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39 KiB
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870 lines
39 KiB
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Computer underground Digest Wed May 12 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 35
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senrio
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CONTENTS, #5.35 (May 12 1993)
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File 1--My Thoughts/questions on the "Clipper" chip.
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File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter on Clipper Chip
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File 3--Response to Rich Mackinnon on Clipper
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File 4--Another Letter of Concern to "Hate Speech" Inquiry
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File 5--FBI Raids Telco Manager's Home (TELECOM DIGEST SPECIAL)
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File 6--DEF CON I Update
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
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editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
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WHQ) 203-832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
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nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893;
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ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
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UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
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uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /pub/CuD/cud
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halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
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AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
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Back issues also may be obtained through mailserver at:
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server@blackwlf.mese.com
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 22:10:03 CDT
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From: Eric Schnoebelen <eric%cirr.com@HARVUNXW.BITNET>
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Subject: File 1--My Thoughts/questions on the "Clipper" chip.
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I've seen a lot of hoopla on the "Clipper" chip that the (U.S.)
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government recently announced, and I am not entirely certain what to
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make of it.
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I'm a little suspicious of the intent, as well as those who created it
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(who exactly did?).
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But, what I am more concerned about is the exportability of it, and
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how it is going to become a "world-wide" standard, which it will need
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to do, if it is to become accepted at all. The U.S. is no longer the
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center of the universe, and U.S. companies cannot afford to make two
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products, one for distribution in the U.S., and one outside. If
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forced to choose, many will choose to build the "international"
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version exclusively.
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Another concern is the lack of a description of the algorithm. The
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algorithm is needed if there are to be software implementations, and
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software implementations are sorely needed.
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I ask because I have been struggling with trying to get the NSA's last
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encryption algorithm, the Data Encryption Standard, exported when used
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for authentication. Our interpretation is that we cannot export any
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form of user accessible routine that implements DES, not even a
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crippled edition of crypt(3), which can do only password
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authentication. Needless to say, this has caused much concern amongst
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our European distributors and customers.
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We have spent the last two years trying to get an answer from the
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Department of Commerce about the legality of exporting a crippled
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version of crypt(3), which can do only authentication, and gotten
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basically no where. We were finally given the names of a couple of
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folks inside the NSA, but we're almost afraid to talk to them...
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If the "Clipper" chip is to be viable, it cannot have these sorts of
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problems hanging over it. The algorithms need to be publicly know,
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and implemented, and no export restrictions placed upon either the
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chip or the software. Otherwise, it is worse than useless.
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------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 11 May 93 17:11:42 -0700
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From: Russell Brand <brand@REASONING.COM>
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Subject: File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter on Clipper Chip
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In CU Digest 5.34, Jerry Leichter <leichter@LRW.COM> attacked Mike
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Godwin's position on the open design principle.
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While Leichter is correct that in certain environments, an %open
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design' is fact neither partical nor appropriate. CLIPPER is doesn't
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present an instance of this. One of the reasons that an open design
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is important is so that you don't have to worry what advantage someone
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can get by stealing it. Because the a well tested is system is
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supposedly intrinsically strong, you are unlikely to have to replace
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MILLIONS of them in the field because of a person being single bribed
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to betray some of the secrets. [Of course in the CLIPPER system there
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are other people to bribe instead and even if CLIPPER had open design
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there would be other strong reasons to oppose it.]
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If CLIPPER is commonly used to protect corporate secrets what is the
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logical bribe price? I bet it is more than enough to buy a mere
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government secret but that it isn't enough to quickly factor an
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product of a pair of well chosen 1000 digit primes.
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Date: Tue, 11 May 1993 11:13:41 -0400
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From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@EFF.ORG>
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Subject: File 3--Response to Rich Mackinnon on Clipper
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In article <1993Apr27.232320.7422@tic.com> Spartan@cup.portal.com (Rich
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Mackinnon of the University of Texas government department )writes:
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>How much will the crippled encryption scheme really "chill" our use of
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>emergent communications technology, i.e., threaten our free speech protection
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>to the point that we may opt (if possible) to use other communication
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>media?
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The fact that it's an emergent medium increases the risk that it can be
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chilled. But note that the risk of a "chilling effect" is only one small
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part of my argument, and not a necessary part. Far more disturbing is the
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increase in the government's power to tell me what *general* forms I'm
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allowed to use when I communicate.
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>The threat of a warrant does not seem to have a wide chilling
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>effect on the use of standard telephones and postal mail--yet, the possibility
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>of interception is still ever-present.
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The use of telephones and mail was already a fait accompli when wiretapping
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became widespread. There was no chance that wiretapping would chill an
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emerging technology. Moreover, the character of e-mail is somewhat
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different from that of telephonic communications--it's less ephemeral and
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more "broadcastable." That is, it's easier to store and echo to large
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groups of people. (In comparison, it's somewhat more difficult to tape a
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voice conversation and echo it to the world.)
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What's more, encryption is likely to increase the expectation of privacy
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with regard to e-mail and all other communications that are encrypted.
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>Does not the warrant sufficiently address this balance?
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If you are asking whether we should rely on the search-warrant process to
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protect our privacy when we have access to encryption, my answer is
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"Why rely on the government to do what you can do yourself?"
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>If the protection that a warrant offers is not
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>sufficient to alleviate our fears of unwarranted search, seizure, and arrest,
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>then perhaps there are bigger problems to deal with other than encryption
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>schemes.
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Perhaps there are, but an individual does not have to ask the legislature
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for permission to use encryption. Not yet, at any rate. So, encryption
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enables an individual to tackle his own privacy problem without having to
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lobby for a change in the warrant process. Most theorists would regard
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this as empowering to the individual.
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>I'm nowhere near as qualified as Mike to offer an opinion on this issue,
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>but it seems to me that the "process" is exactly where we should be
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>focusing--the Constitutional issues are fascinating, but distracting.
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Sigh. The Constitutional issues will be the only ones we are left with.
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Imagine that we have improved the process and had lots of dialog with the
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Administration, and the Clipper initiative remains the result. If the
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process is wonderful and the result is bad, does this mean we have nothing
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to criticize the government about?
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>I have to believe that the warrant is an acceptable safeguard to both
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>sides of the balance. Given that, it appears that the balance has been
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>disturbed by an unilateral decision with respect to the Clipper Chip.
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This is a very charitable picture of the government's mistake, Rich.
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You seem to be saying that if the decision had been other than
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"unilateral," the government's decision would be unimpeachable. I beg to
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differ. The whole point of the Bill of Rights is to remove certain rights
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from political debate. As Melville Nimmer comments, a "balancing" test is
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never adequate to protect freedom of speech. As it stands, we have the
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freedom to say things to each other in secret (through encryption). Must
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we surrender this right to the government once the process gets better?
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> The
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>plan presented by the Clinton Administration, as far as attempting to
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>balance the concerns of government and the people, seems sound.
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The problem is that the plan "balances" the concerns of government in the
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direction of government. Many people have been critical of the
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government's insistence that being able to guarantee access to private
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communications is the cornerstone of law enforcement. No study of law
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enforcement I know of supports this view.
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>This is a political problem in that a practical solution is available, but
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>cannot be agreed upon because the process leading to that solution did
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>not allow for the necessary consultation and input to insure its acceptability.
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>I'm certain that once bruised egos are attended to and future assurances
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>of consultation are gained, that the solution settled upon will be very
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>much like the one that stands.
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This is the kind of myopia I expect from the University of Texas
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Department of Government, a department that privileges process over
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substance. I hope I may be forgiven for being cynical about the
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willingness of government professors to sign our rights away in the name
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of "good process."
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It's true that, historically, government has been able to compel a
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"balance" between our privacy rights and the government's often-legitimate
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interests. But now we have a technology that enables us to remove our
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privacy from the balancing calculation--a technology that restores the
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status quo ante of the last century, when sophisticated bugging and
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wiretapping technologies did not exist. I don't think the 19th-century
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standard of private interpersonal communications is so threatening to
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government stability as to justify mandatory government access to our
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communications through Digital Telephony and Clipper.
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 02:33:12 -0500
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From: Dave.Harnett@F68.N272.Z1.FIDONET.ORG(Dave Harnett)
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Subject: File 4--Another Letter of Concern to "Hate Speech" Inquiry
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23 Apr 93
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Office of Policy Analysis and Development
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NTIA, US Dept of Commerce
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14th St and Constitution Ave NW
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Washington, DC 20230
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In response to Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 930349-3049:
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I stand qualified to respond to this inquiry by virtue of my three
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years experience as the operator of a computer bulletin board and my
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status as a member of three computer bulletin board networks. In the
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five years before I established my computer bulletin board, I
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participated in discussion groups on other computer bulletin boards
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and networks.
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I harbor grave concerns regarding your inquiry, particularly your
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scrutiny of a relationship between computer bulletin boards and "hate
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crimes." I can summarize my position with a response to one of the
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questions you pose in IV.A.13 of the Supplementary Information
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section. Governments, specifically telecommunications regulators,
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have *no* proper role with respect to the content of messages carried
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over telecommunications channels.
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Computer bulletin boards are a truly democratic medium. Unlike
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traditional broadcast and print media, few barriers exist to preclude
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an individual from exchanging ideas via computer-based
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telecommunications. The medium is a great equalizer. In the absence
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of visual and aural cues that might reveal race, religion, gender,
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age, education, or disabilities, ideas become more important than the
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person expressing the ideas. Individuals are free to migrate among
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discussion areas, bulletin boards, and networks, even to start their
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own bulletin boards and networks in pursuit of a comfortable niche.
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This community without boundaries, sometimes known as cyberspace, is
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self-regulating. I participate in a network of computer bulletin
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boards that was forced to expunge a participant. This individual
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repeatedly engaged in offensive behavior. The community treated this
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individual with respect and tolerance, in the hope that our positive
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attitudes could deter anti-social behavior. Through informal means,
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the community reached an consensus for action. Sadly, some members
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withdrew from the community, to protest what they perceived as
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authoritarian censorship. However, this situation keenly illustrates
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that people are capable of resolving problems without interference
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from government statutes and regulations.
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My greatest fear is people who fear ideas, people who would use the
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force of government to stifle the expression of ideas. The legitimate
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role of government is to punish not ideas, but only actions that
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violate the rights of another person to life, liberty, and property.
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It matters not that some groups or individuals find some ideas hateful
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or offensive, or that ideas can prompt some sociopaths to commit
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violent criminal acts. Political speech can be highly offensive and
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even hateful to some people. The rhetoric of politician David Duke
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comes to mind. Historically though, the courts offer the greatest
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protection to political speech. Let us not allow the hysteria of
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political correctness to compromise the principles of a free society.
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If we have confidence in ourselves and our beliefs, we have nothing to
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fear from the forces of intolerance and hate.
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Sincerely,
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David A. Harnett
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Computer bulletin board - 914 452 4753
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Electronic mail address - Dave.Harnett@f68.n272.z1.fidonet.org
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USPS - PO Box 188, Poughkeepsie, NY 12602-0188
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------------------------------
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Date: Sun, 9 May 1993 14:59:47 -0500
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From: TELECOM Moderator <telecom@DELTA.EECS.NWU.EDU>
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Subject: File 5--FBI Raids Telco Manager's Home (TELECOM DIGEST SPECIAL)
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: The following is reprinted from Telecom Digest,
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available as a mailing list or a Usenet Group. For those who forget,
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Pat Townson, the TD moderator, was the original impetus in the
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founding of CuD)).
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This news report from the May 9, 1993 %Omaha World Herald% arrived in
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my mail just a few minutes ago.
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PAT
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From--jsaker@cwis.unomaha.edu (James R. Saker Jr.)
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Subject--FBI Raid on Curtis Nebr. Telco, Family
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Organization--University of Nebraska at Omaha
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Date--Sun, 9 May 1993 16:34:53 GMT
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The following article detailing a FBI raid on a small-town family and
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local exchange carrier was printed in this morning's Sunday %Omaha
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World Herald%:
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"FBI Probe, Raid Anger Curtis Man"
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Stephen Buttry, %Omaha World Herald%, Sunday May 9, 1993
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Curtis Neb. -- The evening was winding down for the Cole family. Ed
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Cole, general manager of the Curtis Telephone Co., had dozed off on
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the living room couch. His wife, Carol, was running water for her
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bath. The 10-year-old identical twins, Stephanie and Jennifer, had
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gone to bed. Amanda, 14, was watching "48 Hours" on television in the
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living room.
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"It had something to do with fingerprints and catching criminals,"
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Amanda remembers of the TV show.
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At 9:40 p.m., Amanda heard a knock and answered the door. In
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marched the FBI. Thus began a year of fear, anger and uncertainty for
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the Coles.
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Mrs. Cole, 40, still has nightmares about the night of May 13,
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1992, when federal agents stormed into her bedroom, startling her as
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she was undressing for her bath, naked from the waist up.
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"I used to go to bed and sleep the whole night," she said last
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week. "I can't anymore."
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Federal agents did not find the illegal wiretapping equipment they
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were seeking, and a year later no one has been charged. The agents
|
|||
|
seized nothing from the house and later returned the cassette tapes
|
|||
|
they took from the phone company office.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Ronald Rawalt, the FBI agent in North Platte who headed the
|
|||
|
investigation that led to the raid, declined to comment, referring
|
|||
|
questions to the Omaha office.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"It's still a pending investigation, and we're not allowed to make
|
|||
|
a statement," said agent Doug Hokenstad of the FBI's Omaha office. If
|
|||
|
the investigation comes up empty, he said "we normally don't make a
|
|||
|
statement at the end of the investigation."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
That infuriates Cole, 39, who says the raid cast suspicion on him
|
|||
|
and the phone company and left them with no way to clear their names.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"Either file charges or say there's nothing there," he said. "This
|
|||
|
was done in a highly visible manner, and there was no finality to it."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Request for Help
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Cole has asked Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., to investigate. Beth
|
|||
|
Gonzales, Kerrey's press secretary, said the senator received Cole's
|
|||
|
letter and is assessing the situation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The case that brought FBI agents from Washington, Denver, Houston
|
|||
|
and Omaha, as well as nearby North Platte, to this tiny southwest
|
|||
|
Nebraska town in the Medicine Creek valley apparently started with a
|
|||
|
personnel squabble in the phone company office.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Cole said two women complained of their treatment by two other
|
|||
|
workers. The women who complained threatened to quit if the company
|
|||
|
did not take action against the other women, he said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Cole and his assistant manager, Steve Cole, who is not related,
|
|||
|
observed the office workers for a while.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"We found the same two making the ultimatum were the aggressors,"
|
|||
|
Ed Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
He gave the complaining employees written reprimands, and they quit
|
|||
|
Jan 16, 1992. The two women contended in a hearing concerning state
|
|||
|
unemployment benefits that personality differences with Ed Cole led to
|
|||
|
the reprimands and their resignations.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Both women declined to comment on the matter.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
300-Hertz Tone
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In an affidavit filed to obtain the search warrants, agent Rawalt
|
|||
|
said one of the two, Carol Zak, contacted the FBI in March 1992 and
|
|||
|
told them of "unusual electronic noises (tapping noises) on her
|
|||
|
telephone line at the inception of a call received."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Later in the affidavit, the noise is described not as tapping, but
|
|||
|
as a 300-hertz tone. Steve and Ed Cole demonstrated the tone last week
|
|||
|
on phone company equipment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It is caused, they said, by a defective 5-by-7 circuit board, or
|
|||
|
card. The defect is common, and the company replaces the card if a
|
|||
|
customer complains.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The tone is not heard if a customer answers between rings, but if
|
|||
|
the customer answers during a ring, the tone blares into the earpiece
|
|||
|
for an instant, about the duration of the ring. Ed Cole, who has
|
|||
|
placed wiretaps for law officers with warrants, said wiretaps don't
|
|||
|
cause such a sound.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"Most wiretaps, don't they have a loud, blasting noise to announce
|
|||
|
there's an illegal wiretap?" he asked sarcastically.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Surveillance
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After Mrs. Zak told agent Rawalt of the noise on her line, the FBI
|
|||
|
began recording her calls, the affidavit says. On April 30, the
|
|||
|
affidavit says, the FBI began surveillance of Ed Cole -- not an easy
|
|||
|
task in a town of 791 people.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
During the weeks before the raid, phone company employees noticed a
|
|||
|
stranger watching the office and workers' houses. They guessed that a
|
|||
|
private investigator was watching, possibly gathering information for
|
|||
|
the former workers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"When somebody sits around in a car in a small-town Curtis,
|
|||
|
especially at 3:30 when grade school lets out, people take notice,"
|
|||
|
Steve Cole said. "We had a suspicion that we were under surveillance."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The affidavit says agent Robert Howan, an electrical engineer from
|
|||
|
FBI headquarters, analyzed tapes of Mrs. Zak's phone calls and
|
|||
|
concluded that a wiretap on the line "is controlled from the residence
|
|||
|
of Eddie Cole Jr. and is facilitated through a device or computer
|
|||
|
program at the Curtis Telephone Company."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Based on Rawalt's affidavit, U.S. Magistrate Kathleen Jaudzemis in
|
|||
|
Omaha issued warrants to search Cole's house and company offices.
|
|||
|
Federal agents gathered in North Platte and headed south to Curtis for
|
|||
|
the late-evening raid.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Flashlights, Commotion
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When Amanda Cole opened the door, she said "The first people that
|
|||
|
came in went past me." They rushed through the living room into the
|
|||
|
kitchen to let more agents in the back door.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The agents wore black jackets and raincoats, with large, yellow
|
|||
|
letters proclaiming "FBI." Neighbors and passersby began to notice the
|
|||
|
commotion as other agents searched the outside with flashlights.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The agents showed Cole the search warrant and told him and Amanda
|
|||
|
to stay in the living room. The agents asked where the other girls
|
|||
|
were, and Cole replied that it was a school night and they were in
|
|||
|
bed.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Rather than flipping the hall light switch, the agents went down
|
|||
|
the darkened hall with flashlights, "like they think my kids are going
|
|||
|
to jump up and shoot them," Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The twins recalled that they were puzzled, then scared, to wake up
|
|||
|
as FBI agents shined flashlights on them. The intruders did not enter
|
|||
|
gently, either.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"After they left, our doorknob was broken," Jennifer said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Farther down the hall, the agents found the embarrassed and angry
|
|||
|
Mrs. Cole. "They didn't knock or anything, and I was undressing," she
|
|||
|
said. "They told me to get a T-shirt on."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After Mrs. Cole put her clothes back on, agents allowed her to go
|
|||
|
with them to get the frightened twins out of bed. Mrs. Cole and the
|
|||
|
twins also were instructed to stay in the living room.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Interrogation
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
As agents searched the house, Cole said, Rawalt told him to step
|
|||
|
out on the porch. While he was outside, Mrs. Cole decided to call the
|
|||
|
phone company's attorney.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"They told me I couldn't do that," she said. "I worked at the
|
|||
|
Sheriff's Office for several years, and I know no matter what you're
|
|||
|
accused of, you're entitled to an attorney." She called anyway.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Meanwhile, according to Cole, Rawalt was interrogating and berating
|
|||
|
him loudly on the front porch, creating what Cole considered a "public
|
|||
|
spectacle."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"I've lived here 15 years. I've built up a reputation," said Cole,
|
|||
|
who is president of the Curtis Housing Authority, chairman of the
|
|||
|
Nebraska Telephone Association, and coach of the twins' softball team.
|
|||
|
"And there's cars going by real slow. Here Rawalt brings me out on the
|
|||
|
front porch, turn on the light for everyone to see and starts
|
|||
|
interrogating me."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Cole said Rawalt tried to pressure him to admit he was wiretapping
|
|||
|
and tell him where the equipment was. "He pointed at my wife and kids
|
|||
|
and said, 'Look at what you're putting them through,'" Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Three-Hour Search
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Cole said it would take about 20 minutes for an expert to examine
|
|||
|
the phones in the house -- a teen line, the main line plus two
|
|||
|
extensions, a 24-hour repair prone that rings at his home as well as
|
|||
|
the main office, and an alarm that rings in from the central office.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"The search continued for more than three hours, as agents looked
|
|||
|
in closets, cabinets and drawers. The family could hear Garth Brooks
|
|||
|
singing as agents played the children's tapes, apparently hunting for
|
|||
|
recorded phone conversations.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
At the same time the Coles' house was being searched, agents
|
|||
|
visited Steve Cole and Roger Bryant, a phone company employee who is a
|
|||
|
neighbor of Mrs. Zak's.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"They insinuated I had broken into my neighbor's house to put in a
|
|||
|
wiretap," he said. The agents "asked me if I knew if Ed was making
|
|||
|
electrical devices in his basement."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(Cole said he wasn't. Agents found no such devices.)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The agents told Steve Cole to take them to the phone company office
|
|||
|
so they could search the switch room.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Number of Agents
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Coles were not sure how many agents participated in the raid.
|
|||
|
They saw at least five at the house but thought they heard others
|
|||
|
outside and entering the back door and going into the basement. They
|
|||
|
said seven agents were at the office, but they weren't sure which
|
|||
|
agents searched both sites.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When the agents said they were looking for wiretap equipment, Steve
|
|||
|
Cole said "I told them it just couldn't be right. If Ed were to do
|
|||
|
something or I were to do something, the other one would know."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Steve Cole said agents searching the phone company, including
|
|||
|
Howan, did not appear to understand the equipment very well. They
|
|||
|
would not tell him why they suspected a wiretap.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After 1 a.m., Ed Cole said, the search of his house ended, with
|
|||
|
agents empty-handed and taking him to the office.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
About 4 a.m., the agents told Steve Cole about the 300-hertz tone.
|
|||
|
"The minute they told me, I knew what it was," he said. He said he
|
|||
|
quickly found the defective card for Mrs. Zak's line, demonstrated the
|
|||
|
sound for the agents, then replaced it and showed that the sound was
|
|||
|
gone.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"I demonstrated it, and then they both got white," Steve Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Card Analyzed
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Howan then went to Rawalt, who was with Ed Cole outside the switch
|
|||
|
room and explained what had caused the tone, Ed and Steve Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"I'm jubilant," Ed Cole recalled thinking. "I've been exonerated."
|
|||
|
But he said Rawalt told him: "I've investigated this for two months.
|
|||
|
I've flown agents in from around the country ... I may charge you on
|
|||
|
circumstantial evidence."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"My heart just sunk," Cole said, "because that means they're not
|
|||
|
here to find the truth. They're just trying to support their pre-
|
|||
|
conceived ideas."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
He said Rawalt told him he would take the card for analysis.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Cole said the searches could have, and should have, been conducted
|
|||
|
without the embarrassing fanfare -- during normal business hours,
|
|||
|
while the children were in school and his wife was at work.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Because of the highly public nature of the raid, Cole said, the
|
|||
|
company has hired a lawyer to investigate the investigation. The
|
|||
|
company is trying, with little success, Cole said, to get information
|
|||
|
from the FBI so it can reassure regulators, lenders, stockholders and
|
|||
|
customers of the company's integrity.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Tapes of Calls
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Rawalt visited the Cole's house again in January. Although this
|
|||
|
time it wasn't a raid, his presence upset the family. He returned
|
|||
|
tapes seized in the raid but told Cole that the circuit card was
|
|||
|
still at the FBI lab being analyzed. It still has not been returned,
|
|||
|
Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"The FBI, the most respected law enforcement agency in the world,
|
|||
|
has had this card in their laboratory in Washington, D.C., for almost
|
|||
|
one year, and they still cannot determine if it has a tape recorder
|
|||
|
strapped to it," Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The bureau also has refused to give the phone company of its tapes
|
|||
|
of Mrs. Zak's phone calls, which could show whether the sound on her
|
|||
|
line was the tone from the defective card, Cole said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"It makes one wonder if they'd put a family and a company through
|
|||
|
this just because they don't want to admit a mistake," he said. "If
|
|||
|
they'll just give me my life back by making a public statement, it
|
|||
|
would be over."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(End of article forwarded to TELECOM Digest.)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Jamie Saker jsaker@cwis.unomaha.edu
|
|||
|
Systems Engineer Business/MIS Major
|
|||
|
Telenational Communications Univ. Nebraska at Omaha
|
|||
|
(402) 392-7548
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
[Moderator's Note: Thank you very much for sending along this report.
|
|||
|
This is just another example of the clumsy, oafish and unprofessional
|
|||
|
organization which has become such a big joke in recent years in the
|
|||
|
USA: The Federal Bureau of Inquisition. Imagine: a telephone line out
|
|||
|
of order which turns into a massive FBI assault on a private family.
|
|||
|
And of course there will be no apology; no reparations; nothing like
|
|||
|
that. The FBI is too arrogant and powerful to bother with making
|
|||
|
amends for the damage they have done. I hope Ed Cole and his telco
|
|||
|
demand and obtain revenge on everyone concerned, including first and
|
|||
|
foremost Mrs. Zak, the scorned woman who set the whole thing in motion
|
|||
|
when she got fired for her bad attitude at work. I know if it was
|
|||
|
myself, I would not be content until I had turned the screws very hard
|
|||
|
on all of them, especially her. PAT]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Date: Wed, 12 May 1993 17:00:53 PDT
|
|||
|
From: "The Dark Tangent" <dtangent@DTANGENT.WA.COM>
|
|||
|
Subject: File 6--DEF CON I Update
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
D E F C O N I C O N V E N T I O N
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE <<
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Finalized Announcement: 5/08/1993
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We are proud to announce the 1st annual Def Con.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If you are at all familiar with any of the previous Con's, then
|
|||
|
you will have a good idea of what DEF CON I will be like. If you don't
|
|||
|
have any experience with Con's, they are an event on the order of a
|
|||
|
pilgrimage to Mecca for the underground. They are a mind-blowing orgy
|
|||
|
of information exchange, viewpoints, speeches, education,
|
|||
|
enlightenment... And most of all sheer, unchecked PARTYING. It is an
|
|||
|
event that you must experience at least once in your lifetime.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The partying aside, it is a wonderful opportunity to met some of
|
|||
|
the celebrities of the underground computer scene. And those that
|
|||
|
shape its destiny - the lawyers, libertarians, and most of all the
|
|||
|
other There will be plenty of open-ended discussion on security,
|
|||
|
telephones and other topics. As well as what TIME magazine calls the
|
|||
|
"Cyberpunk Movement".
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Las Vegas, is as you might have guessed a great choice for the
|
|||
|
Con. Gambling, loads of hotels and facilities, cheap air fare and
|
|||
|
room rates. It's also in the West Coast making it more available to a
|
|||
|
different crowd than the former Cons have been.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Your foray into the scene and your life will be forever incomplete if
|
|||
|
by some chance you miss out on DEF CON I. Plan to be there!
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
WHO: You know who you are.
|
|||
|
WHAT: Super Blowout Party Fest, with Speakers and Activities.
|
|||
|
WHERE: Las Vegas, Nevada
|
|||
|
WHEN: July 9th, 10th and 11th (Fri, Sat, Sun) 1993
|
|||
|
WHY: To meet all the other people out there you've been talking to for
|
|||
|
months and months, and get some solid information instead of rumors.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DESCRIPTION:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
So you're bored, and have never gone to a convention? You want to
|
|||
|
meet all the other members of the so called 'computer underground'?
|
|||
|
You've been calling BBS systems for a long time now, and you
|
|||
|
definitely have been interacting on the national networks. You've
|
|||
|
bullshitted with the best, and now it's time to meet them in Vegas!
|
|||
|
For me I've been networking for years, and now I'll get a chance to
|
|||
|
meet everyone in the flesh. Get together with a group of your friends
|
|||
|
and make the journey.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We cordially invite all hackers/phreaks, techno-rats,
|
|||
|
programmers, writers, activists, lawyers, philosophers, politicians,
|
|||
|
security officials, cyberpunks and all network sysops and users to
|
|||
|
attend.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DEF CON I will be over the weekend in the middle of down town Las
|
|||
|
Vegas at the Sands Hotel. Why Las Vegas? Well the West Coast hasn't
|
|||
|
had a good Convention that I can remember, and Las Vegas is the place
|
|||
|
to do it. Cheap food, alcohol, lots of entertainment and, like us, it
|
|||
|
never sleeps. We will have a convention room open 24 hours so
|
|||
|
everyone can meet and plan and scheme till they pass out. Events and
|
|||
|
speakers will be there to provide distraction and some actual
|
|||
|
information and experiences from this loosely knit community.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is an initial announcement. It is meant only to alert
|
|||
|
you to the time, dates and location of the convention. Future
|
|||
|
announcements will inform you about specific speakers and events.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
An information pack is FTPable off of the internet at
|
|||
|
nwnexus.wa.com, in the cd/pub/dtangent directory. The IP# is
|
|||
|
192.135.191.1 Information updates will be posted there in the future
|
|||
|
as well as scanned map images and updated speaker lists.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
FINAL NOTES:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
COST: How you get there is up to you, but United Airlines
|
|||
|
will be the official carrier (meaning if you fly you get a 5% to 10%
|
|||
|
price reduction off the cheapest available fare at the time of ticket
|
|||
|
purchase) When buying airline tickets, call 1-800-521-4041 and
|
|||
|
reference meeting ID# 540ii. Hotel Rooms will cost $62 per night for
|
|||
|
a double occupancy room. Get your friends together and split the cost
|
|||
|
to $31. Food is inexpensive. The entertainment is free inside the
|
|||
|
hotel. Reference the DEF CON I convention when registering, as we
|
|||
|
have a block of rooms locked out, but once they go it will be first
|
|||
|
come, fist serve. Call 1-800-634-6901 for the reservations desk.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The convention itself will cost $30 at the door, or $15 in
|
|||
|
advance. It pays to register in advance! Also it helps us plan and
|
|||
|
cover expenses! Mail checks/money orders/cashiers checks to: DEF CON
|
|||
|
I, 2709 East Madison Street, #102, Seattle, WA, 98112. Make them
|
|||
|
payable to: "DEF CON" we're not tring to make money, we will be tring
|
|||
|
to cover costs of the conference room and hotel plus air fair for the
|
|||
|
speakers who require it. Don't bother mailing it a week in andvance,
|
|||
|
that just won't happen. Advanced registration gets you a groovy 24
|
|||
|
bit color pre-generated name tag. Include with your payment the name
|
|||
|
you want listed, your association/group affiliation/bbs/whatever,
|
|||
|
email address, and/or bbs number for sysops. Last day for the
|
|||
|
registrations to reach me will be July 1st.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SPEAKERS: We have solicited speakers from all aspects of the
|
|||
|
computer underground and associated culture (Law, Media, Software
|
|||
|
Companies, Cracking Groups, Hacking Groups, Magazine Editors, Etc.)
|
|||
|
If you know of someone interested in speaking on a self selected
|
|||
|
topic, please contact The Dark Tangent to discuss it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
FOR MORE INFORMATION:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For initial comments, requests for more information, information
|
|||
|
about speaking at the event, or maps to the section where prostitution is
|
|||
|
legal outside Las Vegas (Just Kidding) Contact The Dark Tangent by leaving
|
|||
|
me mail at: dtangent@dtangent.wa.com on the InterNet.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Or call: 0-700-TANGENT for conference information/updates and to leave
|
|||
|
questions or comments.
|
|||
|
Or Snail Mail (U.S. Postal Service) it to DEF CON, 2709 East Madison Street,
|
|||
|
#102, Seattle, WA, 98112.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Future information updates will pertain to the speaking agenda.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|||
|
Updates since the last announcement:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> The Secret Service is too busy to attend.
|
|||
|
>> New Media Magazine, Unix World and Robert X. Cringly have stated they will
|
|||
|
attend.
|
|||
|
>> We got a voice mail system working (I think) for comments and questions.
|
|||
|
>> We don't have enough $$$ to fly out the EFF or Phillip Zimmerman (Author
|
|||
|
of PGP) or Loyd Blankenship.
|
|||
|
>> Judy Clark will be representing the CPSR and a few other organizations
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Don't forget to bring a poster / banner representing any of the groups
|
|||
|
you belong to. I want to cover the conference room walls with a
|
|||
|
display of all the various groups / people attending. (Break out the
|
|||
|
crayons and markers)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++=
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DEF CON I CONVENTION [PROPOSED SPEAKING SCHEDULE 5.08.1993]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Saturday the 10th of July 10am, Sands Hotel, Las Vegas
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
INTRODUCTION Welcome to the convention
|
|||
|
*The Dark Tangent (CON Organizer)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Keynote speaker Cyberspace, Society, crime and the future.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To hack or not to hack, that is not the question
|
|||
|
*Ray Kaplan
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Civil Libertarians
|
|||
|
-CPSR Computer Privacy/1st Amendment/Encryption
|
|||
|
*Judy Clark
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-USC Comp. Law Legalities of BBS Operation, message content
|
|||
|
laws and network concerns.
|
|||
|
*Allen Grogan, Editor of Computer Lawyer
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
'The Underworld'
|
|||
|
-Networking Concerns of National Networking
|
|||
|
of CCi Net.
|
|||
|
*Midnight Sorrow.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Corporations
|
|||
|
-Packet Switching
|
|||
|
SPRINT Concerns/security and the future
|
|||
|
MCI of packet switching.
|
|||
|
(*Jim Black, MCI Systems Integrity)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
System 75 Common misbeliefs and rumors of the underground
|
|||
|
*Scott Simpson
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-Virtual Reality The law, and it's intersection with VR
|
|||
|
*Karnow
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-System Administrator Security Concerns of an Administrator
|
|||
|
*Terminus
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The 'Underworld'
|
|||
|
-Internet The security problems with Internet/Networks
|
|||
|
Overview of hacking
|
|||
|
*Dark Druid
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-Getting Busted The process of getting "busted"
|
|||
|
*Count Zero
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-How to be a nobody Hiding your identity in the high-tech future, or
|
|||
|
The payphone is your friend.
|
|||
|
*Anonymous
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-The Prosecutors Their concerns/problems and
|
|||
|
Hacker Hunters suggestions for the 'underworld'/Q&A
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-The Media The effect of the media on public perceptions
|
|||
|
*Erik Bloodaxe / Phrack Magazine
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
CONCLUSION General Q&A
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This itinerary is proposed, and topics and speakers will be marked as
|
|||
|
permanent once a confirmation is recieved. This is by no means the exact
|
|||
|
format of DEF CON I. Any Questions / Comments Contact:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
dtangent@dtangent.wa.com
|
|||
|
Voice Mail 0-700-TANGENT
|
|||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|||
|
Sorry for the huge signature, but I like privacy on sensitive matters.
|
|||
|
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
|||
|
Version: 2.2
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
mQCNAiviMB8AAAEEANO4XmnggG8h8XWtfxShMvRUarlpj2OBSPMrzUNRAKEjupUj
|
|||
|
f/FfszMk0G60GSiCfiosw/m2JcKPQ6OZgQCxfElFUcYkKx/rYjgU3viEmNasjAwN
|
|||
|
jR/9l0WSXlv4CjCUtH/t4rm1C1bs8i6iznmu/dCeuUEZQoRm0Lrdt/10TGt3AAUT
|
|||
|
tCtUaGUgRGFyayBUYW5nZW50IDxkdGFuZ2VudEBkdGFuZ2VudC53YS5jb20+
|
|||
|
=DxKN
|
|||
|
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.35
|
|||
|
************************************
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|