177 lines
7.2 KiB
Plaintext
177 lines
7.2 KiB
Plaintext
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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=============================================================================
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CERT(sm) Advisory CA-94:15
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Original issue date: December 19, 1994
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Last revised: August 30, 1996
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Information previously in the README was inserted
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into the advisory.
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A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
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Topic: NFS Vulnerabilities
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- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The CERT Coordination Center is experiencing an increase in reports of root
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compromises caused by intruders using tools to exploit a number of NFS
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(Network File System) vulnerabilities.
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CERT recommends limiting your exposure to these attacks by implementing
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the security measures described in Section III below.
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We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.
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Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.
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- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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I. Description
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There are tools being used by intruders to exploit a number of NFS
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vulnerabilities. These tools are widely available and widely distributed.
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II. Impact
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The impact varies depending on which vulnerabilities are present.
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In the worst case, intruders gain unauthorized root access from a
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remote host.
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III. Security Measures
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A. Filter packets at your firewall/router.
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Filter TCP port 111, UDP port 111 (portmapper), TCP port 2049,
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and UDP port 2049 (nfsd).
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Note: Some sites may run NFS on a port other than 2049. To determine
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which port is running NFS, enter the following command on the
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machine in question:
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rpcinfo -p
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If NFS is on a different port, then that is the port number to
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block at the firewall.
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Consult your vendor or your firewall documentation for detailed
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instructions on how to configure the ports.
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This measure will prevent access to NFS at your site from outside
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your firewall, but it will not protect you from attacks launched from
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your local network, behind your firewall.
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B. Use a portmapper that disallows proxy access.
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Be sure that you do this for every host that runs a portmapper.
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For Solaris, 2.x, use a version of rpcbind that disallows proxy
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access.
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A portmapper that disallows proxy access protects all hosts with the
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modified portmapper from attacks that originate either inside or
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outside your firewall. Because this security measure addresses only
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the portmapper vulnerability, we recommend combining it with
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measure A above.
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Wietse Venema has developed a portmapper that disallows proxy access.
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It is available by anonymous FTP from
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ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/portmap_3.shar.Z
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info.cert.org:/pub/tools/nfs_tools/portmap_3.shar.Z
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MD5 checksum: f6a3ad98772e7a402ddcdac277adc4a6
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For Solaris systems, Venema has developed a version of rpcbind that
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does not allow proxy access. Solaris users should install this
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program, not the portmapper. Rpcbind is available by anonymous FTP
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from the same sites as the portmapper:
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ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/rpcbind_1.1.tar.Z
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info.cert.org:/pub/tools/nfs_tools/rpcbind_1.1.tar.Z
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MD5 checksum: 58437adcbea0a55e37d3a3211f72c08b
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C. Check the configuration of the /etc/exports files on your hosts.
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In particular:
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1. Do *not* self-reference an NFS server in its own exports file.
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2. Do not allow the exports file to contain a "localhost" entry.
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3. Export file systems only to hosts that require them.
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4. Export only to fully qualified hostnames.
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5. Ensure that export lists do not exceed 256 characters.
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If you have aliases, the list should not exceed 256 characters
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*after* the aliases have been expanded.
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(See CA-94:02.REVISED.SunOS.rpc.mountd.vulnerability.)
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6. Use the showmount(8) utility to check that exports are correct.
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7. Wherever possible, mount file systems to be exported read only and
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export file systems read only.
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D. Ensure that your systems are current with patches and workarounds
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available from your vendor and identified in CERT advisories.
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The following advisories address problems related to NFS:
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CA-91:21.SunOS.NFS.Jumbo.and.fsirand
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CA-92:12.REVISED.SunOS.rpc.mountd.vulnerability
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CA-92:15.Multiple.SunOS.vulnerabilities.patches
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CA-93:15.SunOS.and.Solaris.vulnerabilities
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CA-94:02.REVISED.SunOS.rpc.mountd.vulnerability
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Vendors may have additional patches not covered by a CERT
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advisory, so be sure to contact your vendor for further information.
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- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The CERT Coordination Center thanks Steve Bellovin, Casper Dik, Leendert
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van Doorn, and Wietse Venema for their support in responding to this problem.
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- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
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Coordination Center or your representative in Forum of Incident
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Response and Security Teams (FIRST).
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If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to
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CERT via electronic mail, CERT strongly advises that the e-mail be
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encrypted. CERT can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key
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available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org), or PEM (contact CERT
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for details).
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Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org
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Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
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CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
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and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
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CERT Coordination Center
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Software Engineering Institute
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Carnegie Mellon University
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Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
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USA
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Past advisories, CERT bulletins, information about FIRST representatives,
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and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous
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FTP from info.cert.org.
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Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996 Carnegie Mellon University
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This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided
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it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is
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included.
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CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Revision history
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|
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Aug. 30, 1996 Information previously in the README was inserted
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into the advisory.
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Feb. 02, 1995 Sec. III - Added a note about checking port numbers.
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Version: 2.6.2
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ySVFfYqT0Yk=
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=iyDB
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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