448 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
448 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
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April 1991
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SEARCHES OF PREMISES INCIDENT TO ARREST
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By
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A. Louis DiPietro, J.D.
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Special Agent and Legal Instructor
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FBI Academy
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Quantico, Virginia
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All arrests, regardless of the seriousness of the crime for
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which they are made, pose serious risks to arresting officers.
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In recognition of the danger and the need to discover and seize
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evidence, the law has long permitted officers to make a
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warrantless search incident to an arrest. (1) However, an
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arrest inside premises where officers are in unfamiliar
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surroundings and on their adversary's "turf" often pose greater
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risks to the arresting officers than on-the-street or roadside
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encounters. With these considerations in mind, the U.S. Supreme
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Court recently expanded the scope of an incident to arrest
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search in the context of an in-home arrest.
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This article begins with a brief summary of the general
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requirements for searches incident to arrest and then examines
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the recent case of "Buie v. Maryland," (2) in which the Supreme
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Court expanded the scope of searches of premises incident to
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arrest. Such searches now include protective sweeps for persons
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under the following two alternative grounds: 1) Searches of
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immediately adjoining areas; and 2) searches of other areas
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based on reasonable suspicion of danger to the arresting
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officers.
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GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
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A lawful custodial arrest based on probable cause carries
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with it the legal authority to conduct a warrantless search
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incident to that arrest to secure weapons or means of escape and
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to preserve evidence. However, the constitutional validity of a
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search incident to arrest does not depend on whether police have
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any facts that the person arrested possesses weapons or
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evidence. A lawful custodial arrest, standing alone,
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establishes the authority to conduct a search incident to
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arrest, irrespective of whether suspects are later acquitted of
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the offense for which they were arrested. (3) Probable cause to
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arrest must exist before searching. (4) But, a search may be
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conducted immediately prior to the arrest as long as probable
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cause existed prior to the search, and the fruits of the search
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do not serve as part of the probable cause. (5)
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A search of premises incident to arrest must be conducted
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substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. (6) Once
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officers exclusively control any personal property not
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immediately associated with the person to be arrested, and there
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is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to
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the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of
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that property can no longer be justified as incident to arrest.
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(7) However, courts have held that arresting officers need not
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jeopardize their safety in order to make a contemporaneous
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search. In fact, officers may first secure the arrestee with
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handcuffs before searching incident to arrest. (8) Such
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searches are generally considered substantially contemporaneous
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if they follow immediately after an arrest.
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The "contemporaneous" requirement applies to searches of
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the area within the arrestee's immediate control and to items,
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such as luggage, not directly associated with the arrestee.
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However, it does not extend to searches of the person, clothing,
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or personal belongings on the arrestee's person. (9)
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Accordingly, courts have approved delayed incident to arrest
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searches of an arrestee's clothing, (10) the contents of a
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wallet (11) and address book, (12) but not a briefcase. (13)
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In "Chimel v. California," (14) the Supreme Court limited the
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scope of an incident to arrest search to the arrestee's person
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and areas within his immediate control. Courts have interpreted
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this ruling to include not only the arm's length radius
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encircling an arrestee's wingspan but also areas accessible to
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an arrestee at the time of arrest, regardless of actual
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accessibility at the time of search. (15) In that regard, the
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court held in "New York v. Belton" (16) that the search of a
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jacket located inside the passenger compartment of the car in
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which Belton was riding was within the arrestee's immediate
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control.
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SUPREME COURT AUTHORIZES PROTECTIVE SWEEPS
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The scope of a search of premises incident to arrest
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authorized by "Chimel" was not always adequate to afford safety
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to the arresting officers. Thus, the Supreme Court in "Maryland
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v. Buie" (17) expanded the scope of incident to arrest searches
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to permit arresting officers to go beyond "Chimel," which limited
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such searches to the person and areas within his immediate
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control. "Buie" expands the scope of a search of premises
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incident to arrest to include a warrantless protective sweep of
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all "immediately adjoining" areas. It also authorizes
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protective sweeps into "other areas" based on reasonable
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suspicion.
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Background
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In "Buie," two men, one of whom was wearing a red running
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suit, committed an armed robbery. Police obtained arrest
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warrants for Buie and an accomplice. Two days later, the police
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telephonically verified that Buie was home, and officers
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proceeded to his house. Once inside, they fanned out through
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the first and second floors; one officer shouted into the
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basement ordering anyone down there to come up. When a voice
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asked who was calling, the officer announced three times, "This
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is the police, show me your hands." Eventually, a pair of hands
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appeared around the bottom of the stairwell, and Buie emerged
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from the basement. He was arrested, searched, and handcuffed.
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Thereafter, another officer, Detective Frolich, entered the
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basement to determine if someone else was down there and noticed
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a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack of clothing.
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The officer seized the red running suit which, at trial, was
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admitted into evidence over Buie's objection.
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Buie did not dispute the right of police up to the point of
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his arrest to search anywhere in the house where he might have
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been found. Instead, Buie argued that Detective Frolich's entry
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into the basement after the point of his arrest was not
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constitutionally justified as incident to arrest. The Supreme
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Court agreed to review the case to decide the justification
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required before Detective Frolich could constitutionally enter
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the basement to see if someone else was there. (18)
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Supreme Court Decision
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The Supreme Court weighed the additional invasion of Buie's
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privacy in those remaining areas of his house not searched prior
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to his arrest against the interest of the officers in assuring
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themselves that Buie's house was not harboring other dangerous
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persons who could unexpectedly launch an attack. By noting that
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an ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more
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to be feared than one in open, more familiar surroundings, the
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Court struck the balance in favor of permitting the arresting
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officers to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after
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making the arrest.
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The Court approved the following two alternate grounds for
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police to conduct protective sweeps (19) of premises for persons
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incident to arrest: 1) An automatic right to search any area
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"immediately adjoining" the place of arrest; and 2) a right to
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conduct a protective sweep of "other areas" based on reasonable
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suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing
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a danger to those on the arrest scene. This new protective
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sweep authority in the context of in-home arrests, when added to
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the traditional search incident to arrest authority established
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in "Chimel," permits the scope of such searches to be broken down
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for analysis into four distinct areas with respect to the
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arrest. For illustration, these areas can be thought of as a
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series of concentric circles representing a bird's eye view
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looking down on the arrest. Two innermost circles represent
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searches of the person and items immediately associated with the
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person and the area within the arrestee's immediate control.
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The outermost circles represent searches of immediately
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"adjoining areas" and "other areas," which were approved in
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"Buie."
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IMMEDIATELY ADJOINING AREAS
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Justification--Lawful Custodial Arrest
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In "Buie," the Court specifically stated:
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"As an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a
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precautionary matter and without probable cause or
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reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces
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immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an
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attack could be immediately launched." (20)
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"Buie" thus holds that police need no additional
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justification beyond the lawful custodial arrest itself to
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automatically sweep areas immediately adjoining the place of
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arrest.
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Scope--Limited to Persons
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This protective sweep authorized by "Buie" is not a full
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search of the premises but rather a narrowly confined cursory
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inspection of those places where a person might be hiding. (21)
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It is important to note that this scope limitation to searching
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for only persons is equally applicable to both sweeps of
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"immediately adjoining spaces," as well as to sweeps of "other
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areas."
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Since the Supreme Court did not further define "other
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spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest," police must
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look to lower court decisions for guidance in ascertaining the
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precise limits to such searches. In "United States v.
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Hernandez," (22) a Federal district court upheld the action of
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two deputy U.S. marshals in opening a closet door in a living
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room where the defendant was arrested and seizing evidence that
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was in plain view in the closet. This ruling was predictable,
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since "Buie" specifically permitted the arresting officers to
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look in closets immediately adjoining the place of arrest.
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A more difficult question that police and lower courts will
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be forced to address concerns what "other spaces immediately
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adjoining" the place of arrest qualify for suspicionless sweeps
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under the expanded Buie rationale." The area that may be
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subjected to these suspicionless protective sweeps appears to
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exceed "Chimel's" area of immediate control limitation. However,
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until a body of case law defines the precise parameters for such
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searches, a workable rule of thumb for police to follow is the
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"one threshold" rule. That rule permits arresting officers to
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cross one threshold contiguous with and leading from the room
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where the arrest occurred.
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In "People v. Febus," (23) a New York court approved a police
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officer's pushing open a slightly ajar door to an apartment
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after the officer had arrested the youth outside the apartment.
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The court believed the area on the other side of the door was a
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space immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an
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attack could immediately be launched. The court held that an
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officer should not have to close his eyes to reality and await
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the glint of steel before acting to protect himself or others.
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PROTECTIVE SWEEPS IN "OTHER AREAS"
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Reasonable Suspicion Required
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Police may conduct a sweep in "other areas" of premises
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beyond those areas "immediately adjoining" the place of arrest
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if they have reasonable suspicion to fear for their safety. In
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order for the sweep to proceed beyond spaces immediately
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adjoining the arrest, the Supreme Court in "Buie" held:
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"[T]here must be articulable facts which, taken together
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with the rational inferences from those facts, would
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warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the
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area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to
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those on the arrest scene." (24)
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The reasonable suspicion needed to justify a protective
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sweep of "other areas" of premises incident to arrest requires
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police to have a reasonable individualized suspicion. The
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burden of proving the legitimacy of such warrantless searches is
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on the government, and police do not have automatic authority to
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conduct them.
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The Basis for Fear Must be Articulated
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In "United States v. Akrawi," (25) the U.S. Court of Appeals
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for the Sixth Circuit held that government agents who conducted
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a lengthy protective sweep of premises following an arrest could
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not point to any specific reason why they believed another
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person dangerous to the agents was in the house at the time of
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the arrest. The court suppressed the evidence found during the
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sweep because the government failed to meet its burden to
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articulate a particular reason to support the agents' belief
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that a dangerous individual was present.
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Likewise in "Hayes v. State," (26) two officers attempting to
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justify a sweep following an arrest testified that there was a
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possibility that a dangerous person with a violent past might be
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there, but the officers could point to no facts to support their
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belief. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that while the
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officers need not have probable cause to believe a dangerous
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third person is present, the mere possibility of such presence
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is not enough. The court reasoned that if any possibility of
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danger were sufficient to create a reasonable belief of a
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danger, the police would have carte blanche power to conduct
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sweeps of citizens' homes incident to virtually any arrest and
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that by means of post-hoc rationalizations, the police could
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justify virtually any sweep search.
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Another issue addressed by the "Hayes" court is important
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for all law enforcement officers. When asked why it would not
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have been safer simply to withdraw from the residence, a
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detective responded that sweep searches of residences incident
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to arrest were "standard operating procedure." The court found
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such blanket sweep search procedures patently unconstitutional
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and ruled that such searches may not be conducted automatically
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or as a matter of routine. (27)
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Similarly, in "United States v. Castillo," (28) an officer
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testified that it was standard procedure to do a protective
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sweep of the premises. In rejecting that statement as a "flip
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remark," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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observed that the fourth amendment was adopted for the very
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purpose of protecting citizens from "routine" government
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intrusions into the home and expressed dismay that any trained
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police officer in the United States would believe otherwise.
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Notwithstanding the officer's erroneous belief that he was
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entitled to make protective sweeps as a matter of routine, the
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court concluded that the arresting officers did have specific
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facts to reasonably believe that other persons were on the
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premises to justify a protective sweep.
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Sweep Must Terminate When Fear Dispelled
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The Supreme Court in "Buie" noted that the protective sweep
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aimed at protecting the arresting officers may last no longer
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than necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger,
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complete the arrest, and depart the premises. (29) Once police
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determine that no person who poses a danger to them is present,
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their authority to sweep the premises ends, and they must,
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barring other exigencies, leave the residence. (30) In that
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regard, the court in "United States v. Akrawi" (31) ruled that
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agents who remained in the house for 45 minutes following an
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arrest did not have any factual justification to support a
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casual relation between the sweep and their claimed necessity to
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protect themselves.
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CONCLUSION
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Most challenges to an officer's search incident to an
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arrest in the home will arise in the context of a motion to
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suppress evidence found during the search. As in all
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warrantless searches, the government bears the burden of proving
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that the search falls within one of the few specifically
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established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
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requirement. (32) Where the initial intrusion into areas of a
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home gives officers access to evidence in plain view, such
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evidence can be seized if its incriminating nature is
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immediately apparent. (33) To insure the admissibility of
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evidence seized during an in-home arrest, law enforcement
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officers should document and be prepared to articulate the
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factual justification for any protective sweep conducted
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incident to an arrest. Finally, on remand from the Supreme
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Court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled in the "Buie" case
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that Detective Frolich's protective sweep of Buie's basement was
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justified by a reasonable belief that Buie's accomplice might
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have been hiding there and might have had the gun used in the
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robbery. (34)
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FOOTNOTES
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(1) United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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(2) 110 S.Ct. 1093 (1990).
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(3) Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
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(4) Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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(5) Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). See also,
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United States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
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denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); United States v. Hernandez, 825
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F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988).
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(6) Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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(7) United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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(8) See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189 (7th
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Cir. 1990), where the court of appeals approved a warrantless
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search of a motel room immediately following the arrest of its
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occupants, even though both occupants were handcuffed at the
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time of the search. The officers were not required to be
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"punctilious" in their judgments under the quick developing
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circumstances.
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(9) United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
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(10) United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1978)
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(shoes taken from pretrial detainee 6 weeks after the arrest).
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(11) United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1980)
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(seizure of arrestee's wallet upon arrival at initial place of
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detention, search of its contents, and photocopying of documents
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contained therein, even though evidence unrelated to crime for
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which arrested).
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(12) United States v. Holtzman, 871 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir.
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1989).
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(13) United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.
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1978).
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(14) 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the court defined
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the area of "immediate control" to mean the area into which an
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arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or destroy
|
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|
evidence.
|
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|
|
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(15) Wisconsin v. Murdock, 455 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1990).
|
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|
Three arrestees were handcuffed in back, face down on the floor
|
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|
offering no resistance while police searched. In approving the
|
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|
search, the court held that the scope of search is not dependent
|
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|
upon the level of control the arresting officers have over the
|
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|
arrestee or the arrestee's actual ability to gain access to the
|
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|
area searched, because an officer is not required to weigh the
|
|||
|
arrestee's probability of success in obtaining a weapon or
|
|||
|
destructible evidence hidden within his or her immediate
|
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|
control. See also, United States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346 (7th
|
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|
Cir. 1988).
|
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|
|
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|
(16) 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(17) Supra note 2.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(18) If Detective Frolich's entry into the basement was
|
|||
|
lawful, then the seizure of the red running suit, which was in
|
|||
|
plain view and for which the officer had probable cause to
|
|||
|
believe was evidence of a crime, was also lawful. Horton v.
|
|||
|
California, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(19) In Buie, the Court defined a "protective sweep" as a
|
|||
|
quick and limited search of a premises, incident to an arrest and
|
|||
|
conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. 110
|
|||
|
S.Ct. at 1094.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(20) Id. at 1098 (emphasis added).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(21) Id. at 1099.22 738 F.Supp 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(22) 738 F.Supp 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(23) 556 N.Y.S. 2d 1000 (N.Y. Sup.Ct.), appeal granted, 562
|
|||
|
N.E. 2d 885 (1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(24) 110 S.Ct. at 1098.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(25) 920 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(26) 797 P.2d 962 (Nev. 1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(27) Id. at 967.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(28) 866 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1988).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(29) 110 S.Ct. at 1099.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(30) United States v. Oguns, 1990 WL 205208 (2d Cir. 1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(31) Supra note 25.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(32) Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(33) Supra note 18.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(34) Buie v. Maryland, 586 A.2d 167 (Court of Appeals of
|
|||
|
Maryland 1990).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
_______________
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction
|
|||
|
who are interested in this article should consult their legal
|
|||
|
adviser. Some police procedures ruled permissible under Federal
|
|||
|
constitutional law are of questionable legality under State law
|
|||
|
or are not permitted at all.
|
|||
|
|