employment Second Former) |
|
|||
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Sum-05/76-04/90, PR/OI-Yes, FB-NO, accts:9,HC$300-37000, 5-Ones,
|
|||
|
1-Two, 1-Three, 1-Five, 1-Other
|
|||
|
+-----(Summary of File Items)-------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| 05/76-Oldest Opening Date of Trade 04/90-Newest Reporting Date |
|
|||
|
| PR/OI Yes-File Has Public Records |
|
|||
|
| FB-NO-No information obtained from other Credit Agencies |
|
|||
|
| ACCTS.9-File Contains 9 Trade Lines |
|
|||
|
| HC-High Credit Range ($300-37,000) |
|
|||
|
| 5-Ones-Five Trades in File CS 1 |
|
|||
|
| 1-Two-One Trade in File CS 2 |
|
|||
|
| 1-Three-One Trade in File CS 3 |
|
|||
|
| 1-Five-one Trade in File CS 5 |
|
|||
|
| 1-Other-One Trade in File With No CS |
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*****Public Records or Other Information*****
|
|||
|
07/86 BKRPT 162VF473, 4563723, LIAB $25600, ASSET $10500,
|
|||
|
Exempt $100, INDIVID, Personal, VOL
|
|||
|
04/90 COLL 12/89 401YC364 FOR DR WHITE, $532,02/90 PAYMENT
|
|||
|
BAL-04/90 $200, DLA: 11/89, I,32452
|
|||
|
05/88 ST JD, 401VC121, $769, DEF-SUBJ, 88-30378, VISA, VER 01/89
|
|||
|
Satisfied, 12,88
|
|||
|
+----(Public Record or Other Information)-------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| BKRPT(Bankruptcy) Date Filed, Court Number, Case Number, Liabilities|
|
|||
|
| Assets, Exempt Amount, Filer, Type, Intent |
|
|||
|
| COLL(Collection) Date Reported, Date Assigned to Collection Agency |
|
|||
|
| Agency ID Number, Credit Grantor Name & Number, Amount, Date & |
|
|||
|
| Status, Balance-Date of Last Activity WIth Creditor on Acct, |
|
|||
|
| ECOA Designator, Account Serial Number. |
|
|||
|
| STJD(Satisfied Judgement) Date Filed, Court Number, Amount, |
|
|||
|
| Defendant, Case Number, Plaintiff, Date Verified, Status, Date |
|
|||
|
| Satisfied. |
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* INQS-Subject Shows 3 Inquiries Since 01/90
|
|||
|
Sears 906DC20 04/10/90 ATL FIN VS 49FS20 03/15/90
|
|||
|
RICH'S 401DC25 03/13/90 GMAC 906FA35 07/25/89
|
|||
|
MORTG CRED 650FM1366 01/14/90 BENSON HON 650AN566 09/23/99
|
|||
|
+----(Inquiries)-------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| INQS-Alert Appears if three or more inquiries within the past 60 |
|
|||
|
| 90 Days. Member Name, Number and Date Inquired. Two Year |
|
|||
|
| Inquiry History Shown. |
|
|||
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*FIRM/ID CODE RPTD OPND H/C TRM BAL P/D CS MR ECOA ACCOUNT NUMBER
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ATL FIN VS *49fs28 04/90 03/87 2828 461 2828 974 R5 34 I
|
|||
|
412179000445585
|
|||
|
30(08)60(01)90(01) 04/90-R4,02/90-R4,01/90-R3
|
|||
|
ACCOUNT CLOSED BY CREDITOR
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SEARS *906DC2 04/90 01/90 900 10 100 R1 59 J 52972348348
|
|||
|
30(01)60(02)90(00) 07/88-R3,06,88-R2,02/84-R3 DLA 04/90
|
|||
|
+----(Trade)-----------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|FIRST LINE: |
|
|||
|
| Firm/ID Code-Name & member Number of Reporting Company |
|
|||
|
| *-Trade Information From Automated Tape Supplier |
|
|||
|
| RPTD-Date Item Was Reported |
|
|||
|
| OPND-Date Account Was Opened With Reporting Company |
|
|||
|
| H/C-High Credit (On "R" (Revolving) Accounts indicates Credit Limit |
|
|||
|
| TRM-Monthly Repayment Amount or Number of Months or Years |
|
|||
|
| BAL-Balance Owed as of Reporting Date |
|
|||
|
| P/D-Past Due Amount |
|
|||
|
| CS-Current Status of Account (R(evolving) O(pen) I(nstallments) |
|
|||
|
| 0-Too New to Rate;Approved But Not Used |
|
|||
|
| 1-Pays (or Paid) Within 30 Days of Payment Due Date, or Not Over |
|
|||
|
| One Payment Past Due. |
|
|||
|
| 2-Pays (or Paid) in More Than 30 Days From The Payment Due Date |
|
|||
|
| But Not More Than 60 Days. |
|
|||
|
| 3-Pays (or Paid) In More Than 60 Days From The Payment Due Date |
|
|||
|
| But Not More Than 90 Days, or Three Payments Past Due. |
|
|||
|
| 4-Pays (or Paid) In More Than 90 Days From Payment Due Date, But |
|
|||
|
| not More Than 120 Days, or Four Payments Past Due. |
|
|||
|
| 5-Pays (or Paid) In More Than 120 Days, or More Than Four |
|
|||
|
| Payments Past Due. |
|
|||
|
| 7-Making Regular Payments Under Debtor's Plan/ |
|
|||
|
| 8-Repossession |
|
|||
|
| 9-Bad Debt |
|
|||
|
| MR-Months Reviewed |
|
|||
|
| ECOA-Type Account (I-Individual, J-Joint, S-Shared, C-CO-Maker, |
|
|||
|
| A-Authorized Use, U-Undersiged, M-Marker, B-On Behalf of |
|
|||
|
| Another Person, T-Terminated |
|
|||
|
| ACCOUNT NUMBER-Subjects Account Number With Reporting Agency |
|
|||
|
|SECOND LINE: |
|
|||
|
| 30(01)60(02)90(00)-Number of Times Account Was 30,60,90 Days Late |
|
|||
|
| 07/88-R3,06/88-R2,02/84-R3-Exact Dates of last Two Delinquency |
|
|||
|
| Rating in Last Seven Years |
|
|||
|
| DLA 4/90-Date of Last Activity on the Account |
|
|||
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ARCO-PLUS
|
|||
|
---------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Extension: F.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ARCO-PLUS- This is a very similar type of credit report. The form has
|
|||
|
most of the same headings as the above report. Some of the information
|
|||
|
in the report is located in different areas and there are a few additions.
|
|||
|
Here are the additions:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* SUM COLL-YES---File Has Collection Items
|
|||
|
INQUIRY ALERT--Alert Appears if 3 or More Inquiries Within the Past 90 Days.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
********COLLECTION ITEMS*****
|
|||
|
ECOA LIST AMT DLA AGENCY CLIENT SERIAL BAL RPTD
|
|||
|
I 12/89 $532 11/89 401YC364 Dr White 32452 $200 04/90
|
|||
|
*****************************
|
|||
|
+----(Collection Items)------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| ECOA-Equal Credit Opportunity Act Designator |
|
|||
|
| LIST-Date Assigned to Collection Agency |
|
|||
|
| AMT-Total Amount of Collection |
|
|||
|
| DLA-Date of Last Activity (Payment to Creditor) |
|
|||
|
| AGENCY-Collection Agency I.D. Number |
|
|||
|
| CLIENT-Credit Grantor Name or Industry |
|
|||
|
| SERIAL-Account Serial Number |
|
|||
|
| BAL-Balance as of Date Reported |
|
|||
|
| RPTD-Date Reported |
|
|||
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Addition to Trade Information
|
|||
|
MAX/DEL--Most Recent, Highest Delinquency Beyond the 24 Month History
|
|||
|
24 Month History-Rate History for 24 Months Prior to Current Status.
|
|||
|
Slash (/) Separates Two 12 Month Periods (Read From left to Right)
|
|||
|
*=No Delinquency Reported This Month
|
|||
|
GRAND TOTAL-Grand Totals for Limit, High Credit, Balance, Past Due, and Terms.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SAFE-SCAN
|
|||
|
---------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A Safe-Scan inquiry automatically checks through the credit file to
|
|||
|
determine if irregular or unusual patterns exist. It examines the name,
|
|||
|
address, employment history, telephone number and Social Security number
|
|||
|
contained in each inquiry.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Safe-Scan is a "red Flag" system, designed to alert you to potential
|
|||
|
problems such as mail drop/prison/previously misused address. And
|
|||
|
Safe-Scan is a "living" database, one that is constantly growing through
|
|||
|
information-gathering.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Safe-Scan is the Profiled Address warning. By monitoring every inquiry
|
|||
|
coming through the system, Safe-Scan warns you when, from a single
|
|||
|
address, someone is using different names or different Social Security
|
|||
|
numbers to apply for credit or employment. Another is True Name Fraud,
|
|||
|
which warns you if someone is attempting to obtain credit by stealing
|
|||
|
real identities of innocent consumers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DTEC
|
|||
|
----
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DTEC is a service that allows users of Equifax to make inquiries via
|
|||
|
Social Security Number, simple as that. It allows for more accurate
|
|||
|
inquiry entry.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
On-Line Directory
|
|||
|
-----------------
|
|||
|
Extension: D
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The On-Line Directory contains the current phone numbers of creditors
|
|||
|
and inquiries which appear at the bottom of the credit report.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Connection Process
|
|||
|
------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Connection is established by several returns, then a <CTRL-S> to start
|
|||
|
the login process, prompting "(CB) Please Sign-on."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The account should fit the format of:
|
|||
|
xxxyyxx-yx or xxxyyxxxx-yx (Y=Letter X=Number)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are extensions that you may add on to your account to pull
|
|||
|
different types of transactions. The format is as such..
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
IDnumber,password,user,extensions.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One extension that you will always want to add on is Z. it allows you
|
|||
|
to view the companies name in the firm/ID section, instead of a
|
|||
|
alpha-numeric representation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For example, if I wanted to pull an Arcofile-Plus report with On-Line
|
|||
|
Directory assistance I would enter my account like:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
XXXYYXXXX-YX,James,DFZ.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Extensions:
|
|||
|
D: On-Line Directory
|
|||
|
F: Arcofile-Plus
|
|||
|
Z: View w/names in FIRM/ID Field
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After entering the account information you should receive the prompt:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A-XXX PROCEED:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The X's represent a location where the database is located. here is a
|
|||
|
listing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
WA 980-994 OR 970-979 CA 900-966 ID 832-838
|
|||
|
UT 840-838 AZ 850-865 MT 590-599 WY 820-831
|
|||
|
CO 800-816 NM 870-884 ND 580-588 SD 570-577
|
|||
|
NE 680-693 KS 660-679 OK 730-749 TX 750-799
|
|||
|
MN 550-567 IA 500-528 MO 630-658 AR 716-729
|
|||
|
LA 700-714 WI 530-549 IL 600-629 MS 386-397
|
|||
|
MI 480-499 OH 430-458 KY 400-427 TN 370-385
|
|||
|
AL 350-369 OH 430-458 GA 300-319 WV 247-268
|
|||
|
ME 039-049 NY 090-149 PA 150-196 VA 220-246
|
|||
|
NC 270-289 SC 290-299 FL 320-349 NH 030-038
|
|||
|
VT 050-059 MA 010-027 RI 028-029 CT 060-069
|
|||
|
NJ 070-089 DE 197-199 MD 206-219 DC 200-205
|
|||
|
HI 995-999 VI 008 GUAM 969 PR 006,007,009
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Processing Inquiries
|
|||
|
--------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are two ways in which I currently know how to process inquiries
|
|||
|
either through DTEC, or through Name & Current Address Lines.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-----Name & Current Address Inquiry------
|
|||
|
NM-last,first.<CR>
|
|||
|
CA-####,streetname,,city,state,zip.<CR>
|
|||
|
<CTRL-S>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-----DTEC Inquiry-----
|
|||
|
DTEC-XXX-XX-XXXX.<CR>
|
|||
|
<CTRL-S>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
K L U D G E / S C A N T R O N I C S P U B L I C A T I O N S
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
( 7 ) TRW COMMERCIAL CREDIT REPORTS
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
======================================
|
|||
|
= =
|
|||
|
= =
|
|||
|
= TRW COMMERCIAL =
|
|||
|
= =
|
|||
|
= CREDIT =
|
|||
|
= =
|
|||
|
= REPORTS =
|
|||
|
= =
|
|||
|
= WRITTEN BY: =
|
|||
|
= =
|
|||
|
= KLUDGE/SCANTRONICS PUBLICATIONS! =
|
|||
|
= =
|
|||
|
======================================
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is the second file on how to read a credit report. This one focuses
|
|||
|
on Commercial/Business credit reports that are released from TRW. I will be
|
|||
|
releasing a similar file on individual credit reports through TRW, and
|
|||
|
additional services if possible.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
PAGE RPT DATE TIME PORT TYPE
|
|||
|
1 DEMO DEMO T140 TRAINING 030
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
CROCKER INDUSTRIES TRW FILE NUMBER: 000653969
|
|||
|
100 MAIN ST FILE ESTABLISHED PRIOR JAN. 1977
|
|||
|
PHOENIX AZ 85026
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
* A C C O U N T S T A T U S *
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*** TRADE PAYMENT INFORMATION ***
|
|||
|
---------------------------------
|
|||
|
+-----(Historical Payment Guide)----------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| Six Month Account Balance Range: Total Amount owed by the firm for the past
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| six months and the current total.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| Highest Credit Amount Extended: Largest individual amount of credit extended
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| to the firm in the past 12 months and the
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| median amount.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| Industry Payment Comparison: Six month historical payment prediction
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| and comparison of the firm to its industry.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| Payment Trend Indication: Analysis of the firm's payment behavior changes
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| during the past six months.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| Significant Derogatory Data: Summary of sufficient public record &
|
|||
|
| other data
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
P BUSINESS DATE DATE PAYMENT RECENT DAYS BEYOND TERMS COMMENTS
|
|||
|
R CATEGORY REPD LAST TERMS HIGH ACCOUNT CUR 1- 31- 61-
|
|||
|
O SALE CREDIT BALANCE 30 60 90 91+
|
|||
|
F $ $ % % % % %
|
|||
|
-CHEMICALS 11-87 N30 4000 1800 67 22 11 SOLD 10YR
|
|||
|
+ELEC EQUIP 01-88 2/10PRX 13500 5900 100
|
|||
|
+FAB METALS 09-87 DISC 3500 3500 100
|
|||
|
-FACTOR 11-87 2/10N30 2500 600 55 9 18 9 9 SOLD 1YR
|
|||
|
+FACTOR 11-87 N30 8500 8300 85 12 1 1 1
|
|||
|
+MACHINERY 01-88 2/10N30 10000 6100 100 COLLECT
|
|||
|
+MACHINERY 09-87 5500 <100 100 SECURED
|
|||
|
+PREC INSTR 01-88 VARIED 40000 34600 92 4 1 1 2
|
|||
|
=PREC INSTR 11-87 NET +100000 30800 59 39 2 PAYS-SLO
|
|||
|
+RUBR&PLAST 01-88 NET 4100 3300 100 ADS 7
|
|||
|
* A C C O U N T S T A T U S *
|
|||
|
P BUSINESS DATE DATE PAYMENT RECENT DAYS BEYOND TERMS COMMENTS
|
|||
|
R CATEGORY REPD LAST TERMS HIGH ACCOUNT CUR 1- 31- 61-
|
|||
|
O SALE CREDIT BALANCE 30 60 90 91+
|
|||
|
F $ $ % % % % %
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ALL TRADE LINE TOTAL: 10 ACCOUNTS 94600 81 16 1 1 1
|
|||
|
---------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
PAYMENT TRENDS:
|
|||
|
---------------
|
|||
|
+-----(Payment Trends)-------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| Uses continuously reported trade lines to indicated new term changes in |
|
|||
|
| payment trends. |
|
|||
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
|||
|
30 DAYS AGO TOTALS WERE: 8 ACCOUNTS 91100 80 17 1 1 1
|
|||
|
60 DAYS AGO 10 94600 81 16 1 1 1
|
|||
|
90 DAYS AGO 10 94600 81 16 1 1 1
|
|||
|
120 DAYS AGO 10 93500 83 16 1
|
|||
|
150 DAYS AGO 10 94300 81 16 1 1 1
|
|||
|
180 DAYS AGO 8 90700 80 17 1 1 1
|
|||
|
TRW QUARTERLY CREDIT PATTERN
|
|||
|
----------------------------
|
|||
|
4-Q-87 (OCT-DEC) 8 ACCOUNTS 91100 80 17 1 1 1
|
|||
|
3-Q-87 (JUL-SEP) 10 94300 81 16 1 1 1
|
|||
|
2-Q-87 (APR-JUN) 4 49900 93 3 2 1 1
|
|||
|
1-Q-87 (JAN-MAR) 8 90200 81 17 1 1
|
|||
|
4-Q-86 (OCT-DEC) 8 91100 80 17 1 1 1
|
|||
|
TRW CURRENT PAYMENT GUIDE: ===> F1S <===
|
|||
|
--------------------------
|
|||
|
ACCOUNT BALANCE RANGE : F = $75,000 - $99,999
|
|||
|
COMPANY PAYMENT PERFORMANCE: 1 = FASTER THAN INDUSTRY
|
|||
|
PAYMENT TREND INDICATOR : S = STABLE
|
|||
|
**CONTINUED** COPYRIGHT(C) 1988 TRW INC.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
TRW BUSINESS PROFILE
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
PAGE RPT DATE TIME PORT TYPE
|
|||
|
2 DEMO DEMO T140 TRAINING 030
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
CROCKER INDUSTRIES TRW FILE NUMBER: 000653969
|
|||
|
100 MAIN ST FILE ESTABLISHED PRIOR JAN. 1977
|
|||
|
PHOENIX AZ 85026
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
*** INQUIRY INFORMATION ***
|
|||
|
---------------------------
|
|||
|
INDUS SUPL 10-87 INQUIRY
|
|||
|
AUTO PARTS 11-87 INQUIRY
|
|||
|
ELEC SUPLR 11-87 INQUIRY
|
|||
|
BANK 01-88 INQUIRY
|
|||
|
COMMUN EQP 01-88 INQUIRY
|
|||
|
SERVICES 01-88 INQUIRY
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*** PUBLIC RECORD INFORMATION ***
|
|||
|
---------------------------------
|
|||
|
+-----(Public Record Information)---------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| Details of bankruptcies; federal, state and count tax liens; judgements; |
|
|||
|
| attachment liens and bulk transfers. |
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
UCC PROFILE
|
|||
|
-----------
|
|||
|
UCC-FILED: 07-02-84 J37969
|
|||
|
SECURED PTY: THE BENJ FRANKLIN LEASING CO INC, OR 97201
|
|||
|
ASSIGNEE: FIRST INTERSTATE BK, BX 3438, PTLD, OR 97208
|
|||
|
COLLATERAL: CERT DESCR COMPUTER EQUIP, PRODUCTS
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
UCC-FILED: 07-19-84 J40849
|
|||
|
SECURED PTY: THE BENJ FRANKLIN LEASING CO INC, OR 97201
|
|||
|
ASSIGNEE: FIRST INTERSTATE BK, BX 3438, PTLD, OR 97208
|
|||
|
UCC-ASSIGN: 08-13-85 J55461A
|
|||
|
ORIG FILING: 10-17-84 J55461
|
|||
|
SECURED PTY: FIRST INTERSTATE BK, BX 3438, PTLD, OR 97201
|
|||
|
ASSIGNEE: THE BENJ FRANKLIN LEASING CO INC, OR 97201
|
|||
|
COLLATERAL: MACHINERY, PRODUCTS
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
*** STANDARD AND POOR'S INFORMATION ***
|
|||
|
+-(Summary of Business Background---------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| Contains key financial information on publicly and privately held firms. |
|
|||
|
| Description of products and services offered, including SIC codes. |
|
|||
|
| Approximate annual sales. |
|
|||
|
| |
|
|||
|
| Years in business. |
|
|||
|
| Name of company's accounting firm and primary bank. |
|
|||
|
| Names and titles of key officers. |
|
|||
|
| Balance sheet contains fiscal year and two years prior. |
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
BALANCE SHEET FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DEC 31
|
|||
|
DATA CURRENT THROUGH 01-20-88 ($THOUSANDS)
|
|||
|
1986 1985 1984
|
|||
|
CASH AND EQUIVALENT 39 32 114
|
|||
|
RECEIVABLES - NET 548 2,090 981
|
|||
|
INVENTORY 740 2,112 1,237
|
|||
|
OTHER CURRENT ASSETS 52 144 1,106
|
|||
|
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 1,379 4,378 3,438
|
|||
|
FIXED ASSETS - NET 1,068 2,610 1,408
|
|||
|
INVESTMENTS 258 105 211
|
|||
|
OTHER ASSETS 102 330 158
|
|||
|
TOTAL ASSETS 2,807 7,423 5,215
|
|||
|
DEBT DUE IN 1 YEAR 272 246 475
|
|||
|
NOTES PAYABLE 340 2,273 1,331
|
|||
|
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 706 1,313 929
|
|||
|
TAXES PAYABLE 0 0 4
|
|||
|
OTHER CURRENT LIABILITIES 196 472 223
|
|||
|
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 1,514 4,304 2,962
|
|||
|
LONG TERM DEBT 693 1,837 833
|
|||
|
OTHER LIABILITIES 0 0 29
|
|||
|
NET WORTH 600 1,282 1,391
|
|||
|
TOTAL LIAB AND NET WORTH 2,807 7,423 5,215
|
|||
|
**CONTINUED** COPYRIGHT(C) 1988 TRW INC.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
TRW BUSINESS PROFILE
|
|||
|
PAGE RPT DATE TIME PORT TYPE
|
|||
|
3 DEMO DEMO T140 TRAINING 030
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
CROCKER INDUSTRIES TRW FILE NUMBER: 000653969
|
|||
|
100 MAIN ST FILE ESTABLISHED PRIOR JAN. 1977
|
|||
|
PHOENIX AZ 85026
|
|||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
+-OPERATING STATEMENT -Provides profit/loss statement for fiscal & 2YRS prior-+
|
|||
|
OPERATING STATEMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DEC 31 ($THOUSANDS)
|
|||
|
DATA CURRENT THROUGH 01-20-88 1986 1985 1984
|
|||
|
NET SALES 3,414 30,439 4,424
|
|||
|
COST OF GOODS SOLD 2,698 27,415 3,084
|
|||
|
GROSS INCOME ON SALES 716 3,024 1,340
|
|||
|
EXPENSES 2,582 3,167 1,531
|
|||
|
PRE-TAX INCOME -1,866 -143 -191
|
|||
|
TAXES -402 -35 -81
|
|||
|
AFTER TAX INCOME -1,464 -108 -110
|
|||
|
EXTRAORD INC & DISCNT'D OPS 781 0 0
|
|||
|
NET INCOME -683 -108 -110
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
CRITICAL DATA AND RATIOS FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DEC 31 ($THOUSANDS)
|
|||
|
+---(Critical Data and Ratios)------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
| TRW calculates critical ratios for the most recently reported fiscal
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
| year and two years prior.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|||
|
DATA CURRENT THROUGH 01-20-88 INDUSTRY 1986 1985 1984
|
|||
|
TANGIBLE NET WORTH AVERAGES 600 1,282 1,391
|
|||
|
NET WORKING CAPITAL SIC 2400 -135 74 476
|
|||
|
CURRENT RATIO(TIMES) 2.2 .9 1.0 1.2
|
|||
|
% TOTAL DEBT TO TANG NW 237.6 367.8 479.0 274.9
|
|||
|
% CURRENT DEBT TO TANG NW 142.6 252.3 335.7 212.9
|
|||
|
% AFTER TAX INC TO TANG NW -23.1 -244.0 -8.4 -7.9
|
|||
|
% AFTER TAX INC TO NET SALES -3.8 -42.9 - .4 -2.5
|
|||
|
NET SALES TO INVENTORY (TIMES) 6.8 4.6 14.4 3.6
|
|||
|
CGS TO INVENTORY (TIMES) 5.1 3.6 13.0 2.5
|
|||
|
AVG DAYS SALES OUTSTANDING(DAYS) 49.3 58.6 25.1 80.9
|
|||
|
AUDITOR OPINION QUALIFIED QUALIFIED QUALIFIED
|
|||
|
FTNOTE:84,85,86-DATA REFLECTS A RECLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN ITEMS
|
|||
|
FTNOTE:84,85,86-COST OF GOODS SOLD REDUCED BY NON-ALLOCATED DEPRECIATION
|
|||
|
INDUSTRY AVERAGES ARE BASED ON 20 COMPANIES
|
|||
|
*** BANK INFORMATION ***
|
|||
|
------------------------
|
|||
|
BANK-BORROWER-LARCHMONT NAT'L BANK,1130 7TH STREET,PHOENIX,AZ
|
|||
|
(602)555-8231
|
|||
|
BANK-NAT'L BANK OF SAN MARINO,3471 LOS COYOTE PASS,SAN MARINO,AZ
|
|||
|
(602)555-3726
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
THE INFORMATION HEREIN IS FURNISHED IN CONFIDENCE FOR YOUR EXCLUSIVE USE
|
|||
|
FOR LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSES AND SHALL NOT BE REPRODUCED. NEITHER
|
|||
|
TRW INC., NOR ITS SOURCES OR DISTRIBUTORS WARRANT SUCH INFORMATION NOR
|
|||
|
SHALL THEY BE LIABLE FOR YOUR USE OR RELIANCE UPON IT.
|
|||
|
COPYRIGHT(C) 1988 TRW INC.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
I have also included the price listing for any of you who were curious.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
TRW Commercial Credit Reports
|
|||
|
Rose Canyon Business Park
|
|||
|
4907 Morena Blvd.. # 17
|
|||
|
San Diego, CA 92117
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Basic Annual Service Subscription
|
|||
|
---------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
# Contributor Non-Contributor
|
|||
|
25-49 $17.15 $18.15
|
|||
|
50-99 16.96 17.70
|
|||
|
100-174 16.25 17.55
|
|||
|
175-249 15.75 17.40
|
|||
|
250-499 14.20 16.05
|
|||
|
500-749 13.45 15.30
|
|||
|
750-999 13.35 15.20
|
|||
|
1000-2499 13.20 15.07
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Non-Subscriber 24.20 27.50
|
|||
|
Access Charge 2.40 4.40
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Business Profile Report
|
|||
|
Executive Summary Days Beyond Term Score
|
|||
|
Historical Payment Guide Public Record Information
|
|||
|
Key Facts Information Banking Relationship
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Small Business Advisory Report (SBAR) $10.90
|
|||
|
(Personal Credit report on owners of small businesses)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Trade Payment Guide
|
|||
|
Identifying Information Years in File
|
|||
|
Days Beyond Term Score Public Record Indicator
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1 Region $545.00 2 Regions $890.00
|
|||
|
3 Regions $1220.00 4 Regions $1335.00
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Call back: Verbal Summary of Phoned-in Inquiries: $4.00
|
|||
|
FAX: $5-10 Dollars
|
|||
|
Other Charges :
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Here are numerous numbers for TRW. They do not all belong to the credit
|
|||
|
division. I added them for those of you who would like to research TRW
|
|||
|
further, or who deem it necessary to call.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 452-2987 (U) [OR]
|
|||
|
TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 432-1327 (B) HOLLYWOOD, FL [FL]
|
|||
|
TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 638-3418 (B) BALTIMORE, MD [DC DE NJ NY 212 516 718 914 PA VA WV]
|
|||
|
TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 638-7011 (B) COLUMBIA, MD [MD]
|
|||
|
TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 282-6758 (U) NORCROSS, GA [GA]
|
|||
|
TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 642-2454 (U) BOTHELL, WA [WA]
|
|||
|
TRW APPRAISAL SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 458-9977 (U) SAN DIEGO, CA [AZ CA NM NV OR UT]
|
|||
|
TRW BEARINGS DIVISION
|
|||
|
1 800 672-7000 (U) ROBBINSVILLE, NJ [US]
|
|||
|
TRW CHILTON
|
|||
|
1 800 526-4882 (U) DAVENPORT, IA [US]
|
|||
|
TRW COMPUTER RECONDITIONING SERVICE & PARTS
|
|||
|
1 800 325-2707 (B) BALDWIN PARK, CA [US ex CA]
|
|||
|
TRW CREDIT
|
|||
|
1 800 542-2314 (U) BOTHELL, WA [WA]
|
|||
|
TRW CREDIT DATA
|
|||
|
1 800 447-9173 (U) [CO]
|
|||
|
TRW CREDIT DATA
|
|||
|
1 800 962-0520 (U) [CO]
|
|||
|
TRW CREDIT DATA DIVISION
|
|||
|
1 800 962-9871 (U) [CO]
|
|||
|
TRW CREDIT DATA DIVISION OF TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 628-3489 (U) [CT]
|
|||
|
TRW CREDIT DATA DIVISION OF TRW
|
|||
|
1 800 356-2325 (U) BRIDGEPORT, CT [CT]
|
|||
|
TRW CREDIT UNION
|
|||
|
1 800 458-9904 (U) REDONDO BEACH, CA [US ex CA]
|
|||
|
TRW CUSTOMER
|
|||
|
1 800 792-3515 (U) [IN]
|
|||
|
TRW CUSTOMER SERVICE
|
|||
|
1 800 362-4485 (U) WALTHAM, MA [MA]
|
|||
|
TRW CUSTOMER SERVICE
|
|||
|
1 800 354-4848 (C) OAKLAND, CA [CA]
|
|||
|
TRW CUSTOMER SERVICE DIVISION
|
|||
|
1 800 432-1879 (B) GRAND PRAIRIE, TX [US]
|
|||
|
TRW CUTTING TOOLS DIVISION
|
|||
|
1 800 544-7732 (B) AUGUSTA, GA [GA]
|
|||
|
TRW FASTENERS DIVISION
|
|||
|
1 800 327-8361 (U) CAMBRIDGE, MA [US ex MA]
|
|||
|
TRW IMAGE PROCESSING
|
|||
|
1 800 637-6812 (U) SACRAMENTO, CA [CA]
|
|||
|
TRW INCORPORATED RPLCMNT PRTS DVSN OF CSTMR SRVC
|
|||
|
1 800 352-2273 (D) INDEPENDENCE, OH [US ex OH]
|
|||
|
TRW MEDICAL ELECTRONICS
|
|||
|
1 800 446-6714 (U) MARLBORO, MA [CT MA NH RI]
|
|||
|
TRW MICROWAVE
|
|||
|
1 800 822-5864 (B) SUNNYVALE, CA [US]
|
|||
|
TRW MORTGAGE CREDIT CUSTOMER SERVICE
|
|||
|
1 800 633-8809 (U) MIAMI, FL [US]
|
|||
|
TRW NELSON STUD WELDING DIVISION
|
|||
|
1 800 831-7425 (C) SAN LEANDRO, CA [US ex CA]
|
|||
|
TRW PLEUGER
|
|||
|
1 800 438-0216 (B) STATESVILLE, NC [US ex NC]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE INFORMATION
|
|||
|
1 800 872-1288 (U) ORANGE, CA [CA]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICE
|
|||
|
1 800 343-8745 (U) WHEATON, IL [US]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICE
|
|||
|
1 800 458-7357 (U) TREVOSE, PA [US]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 321-1890 (U) CLEVELAND, OH []
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 228-7357 (U) CLEVELAND, OH [US]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 537-9320 (B) ANAHEIM, CA [US]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 842-2030 (U) TREVOSE, PA [PA]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 462-0750 (U) WARREN, OH [AK OH]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 922-7183 (B) RICHMOND, VA [VA]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 451-6887 (U) MIAMI, FL [FL]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 772-1720 (U) SUITE 109, [MS]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 321-1891 (U) CLEVELAND, OH [US ex OH]
|
|||
|
TRW REAL ESTATE LOAN SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 962-2214 (B) JACKSON, MS [MS]
|
|||
|
TRW REIS
|
|||
|
1 800 248-4879 (U) RIVERSIDE, CA [US CD]
|
|||
|
TRW RELS
|
|||
|
1 800 448-9538 (U) SOUTHFIELD, MI [US]
|
|||
|
TRW RELS
|
|||
|
1 800 843-0266 (U) DEDHAM, MA [US]
|
|||
|
TRW RELS
|
|||
|
1 800 334-4594 (U) SOUTHFIELD, MI [US]
|
|||
|
TRW RELS
|
|||
|
1 800 845-4331 (U) BROOKLYN, NY [US]
|
|||
|
TRW SYSTEMS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
|
|||
|
1 800 262-1545 (U) REDONDO BEACH, CA [CA]
|
|||
|
TRW SYSTEMS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
|
|||
|
1 800 421-6818 (U) REDONDO BEACH, CA [US ex CA]
|
|||
|
TRW TITLE INSURANCE
|
|||
|
1 800 872-4349 (U) AUSTIN, TX [US]
|
|||
|
TRW TITLE INSURANCE OF NEW YORK
|
|||
|
1 800 848-1801 (U) HACKENSACK, NJ [US]
|
|||
|
TRW TRANSPORTATION
|
|||
|
1 800 255-6116 () FARMINGTON HILLS, MI [US]
|
|||
|
TRW/REAL ESTATE INFORMATION SERVICES
|
|||
|
1 800 445-5201 (C) ENGLEWOOD, CO [US]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
I will be releasing a file on the individual credit as soon
|
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|
as it becomes available to me. It should be coming in the mail soon,
|
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|
so it will be released shortly thereafter.
|
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|
|
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|
Till then,
|
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|
|
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|
HASTA, RASTA, PARTY TIL' YA PUKE!!!!
|
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|
|||
|
K L U D G E / S C A N T R O N I C S P U B L I C A T I O N S
|
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|
|||
|
|
|||
|
=============================================================================
|
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|
( 8 ) HACK/PHREAK NEWS & RUMORS
|
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=============================================================================
|
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|
|
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|
============================================================
|
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|
= HACK/PHREAK NEWS & RUMORS =
|
|||
|
============================================================
|
|||
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|
|||
|
Rumor has it that New York Telephone will be changing the ANAC for New York
|
|||
|
(Currently 958)
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
The Lost City Of Atlantis will be going back up again. It will have more
|
|||
|
than three nodes!
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Recently we received this note on our bulletin board (Realm Of Chaos), it
|
|||
|
would have made us nervous if it weren't for:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1. They left a number that does not belong to MCI.
|
|||
|
2. There is no employee listed as Ted Jahnsen at MCI.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This goes to show you just how low some people will go. Hope you get as good
|
|||
|
a laugh from it as we did!
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
re: Toll Fraud Abuse Cases
|
|||
|
4/29/91 5:58 pm EST
|
|||
|
Stem: Office of Communications/Data Integrity & Auditing
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Hello. My name is Ted Jahnsen and I am a representative at MCI
|
|||
|
telecommunications in Texas. My reason for calling you on this bulletin board
|
|||
|
system stems from a number of unauthorized calls coming from this installation
|
|||
|
address in the near-present and not-so distant past. Aside from that, there
|
|||
|
are also numerous attempts to call this system using MCI and subsidiary
|
|||
|
long-haul lines, with illegitimate calling cards, to this system. I have made
|
|||
|
a note to the Fraud Control and Communications office here in Texas and they in
|
|||
|
turn will contact your local office in New York. NYNEX has been very
|
|||
|
cooperative in providing us with the information we need in order to bring
|
|||
|
charges upon you, most specifically US Code 1030 which involves wire fraud and
|
|||
|
similar offenses. Please note, a racketeering charge is also possible being
|
|||
|
that you may have committed 2 or more violations in accordance with this
|
|||
|
statute.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For some time we have also been aware of pro-hacker related activities on this
|
|||
|
system as well. We URGE you not to continue it unless you find it your
|
|||
|
court.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Thanks for you time.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We thank you ahead of time for your cooperation,
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Ted Jahnsen
|
|||
|
(MCI West Division Communications Control and Auditing)
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
It has now been confirmed, DAVID LIGHTMAN (NPA 214) is a NARC.
|
|||
|
This information was verified when he threatened a member of N.A.S.T.Y.
|
|||
|
(JAMES BROWN) with calling up his friend at the Secret Service office and
|
|||
|
giving him his full information. (Besides, wouldn't you think a guy who ran
|
|||
|
a board called 'HACKERS' was a NARC anyway???) After JAMES BROWN politely told
|
|||
|
him to 'FUCK OFF' he then proceeded in calling the Secret Service.
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
It is a confirmed fact that Everlast (Julio Alverez NPA 305) is a narc. He
|
|||
|
has, on numerous occasions turned in people while on three-way with others.
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
Word is out on the upcoming raids stemming from the current investigations
|
|||
|
involving the abuse of BT-Tymnet. The investigation has an extremely large
|
|||
|
number of agencies working together: CIA, FBI, SS, Army Intelligence and
|
|||
|
several Bell companies are rumored to be working closely with Tymnet
|
|||
|
security to pinpoint the person(s) involved. The focus is believed to be
|
|||
|
on individuals in or around New York State.
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
New York Telephones INFO-LOOK Gateway will soon be discontinued.
|
|||
|
Court rulings related to the breakup of AT&T prohibit NYNEX and the six
|
|||
|
other regional Bell Operating Companies from providing their own information
|
|||
|
services or regulating the content of the services they transport on their
|
|||
|
networks. The Bell operating companies are seeking to overturn these
|
|||
|
restrictions preventing it from ensuring the quality and consistency of
|
|||
|
services offered on INFO-LOOK. (Censorship perhaps?)
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
The rumors of a new-revised Legion of Doom have been thoroughly denied by
|
|||
|
still-surviving ex-member Erik Bloodaxe. Bloodaxe says that he had toyed
|
|||
|
with the idea of reforming the group with many of the still remaining active
|
|||
|
members, with several new additions. The group was to include:
|
|||
|
Erik Bloodaxe, Skinny Puppy, Prime Suspect, Jester Sluggo, Phantom Phreaker,
|
|||
|
Doom Prophet, Doc Holliday, Malefactor, Agent Steal, Epsilon, Pain Hertz,
|
|||
|
and Parmaster. The group was never formed due to a number of reasons.
|
|||
|
Bloodaxe assures everyone that the Legion of Doom is gone, and any rumors to
|
|||
|
the contrary are completely false. Any people claiming to be in any new LOD
|
|||
|
are liars and should not be believed. Bloodaxe added that he wishes people
|
|||
|
would stop 'flogging a dead horse' and lay the group to rest.
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
JAMES BROWN received notice from BAGHEAD that he has been busted. All his
|
|||
|
notes and computer equipment were confiscated.
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|||
|
An as of yet unidentified hacker known as Dr. Doom is plaguing the Internet
|
|||
|
Relay Chat (IRC) with rather childish antics. This person has gained root
|
|||
|
on the GNU system POGO (pogo.gnu.ai.mit.edu) and is changing the system's
|
|||
|
message of the day to read various things having to do with "the new LOD."
|
|||
|
Because of the nature of the GNU system, and Richard Stallman's abhorrence
|
|||
|
to computer security, system administrators refuse to investigate the
|
|||
|
problem, but are becoming annoyed at having to continually change
|
|||
|
/etc/motd to its original message. Sources say that if the problem persists
|
|||
|
GNU may rethink its open policy somewhat, since deliberate abuse of the
|
|||
|
system's non-security defeats the nature of trust trying to be demonstrated
|
|||
|
in having such a system.
|
|||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|