442 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
442 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
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February 1991
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TRASH INSPECTIONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
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By
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Thomas V. Kukura, J.D.
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Special Agent
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Drug Enforcement Administration
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Assigned to the Legal Instruction Unit
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FBI Academy
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Law enforcement officers have learned that trash
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inspections are a worthwhile investigative technique that often
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reveal useful incriminating evidence. Therefore, officers
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contemplating a trash inspection must be cognizant of fourth
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amendment requirements to ensure the subsequent admissibility of
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any evidence obtained. Trash inspections that do not implicate
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fourth amendment privacy interests can be conducted without
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either a search warrant or any constitutionally required factual
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predicate. Conversely, trash inspections that intrude into a
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reasonable expectation of privacy must generally be conducted
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pursuant to a search warrant supported by probable cause.
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This article begins with a discussion of a recent U.S.
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Supreme Court decision upholding a warrantless trash inspection.
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It then examines some recent lower court cases that delineate
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several important factors law enforcement officers should
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consider in deciding whether a particular trash inspection is
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lawful under the fourth amendment.
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SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS WARRANTLESS TRASH INSPECTION
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In California v. Greenwood, (1) the Laguna Beach,
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California, police received information regarding possible drug
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trafficking activity at the residence of Billy Greenwood. After
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some investigation and surveillance of the Greenwood residence,
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an officer asked the regular trash collector to pick up the
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garbage that had been left on the curb in front of the Greenwood
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home and to turn it over to the police without commingling it
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with trash from other houses. The trash collector complied, and
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a subsequent warrantless inspection of the trash bags by the
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officer revealed evidence of drug use, which formed the basis
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for a search warrant for Greenwood's residence and his later
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arrest on felony drug charges.
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On the authority of an earlier California Supreme Court
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ruling, which held that warrantless trash inspections violate
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the fourth amendment, (2) the California courts in Greenwood
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concluded that the probable cause for the search of Greenwood's
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residence would not have existed without the evidence obtained
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from the illegal trash inspections, and that accordingly, all
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the evidence seized from the residence should be suppressed and
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all charges against Greenwood dismissed. The U.S. Supreme Court
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reversed the California court decision.
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No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Publicly Accessible Trash
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The Supreme Court held that a warrantless inspection of
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garbage left at the curb for collection does not constitute a
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fourth amendment search that intrudes into a reasonable
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expectation of privacy. The Court determined that even though
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Greenwood may have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy
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in his trash, that expectation was not objectively reasonable and
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not one that society is willing to protect. (3)
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The Court relied on two factors in concluding there was no
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reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left at the curb for
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collection. First, the Court noted that "[I]t is common
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knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a
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public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
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scavengers, snoops and other members of the public" (4) and that
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it is well established that "[W]hat a person knowingly exposes
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to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
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of Fourth Amendment protection." (5)
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Finding that Greenwood exposed his garbage to the public
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sufficiently to defeat his claim to fourth amendment protection,
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the Court stated that the fourth amendment has never required
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law enforcement officers to shield their eyes from evidence of
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criminal activity that could be observed by any member of the
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public. (6) Here, Greenwood's trash was placed outside the
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curtilage (7) of his residence in an area particularly suited
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for public inspection and where any person in the neighborhood
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had access to the trash.
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Assumption of the Risk Rationale
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A second factor relied on by the Court was the fact
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Greenwood placed his trash at the curb for the express purpose
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of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might
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have sorted through the trash or permitted others, such as the
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police, to do so. In that regard, the Court has consistently
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held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
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in information voluntarily turned over to third parties, even
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where the information is disclosed with the belief that it will
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be used only for a limited purpose, and even where it is assumed
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the third parties will not betray the confidence placed in them.
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(8)
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Individuals assume the risk that information they
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voluntarily reveal to a third party may be conveyed by that
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person to law enforcement officials. By voluntarily conveying
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his trash to the regular trash collector for routine pickup,
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Greenwood assumed the risk that the trash collector might convey
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the contents of that trash to a law enforcement officer. This
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assumption of the risk rationale applies even if Greenwood
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believed the garbage would be taken to the dump and destroyed
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and even if Greenwood believed the confidence he placed in the
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collector to destroy the trash would not be betrayed. (9)
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DETERMINATIVE FACTORS IN THE LEGALITY OF TRASH INSPECTIONS
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Although the Supreme Court in Greenwood clearly held that a
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person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash
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contained in plastic bags placed outside the curtilage for
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regular pickup, Greenwood does not hold that all trash
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inspections conducted by the police are beyond fourth amendment
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constraints. Lower court decisions since Greenwood have
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addressed the following four questions that are relevant in
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determining the constitutionality of trash inspections as a law
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enforcement investigative technique:
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1) Since Greenwood's trash was in plastic bags, is the
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type of trash container a significant factor in
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determining whether a person has a reasonable
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expectation of privacy?
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2) Since Greenwood's trash was placed outside the
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curtilage, is location of the trash a significant
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factor in assessing a privacy claim; and are
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warrantless trash inspections permitted on publicly
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accessible areas of curtilage?
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3) Do police need a warrant to enter private areas of
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curtilage to conduct trash inspections?
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4) Can trash collected from private areas of the curtilage
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during a routine trash collection be delivered to the
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police for their inspection?
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Law enforcement officers contemplating a particular trash
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inspection need to be knowledgeable of how courts have answered
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these questions to ensure that trash inspections are in
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conformity with the requirements of the fourth amendment.
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Type of Container Not Significant in Privacy Analysis
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Lower court cases since Greenwood clearly hold that the
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placement of trash in a garbage can or dumpster, as opposed to
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plastic bags, does not create a reasonable expectation of
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privacy. For example, in United States v. Trice, (10) Special
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Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration obtained a search
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warrant based, in part, on evidence obtained from a warrantless
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inspection of a trash can placed near the curb of the
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defendant's residence. The court rejected the defendant's
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reasonable expectation of privacy claim because, while a trash
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can is less accessible than a garbage bag, a trash can placed at
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the curb is still readily accessible to other members of the
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public." (11)
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Similarly, court decisions since Greenwood have denied
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fourth amendment protection to trash placed in a communal
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dumpster. (12) While trash placed in a communal dumpster is
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normally intermingled with the trash of others, such trash is
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still accessible and others can easily rummage through the
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dumpster's contents. Because courts conclude that it is not
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reasonable for a person to believe that trash is safe from
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inspection when it is placed in a communal dumpster, law
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enforcement officers in these cases have not been required to
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obtain a search warrant to inspect trash placed in such
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dumpsters. These cases suggest that the type of container a
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person uses to discard trash has little bearing on the extent of
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fourth amendment protection against police inspection of that
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trash.
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Location of the Trash is the Most Determinative Factor
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The most compelling factor in determining the
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constitutionality of a warrantless trash inspection is the
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location of the trash. In Greenwood, the Court held that the
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warrantless retrieval and subsequent inspection of trash placed
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for collection outside the curtilage does not constitute a
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fourth amendment search or seizure because the trash was
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accessible to the public. While it is clear that an inspection
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of a trash bag located under a person's kitchen sink would
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generally require a search warrant authorizing police entry into
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the home to conduct the search, the legality of trash
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inspections is more problematic where police make a warrantless
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entry into curtilage to retrieve and inspect trash, or where
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trash collectors enter private areas of curtilage to retrieve
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trash and then turn that trash over to police for inspection.
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Warrantless trash inspections permitted on publicly
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accessible areas of curtilage
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Several courts since Greenwood have held that a person does
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not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed for
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collection inside the curtilage, if the location is readily
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accessible to the public. Courts assess the constitutionality
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of a warrantless entry onto curtilage by examining the public
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accessibility of the area entered to determine whether the entry
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implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy.
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In Trice, (13) an officer without a search warrant removed
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a garbage bag from a trash can located in the curtilage near the
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street curb of the defendant's residence. Although the trash
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was technically on the defendant's private property and within
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his curtilage, the court held that no fourth amendment search
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had occurred because the garbage was: (1) In a location that
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was in public view; (2) easily accessible to pedestrians; and
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(3) placed near the curb for the express purpose of turning it
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over to the trash collector. (14)
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In State v. Trahan, (15) the Supreme Court of Nebraska
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upheld an officer's warrantless inspection of trash left for
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collection 4 feet from a trailer. Noting factual similarities
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to Greenwood, the court held that the public accessibility of
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the trash and its placement for collection at a designated
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location were determinative factors in concluding that the
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officer's entry onto the curtilage and inspection of the trash
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was not a search that implicated a reasonable expectation of
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privacy. (16)
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In Commonwealth v. Perdue, (17) officers investigating the
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extensive vandalization of a church observed a garbage can
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underneath the porch of an adjoining parsonage and conducted a
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warrantless inspection of the trash that revealed incriminating
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evidence. The defendant argued the warrantless trash inspection
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violated his reasonable expectation of privacy because the
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garbage can was within the curtilage of the parsonage where he
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resided. The Court disagreed and held as follows:
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"... property rights are only one consideration in
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determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy
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exists.... Being next to a church, the public has easy
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access to the parsonage and the surrounding area.... As a
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result, the parsonage and its surroundings are subject to
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public access. Thus like the garbage left for collection
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in...Greenwood, the garbage in the instant case was subject
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to public inspection. Consequently, no objectively
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reasonable expectation of privacy existed." (18)
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These cases suggest that garbage put out for collection in
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an area of curtilage accessible to the public may be subject to
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warrantless police inspections. As a general rule, the fourth
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amendment does not prohibit warrantless police entry into
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publicly accessible walkways implicitly open to the public, or
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into areas of curtilage close to a public street that are
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otherwise expressly or implicitly open to the public. (19)
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Thus, where solicited and unsolicited visitors are invited to
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enter publicly accessible areas of private property where trash
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has been placed for collection, it may be constitutionally
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reasonable for law enforcement to also enter onto that property
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for the purpose of inspecting the trash.
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Warrant required for police entry into curtilage not
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accessible to the public
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Law enforcement officers should understand that the fourth
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amendment is implicated when they enter an area of curtilage not
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accessible to the public. Entry by officers into such areas to
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retrieve trash put out for collection is a search under the
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fourth amendment that requires a search warrant based on
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probable cause.
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For example, in United States v. Certain Real Property
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Located at 987 Fisher Road, (20) the court held that an officer
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could not retrieve without a search warrant the defendant's
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trash bags, which were placed for collection against the back
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wall of the home and hidden from the view of ordinary
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pedestrians. The court held that the officer's entry into the
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area of the backyard immediately abutting the rear of the home
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constituted an intrusion into the defendant's reasonable
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expectation of privacy because the trash was not readily
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accessible to the public and the officer intentionally
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trespassed with the express purpose of obtaining the garbage.
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(21)
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The limited authority given to trash collectors to enter
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the curtilage area near the back wall of the home did not also
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authorize law enforcement officers to enter that area. (22)
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Thus, where trash is placed for collection in an area of
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curtilage not immediately accessible to the public, a search
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warrant is generally required to authorize police entry into
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that area to remove and inspect trash.
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Routine Trash Collection Can Be Delivered To Police
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Courts have suggested that another lawful method for
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obtaining trash for inspection would be for law enforcement
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officers to ask the regular trash collector to deliver the trash
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bags to them after the bags have been removed from the curtilage
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during a routine trash collection. (23) For example, in a case
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decided before Greenwood, a trash collector's routine pickup
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required him to enter into a private area of curtilage through a
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gate of a fence enclosing the defendant's backyard. (24) In
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response to an officer's request not to dump the defendant's
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trash into his truck, the trash collector turned the collected
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trash over to the police for inspection. The court held the
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defendant impliedly consented to entry upon his premises by the
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trash collector and to the removal of the trash to a publicly
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accessible area where the trash collector could allow the police
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or anyone else to examine the trash. (25) In essence, the court
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reasoned that the trash collector did precisely what the
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defendant contemplated by coming onto the private curtilage and
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taking the trash.
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While an individual may not contemplate that a trash
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collector will not "commingle" his trash and take it to the
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dump, Greenwood holds that an individual assumes the risk that
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trash turned over to a collector may be conveyed by that third
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party to law enforcement officials. (26) Thus, a person does
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not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash once it
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leaves the curtilage. A trash collector who enters the
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curtilage to collect trash subsequently turned over to police is
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considered a private actor for fourth amendment purposes when
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acting in the scope of a routine trash collection.
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Law enforcement officers who request assistance from trash
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collectors should ensure that they do nothing that exceeds the
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routine performance of their duties. Trash placed for routine
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collection in private areas of curtilage can constitutionally be
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turned over to the police after its routine removal from the
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curtilage by the trash collector. However, law enforcement
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officers contemplating this method of obtaining trash for
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inspection should consult with a competent legal adviser to
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determine whether a search warrant would be a more prudent
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method of obtaining the trash.
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CONCLUSION
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The cases discussed in this article suggest that law
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enforcement officers can, without a search warrant,
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constitutionally retrieve and inspect trash that is placed for
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collection in a publicly accessible area. Conversely, entry by
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law enforcement officers into private areas of curtilage
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constitutes a search that generally requires a search warrant
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based on probable cause. Trash left for routine collection
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within a private area of curtilage can be inspected without a
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search warrant by police after the the trash collector has
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retrieved and transported the trash off the private property.
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Officers contemplating a warrantless trash inspection should be
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thoroughly familiar with State law, as well as the Federal
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constitutional principles discussed in this article, because
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State courts may impose more restrictive rules under State law.
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(27)
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) 108 S.Ct. 1625 (1988).
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(2) See, People v. Krivada, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971). The
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Krivada Court, presented with facts similar to those in
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Greenwood, held the defendant continued to maintain a reasonable
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expectation of privacy in his trash concealed in paper bags,
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even after the trash had been place into the well of the refuse
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truck.
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(3) 108 S.Ct. at 1629. Greenwood declared that he had a
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subjective expectation of privacy in the inspected garbage
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because of the following factors: (1) The trash was placed for
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collection at a fixed time; (2) it was contained in opaque
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plastic bags; (3) the collector was expected to pick up the
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trash and mingle it with other trash and deposit it at the dump;
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and (4) the trash was on the street for a short time and there
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was very little chance the trash would be inspected by anyone.
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(4) Id. at 1628-29.
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(5) Id. at 1629.
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(6) Id.
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(7) Curtilage is generally defined as the area immediately
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surrounding a residence in which the intimate activities related
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to private domestic life are associated. For a more
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comprehenisve discussion of curtilage, see Sauls, "Curtilage-The
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Fourth Amendment in the Garden," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
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May 1990.
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(8) See, e.g., United States v. Maryland, 99 S.Ct. 2577
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(1979) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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(9) 108 S.Ct. at 1629.
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(10) 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988).
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(11) Id. at 1424.
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(12) See, e.g., United States v. Dunkel, 900 F.2d 105 (7th
|
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Cir. 1990) and United States v. Young, 862 F.2d 815 (10th Cir.
|
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1988).
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(13) 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988).
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(14) Id. at 1423.
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(15) 428 N.W.2d 619 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 561
|
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(1988).
|
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|
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(16) Id. at 623.
|
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(17) 564 A.2d 489 (Pa. Super. 1989).
|
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|
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|
(18) Id. at 493.
|
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|
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(19) See, People v. Shorty, 731 P.2d 679, 682 (Colo. 1987).
|
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|
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|
(20) 719 F.Supp. 1396 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
|
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|
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|
(21) Id. at 1404-5.
|
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|
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|
(22) Id.
|
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|
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|
(23) Id. at 1407, n.8.
|
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|
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|
(24) Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122 (Wyo. 1970).
|
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|
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|
(25) Id. at 125.
|
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|
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|
(26) 108 S.Ct. at 1629.
|
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|
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|
(27) See, e.g., State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. Sup.
|
|||
|
Ct. 1990) and State v. Boland, 48 CrL 1205 (Wash. Sup. Ct.
|
|||
|
1990). The Washington Supreme Court rejected the U.S. Supreme
|
|||
|
Court's reasoning in Greenwood and held that under their own
|
|||
|
State constitution, citizens do have a reasonable expectation of
|
|||
|
privacy in trash set out for pickup and a warrant is required
|
|||
|
before State law enforcement officers can inspect that trash.
|
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|
|
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|
_______________
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction
|
|||
|
who are interested in this article should consult their legal
|
|||
|
adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal
|
|||
|
constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law
|
|||
|
or are not permitted at all.
|
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|
|