355 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
355 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
COMPUTER ELECTRONIC MAIL AND PRIVACY
|
||
|
====================================
|
||
|
|
||
|
by
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ruel T. Hernandez
|
||
|
|
||
|
801 Cedarbend Way
|
||
|
Chula Vista, California 92010
|
||
|
(619) 421-6517 (voice)
|
||
|
(CompuServe: 71450,3341)
|
||
|
(GEnie Mail: R.HERNANDEZ)
|
||
|
|
||
|
January 11, 1987
|
||
|
|
||
|
Copyright (c) 1986, 1987 by Ruel T. Hernandez
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
(This is an edited version of a law school seminar paper I wrote at
|
||
|
California Western School of Law. A another version of the paper, entitled
|
||
|
"Electronic Mail - Your Right to Privacy," by Ruel T. Hernandez as told to
|
||
|
Dan Gookin, was published as the cover story in The Byte Buyer, San Diego's
|
||
|
Microcomputer Magazine, volume 4, number 24, December 5, 1986. That version
|
||
|
may also be found on their BBS at 619/226-3304 or 619/573-0359. Note,
|
||
|
citations to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 refer to the
|
||
|
final version passed by the House of Representatives on October 2, 1986,
|
||
|
which was passed by the Senate the day before, as listed in the
|
||
|
Congressional Record.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
INTRODUCTION
|
||
|
|
||
|
Two years ago, legislation was introduced into Congress that sought to
|
||
|
provide federal statutory guidelines for privacy protection of computer
|
||
|
communications, such as electronic mail found on commercial computer systems
|
||
|
and on remote computer systems, commonly known as bulletin board systems
|
||
|
(BBS). Old federal wiretap law only gave protection to normal audio
|
||
|
telephonic communications. There was no contemplation of computers or their
|
||
|
operators using telephone lines to communicate. The old federal wiretap law
|
||
|
regulated police interceptions of communications while they are being
|
||
|
transmitted on a telephone line. Before the Electronic Communications
|
||
|
Privacy Act of 1976, the law did not provide guidelines for protecting the
|
||
|
transmitted message once it was stored within a computer system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
QUESTIONS
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) Whether electronic mail and other intended private material stored
|
||
|
within an electronic computer communication system have Fourth Amendment
|
||
|
privacy protection?
|
||
|
|
||
|
(2) Should private electronic mail and other such material be accorded
|
||
|
the protection guidelines as with telephone communication and the U.S. Mail?
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
PROBLEM
|
||
|
|
||
|
Law enforcement seeks criminal evidence stored as E-Mail on either a
|
||
|
local, user-supported BBS, or on a commercial computer service, such as
|
||
|
CompuServe, GEnie or The Source. (Note, this situation is equally
|
||
|
applicable to personal, private data stored on a remote system for later
|
||
|
retrieval, as with CompuServe's online disk storage capabilities.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
For instance, a computer user calls up a computer communication system.
|
||
|
Using the electronic mail function, he leaves a private message that can
|
||
|
only be read by an intended recipient. The message is to inform the
|
||
|
recipient of a conspiracy plan to violate a federal or state criminal
|
||
|
statute. Law enforcement gets a tip about the criminal activity and learn
|
||
|
that incriminating evidence may be found on the computer system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In 1982, such a situation occurred. (Meeks, Brock, "Life at 300 Baud:
|
||
|
Crime on the BBS Network," Profiles, August, 1986, 12-13.) A Detroit
|
||
|
federal grand jury, investigating a million-dollar cocaine ring, issued a
|
||
|
subpoena ordering a commercial service, The Source, to hand over private
|
||
|
subscriber data files. The files were routinely backed up to guard against
|
||
|
system crashes. The grand jury was looking for evidence to show that the
|
||
|
cocaine ring was using The Source as communication base to send messages to
|
||
|
members of the ring. With such evidence, the grand jury could implicate or
|
||
|
indict those suspected to be a part of the cocaine ring. The Source refused
|
||
|
to obey the subpoena. The prosecution argued The Source could not
|
||
|
vicariously assert a subscriber's privacy rights. Constitutional rights are
|
||
|
personal and could only be asserted by the person whose rights are invaded.
|
||
|
Additionally, if the files containing messages were duplicated, any
|
||
|
reasonable expectation of privacy by users would be extinguished. A court
|
||
|
battle ensued. However, before a ruling could be made, the kingpin of the
|
||
|
cocaine ring entered a surprise guilty plea to federal drug trafficking
|
||
|
charges. The case against the Source was discontinued.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Publicly posted messages and other public material may be easily
|
||
|
retrieved by law enforcement. It is the private material, such as E-Mail,
|
||
|
that poses the problem.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Law enforcement's task is then to gather enough evidence to
|
||
|
substantiate a criminal case. Specifically, they would want the E-Mail, or
|
||
|
other private files, transmitted by suspected criminals. A computer
|
||
|
communications service, as keeper and transmitter of private electronic
|
||
|
messages, would not want to turn over the private data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
INADEQUACY OF OLD LAW
|
||
|
|
||
|
Brock Meeks of Profiles magazine noted that as of August, 1986, "no ...
|
||
|
protection exist[ed] for electronic communications. Any law enforcement
|
||
|
agency can, for example, confiscate a local BBS and examine all the message
|
||
|
traffic," including and private files and E-Mail. (Ibid.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the next section, case law will be examined and statutory law prior
|
||
|
to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) will be noted.
|
||
|
Seemingly applicable statutes, as they stood, provided no guidelines for
|
||
|
privacy protection of electronic computer communication systems, such as
|
||
|
CompuServe, GEnie, and local, user-operated BBSs.
|
||
|
|
||
|
CASE LAW
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is little case law available on computer communications and
|
||
|
Fourth Amendment constitutional problems. (M.D. Scott, Computer Law, 9-9
|
||
|
(1984 & Special Update, August 1, 1984).) If not for the surprise
|
||
|
preemptive guilty plea, the above described Detroit case may have provided
|
||
|
guidance on computer communications and privacy issues.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Of the available cases, Scott noted those that primarily dealt with
|
||
|
financial information found in bank and consumer credit organization
|
||
|
computers. In U.S. v. Davey, 426 F.2d 842, 845 (2 Cir. 1970), the
|
||
|
government had the right to require the production of relevant information
|
||
|
wherever it may be lodged and regardless of the form in which it is kept and
|
||
|
the manner in which it may be retrieved, so long as it pays the reasonable
|
||
|
costs of retrieval. In a California case, Burrows v. Superior Court, 13
|
||
|
Cal. 3d 238, 243, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1974), a depositor was found to
|
||
|
have a reasonable expectation that a bank would maintain the confidentiality
|
||
|
of both those papers in check form originating from the depositor and the
|
||
|
depositor's bank statements and records of those same checks. However, in
|
||
|
U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976), customer account records on a
|
||
|
banks' computer were held to not be private papers of the bank customer,
|
||
|
and, hence, there is no Fourth Amendment problem when they are subpoenaed
|
||
|
directly from the bank.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The computer data and information in these cases have more of a
|
||
|
business character in contrast to personal E-Mail found on remote computer
|
||
|
systems such as CompuServe or a local BBS. Under the old law, a prosecutor,
|
||
|
as in the Detroit case, may try to analogize duplicated and backed up E-Mail
|
||
|
to business situations where data on business computer databases are also
|
||
|
backed up. Both types of computer data are stored on a system and then
|
||
|
later retrieved. The provider of the remote computing service or the sysop
|
||
|
would counterargue that the nature of computers always require the
|
||
|
duplication and backup of any computer data, whether the data files are E-
|
||
|
Mail or centrally-based financial or credit data. Duplication does not
|
||
|
necessarily make E-Mail the same as financial or credit data stored in
|
||
|
business computers. Centrally-based business information is more concerned
|
||
|
with the data processing. That information is generally stored and
|
||
|
retrieved by the same operator. E-Mail is more concerned with personal
|
||
|
communications between individuals where the sender transmits a private
|
||
|
message to be retrieved only by an intended recipient. The sender and the
|
||
|
recipient have subjective expectations of privacy that when viewed
|
||
|
objectively is reasonable. Therefore, there is a constitutionally protected
|
||
|
expectation of privacy under Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed. 88 S.Ct.
|
||
|
507 (1967). However, the prosecution would note under California v.
|
||
|
Ciraolo, -- U.S. --, 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1984), the users would have to protect
|
||
|
their electronic mail from any privacy intrusion. The provider or operator
|
||
|
of the remote system has ultimate control of his system. He has complete
|
||
|
access to all areas of the system. He could easily examine the material.
|
||
|
The prosecution would note the user could not reasonably protect his private
|
||
|
data from provider or operator invasion. This "knot-hole" would exclude any
|
||
|
idea of privacy. If there is no privacy, there can be no search and
|
||
|
therefore no Fourth Amendment constitutional violation. Law enforcement can
|
||
|
retrieve the material.
|
||
|
|
||
|
FEDERAL WIRETAP STATUTES
|
||
|
|
||
|
The federal wiretap statutes, before the Electronic Communication
|
||
|
Privacy Act of 1986, protected oral telephone communications from police
|
||
|
interceptions. This protection was made in 1968 in response to electronic
|
||
|
eavesdropping by government. (Cohodas, Nadine, "Congress Races to stay
|
||
|
Ahead of Technology," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 31, 1986,
|
||
|
1235.) Although E-Mail appears to come under the statute's definition of
|
||
|
"wire communication," under the old law, it was limited to audio
|
||
|
transmissions by wire or cable and does not mention stored computer data.
|
||
|
(18 U.S.C. sec. 2510(1).) The old law required that an interception of a
|
||
|
wire communication be an aural acquisition of the communication. (18 U.S.C.
|
||
|
sec. 2510(4).) Being "aural," the communication must be "heard."
|
||
|
Therefore, a computer communication may come under the old law while being
|
||
|
transmitted. After a caller's message is "sent" on a remote computer
|
||
|
system, the message is then stored within the computer's system. The
|
||
|
communication's conversion into computer stored data, thus no longer in
|
||
|
transmission until retrieved, takes the communication out of the old
|
||
|
statutory protection.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Eighteen years ago ... Congress could not appreciate - or in some
|
||
|
cases even contemplate - [today's] telecommunications and computer
|
||
|
technology...." (132 Cong. Rec. S7992 (daily ed. June 19, 1986) (statement
|
||
|
of Sen. Leahy).)
|
||
|
|
||
|
CALIFORNIA'S INVASION OF PRIVACY AND WIRETAP STATUTE
|
||
|
|
||
|
California's "invasion of privacy" and wiretap statutes (Cal. Penal
|
||
|
Code sec. 630 et seq.), appears to provide state protection for BBSs.
|
||
|
California Penal Code sec. 637 reads as:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Every person not a party to a telegraphic or telephonic
|
||
|
communication who willfully discloses the contents of a
|
||
|
telegraphic or telephonic message, or any part thereof, addressed
|
||
|
to another person, without the permission of such person, unless
|
||
|
directed so to do by the lawful order of a court, is punishable
|
||
|
by imprisonment in the state prison, or in the count jail not
|
||
|
exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding five thousand
|
||
|
dollars ($5000), or by both fine and imprisonment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Again, the question here would be whether "telegraphic or telephonic
|
||
|
messages" include computer communications via modem where a transmitted
|
||
|
message is subsequently stored within a computer awaiting retrieval by its
|
||
|
intended recipient. Again, the storage of the data takes the computer
|
||
|
communications out of the statute. When the statute was passed, the
|
||
|
California legislature, much like the Congress, could not foresee the
|
||
|
technological advances in computer communications.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It should be noted that Assemblywoman Moore introduced legislation in
|
||
|
1985 that would amend have the California state constitution to explicitly
|
||
|
provide state constitutional privacy protection for remote computing
|
||
|
services and their stored information. However, nothing has come out of
|
||
|
this. Aside from political reasons for the lack of further action is one
|
||
|
possible legal consequential argument against the amendment may be if
|
||
|
computer privacy protection is specified in the state constitution, more
|
||
|
litigation may result to tie up the courts in cases deciding whether or not
|
||
|
there is privacy protection for other unspecified matters. Although,
|
||
|
overall, the California state constitution is much more specific than the
|
||
|
United States Constitution, it may be best to not be any more specific with
|
||
|
regard to privacy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
PROTECTION FOR U.S. MAIL
|
||
|
|
||
|
Statutory U.S. Mail protection provides a suggestion for statutory
|
||
|
provisions of privacy protection for E-Mail deposited in electronic
|
||
|
communication systems. The unauthorized taking out of and examining of the
|
||
|
contents of mail held in a "depository for mail matter" before it is
|
||
|
delivered to the mail's intended recipient is punishable by fine,
|
||
|
imprisonment, or both. (18 U.S.C. sec. 1702.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
SOLUTION - THE NEW LAW
|
||
|
|
||
|
There are two methods towards a solution: (1) court decisions; and (2)
|
||
|
new legislated privacy protection.
|
||
|
|
||
|
COURT DECISIONS
|
||
|
|
||
|
Courts may have chosen to read computer communications protection into
|
||
|
the old federal wiretap statute or into existing state law. However, they
|
||
|
were reluctant to do so. Courts "are in no hurry to [revise or make new law
|
||
|
in this area] and some judges are openly asking Congress for help....
|
||
|
[F]ederal Appeals Court Judge Richard Posner in Chicago said Congress needed
|
||
|
to revise current law, adding that 'judges are not authorized to amend
|
||
|
statutes even to bring them up-to-date.'" (Cohodas, Nadine, "Congress Races
|
||
|
to Stay Ahead of Technology," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 31,
|
||
|
1986, p. 1233.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
NEW STATUTE
|
||
|
|
||
|
Last October 21, 1986, President Reagan signed the Electronic
|
||
|
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 amending the federal wiretap law. The
|
||
|
new Act (P.L. 99-508) would not take immediate effect until three months
|
||
|
after the signing - presumably January 21, 1986. (18 U.S.C. secs. 111 and
|
||
|
202.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
When the new law does take effect, it would first provide privacy
|
||
|
protection for any
|
||
|
|
||
|
'electronic communication' ... [by] any transfer of signs,
|
||
|
signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any
|
||
|
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
|
||
|
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that
|
||
|
affects interstate or foreign commerce...."
|
||
|
|
||
|
(18 U.S.C. sec. 2510(10).)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Second, and more importantly for this discussion, ECPA would protect
|
||
|
"stored wire and electronic communications," i.e. E-Mail stored and backed
|
||
|
up on disk or tape on an electronic computer communication system. (18
|
||
|
U.S.C. sec. 2701(a)(1) and (2).) The legislation makes it a federal
|
||
|
criminal offense to break into any electronic system holding copies of
|
||
|
messages or to exceed authorized access to alter or obtain the stored
|
||
|
messages. (Ibid.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The legislation would protect electronic computer communication systems
|
||
|
from law enforcement invasion of user E-Mail without a court order. (18
|
||
|
U.S.C. sec. 2703.) Although the burden of preventing invasion of the E-Mail
|
||
|
is placed on the subscriber or user of the system, the government must give
|
||
|
him notice allowing him fourteen days to file a motion to quash a subpoena
|
||
|
or to vacate a court order seeking disclosure of his computer data. (18
|
||
|
U.S.C. sec. 2704(b).) However, the government may give delayed notice when
|
||
|
there are exigent circumstances as listed by the Act (18 U.S.C. sec. 2705.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The legislation gives a civil cause of action to the provider or
|
||
|
operator, subscriber, customer or user of the system aggrieved by an
|
||
|
invasion of private material stored in the system in violation of ECPA. (18
|
||
|
U.S.C. sec. 2702; see also 18 U.S.C. sec. 2520.) If the provider or
|
||
|
operator has to disclose information stored on his system due to a court
|
||
|
order, warrant, subpoena, or certification under ECPA, there can be no cause
|
||
|
of action against him by any person aggrieved by such disclosure. (18
|
||
|
U.S.C. sec. 2703(e); see also sec. 2702(b).)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The electronic communications, under this new Act, must be sent by a
|
||
|
system that "affects interstate or foreign commerce." (18 U.S.C. sec.
|
||
|
2510(12).) The "electronic communications" may practically be limited to
|
||
|
electronic communications sent by common carrier telephone lines.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There may be some question as to whether or not ECPA is confined to
|
||
|
commercial systems and does not cover user-operated bulletin board systems.
|
||
|
That would be similar to arguing the old federal wiretap law was confined to
|
||
|
long distance communications and not to local telephone calls. The House
|
||
|
report (H.R. No. 647, 99th Cong. (1986)), indicates user-operated BBSs are
|
||
|
intended to be covered by the Act. The House noted a difference between
|
||
|
commercial subscription systems and user-operated BBSs readily accessible by
|
||
|
the public. However, it also noted the different levels of security found
|
||
|
on user-operated BBSs, i.e. the difference between system areas containing
|
||
|
private electronic mail and other areas containing public information.
|
||
|
Electronic communications that the operator attempts to keep confidential
|
||
|
would be protected by ECPA, while there would be no liability for access to
|
||
|
features configured to be readily accessible by the general public.
|
||
|
Language in the Act also refers to "the person or entity providing the wire
|
||
|
or electronic communication service." Such language may be seen to indicate
|
||
|
the inclusion of individuals who operate a BBS. (18 U.S. secs. 2701(c)(1)
|
||
|
and 2702(a)(1) and (b).) Additionally, a remote computing service was
|
||
|
defined in the Act as an electronic communications system that provides
|
||
|
computer storage or processing services to the public. (18 U.S.C. sec.
|
||
|
2710(2).) This would certainly be applicable to a user-operated BBS that
|
||
|
is easily accessible to public with the simple dialing of a telephone number
|
||
|
by a modem-equipped computer. On the political side, Senator Leahy, a
|
||
|
principal sponsor of the Act was reported to have been "soliciting [users
|
||
|
and operators' of BBSs] comments and encourage sensitivity to the needs of
|
||
|
BBS's in the legislation.... They are ... willing to listen to our side of
|
||
|
things." (BBSLAW02.MSG, dated 07/24/85, information from Chip Berlet,
|
||
|
Secretary, National Lawyers Guild Civil Liberties Committee, transmitted by
|
||
|
Paul Bernstein, SYSOP, LAW MUG, Chicago, Illinois 312/280-8180, regarding
|
||
|
Federal Legislation Affecting Computer Bulletin Boards, deposited on The
|
||
|
Legacy Network 213/553-1473.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
CONCLUSION
|
||
|
|
||
|
Electronic mail stored on computer communication systems have Fourth
|
||
|
Amendment constitutional privacy protection. Unfortunately, before the
|
||
|
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, such protection was not
|
||
|
articulated by federal or state statutory guidelines. Case law also did
|
||
|
not provide any helpful guidance. The peculiarities of computers and
|
||
|
computer storage posed problems which were not addressed by the old wiretap
|
||
|
laws. They were also problems overwhelmed by constitutional privacy law as
|
||
|
defined by the United States Supreme Court. A legislative solution was
|
||
|
required and was provided for by ECPA.
|
||
|
|
||
|
[For more information on ECPA, see 132 Cong. Rec. H8977 (daily ed.
|
||
|
October 2, 1986) or "Major Provisions of 1986 Electronic Privacy Act,"
|
||
|
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 11, 1986, 2558.]
|
||
|
|