755 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
755 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
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THE INSLAW AFFAIR
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SEPTEMBER 10, 1992.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole
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House on the
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State of the Union and ordered to be printed
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Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
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the following
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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
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together with
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DISSENTING AND SEPARATE DISSENTING VIEWS
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BASED ON A STUDY BY THE FULL COMMITTEE
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On August 11, 1992, the Committee on the Judiciary
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approved and adopted a report entitled, '"The INSLAW
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Affair." The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the
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Speaker of the House.
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I. SUMMARY
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The Department of Justice has long recognized the need
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for a standardized management information system to assist
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law enforcement offices across the country in the
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recordkeeping and tracking of criminal cases. During the
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1970's, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
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funded the development by INSLAW1
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of a computer software system called the Prosecutor's
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Management Information System or PROMIS. This system was
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designed to meet the criminal prosecutor workloads of large
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urban jurisdictions; and by 1980, several large U.S.
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attorneys offices were using the PROMIS software. At this
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time, INSLAW (formerly
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called the Institute for Law and Social Research) was a
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nonprofit corporation funded almost entirely through
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Government grants and contracts. When President Carter
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terminated the LEAA, INSLAW converted the company to a for-
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profit corporation in 1981 to commercially market PROMIS.
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The new corporation made several significant improvements to
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the original PROMIS software and the resulting product came
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to be known as INSLAW's proprietary Enhanced PROMIS. The
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original PROMIS was funded entirely with Government funds
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and was in the public domain.
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In March 1982, the Justice Department awarded INSLAW,
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Inc., a $10 million, 3-year contract to implement the public
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domain version of PROMIS at 94 U.S. attorneys' offices
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across the country and U.S. Territories. While the PROMIS
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software could have gone a long way toward correcting the
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Department's longstanding need for a standardized case
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management system, the contract between INSLAW and Justice
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quickly became embroiled in bitterness and controversy which
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has lasted for almost a decade. The conflict centers on the
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question of whether INSLAW has ownership of its privately
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funded "Enhanced PROMIS." This software was eventually
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installed at numerous U.S. attorneys' offices after a 1983
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modification to the contract. While Justice officials at the
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time recognized INSLAW's proprietary rights to any privately
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funded enhancements to the original public domain version of
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PROMIS, the Department later claimed that it had unlimited
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rights to all software supplied under the contract. (See
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section of report entitled, "The Department Misappropriated
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INSLAW Software.'")
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INSLAW attempted to resolve the matter several times but
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was largely met with indifference or hostility by Department
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officials. Eventually, the Department canceled part of the
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contract and, by February 1985, had withheld at least $1.6
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million in payments. As a result, the company was driven to
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the brink of insolvency and was threatened with dissolution
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under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy laws. Department officials
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have steadfastly claimed the INSLAW controversy is merely a
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contract dispute which has been blown out of proportion by
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the media. INSLAW's owners, William and Nancy Hamilton,
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however, have persisted in their belief that the
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Department's actions were Part of a high level conspiracy
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within Justice to steal the Enhanced PROMIS software.
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A. INSLAW ALLEGATIONS
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Based on their knowledge and belief, the Hamiltons have
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alleged that high level officials in the Department of
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Justice conspired to steal the Enhanced PROMIS software
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system. As an element of this theft, these officials, who
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included former Attorney General Edwin Meese and Deputy
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Attorney General Lowell Jensen, forced INSLAW into
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bankruptcy by intentionally creating a sham contract dispute
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over the terms and conditions of the contract which led to
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the withholding of payments due INSLAW by the Department.
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The Hamiltons maintain that, after driving the company into
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bankruptcy, Justice officials attempted to force the
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conversion of INSLAW's bankruptcy status from Chapter 11:
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Reorganization to Chapter 7: Liquidation. They assert that
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such a change in bankruptcy status would have resulted in
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the forced sale of INSLAW'S assets, including Enhanced
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PROMIS to a rival computer company
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called Hadron, Inc., which, at the time, was attempting
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to conduct a hostile buyout of INSLAW. Hadron, Inc., was
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controlled by the Biotech Capital Corporation, under the
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control of Dr. Earl Brian, who was president and chairman of
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the corporation. The Hamiltons assert that even though the
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attempt to change the status of INSLAW's bankruptcy was
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unsuccessful, the Enhanced PROMIS software system was
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eventually provided to Dr. Brian by individuals from the
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Department with the knowledge and concurrence of then
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Attorney General Meese who had previously worked with Dr.
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Brian in the cabinet of California Governor Ronald Reagan
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and later at the Reagan White House. According to the
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Hamiltons, the ultimate goal of the conspiracy was to
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position Hadron and the other companies owned or controlled
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by Dr. Brian to take advantage of the nearly 3 billion
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dollars, worth of automated data processing upgrade
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contracts planned to be awarded by the Department of Justice
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during the 1980's.
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Information obtained by the Hamiltons through sworn
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affidavits of several individuals, including Ari Ben-
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Menashe, a former Israeli Mossad officer, and Michael
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Riconosciuto, an individual who claims to have ties to the
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intelligence community, indicated that an element of this
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ongoing criminal enterprise by Mr. Meese, Dr. Brian and
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others included the modification of the Enhanced PROMIS
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software by individuals associated with the world of covert
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intelligence operations. The Hamiltons claim the
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modification of Enhanced PROMIS was an essential element of
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the enterprise, because the software was subsequently
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distributed by Dr. Brian to intelligence agencies
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internationally with a "back door" software routine, so that
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U.S. intelligence agencies could covertly break into the
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system when needed. The Hamiltons also presented information
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indicating that PROMIS had been distributed to several
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Federal agencies, including the FBI, CIA, and DEA.
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B. COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
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Due to the complexity and breadth of the INSLAW
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allegations against the Department of Justice, the
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committee's investigation focused on two principal
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questions: (1) Did high level Department officials convert,
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steal or otherwise misappropriate INSLAW's PROMIS software
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and attempt to put the company out of business; and, (2) did
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high level Department of Justice officials, including
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Attorney General Edwin Meese and then Deputy Attorney
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General Lowell Jensen, and others conspire to sell,
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transfer, or in any way distribute INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS
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to other Federal agencies and foreign governments?
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1. DID THE DEPARTMENT CONVERT, STEAL OR MISAPPROPRIATE THE
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PROMIS SOFTWARE?
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With regard to the first question, there appears to be
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strong evidence, as indicated by the findings in two Federal
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court proceedings as well as by the committee investigation,
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that the Department of Justice "acted willfully and
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fraudulently"2 and "took, con-
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verted and stole"3 INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS by "trickery,
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fraud and deceit."4 It appears that these actions against
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INSLAW were implemented through the project manager from the
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beginning of the contract and under the direction of high
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level Justice Department officials.
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Just 1 month after the contract was signed, Mr. C.
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Madison "Brick" Brewer, the PROMIS project manager, raised
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the possibility of canceling the INSLAW contract. During an
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April 14, 1982, meeting of the PROMIS Project Team, Mr.
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Brewer, and others discussed terminating the contract with
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INSLAW for convenience of the Government. Mr. Brewer did not
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recall the details of the meeting but said that if this
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recommendation was made, it was made "in jest."5 Based on
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notes taken at this meeting by Justice officials, Bankruptcy
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Court Judge George Bason found that Mr. Brewer's
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recommendation to terminate the INSLAW contract,
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"<22>constituted a smoking gun that clearly evidences Brewer's
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intense bias against INSLAW, his single-minded intent to
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drive INSLAW out of business<73>."6 By his own admission, Mr.
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Brewer became upset when INSLAW claimed that it had made
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enhancements to the public domain version of PROMIS using
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private funds. In his view, under the contract all versions
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of PROMIS were the Government's property. It is clear from
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the record that Mr. Brewer and Mr. Videnieks (the PROMIS
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contracting officer), supported by high level Justice
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officials continued to confront INSLAW at every turn. As
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Senior District Court Judge Bryant stated in his ruling on
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the case: '"There was unending contention about payments
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under this contract and the rights of the respective
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parties."
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Over the life of the contract, INSLAW made several
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attempts to reach an agreement with the Department over its
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proprietary rights to the Enhanced PROMIS software. The
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Department, however, steadfastly refused to conduct any
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meaningful negotiations and exhibited little inclination to
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resolve the controversy. In the meantime, INSLAW was pushed
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to the brink of financial ruin because the Department
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withheld at least $1.6 million in critical contract payments
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on questionable grounds, and in February 1985 was forced to
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file for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
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in order to stay economically viable. INSLAW at this time
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had installed PROMIS at the 20 largest U.S. attorneys'
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offices across the country as required by the contract.7 The
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Department had earlier canceled installation of PROMIS at
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the 74 smaller offices.
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While refusing to engage in good faith negotiations with
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INSLAW, Mr. Brewer and Mr. Videnieks, with the approval of
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high level Justice Department officials, proceeded to take
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actions to misappropriate the Enhanced PROMIS software.
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These officials knew that INSLAW had installed Enhanced
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PROMIS at the 20 sites. Yet, without notice, and certainly
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without permission, the Depart-
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ment of Justice illegally copied INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS
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software and installed it eventually at 25 additional U.S.
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attorneys' offices. The Department reportedly also brought
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another 31 U.S. attorneys, offices "on-line" to Enhanced
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PROMIS systems via telecommunications. INSLAW first learned
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of these unauthorized actions in September 1985, and
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notified the Department that it must remove the Enhanced
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PROMIS software or arrange for license agreements. When the
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Department refused, INSLAW subsequently filed a claim
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against Justice in the Federal Bankruptcy Court which
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eventually led to the Bankruptcy's Court's finding that the
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Department's actions "<22>were done in bad faith, vexatiously,
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in wanton disregard of the law and the facts, and for
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oppressive reasons <20> to drive INSLAW out of business and to
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convert, by trickery, fraud and deceit, INSLAW's PROMIS
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software. When the case was appealed by the Department,
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Senior District Court Judge William Bryant concurred with
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the Bankruptcy Court and was very critical of the
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Department's handling of the case. In his ruling, at 49a,
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Judge Bryant stated:
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The Government accuses the bankruptcy court of
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looking beyond the bankruptcy proceeding to find
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culpability by the Government. What is strikingly
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apparent from the testimony and depositions of key
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witnesses and many documents is that INSLAW
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performed its contract in a hostile environment
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that extended from the higher echelons of the
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Justice Department to the officials who had the
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day-to-day responsibility for supervising its
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work. [Emphasis added.]
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Recently, the posture of some Department officials has
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been to attempt to exonerate the Department's handling of
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the INSLAW matter by citing the fact that the Court of
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Appeals has vacated the Bankruptcy and District Courts'
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judgment involving illegal misconduct of the Department
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including violations of the automatic stay provisions of the
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Bankruptcy Code. However, the D.C. Circuit's opinion was
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grounded primarily on jurisdictional questions and did not
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address the substantive merits of the findings of fact and
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conclusions of law of either the Bankruptcy Court or the
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ruling of the U.S. District Court.
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Based on the facts presented in court and the committee's
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review of Department records, it does indeed appear that
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Justice officials, including Mr. Brewer and Mr. Videnieks,
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never intended to fully honor the proprietary rights of
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INSLAW or bargain in good faith with the company. The
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Bankruptcy Court found that:
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<20> [The Department] engaged in an outrageous,
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deceitful, fraudulent game of cat and mouse,
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demonstrating contempt for both the law and any
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principle of fair dealing. [Finding No. 266 at
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138.]
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As the Bankruptcy and District Courts found on the
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merits, it is very unlikely that Mr. Brewer and Mr.
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Videnieks acted alone to violate the proprietary rights of
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INSLAW in this matter. In explaining his own actions, Mr.
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Brewer, the project manager, has repeatedly stated that he
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was not acting out any personal vendetta against INSLAW and
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that high level Department officials including Lowell Jensen
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were aware of every decision he made with regard to the
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contract. Mr. Brewer stated, under oath that "<22>there was
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somebody in the Department at a higher level, looking over
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the shoulder of not just me but the people who worked for
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me<EFBFBD>.''8 The PROMIS Oversight Committee, headed by Deputy
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Attorney General Lowell Jensen, kept a close watch over the
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administration of the contract and was involved in every
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major decision. Mr. Jensen, who worked with former Attorney
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General Edwin Meese in the Alameda County district
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attorneys' offices, stated under oath that he kept the
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Attorney General regularly informed of all aspects of the
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INSLAW contract. The PROMIS Oversight Committee readily
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agreed with Mr. Brewer's recommendation to cancel part of
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INSLAW's contract for default because of the controversy
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regarding the installation of PROMIS in word processing
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systems at the 74 smaller U.S. attorneys' offices. Mr.
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Brewer's proposal was ultimately rejected only because a
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Justice contracts attorney advised the oversight committee
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that the Department did not have the legal authority to do
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so. Curiously, the recommendation to find INSLAW in default
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occurred shortly after INSLAW and the Department signed a
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modification to the contract (Mod. 12), which was supposed
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to end the conflict over proprietary rights.
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Mr. Jensen, who is currently a Federal District Court
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judge in San Francisco, served at the Justice Department
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successively as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
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Criminal Division, Associate Attorney General and Deputy
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Attorney General between 1981 and 1986. The Bankruptcy court
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found that he "had a previously developed negative attitude
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about PROMIS and INSLAW" from the beginning (Findings No.
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307-309) because he had been associated with the development
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of a rival case management system while he was a district
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attorney in California, and that this experience, at the
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very least, affected his judgment throughout his oversight
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of the contract. During a sworn statement, Judge Jensen
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denied being biased against INSLAW, but averred that he did
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not have complete recollection of the events surrounding his
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involvement in the contract. However, based on the
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committee's own investigation it is clear that Judge Jensen
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was not particularly interested or active in pursuing
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INSLAW's claims that Department officials were biased
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against the company and had taken action to harm the
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company. Perhaps most disturbing, he remembered very few
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details of the PROMIS Oversight Committee meetings even
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though he had served as its chairman and was certainly one
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of its most influential members. He stated that after a
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meeting with former Attorney General Elliot Richardson
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(representing INSLAW) regarding the alleged Brewer bias, he
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commissioned his deputy, Mr. Jay Stephens, to conduct an
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investigation of the bias charges. Based on this
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investigation, Judge Jensen said he concluded that there
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were no bias problems associated with the Department's
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handling of the INSLAW contract.
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This assertion, however, contradicted Mr. Stephens, who
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testified during a sworn statement that he was never asked
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by Judge Jensen to conduct an investigation of the Brewer
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bias allegations raised by Mr. Richardson and others. Mr.
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Stephens, recollection of the events was sharp and complete
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in stark contrast to Judge Jensen's. As a result, many
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questions remain about the accuracy and
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completeness of Judge Jensen's recollections and statements.
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As for the PROMIS Oversight Committee, committee
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investigators were told that detailed minutes were not kept
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at any of the meetings, nor was there any record of specific
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discussions by its members affecting the INSLAW contract.
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The records that were available were inordinately sparse and
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often did not include any background of how and why
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decisions were made.
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To date, former Attorney General Meese denies having
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knowledge of any bias against INSLAW by the Department or
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any of its officials. He stated, under oath, that he had
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little, if any, involvement with the INSLAW controversy and
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that he recalls no specific discussion with anyone,
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including Department officials about INSLAW's contract with
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Justice regarding the use or misuse of the PROMIS software.
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This statement is in direct conflict with Judge Jensen's
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testimony, that he briefed Mr. Meese regularly on this issue
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and that Mr. Meese was very interested in the details of the
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contract and negotiations.
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One of the most damaging statements received by the
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committee is a sworn statement made by Deputy Attorney
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General Arnold Burns to Office of Professional
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Responsibility (OPR) investigators in 1988. In this
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statement, Mr. Burns stated that Department attorneys had
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already advised him (sometime in 1986) that INSLAW's claim
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of proprietary rights in the Enhanced PROMIS software was
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legitimate and that the Department had waived any rights in
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these enhancements. Mr. Burns was also told by Justice
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attorneys that the Department would probably lose the case
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in court on this issue. Accepting this statement, it is
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incredible that the Department, having made this
|
|||
|
determination, would continue to pursue its litigation of
|
|||
|
these matters. More than $1 million has been spent in
|
|||
|
litigation on this case by the Justice Department even
|
|||
|
though it knew in 1986 that it did not have a chance to win
|
|||
|
the case on merits. This clearly raises the specter that the
|
|||
|
Department actions taken against INSLAW in this matter
|
|||
|
represent an abuse of power of shameful proportions.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2. WAS THERE A HIGH LEVEL CONSPIRACY?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The second phase of the committee's investigation
|
|||
|
concentrated on the allegations that high level officials at
|
|||
|
the Department of Justice conspired to drive INSLAW into
|
|||
|
insolvency and steal the PROMIS software so it could be used
|
|||
|
by Dr. Earl Brian, a former associate and friend of then
|
|||
|
Attorney General Edwin Meese. Dr. Brian is a businessman and
|
|||
|
entrepreneur who owns or controls several] businesses
|
|||
|
including Hadron, Inc., which has contracts with the Justice
|
|||
|
Department, CIA, and other agencies. The Hamiltons and
|
|||
|
others have asserted that Dr. Brian conspired with high
|
|||
|
level Justice officials to sell PROMIS to law enforcement
|
|||
|
and intelligence agencies worldwide.
|
|||
|
Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, counsel to
|
|||
|
INSLAW, has alleged that the circumstances involving the
|
|||
|
theft of the PROMIS software system constitute a possible
|
|||
|
criminal conspiracy involving Mr. Meese, Judge Jensen, Dr.
|
|||
|
Brian, and several current and former officials at the
|
|||
|
Department of Justice. Mr. Richardson maintains that the
|
|||
|
individuals involved in the theft of the Enhanced PROMIS
|
|||
|
system have violated a plethora of Federal crimi-
|
|||
|
nal statutes, including but not limited to: (1) 18 U.S.C 654
|
|||
|
(officer or employee of the United States converting the
|
|||
|
property of another); (2) 18 U.S.C 1001 (false statements);
|
|||
|
(3)18 U.S.C 1621 (perjury); (4) 18 U.S.C 1503 (obstruction
|
|||
|
of justice); (5) 18 U.S.C 1341 (mail fraud) and (6) 18
|
|||
|
U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy to commit criminal offenses). Mr.
|
|||
|
Richardson further contends that the violations of Federal
|
|||
|
law associated in the theft of Enhanced PROMIS, the
|
|||
|
subsequent coverup and the illegal distribution of PROMIS
|
|||
|
fulfill the requirements for prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
|
|||
|
1961 et seq. (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
|
|||
|
Organizations (RICO) statute).
|
|||
|
As discussed earlier, the committee's investigation
|
|||
|
largely supports the findings of two Federal courts that the
|
|||
|
Department "took, converted, stole INSLAW'S Enhanced PROMIS
|
|||
|
by "trickery, fraud and deceit'', and that this
|
|||
|
misappropriation involved officials at the highest levels of
|
|||
|
the Department of Justice. The recent ruling by the D.C.
|
|||
|
Circuit Court of Appeals does nothing to vitiate those
|
|||
|
conclusions, the product of an extensive record compiled
|
|||
|
under oath by two Federal jurists. While the Department
|
|||
|
continues to attempt to explain away the INSLAW matter as a
|
|||
|
simple contract dispute, the committee's investigation has
|
|||
|
uncovered other information which plausibly could suggest a
|
|||
|
different conclusion if full access to documents and other
|
|||
|
witnesses were permitted. Several individuals have stated
|
|||
|
under oath that the Enhanced PROMIS software was stolen and
|
|||
|
distributed internationally in order to provide financial
|
|||
|
gain to Dr. Brian and to further intelligence and foreign
|
|||
|
policy objectives for the United States. While it should be
|
|||
|
acknowledged at the outset that some of the testimony comes
|
|||
|
from individuals whose past associations and enterprises are
|
|||
|
not commendable, corroborating evidence for a number of
|
|||
|
their claims made under oath has been found. It should be
|
|||
|
observed that these individuals provided testimony with the
|
|||
|
full knowledge that the Justice Department could-and would
|
|||
|
probably be strongly inclined to-prosecute them for perjury
|
|||
|
if they lied under oath. Moreover, we note that the
|
|||
|
Department is hardly in a position to negate summarily
|
|||
|
testimony offered by witnesses who have led less than an
|
|||
|
exemplary life in their choice of associations and
|
|||
|
activities. As indicated by the recent prosecution of Manuel
|
|||
|
Noriega, which involved the use of over 40 witnesses, the
|
|||
|
majority of whom were previously convicted drug traffickers,
|
|||
|
a witness, perceived credibility is not always indicative of
|
|||
|
the accuracy or usability in court of the information
|
|||
|
provided. Although the committee's investigation could not
|
|||
|
reach a definitive conclusion regarding a possible motive
|
|||
|
behind the misappropriation of the Enhanced PROMIS software,
|
|||
|
the disturbing questions raised, unexplained coincidences
|
|||
|
and peculiar events that have surfaced throughout the INSLAW
|
|||
|
case raises the need for further investigation.
|
|||
|
One area which requires further investigation is the
|
|||
|
allegations made by Mr. Michael Riconosciuto. Mr.
|
|||
|
Riconosciuto, a shady character allegedly tied to U.S.
|
|||
|
intelligence agencies and recently convicted on drug
|
|||
|
charges, alleges that Dr. Brian and Mr. Peter Videnieks
|
|||
|
secretly delivered INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS software to the
|
|||
|
Cabazon Indian Reservation, located in California, for
|
|||
|
"refitting" for use by intelligence agencies in the United
|
|||
|
States and
|
|||
|
abroad.9 When Dr. Brian was questioned about his alleged
|
|||
|
involvement in the INSLAW case, he denied under oath that he
|
|||
|
had ever met Mr. Riconosciuto and stated that he had never
|
|||
|
heard of the Cabazon Indian Reservation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
C. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Suspicions of a Department of Justice conspiracy to steal
|
|||
|
INSLAW's PROMIS were fueled when Danny Casolaro-an
|
|||
|
investigative writer inquiring into those issues-was found
|
|||
|
dead in a hotel room in Martinsburg, WV, where he was to
|
|||
|
meet a source that he claimed was critical to his
|
|||
|
investigation. Mr. Casolaro's body was found on August 10,
|
|||
|
1991, with his wrists slashed numerous times. Following a
|
|||
|
brief preliminary investigation by local authorities, Mr.
|
|||
|
Casolaro's death was ruled a suicide. The investigation was
|
|||
|
reopened later as a result of numerous inquiries from Mr.
|
|||
|
Casolaro's brother and others regarding the suspicious
|
|||
|
circumstances surrounding his death.
|
|||
|
The Martinsburg Police investigation subsequently
|
|||
|
concluded in January 1992, that Mr. Casolaro's death was a
|
|||
|
suicide. Subsequently, Chairman Brooks directed committee
|
|||
|
investigators to obtain sworn statements from the FBI agent
|
|||
|
and two former Federal Organized Crime Strike Force
|
|||
|
prosecutors in Los Angeles who had information bearing on
|
|||
|
the Casolaro case. Sworn statements were obtained from
|
|||
|
former Federal prosecutors Richard Stavin and Marvin Rudnick
|
|||
|
on March 13 and 14, 1992. After initial resistance from the
|
|||
|
Bureau, a sworn statement was taken from FBI Special Agent
|
|||
|
Thomas Gates on March 25 and 26, 1992.
|
|||
|
Special Agent Gates stated that Mr. Casolaro claimed he
|
|||
|
had found a link between the INSLAW matter, the activities
|
|||
|
taking place at the Cabazon Indian Reservation, and a
|
|||
|
Federal investigation in which Special Agent Gates had been
|
|||
|
involved regarding organized crime influence in the
|
|||
|
entertainment industry.
|
|||
|
Special Agent Gates stated that Mr. Casolaro had several
|
|||
|
conversations with Mr. Robert Booth Nichols in the weeks
|
|||
|
preceding his death. Mr. Nichols, according to documents
|
|||
|
submitted to a Federal court by the FBI, has ties with
|
|||
|
organized crime and the world of covert intelligence
|
|||
|
operations. When he learned of Mr. Casolaro's death, Special
|
|||
|
Agent Gates contacted the Martinsburg, WV, Police Department
|
|||
|
to inform them of the information he had concerning Mr.
|
|||
|
Nichols and Mr. Casolaro. The Martinsburg Police have not
|
|||
|
commented on whether or not they eventually pursued the
|
|||
|
leads provided by Special Agent Gates.
|
|||
|
Based on the evidence collected by the committee, it
|
|||
|
appears that the path followed by Danny Casolaro in pursuing
|
|||
|
his investigation into the INSLAW matter brought him in
|
|||
|
contact with a number of dangerous individuals associated
|
|||
|
with organized crime and the world of covert intelligence
|
|||
|
operations. The suspicious circumstances surrounding his
|
|||
|
death have led some law enforcement professionals and others
|
|||
|
to believe that his death may not have been a suicide. As
|
|||
|
long as the possibility exists that Danny
|
|||
|
Casolaro died as a result of his investigation into the
|
|||
|
INSLAW matter, it is imperative that further investigation
|
|||
|
be conducted.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
D. EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE COVERUP AND OBSTRUCTION
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One of the principal reasons the committee could not
|
|||
|
reach any definitive conclusion about INSLAW's allegations
|
|||
|
of a high criminal conspiracy at Justice was the lack of
|
|||
|
cooperation from the Department. Throughout the two INSLAW
|
|||
|
investigations, the Congress met with restrictions, delays
|
|||
|
and outright denials to requests for information and to
|
|||
|
unobstructed access to records and witnesses since 1988. The
|
|||
|
Department initially attempted to prevent the Senate
|
|||
|
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations from conducting an
|
|||
|
investigation of the INSLAW affair. During this committee's
|
|||
|
investigation, Attorney General Thornburgh repeatedly
|
|||
|
reneged on agreements made with this committee to provide
|
|||
|
full and open access to information and witnesses. Although
|
|||
|
the day before a planned committee meeting to consider the
|
|||
|
issuance of a subpoena the Department promised full access
|
|||
|
to documents and witnesses, the committee was compelled to
|
|||
|
subpoena Attorney General Thornburgh to obtain documents
|
|||
|
needed to complete its investigation. Even then, the
|
|||
|
Department failed to provide all the documents subpoenaed,
|
|||
|
claiming that some of the documents held by the Department's
|
|||
|
chief attorney in charge of the INSLAW litigation had been
|
|||
|
misplaced or accidentally destroyed. The Department has not
|
|||
|
provided a complete accounting of the number of documents
|
|||
|
missing nor has it conducted an investigation to determine
|
|||
|
if the documents were stolen or illegally destroyed.
|
|||
|
Questions regarding the Department's willingness and
|
|||
|
objectivity to investigate the charges of possible
|
|||
|
misconduct of Justice employees remain. That Justice
|
|||
|
officials may have too readily concluded that witnesses
|
|||
|
supporting the Department's position were credible while
|
|||
|
those who did not were ignored or retaliated against was,
|
|||
|
perhaps, most painfully demonstrated with the firing of
|
|||
|
Anthony Pasciuto, the former Deputy Director, Executive
|
|||
|
Office of the U.S. Trustees.
|
|||
|
Mr. Pasciuto had informed the Hamiltons that soon after
|
|||
|
INSLAW filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1985, the Justice
|
|||
|
Department had planned to petition the court to force INSLAW
|
|||
|
into chapter 7 bankruptcy and liquidate its assets including
|
|||
|
the PROMIS software. His source for this information was
|
|||
|
Judge Cornelius Blackshear who, at the time, was the U.S.
|
|||
|
Trustee for the Southern District of New York. Judge
|
|||
|
Blackshear subsequently provided INSLAW's attorneys with a
|
|||
|
sworn statement confirming what Mr. Pasciuto had told the
|
|||
|
Hamiltons. However, following a conversation with a Justice
|
|||
|
Department attorney who was representing the Department in
|
|||
|
the INSLAW case,10 Judge Blackshear recanted his earlier
|
|||
|
sworn statement. Moreover, Judge Blackshear, under oath,
|
|||
|
could not or would not provide committee investigators with
|
|||
|
a plausible explanation of why he had recanted
|
|||
|
his earlier statements to INSLAW, Mr. Pasciuto and others
|
|||
|
regarding the Justice Department's efforts to force INSLAW
|
|||
|
out of business. He did confirm an earlier statement
|
|||
|
attributed to him that his recantation was a result of "his
|
|||
|
desire to hurt the least number of people." However, he
|
|||
|
would not elaborate on this enigmatic statement.
|
|||
|
Similarly, Mr. Pasciuto, under strong pressure from
|
|||
|
senior Department officials, recanted his statement made to
|
|||
|
the Hamiltons regarding Judge Blackshear. It appears that
|
|||
|
Mr. Pasciuto may have been fired from his position with the
|
|||
|
Executive Office of U.S. Trustees because he had provided
|
|||
|
information to the Hamiltons and their attorneys which
|
|||
|
undercut the Department's litigating position before the
|
|||
|
Bankruptcy Court.11 This action was based on a recommendation
|
|||
|
made by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). In
|
|||
|
a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Burns, dated
|
|||
|
December 18, 1987, the OPR concluded that:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In our view, but for Mr. Pasciuto's highly
|
|||
|
irresponsible actions, the department would be in
|
|||
|
a much better litigation posture than it presently
|
|||
|
finds itself. Mr. Pasciuto has wholly failed to
|
|||
|
comport himself in accordance with the standard of
|
|||
|
conduct expected of an official of his position.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Mr. Pasciuto now states he regrets having allowed himself
|
|||
|
to be coerced by the Department into recanting and has
|
|||
|
stated under oath to committee investigators that he stands
|
|||
|
by his earlier statements made to the Hamiltons that Judge
|
|||
|
Blackshear had informed him that the Department wanted to
|
|||
|
force INSLAW out of business. Certainly, Mr. Pasciuto's
|
|||
|
treatment by the Department during his participation in the
|
|||
|
INSLAW litigation raises serious questions of how far the
|
|||
|
Department will go to protect its interests while defending
|
|||
|
itself in litigation. Not unexpectedly, Mr. Pasciuto's
|
|||
|
firing had a chilling effect on other potential Department
|
|||
|
witnesses who might have otherwise cooperated with the
|
|||
|
committee in this matter. Judge Blackshear, on the other
|
|||
|
hand, was not accused of wrongdoing by the Department even
|
|||
|
though he originally provided essentially the same
|
|||
|
information as had Mr. Pasciuto.
|
|||
|
Despite this series of obvious reversals, the Department,
|
|||
|
after limited investigation, has apparently satisfied itself
|
|||
|
that the sworn statements of its witnesses, including Judge
|
|||
|
Blackshear, have somehow been reconciled on key issues such
|
|||
|
that no false statements have been made by any of these
|
|||
|
individuals. This position is flatly in opposition to the
|
|||
|
Bankruptcy Court's finding that several Department officials
|
|||
|
may have perjured themselves which was never seriously
|
|||
|
investigated by the Department. In addition, there are
|
|||
|
serious conflicts and inconsistencies in sworn statements
|
|||
|
provided to the committee that have not been resolved.
|
|||
|
Equally important, the possibility that witnesses, testimony
|
|||
|
were manipulated by the Department in order to present a
|
|||
|
"united front" to the Congress and the public on the INSLAW
|
|||
|
case needs to be fully and honestly explored. The potential
|
|||
|
for a conflict of interest in the Department's
|
|||
|
carrying out such an inquiry is high, if not prudently
|
|||
|
manifest, and independent scrutiny is required.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
E. JUDGE BASON'S ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Judge Bason testified, under oath, before the Economic
|
|||
|
and Commercial Law Subcommittee that the Department's
|
|||
|
actions against its critics may have extended into blocking
|
|||
|
his reappointment as a bankruptcy judge in 1988 because of
|
|||
|
his ruling in INSLAW's case. Judge Bason was replaced by
|
|||
|
Martin Teel, Jr., who, prior to his appointment, was a
|
|||
|
Justice Department attorney heavily involved in the
|
|||
|
Department's litigation of the INSLAW case.12 The committee
|
|||
|
was unable to substantiate Judge Bason's charges. If such
|
|||
|
undue influence did occur, it was subtle and lost in the
|
|||
|
highly private manner in which judge selection procedures
|
|||
|
are conducted. While sworn statements were not taken, the
|
|||
|
committee investigators interviewed several of the judges
|
|||
|
involved in the selection process. The judges who agreed to
|
|||
|
provide interviews all stated that they had little firsthand
|
|||
|
knowledge in which to evaluate the candidates, including the
|
|||
|
incumbent judge. As a result, the members of the Judicial
|
|||
|
Council had to rely on the findings of the Merit Selection
|
|||
|
Panel headed by Judge Norma Johnson.
|
|||
|
The Merit Selection Panel's findings were provided to the
|
|||
|
Judicial Council by Judge Johnson whose oral presentation
|
|||
|
was instrumental in the final selection. Judge Johnson had
|
|||
|
previously worked at the Department of Justice with Stuart
|
|||
|
Schiffer, who led the Department's attempt to have the
|
|||
|
District Court remove Judge Bason from the INSLAW case. Mr.
|
|||
|
Schiffer is also the official who argued vociferously
|
|||
|
against the appointment of an independent counsel on the
|
|||
|
INSLAW case in a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General
|
|||
|
Arthur Burns. Judge Johnson also served in the D.C. Superior
|
|||
|
Court with Judge Tim Murphy from 1970 through 1980. Judge
|
|||
|
Murphy subsequently worked directly for Mr. Brewer on the
|
|||
|
PROMIS contract. The committee, however, has not at this
|
|||
|
date found any evidence that Judge Johnson had specific
|
|||
|
discussions with Mr. Schiffer or anyone else at the
|
|||
|
Department of Justice about Judge Bason, the INSLAW case or
|
|||
|
the bankruptcy judicial selection process.
|
|||
|
The committee's investigation revealed that the selection
|
|||
|
process was largely informal, undocumented and highly
|
|||
|
subjective. For example, several members of the Judicial
|
|||
|
Council indicated that one of the primary factors
|
|||
|
influencing the non-reappointment of Judge Bason, was the
|
|||
|
poor administrative condition of his court. These same
|
|||
|
members admitted that they had no firsthand knowledge of the
|
|||
|
administrative condition and based this opinion on the
|
|||
|
reports of the Merit Selection Panel and Judge Johnson. This
|
|||
|
was corroborated by the discovery of a confidential
|
|||
|
memorandum written by a member of the Merit Selection Panel
|
|||
|
which was highly critical of
|
|||
|
Judge Bason and the administrative condition of the
|
|||
|
Bankruptcy Court. While this memorandum had been seen by
|
|||
|
several judges during the selection process, committee
|
|||
|
investigators were unable to determine who authored it. The
|
|||
|
committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence to
|
|||
|
support the criticisms raised in the memorandum. Martin
|
|||
|
Bloom, Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, indicated in his sworn
|
|||
|
statement to committee investigators that under Judge Bason,
|
|||
|
the administrative condition of the court vastly improved.
|
|||
|
These sentiments were echoed by Chief Judge Aubrey Robinson
|
|||
|
who consistently complimented Judge Bason on his efforts to
|
|||
|
improve the administrative condition of the Bankruptcy Court
|
|||
|
in his remarks to the Annual Judicial Conference.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
F. CONCLUSION
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The history of the Department's behavior in the INSLAW
|
|||
|
case dramatically illustrates its (1) reflexive hostility
|
|||
|
and "circle the wagons" approach toward outside
|
|||
|
investigations; (2) inability or unwillingness to look
|
|||
|
objectively at charges of wrongdoing by high level Justice
|
|||
|
officials, particularly when the agency itself is a
|
|||
|
defendant in litigation; and, (3) belligerence toward
|
|||
|
Justice employees with views that run counter to those of
|
|||
|
the agency's upper management. The fact that the Department
|
|||
|
failed to recognize a need for an independent investigation
|
|||
|
of the INSLAW matter for more than 7 years is remarkable.
|
|||
|
Failure to do so has effectively shielded officials who may
|
|||
|
have committed wrongdoing from investigation and
|
|||
|
prosecution.
|
|||
|
As already documented and confirmed by two Federal
|
|||
|
judges, the Department's actions in the INSLAW case have
|
|||
|
greatly harmed the company and its owners. These actions, as
|
|||
|
they pertain to the dispute with INSLAW over the
|
|||
|
misappropriation of the PROMIS software, were taken with the
|
|||
|
full knowledge and support of high level Justice officials.
|
|||
|
The harm to the company was further perpetuated by
|
|||
|
succeeding high level officials, such as former Attorney
|
|||
|
General Richard Thornburgh, who not only failed to
|
|||
|
objectively investigate the serious charges raised by the
|
|||
|
Hamiltons and their attorney, former Attorney General Elliot
|
|||
|
Richardson, but also delayed and rebuffed effective and
|
|||
|
expeditious outside investigation of the matter by Congress.
|
|||
|
The Department of Justice is this nation's most visible
|
|||
|
guarantor of the notion that wrongdoing will be sought out
|
|||
|
and punished irrespective of the identity of the actors
|
|||
|
involved. Moreover, its mandate is to protect all private
|
|||
|
citizens from illegal activities that undermine the public
|
|||
|
trust. The Department's handling of the INSLAW case has
|
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|
seriously undermined its credibility and reputation in
|
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|
playing such a role. Congress and the executive must take
|
|||
|
immediate and forceful steps to restore public confidence
|
|||
|
and faith in our system of justice, which cannot be
|
|||
|
undermined by the very agent entrusted with enforcement of
|
|||
|
our laws and protections afforded every citizen. In view of
|
|||
|
the history surrounding the INSLAW affair and the serious
|
|||
|
implications of evidence presented by the Hamiltons, two
|
|||
|
court proceedings in the judicial branch and the committee's
|
|||
|
own investigation, there is a clear need for further
|
|||
|
investigation. The committee believes that the only way in
|
|||
|
which INSLAW's allegations can be adequately and fully
|
|||
|
investigated is
|
|||
|
by the appointment of an independent counsel. The
|
|||
|
committee is aware that on November 13, 1991, Attorney
|
|||
|
General Barr appointed Nicholas Bua, a retired Federal judge
|
|||
|
from Chicago, as his special counsel to investigate and
|
|||
|
advise him on the INSLAW controversy. The committee eagerly
|
|||
|
awaits Judge Bua's findings; however, as long as the
|
|||
|
investigation of wrongdoing by former and current high level
|
|||
|
Justice officials remains under the ultimate control of the
|
|||
|
Department itself, there will always be serious doubt about
|
|||
|
the objectivity and thoroughness of the inquiry.
|
|||
|
|