2254 lines
64 KiB
Plaintext
2254 lines
64 KiB
Plaintext
![]() |
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
GLOSSARY OF COMPUTER SECURITY ACRONYMS
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIS Automated Information System
|
||
|
|
||
|
COMPUSEC Computer Security
|
||
|
|
||
|
COMSEC Communications Security
|
||
|
|
||
|
CSTVRP Computer Security Technical Vulnerability Reporting Program
|
||
|
|
||
|
DAA Designated Approving Authority
|
||
|
|
||
|
DAC Discretionary Access Control
|
||
|
|
||
|
DES Data Encryption Standard
|
||
|
|
||
|
DPL Degausser Products List
|
||
|
|
||
|
DTLS Descriptive Top-Level Specification
|
||
|
|
||
|
EPL Evaluated Products List
|
||
|
|
||
|
ETL Endorsed Tools List
|
||
|
|
||
|
FTLS Formal Top-Level Specification
|
||
|
|
||
|
ISSO Information System Security Officer
|
||
|
|
||
|
MAC Mandatory Access Control
|
||
|
|
||
|
NCSC National Computer Security Center
|
||
|
|
||
|
NTISSC National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
|
||
|
Committee
|
||
|
|
||
|
OPSEC Operations Security
|
||
|
|
||
|
PPL Preferred Products List
|
||
|
|
||
|
SAISS Subcommittee on Automated Information Systems Security of NTISSC
|
||
|
|
||
|
SSO System Security Officer
|
||
|
|
||
|
STS Subcommittee on Telecommunications Security of NTISSC
|
||
|
|
||
|
TCB Trusted Computing Base
|
||
|
|
||
|
TCSEC DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
GLOSSARY OF COMPUTER SECURITY TERMS
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
*-property (or star property)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A Bell-La Padula security model rule allowing a subject write access to an
|
||
|
object only if the security level of the object dominates the security level
|
||
|
of the subject. Also called confinement property.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-A-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
acceptance inspection
|
||
|
|
||
|
The final inspection to determine whether or not a facility or
|
||
|
system meets the specified technical and performance standards. Note: This
|
||
|
inspection is held immediately after facility and software testing and is the
|
||
|
basis for commissioning or accepting the information system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access
|
||
|
|
||
|
A specific type of interaction between a subject and an object that
|
||
|
results in the flow of information from one to the other.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access control
|
||
|
|
||
|
The process of limiting access to the resources of a system only to
|
||
|
authorized programs, processes, or other systems (in a network). Synonymous
|
||
|
with controlled access and limited access.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access control mechanism
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hardware or software features, operating procedures, management
|
||
|
procedures, and various combinations of these designed to detect and prevent
|
||
|
unauthorized access and to permit authorized access in an automated system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access level
|
||
|
|
||
|
The hierarchical portion of the security level used to identify the
|
||
|
sensitivity of data and the clearance or authorization of users. Note: The
|
||
|
access level, in conjunction with the nonhierarchical categories, forms the
|
||
|
sensitivity label of an object. See category, security level, and sensitivity
|
||
|
label.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access list
|
||
|
|
||
|
A list of users, programs, and/or processes and the specifications
|
||
|
of access categories to which each is assigned.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access period
|
||
|
|
||
|
A segment of time, generally expressed on a daily or weekly basis,
|
||
|
during which access rights prevail.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access port
|
||
|
|
||
|
A logical or physical identifier that a computer uses to distinguish
|
||
|
different terminal input/output data streams.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
access type
|
||
|
|
||
|
The nature of an access right to a particular device, program, or
|
||
|
file (e.g., read, write, execute, append, modify, delete, or create).
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
accountability
|
||
|
|
||
|
The property that enables activities on a system to be traced to
|
||
|
individuals who may then be held responsible for their actions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
accreditation
|
||
|
|
||
|
A formal declaration by the DAA that the AIS is approved to operate
|
||
|
in a particular security mode using a perscribed set of safeguards.
|
||
|
Accreditation is the official management authorization for operation of an AIS
|
||
|
and is based on the certification process as well as other management
|
||
|
considerations. The accreditation statement affixes security responsibility
|
||
|
with the DAA and shows that due care has been taken for security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
accreditation authority
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with Designated Approving Authority.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
add-on security
|
||
|
|
||
|
The retrofitting of protection mechanisms, implemented by hardware
|
||
|
or software.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
administrative security
|
||
|
|
||
|
The management constraints and supplemental controls established to
|
||
|
provide an acceptable level of protection for data. Synonymous with
|
||
|
procedural security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
assurance
|
||
|
|
||
|
A measure of confidence that the security features and architecture
|
||
|
of an AIS accurately mediate and enforce the security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
attack
|
||
|
|
||
|
The act of trying to bypass security controls on a system. An
|
||
|
attack may be active, resulting in the alteration of data; or passive,
|
||
|
resulting in the release of data. Note: The fact that an attack is made does
|
||
|
not necessarily mean that it will succeed. The degree of success depends on
|
||
|
the vulnerability of the system or activity and the effectiveness of existing
|
||
|
countermeasures.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
audit trail
|
||
|
|
||
|
A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient to
|
||
|
enable the reconstruction, reviewing, and examination of the sequence of
|
||
|
environments and activities surrounding or leading to an operation, a
|
||
|
procedure, or an event in a transaction from its inception to final results.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
authenticate
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) To verify the identity of a user, device, or other entity in a
|
||
|
computer system, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a
|
||
|
system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(2) To verify the integrity of data that have been stored,
|
||
|
transmitted, or otherwise exposed to possible unauthorized modification.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
authenticator
|
||
|
|
||
|
The means used to confirm the identity or to verify the eligibility
|
||
|
of a station, originator, or individual.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
authorization
|
||
|
|
||
|
The granting of access rights to a user, program, or process.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
automated data processing security
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with automated information systems security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
automated information system (AIS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
An assembly of computer hardware, software and/or firmware
|
||
|
configured to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process,
|
||
|
store, and/or control data or information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
automated information system security
|
||
|
|
||
|
Measures and controls that protect an AIS against denial of service
|
||
|
and unauthorized (accidental or intentional) disclosure, modification, or
|
||
|
destruction of AISs and data. AIS security includes consideration of all
|
||
|
hardware and/or software functions, characteristics and/or features;
|
||
|
operational procedures, accountability procedures, and access controls at the
|
||
|
central computer facility, remote computer, and terminal facilities;
|
||
|
management constraints; physical structures and devices; and personnel and
|
||
|
communication controls needed to provide an acceptable level of risk for the
|
||
|
AIS and for the data and information contained in the AIS. It includes the
|
||
|
totality of security safeguards needed to provide an acceptable protection
|
||
|
level for an AIS and for data handled by an AIS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
automated security monitoring
|
||
|
|
||
|
The use of automated procedures to ensure that security controls are
|
||
|
not circumvented.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
availability of data
|
||
|
|
||
|
The state when data are in the place needed by the user, at the time
|
||
|
the user needs them, and in the form needed by the user.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-B-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
back door
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with trap door.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
backup plan
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with contingency plan.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Bell-La Padula model
|
||
|
|
||
|
A formal state transition model of computer security policy that
|
||
|
describes a set of access control rules. In this formal model, the entities
|
||
|
in a computer system are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects.
|
||
|
The notion of a secure state is defined, and it is proven that each state
|
||
|
transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state,
|
||
|
thereby inductively proving that the system is secure. A system state is
|
||
|
defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to
|
||
|
objects are in accordance with a specific security policy. In order to
|
||
|
determine whether or not a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a
|
||
|
subject is compared to the classification of the object, and a determination
|
||
|
is made as to whether the subject is authorized for the specific access mode.
|
||
|
See star property (*-property) and simple security property.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
benign environment
|
||
|
|
||
|
A nonhostile environment that may be protected from external hostile
|
||
|
elements by physical, personnel, and procedural security countermeasures.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
between-the-lines entry
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unauthorized access obtained by tapping the temporarily inactive
|
||
|
terminal of a legitimate user. See piggyback.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
beyond A1
|
||
|
|
||
|
A level of trust defined by the DoD Trusted Computer System
|
||
|
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) that is beyond the state-of-the-art technology
|
||
|
available at the time the criteria were developed. It includes all the
|
||
|
A1-level features plus additional ones not required at the A1 level.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
browsing
|
||
|
|
||
|
The act of searching through storage to locate or acquire
|
||
|
information without necessarily knowing of the existence or the format of the
|
||
|
information being sought.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-C-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
call back
|
||
|
|
||
|
A procedure for identifying a remote terminal. In a call back, the
|
||
|
host system disconnects the caller and then dials the authorized telephone
|
||
|
number of the remote terminal to reestablish the connection. Synonymous with
|
||
|
dial back.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
capability
|
||
|
|
||
|
A protected identifier that both identifies the object and specifies
|
||
|
the access rights to be allowed to the accessor who possesses the capability.
|
||
|
In a capability-based system, access to protected objects such as files is
|
||
|
granted if the would-be accessor possesses a capability for the object.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
category
|
||
|
|
||
|
A restrictive label that has been applied to classified or
|
||
|
unclassified data as a means of increasing the protection of the data and
|
||
|
further restricting access to the data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
certification
|
||
|
|
||
|
The comprehensive evaluation of the technical and nontechnical
|
||
|
security features of an AIS and other safeguards, made in support of the
|
||
|
accreditation process, that establishes the extent to which a particular
|
||
|
design and implementation meet a specified set of security requirements.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
closed security environment
|
||
|
|
||
|
An environment in which both of the following conditions hold true:
|
||
|
(1) Application developers (including maintainers) have sufficient clearances
|
||
|
and authorizations to provide an acceptable presumption that they have not
|
||
|
introduced malicious logic. (2) Configuration control provides sufficient
|
||
|
assurance that applications and the equipment are protected against the
|
||
|
introduction of malicious logic prior to and during the operation of system
|
||
|
applications.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
communications security (COMSEC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from
|
||
|
telecommunications of the U.S. Government concerning national security, and
|
||
|
to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunicatons. Communications security
|
||
|
includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and
|
||
|
physical security of communications security material and information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
compartment
|
||
|
|
||
|
A class of information that has need-to-know access controls beyond
|
||
|
those normally provided for access to Confidential, Secret or Top Secret
|
||
|
information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
compartmented security mode
|
||
|
|
||
|
See modes of operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
compromise
|
||
|
|
||
|
A violation of the security policy of a system such that
|
||
|
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information may have occurred.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
compromising emanations
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unintentional data-related or intelligence-bearing signals that, if
|
||
|
intercepted and analyzed, disclose the information transmission received,
|
||
|
handled, or otherwise processed by any information processing equipment. See
|
||
|
TEMPEST.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
computer abuse
|
||
|
|
||
|
The misuse, alteration, disruption or destruction of data processing
|
||
|
resources. The key aspect is that it is intentional and improper.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
computer cryptography
|
||
|
|
||
|
The use of a crypto-algorithm in a computer, microprocessor, or
|
||
|
microcomputer to perform encryption or decryption in order to protect
|
||
|
information or to authenticate users, sources, or information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
computer fraud
|
||
|
|
||
|
Computer-related crimes involving deliberate misrepresentation,
|
||
|
alteration or disclosure of data in order to obtain something of value
|
||
|
(usually for monetary gain). A computer system must have been involved in the
|
||
|
perpetration or coverup of the act or series of acts. A computer system might
|
||
|
have been involved through improper manipulation of input data; output or
|
||
|
results; applications programs; data files; computer operations;
|
||
|
communications; or computer hardware, systems software, or firmware.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
computer security (COMPUSEC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with automated information systems security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
computer security subsystem
|
||
|
|
||
|
A device designed to provide limited computer security features in a
|
||
|
larger system environment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Computer Security Technical Vulnerability Reporting Program (CSTVRP)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A program that focuses on technical vulnerabilities in commercially
|
||
|
available hardware, firmware and software products acquired by DoD. CSTVRP
|
||
|
provides for the reporting, cataloging, and discreet dissemination of
|
||
|
technical vulnerability and corrective measure information to DoD components
|
||
|
on a need-to-know basis.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
concealment system
|
||
|
|
||
|
A method of achieving confidentiality in which sensitive information
|
||
|
is hidden by embedding it in irrelevant data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
confidentiality
|
||
|
|
||
|
The concept of holding sensitive data in confidence, limited to an
|
||
|
appropriate set of individuals or organizations.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
configuration control
|
||
|
|
||
|
The process of controlling modifications to the system's hardware,
|
||
|
firmware, software, and documentation that provides sufficient assurance that
|
||
|
the system is protected against the introduction of improper modifications
|
||
|
prior to, during, and after system implementation. Compare configuration
|
||
|
management.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
configuration management
|
||
|
|
||
|
The management of security features and assurances through control
|
||
|
of changes made to a system's hardware, software, firmware, documentation,
|
||
|
test, test fixtures and test documentation throughout the development and
|
||
|
operational life of the system. Compare configuration control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
confinement
|
||
|
|
||
|
The prevention of the leaking of sensitive data from a program.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
confinement channel
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with covert channel.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
confinement property
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with star property (*-property).
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
contamination
|
||
|
|
||
|
The intermixing of data at different sensitivity and need-to-know
|
||
|
levels. The lower level data is said to be contaminated by the higher level
|
||
|
data; thus, the contaminating (higher level) data may not receive the required
|
||
|
level of protection.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
contingency plan
|
||
|
|
||
|
A plan for emergency response, backup operations, and post-disaster
|
||
|
recovery maintained by an activity as a part of its security program that will
|
||
|
ensure the availability of critical resources and facilitate the continuity of
|
||
|
operations in an emergency situation. Synonymous with disaster plan and
|
||
|
emergency plan.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
control zone
|
||
|
|
||
|
The space, expressed in feet of radius, surrounding equipment
|
||
|
processing sensitive information, that is under sufficient physical and
|
||
|
technical control to preclude an unauthorized entry or compromise.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
controlled access
|
||
|
|
||
|
See access control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
controlled sharing
|
||
|
|
||
|
The condition that exists when access control is applied to all
|
||
|
users and components of a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
cost-risk analysis
|
||
|
|
||
|
The assessment of the costs of providing data protection for a
|
||
|
system versus the cost of losing or compromising the data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
countermeasure
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that
|
||
|
reduces the vulnerability of or threat to a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
covert channel
|
||
|
|
||
|
A communications channel that allows two cooperating processes to
|
||
|
transfer information in a manner that violates the system's security policy.
|
||
|
Synonymous with confinement channel.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
covert storage channel
|
||
|
|
||
|
A covert channel that involves the direct or indirect writing of a
|
||
|
storage location by one process and the direct or indirect reading of the
|
||
|
storage location by another process. Covert storage channels typically
|
||
|
involve a finite resource (e.g., sectors on a disk) that is shared by two
|
||
|
subjects at different security levels.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
covert timing channel
|
||
|
|
||
|
A covert channel in which one process signals information to another
|
||
|
by modulating its own use of system resources (e.g., CPU time) in such a way
|
||
|
that this manipulation affects the real response time observed by the second
|
||
|
process.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Criteria
|
||
|
|
||
|
See DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
crypto-algorithm
|
||
|
|
||
|
A well-defined procedure or sequence of rules or steps used to
|
||
|
produce a key stream or cipher text from plain text and vice versa.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
cryptography
|
||
|
|
||
|
The principles, means and methods for rendering information
|
||
|
unintelligible, and for restoring encrypted information to intelligible form.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
cryptosecurity
|
||
|
|
||
|
The security or protection resulting from the proper use of
|
||
|
technically sound cryptosystems.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-D-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Data Encryption Standard (DES)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A cryptographic algorithm for the protection of unclassified data,
|
||
|
published in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46. The DES,
|
||
|
which was approved by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is
|
||
|
intended for public and government use.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
data flow control
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with information flow control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
data integrity
|
||
|
|
||
|
The property that data meet an a priori expectation of quality.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
data security
|
||
|
|
||
|
The protection of data from unauthorized (accidental or intentional)
|
||
|
modification, destruction, or disclosure.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
declassification of AIS storage media
|
||
|
|
||
|
An administrative decision or procedure to remove or reduce the
|
||
|
security classification of the subject media.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
dedicated security mode
|
||
|
|
||
|
See modes of operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
default classification
|
||
|
|
||
|
A temporary classification reflecting the highest classification
|
||
|
being processed in a system. The default classification is included in the
|
||
|
caution statement affixed to the object.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
degauss
|
||
|
|
||
|
To reduce magnetic flux density to zero by applying a reverse
|
||
|
magnetizing field.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
degausser
|
||
|
|
||
|
An electrical device that can generate a magnetic field for the
|
||
|
purpose of degaussing magnetic storage media. Degausser Products List (DPL)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A list of commercially produced degaussers that meet National
|
||
|
Security Agency specifications. This list is included in the NSA Information
|
||
|
Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue, and is available through the
|
||
|
Government Printing Office.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
denial of service
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any action or series of actions that prevent any part of a system
|
||
|
from functioning in accordance with its intended purpose. This includes any
|
||
|
action that causes unauthorized destruction, modification, or delay of
|
||
|
service. Synonymous with interdiction.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Descriptive Top-Level Specification (DTLS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A top-level specification that is written in a natural language
|
||
|
(e.g., English), an informal design notation, or a combination of the two.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Designated Approving Authority (DAA)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The official who has the authority to decide on accepting the
|
||
|
security safeguards prescribed for an AIS or that official who may be
|
||
|
responsible for issuing an accreditation statement that records the decision
|
||
|
to accept those safeguards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
dial back
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with call back.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
dial-up
|
||
|
|
||
|
The service whereby a computer terminal can use the telephone to
|
||
|
initiate and effect communication with a computer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
disaster plan
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with contingency plan.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
discretionary access control (DAC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A means of restricting access to objects based on the identity and
|
||
|
need-to-know of the user, process and/or groups to which they belong. The
|
||
|
controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access
|
||
|
permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to
|
||
|
any other subject. Compare mandatory access control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A document published by the National Computer Security Center
|
||
|
containing a uniform set of basic requirements and evaluation classes for
|
||
|
assessing degrees of assurance in the effectiveness of hardware and software
|
||
|
security controls built into systems. These criteria are intended for use in
|
||
|
the design and evaluation of systems that will process and/or store sensitive
|
||
|
or classified data. This document is Government Standard DoD 5200.28-STD and
|
||
|
is frequently referred to as "The Criteria" or "The Orange Book."
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
domain
|
||
|
|
||
|
The unique context (e.g., access control parameters) in which a
|
||
|
program is operating; in effect, the set of objects that a subject has the
|
||
|
ability to access. See process and subject.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
dominate
|
||
|
|
||
|
Security level S1 is said to dominate security level S2 if the
|
||
|
hierarchical classification of S1 is greater than or equal to that of S2 and
|
||
|
the nonhierarchical categories of S1 include all those of S2 as a subset.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-E-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
emanations
|
||
|
|
||
|
See compromising emanations.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
embedded system
|
||
|
|
||
|
A system that performs or controls a function, either in whole or in
|
||
|
part, as an integral element of a larger system or subsystem.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
emergency plan
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with contingency plan.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
emission security
|
||
|
|
||
|
The protection resulting from all measures taken to deny
|
||
|
unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept
|
||
|
and from an analysis of compromising emanations from systems.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
end-to-end encryption
|
||
|
|
||
|
The protection of information passed in a telecommunications system
|
||
|
by cryptographic means, from point of origin to point of destination.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Endorsed Tools List (ETL)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The list of formal verification tools endorsed by the NCSC for the
|
||
|
development of systems with high levels of trust.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Enhanced Hierarchical Development Methodology
|
||
|
|
||
|
An integrated set of tools designed to aid in creating, analyzing,
|
||
|
modifying, managing, and documenting program specifications and proofs. This
|
||
|
methology includes a specification parser and typechecker, a theorem prover,
|
||
|
and a multi-level security checker. Note: This methodology is not based upon
|
||
|
the Hierarchical Development Methodology.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
entrapment
|
||
|
|
||
|
The deliberate planting of apparent flaws in a system for the
|
||
|
purpose of detecting attempted penetrations.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
environment
|
||
|
|
||
|
The aggregate of external procedures, conditions, and objects that
|
||
|
affect the development, operation, and maintenance of a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
erasure
|
||
|
|
||
|
A process by which a signal recorded on magnetic media is removed.
|
||
|
Erasure is accomplished in two ways: (1) by alternating current erasure, by
|
||
|
which the information is destroyed by applying an alternating high and low
|
||
|
magnetic field to the media; or (2) by direct current erasure, by which the
|
||
|
media are saturated by applying a unidirectional magnetic field.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Evaluated Products List (EPL)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A list of equipments, hardware, software, and/or firmware that have
|
||
|
been evaluated against, and found to be technically compliant, at a particular
|
||
|
level of trust, with the DoD TCSEC by the NCSC. The EPL is included in the
|
||
|
National Security Agency Information Systems Security Products and Services
|
||
|
Catalogue, which is available through the Government Printing Office.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
executive state
|
||
|
|
||
|
One of several states in which a system may operate and the only one
|
||
|
in which certain privileged instructions may be executed. Such instructions
|
||
|
cannot be executed when the system is operating in other (e.g., user) states.
|
||
|
Synonymous with supervisor state.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
exploitable channel
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any information channel that is usable or detectable by subjects
|
||
|
external to the trusted computing base whose purpose is to violate the
|
||
|
security policy of the system. See covert channel.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-F-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
fail safe
|
||
|
|
||
|
Pertaining to the automatic protection of programs and/or processing
|
||
|
systems to maintain safety when a hardware or software failure is detected in
|
||
|
a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
fail soft
|
||
|
|
||
|
Pertaining to the selective termination of affected nonessential
|
||
|
processing when a hardware or software failure is detected in a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
failure access
|
||
|
|
||
|
An unauthorized and usually inadvertent access to data resulting
|
||
|
from a hardware or software failure in the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
failure control
|
||
|
|
||
|
The methodology used to detect and provide fail-safe or fail-soft
|
||
|
recovery from hardware and software failures in a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
fault
|
||
|
|
||
|
A condition that causes a device or system component to fail to
|
||
|
perform in a required manner.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
fetch protection
|
||
|
|
||
|
A system-provided restriction to prevent a program from accessing
|
||
|
data in another user's segment of storage.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
file protection
|
||
|
|
||
|
The aggregate of all processes and procedures in a system designed
|
||
|
to inhibit unauthorized access, contamination, or elimination of a file.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
file security
|
||
|
|
||
|
The means by which access to computer files is limited to authorized
|
||
|
users only.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
flaw hypothesis methodology
|
||
|
|
||
|
A systems analysis and penetration technique in which specifications
|
||
|
and documentation for the system are analyzed and then flaws in the system are
|
||
|
hypothesized. The list of hypothesized flaws is then prioritized on the basis
|
||
|
of the estimated probability that a flaw exists and, assuming a flaw does
|
||
|
exist, on the ease of exploiting it, and on the extent of control or
|
||
|
compromise it would provide. The prioritized list is used to direct a
|
||
|
penetration attack against the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
flow control
|
||
|
|
||
|
See information flow control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
formal access approval
|
||
|
|
||
|
Documented approval by a data owner to allow access to a particular
|
||
|
category of information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Formal Development Methodology
|
||
|
|
||
|
A collection of languages and tools that enforces a rigorous method
|
||
|
of verification. This methodology uses the Ina Jo specification language for
|
||
|
successive stages of system development, including identification and modeling
|
||
|
of requirements, high-level design, and program design.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
formal proof
|
||
|
|
||
|
A complete and convincing mathematical argument, presenting the full
|
||
|
logical justification for each proof step, for the truth of a theorem or set
|
||
|
of theorems.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
formal security policy model
|
||
|
|
||
|
A mathematically precise statement of a security policy. To be
|
||
|
adequately precise, such a model must represent the initial state of a system,
|
||
|
the way in which the system progresses from one state to another, and a
|
||
|
definition of a "secure" state of the system. To be acceptable as a basis for
|
||
|
a TCB, the model must be supported by a formal proof that if the initial state
|
||
|
of the system satisfies the definition of a "secure" state and if all
|
||
|
assumptions required by the model hold, then all future states of the system
|
||
|
will be secure. Some formal modeling techniques include: state transition
|
||
|
models, denotational semantics models, and algebraic specification models.
|
||
|
See Bell-La Padula model and security policy model.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Formal Top-Level Specification (FTLS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A top-level specification that is written in a formal mathematical
|
||
|
language to allow theorems showing the correspondence of the system
|
||
|
specification to its formal requirements to be hypothesized and formally
|
||
|
proven. formal verification
|
||
|
|
||
|
The process of using formal proofs to demonstrate the consistency
|
||
|
between a formal specification of a system and a formal security policy model
|
||
|
(design verification) or between the formal specification and its high level
|
||
|
program implementation (implementation verification).
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
front-end security filter
|
||
|
|
||
|
A security filter, which could be implemented in hardware or
|
||
|
software, that is logically separated from the remainder of the system to
|
||
|
protect the system's integrity.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
functional testing
|
||
|
|
||
|
The segment of security testing in which the advertised security
|
||
|
mechanisms of the system are tested, under operational conditions, for correct
|
||
|
operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-G-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
granularity
|
||
|
|
||
|
An expression of the relative size of a data object; e.g.,
|
||
|
protection at the file level is considered coarse granularity, whereas
|
||
|
protection at field level is considered to be of a finer granularity.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
guard
|
||
|
|
||
|
A processor that provides a filter between two disparate systems
|
||
|
operating at different security levels or between a user terminal and a data
|
||
|
base to filter out data that the user is not authorized to access.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Gypsy Verification Environment
|
||
|
|
||
|
An integrated set of tools for specifying, coding, and verifying
|
||
|
programs written in the Gypsy language, a language similar to Pascal which has
|
||
|
both specification and programming features. This methology includes an
|
||
|
editor, a specification processor, a verification condition generator, a
|
||
|
user-directed theorem prover, and an information flow tool.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-H-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
handshaking procedure
|
||
|
|
||
|
A dialogue between two entities (e.g., a user and a computer, a
|
||
|
computer and another computer, or a program and another program) for the
|
||
|
purpose of identifying and authenticating the entities to one another.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hierarchical Development Methodology
|
||
|
|
||
|
A methodology for specifying and verifying the design programs
|
||
|
written in the Special specification language. The tools for this methodology
|
||
|
include the Special specification processor, the Boyer-Moore theorem prover,
|
||
|
and the Feiertag information flow tool.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
host to front-end protocol
|
||
|
|
||
|
A set of conventions governing the format and control of data that
|
||
|
are passed from a host to a front-end machine.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-I-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
identification
|
||
|
|
||
|
The process that enables recognition of an entity by a system,
|
||
|
generally by the use of unique machine-readable user names.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
impersonating
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with spoofing.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
incomplete parameter checking
|
||
|
|
||
|
A system design flaw that results when all parameters have not been
|
||
|
fully anticipated for accuracy and consistency, thus making the system
|
||
|
vulnerable to penetration.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
individual accountability
|
||
|
|
||
|
The ability to associate positively the identity of a user with the
|
||
|
time, method, and degree of access to a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
information flow control
|
||
|
|
||
|
A procedure to ensure that information transfers within a system are
|
||
|
not made from a higher security level object to an object of a lower security
|
||
|
level. See covert channel, simple security property, star property
|
||
|
(*-property). Synonymous with data flow control and flow control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Information System Security Officer (ISSO)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The person responsible to the DAA for ensuring that security is
|
||
|
provided for and implemented throughout the life cycle of an AIS from the
|
||
|
beginning of the concept development plan through its design, development,
|
||
|
operation, maintenance, and secure disposal.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Information Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue
|
||
|
|
||
|
A catalogue issued quarterly by the National Security Agency that
|
||
|
incorporates the DPL, EPL, ETL, PPL and other security product and service
|
||
|
lists. This catalogue is available through the U.S. Government Printing
|
||
|
Office, Washington, DC 20402, (202) 783-3238.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
integrity
|
||
|
|
||
|
Sound, unimpaired or perfect condition.
|
||
|
|
||
|
interdiction
|
||
|
|
||
|
See denial of service.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
internal security controls
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hardware, firmware, and software features within a system that
|
||
|
restrict access to resources (hardware, software, and data) to authorized
|
||
|
subjects only (persons, programs, or devices).
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
isolation
|
||
|
|
||
|
The containment of subjects and objects in a system in such a way
|
||
|
that they are separated from one another, as well as from the protection
|
||
|
controls of the operating system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-J-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
This document contains no entries beginning with the letter.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-K-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
This document contains no entries beginning with the letter.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-L-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
least privilege
|
||
|
|
||
|
The principle that requires that each subject be granted the most
|
||
|
restrictive set of privileges needed for the performance of authorized tasks.
|
||
|
The application of this principle limits the damage that can result from
|
||
|
accident, error, or unauthorized use.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
limited access
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with access control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
list-oriented
|
||
|
|
||
|
A computer protection system in which each protected object has a
|
||
|
list of all subjects authorized to access it. Compare ticket-oriented.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
lock-and-key protection system
|
||
|
|
||
|
A protection system that involves matching a key or password with a
|
||
|
specific access requirement.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
logic bomb
|
||
|
|
||
|
A resident computer program that triggers the perpetration of an
|
||
|
unauthorized act when particular states of the system are realized.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
loophole
|
||
|
|
||
|
An error of omission or oversight in software or hardware that
|
||
|
permits circumventing the system security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-M-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
magnetic remanence
|
||
|
|
||
|
A measure of the magnetic flux density remaining after removal of
|
||
|
the applied magnetic force. Refers to any data remaining on magnetic storage
|
||
|
media after removal of the power.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
maintenance hook
|
||
|
|
||
|
Special instructions in software to allow easy maintenance and
|
||
|
additional feature development. These are not clearly defined during access
|
||
|
for design specification. Hooks frequently allow entry into the code at
|
||
|
unusual points or without the usual checks, so they are a serious security
|
||
|
risk if they are not removed prior to live implementation. Maintenance hooks
|
||
|
are special types of trap doors.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
malicious logic
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally included in a
|
||
|
system for an unauthorized purpose; e.g., a Trojan horse.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
mandatory access control (MAC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity
|
||
|
(as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and
|
||
|
the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access information
|
||
|
of such sensitivity. Compare discretionary access control.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
masquerading
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with spoofing.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
mimicking
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with spoofing.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
modes of operation
|
||
|
|
||
|
A description of the conditions under which an AIS functions, based
|
||
|
on the sensitivity of data processed and the clearance levels and
|
||
|
authorizations of the users. Four modes of operation are authorized:
|
||
|
|
||
|
(1) Dedicated Mode
|
||
|
An AIS is operating in the dedicated mode when each user
|
||
|
with direct or indirect individual access to the AIS, its peripherals, remote
|
||
|
terminals, or remote hosts, has all of the following:
|
||
|
a. A valid personnel
|
||
|
clearance for all information on the system.
|
||
|
b. Formal access approval for, and has signed
|
||
|
nondisclosure agreements for all the information stored and/or processed
|
||
|
(including all compartments, subcompartments and/or special access programs).
|
||
|
c. A valid need-to-know for all information
|
||
|
contained within the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(2) System-High Mode
|
||
|
An AIS is operating in the system-high mode when each user
|
||
|
with direct or indirect access to the AIS, its peripherals, remote terminals,
|
||
|
or remote hosts has all of the following:
|
||
|
a. A valid personnel clearance for all
|
||
|
information on the AIS.
|
||
|
b. Formal access approval for, and has signed
|
||
|
nondisclosure agreements for all the information stored and/or processed
|
||
|
(including all compartments, subcompartments, and/or special access programs).
|
||
|
|
||
|
c. A valid need-to-know for some of the
|
||
|
information contained within the AIS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(3) Compartmented Mode
|
||
|
An AIS is operating in the compartmented mode when each
|
||
|
user with direct or indirect access to the AIS, its peripherals, remote
|
||
|
terminals, or remote hosts, has all of the following:
|
||
|
a. A valid personnel clearance for the most
|
||
|
restricted information processed in the AIS.
|
||
|
b. Formal access approval for, and has signed
|
||
|
nondisclosure agreements for that information to which he/she is to have
|
||
|
access.
|
||
|
c. A valid need-to-know for that information to
|
||
|
which he/she is to have access.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(4) Multilevel Mode
|
||
|
An AIS is operating in the multilevel mode when all the
|
||
|
following statements are satisfied concerning the users with direct or
|
||
|
indirect access to the AIS, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote
|
||
|
hosts:
|
||
|
a. Some do not have a valid personnel clearance
|
||
|
for all the information processed in the AIS.
|
||
|
b. All have the proper clearance and have the
|
||
|
appropriate formal access approval for that information to which he/she is to
|
||
|
have access.
|
||
|
c. All have a valid need-to-know for that
|
||
|
information to which they are to have access.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
multilevel device
|
||
|
|
||
|
A device that is used in a manner that permits it to simultaneously
|
||
|
process data of two or more security levels without risk of compromise. To
|
||
|
accomplish this, sensitivity labels are normally stored on the same physical
|
||
|
medium and in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable) as the
|
||
|
data being processed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
multilevel secure
|
||
|
|
||
|
A class of system containing information with different
|
||
|
sensitivities that simultaneously permits access by users with different
|
||
|
security clearances and needs-to-know, but prevents users from obtaining
|
||
|
access to information for which they lack authorization.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
multilevel security mode
|
||
|
|
||
|
See modes of operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
multiple access rights terminal
|
||
|
|
||
|
A terminal that may be used by more than one class of users; for
|
||
|
example, users with different access rights to data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
multiuser mode of operation
|
||
|
|
||
|
A mode of operation designed for systems that process sensitive
|
||
|
unclassified information in which users may not have a need-to-know for all
|
||
|
information processed in the system. This mode is also for microcomputers
|
||
|
processing sensitive unclassified information that cannot meet the
|
||
|
requirements of the stand-alone mode of operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
mutually suspicious
|
||
|
|
||
|
The state that exists between interacting processes (subsystems or
|
||
|
programs) in which neither process can expect the other process to function
|
||
|
securely with respect to some property.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-N-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
National Computer Security Assessment Program
|
||
|
|
||
|
A program designed to evaluate the interrelationship of empirical
|
||
|
data of computer security infractions and critical systems profiles, while
|
||
|
comprehensively incorporating information from the CSTVRP. The assessment
|
||
|
will build threat and vulnerability scenarios that are based on a collection
|
||
|
of facts from relevant reported cases. Such scenarios are a powerful,
|
||
|
dramatic, and concise form of representing the value of loss experience
|
||
|
analysis.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
National Computer Security Center (NCSC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Originally named the DoD Computer Security Center, the NCSC is
|
||
|
responsible for encouraging the widespread availability of trusted computer
|
||
|
systems throughout the Federal Government.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
National Security Decision Directive 145 (NSDD 145)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Signed by President Reagan on l7 September l984, this directive is
|
||
|
entitled "National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information
|
||
|
Systems Security." It provides initial objectives, policies, and an
|
||
|
organizational structure to guide the conduct of national activities toward
|
||
|
safeguarding systems that process, store, or communicate sensitive
|
||
|
information; establishes a mechanism for policy development; and assigns
|
||
|
implementation responsibilities.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Advisory
|
||
|
Memoranda/ Instructions (NTISSAM, NTISSI)
|
||
|
|
||
|
NTISS Advisory Memoranda and Instructions provide advice,
|
||
|
assistance, or information of general interest on telecommunications and
|
||
|
systems security to all applicable federal departments and agencies.
|
||
|
NTISSAMs/NTISSIs are promulgated by the National Manager for
|
||
|
Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security and are
|
||
|
recommendatory.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
National Telecommunications and Information System Security Directives (NTISSD)
|
||
|
|
||
|
NTISS Directives establish national-level decisions relating to
|
||
|
NTISS policies, plans, programs, systems, or organizational delegations of
|
||
|
authority. NTISSDs are promulgated by the Executive Agent of the Government
|
||
|
for Telecommunications and Information Systems Security, or by the Chairman of
|
||
|
the NTISSC when so delegated by the Executive Agent. NTISSDs are binding upon
|
||
|
all federal departments and agencies.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
need-to-know
|
||
|
|
||
|
The necessity for access to, knowledge of, or possession of specific
|
||
|
information required to carry out official duties.
|
||
|
|
||
|
network front end
|
||
|
|
||
|
A device that implements the necessary network protocols, including
|
||
|
security-related protocols, to allow a computer system to be attached to a
|
||
|
network.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
NSDD 145
|
||
|
|
||
|
See National Security Decision Directive 145.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-O-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
object
|
||
|
|
||
|
A passive entity that contains or receives information. Access to
|
||
|
an object potentially implies access to the information it contains. Examples
|
||
|
of objects are: records, blocks, pages, segments, files, directories,
|
||
|
directory trees, and programs, as well as bits, bytes, words, fields,
|
||
|
processors, video displays, keyboards, clocks, printers, and network nodes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
object reuse
|
||
|
|
||
|
The reassignment and reuse of a storage medium (e.g., page frame,
|
||
|
disk sector, magnetic tape) that once contained one or more objects. To be
|
||
|
securely reused and assigned to a new subject, storage media must contain no
|
||
|
residual data (magnetic remanence) from the object(s) previously contained in
|
||
|
the media.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
open security environment
|
||
|
|
||
|
An environment that includes those systems in which at least one of
|
||
|
the following conditions holds true: (l) Application developers (including
|
||
|
maintainers) do not have sufficient clearance or authorization to provide an
|
||
|
acceptable presumption that they have not introduced malicious logic. (2)
|
||
|
Configuration control does not provide sufficient assurance that applications
|
||
|
are protected against the introduction of malicious logic prior to and during
|
||
|
the operation of system applications.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Operations Security (OPSEC)
|
||
|
|
||
|
An analytical process by which the U.S. Government and its
|
||
|
supporting contractors can deny to potential adversaries information about
|
||
|
capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting
|
||
|
evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Orange Book
|
||
|
|
||
|
Alternate name for DoD Trusted Computer Security Evaluation
|
||
|
Criteria.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
overt channel
|
||
|
|
||
|
A path within a computer system or network that is designed for the
|
||
|
authorized transfer of data. Compare covert channel.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
overwrite procedure
|
||
|
|
||
|
A stimulation to change the state of a bit followed by a known
|
||
|
pattern. See magnetic remanence.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-P-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
partitioned security mode
|
||
|
|
||
|
A mode of operation wherein all personnel have the clearance but not
|
||
|
necessarily formal access approval and need-to-know for all information
|
||
|
contained in the system. Not to be confused with compartmented security mode.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
password
|
||
|
|
||
|
A protected/private character string used to authenticate an
|
||
|
identity.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
penetration
|
||
|
|
||
|
The successful act of bypassing the security mechanisms of a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
penetration signature
|
||
|
|
||
|
The characteristics or identifying marks that may be produced by a
|
||
|
penetration.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
penetration study
|
||
|
|
||
|
A study to determine the feasibility and methods for defeating
|
||
|
controls of a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
penetration testing
|
||
|
|
||
|
The portion of security testing in which the evaluators attempt to
|
||
|
circumvent the security features of a system. The evaluators may be assumed
|
||
|
to use all system design and implementation documentation, which may include
|
||
|
listings of system source code, manuals, and circuit diagrams. The evaluators
|
||
|
work under the same constraints applied to ordinary users.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
periods processing
|
||
|
|
||
|
The processing of various levels of sensitive information at
|
||
|
distinctly different times. Under periods processing, the system must be
|
||
|
purged of all information from one processing period before transitioning to
|
||
|
the next when there are different users with differing authorizations.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
permissions
|
||
|
|
||
|
A description of the type of authorized interactions a subject can
|
||
|
have with an object. Examples include: read, write, execute, add, modify, and
|
||
|
delete.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
personnel security
|
||
|
|
||
|
The procedures established to ensure that all personnel who have
|
||
|
access to sensitive information have the required authority as well as
|
||
|
appropriate clearances.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
physical security
|
||
|
|
||
|
The application of physical barriers and control procedures as
|
||
|
preventive measures or countermeasures against threats to resources and
|
||
|
sensitive information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
piggyback
|
||
|
|
||
|
Gaining unauthorized access to a system via another user's
|
||
|
legitimate connection. See between-the-lines entry.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Preferred Products List (PPL)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A list of commercially produced equipments that meet TEMPEST and
|
||
|
other requirements prescribed by the National Security Agency. This list is
|
||
|
included in the NSA Information Systems Security Products and Services
|
||
|
Catalogue, issued quarterly and available through the Government Printing
|
||
|
Office.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
print suppression
|
||
|
|
||
|
Eliminating the displaying of characters in order to preserve their
|
||
|
secrecy; e.g., not displaying the characters of a password as it is keyed at
|
||
|
the input terminal.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
privileged instructions
|
||
|
|
||
|
A set of instructions (e.g., interrupt handling or special computer
|
||
|
instructions) to control features (such as storage protection features) that
|
||
|
are generally executable only when the automated system is operating in the
|
||
|
executive state.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
procedural security
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with administrative security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
process
|
||
|
|
||
|
A program in execution. See domain and subject.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
protection philosophy
|
||
|
|
||
|
An informal description of the overall design of a system that
|
||
|
delineates each of the protection mechanisms employed. A combination,
|
||
|
appropriate to the evaluation class, of formal and informal techniques is used
|
||
|
to show that the mechanisms are adequate to enforce the security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
protection ring
|
||
|
|
||
|
One of a hierarchy of privileged modes of a system that gives
|
||
|
certain access rights to user programs and processes authorized to operate in
|
||
|
a given mode.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
protection-critical portions of the TCB
|
||
|
|
||
|
Those portions of the TCB whose normal function is to deal with the
|
||
|
control of access between subjects and objects. Their correct operation is
|
||
|
essential to the protection of the data on the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
protocols
|
||
|
|
||
|
A set of rules and formats, semantic and syntactic, that permits
|
||
|
entities to exchange information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
pseudo-flaw
|
||
|
|
||
|
An apparent loophole deliberately implanted in an operating system
|
||
|
program as a trap for intruders.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Public Law 100-235 (P.L. 100-235)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Also known as the Computer Security Act of 1987, this law creates a
|
||
|
means for establishing minimum acceptable security practices for improving the
|
||
|
security and privacy of sensitive information in federal computer systems.
|
||
|
This law assigns to the National Institute of Standards and Technology
|
||
|
responsibility for developing standards and guidelines for federal computer
|
||
|
systems processing unclassified data. The law also requires establishment of
|
||
|
security plans by all operators of federal computer systems that contain
|
||
|
sensitive information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
purge
|
||
|
|
||
|
The removal of sensitive data from an AIS, AIS storage device, or
|
||
|
peripheral device with storage capacity, at the end of a processing period.
|
||
|
This action is performed in such a way that there is assurance proportional to
|
||
|
the sensitivity of the data that the data may not be reconstructed. An AIS
|
||
|
must be disconnected from any external network before a purge. After a purge,
|
||
|
the medium can be declassified by observing the review procedures of the
|
||
|
respective agency.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-Q-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
This document contains no entries beginning with the letter.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-R-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
read
|
||
|
|
||
|
A fundamental operation that results only in the flow of information
|
||
|
from an object to a subject.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
read access
|
||
|
|
||
|
Permission to read information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
recovery procedures
|
||
|
|
||
|
The actions necessary to restore a system's computational capability
|
||
|
and data files after a system failure.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
reference monitor concept
|
||
|
|
||
|
An access-control concept that refers to an abstract machine that
|
||
|
mediates all accesses to objects by subjects.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
reference validation mechanism
|
||
|
|
||
|
An implementation of the reference monitor concept. A security
|
||
|
kernel is a type of reference validation mechanism.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
reliability
|
||
|
|
||
|
The probability of a given system performing its mission adequately
|
||
|
for a specified period of time under the expected operating conditions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
residual risk
|
||
|
|
||
|
The portion of risk that remains after security measures have been
|
||
|
applied.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
residue
|
||
|
|
||
|
Data left in storage after processing operations are complete, but
|
||
|
before degaussing or rewriting has taken place.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
resource encapsulation
|
||
|
|
||
|
The process of ensuring that a resource not be directly accessible
|
||
|
by a subject, but that it be protected so that the reference monitor can
|
||
|
properly mediate accesses to it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
restricted area
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any area to which access is subject to special restrictions or
|
||
|
controls for reasons of security or safeguarding of property or material.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
risk
|
||
|
|
||
|
The probability that a particular threat will exploit a particular
|
||
|
vulnerability of the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
risk analysis
|
||
|
|
||
|
The process of identifying security risks, determining their
|
||
|
magnitude, and identifying areas needing safeguards. Risk analysis is a part
|
||
|
of risk management. Synonymous with risk assessment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
risk assessment
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with risk analysis.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
risk index
|
||
|
|
||
|
The disparity between the minimum clearance or authorization of
|
||
|
system users and the maximum sensitivity (e.g., classification and categories)
|
||
|
of data processed by a system. See CSC-STD-003-85 and CSC-STD-004-85 for a
|
||
|
complete explanation of this term.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
risk management
|
||
|
|
||
|
The total process of identifying, controlling, and eliminating or
|
||
|
minimizing uncertain events that may affect system resources. It includes
|
||
|
risk analysis, cost benefit analysis, selection, implementation and test,
|
||
|
security evaluation of safeguards, and overall security review.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-S-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
safeguards
|
||
|
|
||
|
See security safeguards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
scavenging
|
||
|
|
||
|
Searching through object residue to acquire unauthorized data.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
secure configuration management
|
||
|
|
||
|
The set of procedures appropriate for controlling changes to a
|
||
|
system's hardware and software structure for the purpose of ensuring that
|
||
|
changes will not lead to violations of the system's security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
secure state
|
||
|
|
||
|
A condition in which no subject can access any object in an
|
||
|
unauthorized manner.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
secure subsystem
|
||
|
|
||
|
A subsystem that contains its own implementation of the reference
|
||
|
monitor concept for those resources it controls. However, the secure
|
||
|
subsystem must depend on other controls and the base operating system for the
|
||
|
control of subjects and the more primitive system objects.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security critical mechanisms
|
||
|
|
||
|
Those security mechanisms whose correct operation is necessary to
|
||
|
ensure that the security policy is enforced.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security evaluation
|
||
|
|
||
|
An evaluation done to assess the degree of trust that can be placed
|
||
|
in systems for the secure handling of sensitive information. One type, a
|
||
|
product evaluation, is an evaluation performed on the hardware and software
|
||
|
features and assurances of a computer product from a perspective that excludes
|
||
|
the application environment. The other type, a system evaluation, is done for
|
||
|
the purpose of assessing a system's security safeguards with respect to a
|
||
|
specific operational mission and is a major step in the certification and
|
||
|
accreditation process.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security fault analysis
|
||
|
|
||
|
A security analysis, usually performed on hardware at gate level, to
|
||
|
determine the security properties of a device when a hardware fault is
|
||
|
encountered.
|
||
|
|
||
|
security features
|
||
|
|
||
|
The security-relevant functions, mechanisms, and characteristics of
|
||
|
system hardware and software. Security features are a subset of system
|
||
|
security safeguards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security filter
|
||
|
|
||
|
A trusted subsystem that enforces a security policy on the data that
|
||
|
pass through it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security flaw
|
||
|
|
||
|
An error of commission or omission in a system that may allow
|
||
|
protection mechanisms to be bypassed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security flow analysis
|
||
|
|
||
|
A security analysis performed on a formal system specification that
|
||
|
locates potential flows of information within the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security kernel
|
||
|
|
||
|
The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a TCB that
|
||
|
implement the reference monitor concept. It must mediate all accesses, be
|
||
|
protected from modification, and be verifiable as correct.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security label
|
||
|
|
||
|
A piece of information that represents the security level of an
|
||
|
object.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security level
|
||
|
|
||
|
The combination of a hierarchical classification and a set of
|
||
|
nonhierarchical categories that represents the sensitivity of information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security measures
|
||
|
|
||
|
Elements of software, firmware, hardware, or procedures that are
|
||
|
included in a system for the satisfaction of security specifications.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security perimeter
|
||
|
|
||
|
The boundary where security controls are in effect to protect
|
||
|
assets.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security policy
|
||
|
|
||
|
The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an
|
||
|
organization manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security policy model
|
||
|
|
||
|
A formal presentation of the security policy enforced by the system.
|
||
|
It must identify the set of rules and practices that regulate how a system
|
||
|
manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information. See Bell-La Padula
|
||
|
model and formal security policy model.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security range
|
||
|
|
||
|
The highest and lowest security levels that are permitted in or on a
|
||
|
system, system component, subsystem or network.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security requirements
|
||
|
|
||
|
The types and levels of protection necessary for equipment, data,
|
||
|
information, applications, and facilities to meet security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security requirements baseline
|
||
|
|
||
|
A description of minimum requirements necessary for a system to
|
||
|
maintain an acceptable level of security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security safeguards
|
||
|
|
||
|
The protective measures and controls that are prescribed to meet the
|
||
|
security requirements specified for a system. Those safeguards may include
|
||
|
but are not necessarily limited to: hardware and software security features,
|
||
|
operating procedures, accountability procedures, access and distribution
|
||
|
controls, management constraints, personnel security, and physical structures,
|
||
|
areas, and devices. Also called safeguards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security specifications
|
||
|
|
||
|
A detailed description of the safeguards required to protect a
|
||
|
system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security test and evaluation
|
||
|
|
||
|
An examination and analysis of the security safeguards of a system
|
||
|
as they have been applied in an operational environment to determine the
|
||
|
security posture of the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
security testing
|
||
|
|
||
|
A process used to determine that the security features of a system
|
||
|
are implemented as designed. This includes hands-on functional testing,
|
||
|
penetration testing, and verification.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
sensitive information
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any information, the loss, misuse, modification of, or unauthorized
|
||
|
access to, could affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal
|
||
|
programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under Section 552a
|
||
|
of Title 5, U.S. Code, but that has not been specifically authorized under
|
||
|
criteria established by an Executive order or an act of Congress to be kept
|
||
|
classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
sensitivity label
|
||
|
|
||
|
A piece of information that represents the security level of an
|
||
|
object. Sensitivity labels are used by the TCB as the basis for mandatory
|
||
|
access control decisions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
simple security condition
|
||
|
|
||
|
See simple security property.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
simple security property
|
||
|
|
||
|
A Bell-La Padula security model rule allowing a subject read access
|
||
|
to an object only if the security level of the subject dominates the security
|
||
|
level of the object. Synonymous with simple security condition.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
single-level device
|
||
|
|
||
|
An automated information systems device that is used to process data
|
||
|
of a single security level at any one time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Software Development Methodologies
|
||
|
|
||
|
Methodologies for specifying and verifying design programs for
|
||
|
system development. Each methodology is written for a specific computer
|
||
|
language. See Enhanced Hierarchical Development Methodology, Formal
|
||
|
Development Methodology, Gypsy Verification Environment and Hierarchical
|
||
|
Development Methodology.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
software security
|
||
|
|
||
|
General purpose (executive, utility or software development tools)
|
||
|
and applications programs or routines that protect data handled by a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
software system test and evaluation process
|
||
|
|
||
|
A process that plans, develops and documents the quantitative
|
||
|
demonstration of the fulfillment of all baseline functional performance,
|
||
|
operational and interface requirements.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
spoofing
|
||
|
|
||
|
An attempt to gain access to a system by posing as an authorized
|
||
|
user. Synonymous with impersonating, masquerading or.mimicking.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
stand-alone, shared system
|
||
|
|
||
|
A system that is physically and electrically isolated from all other
|
||
|
systems, and is intended to be used by more than one person, either
|
||
|
simultaneously (e.g., a system with multiple terminals) or serially, with data
|
||
|
belonging to one user remaining available to the system while another user is
|
||
|
using the system (e.g., a personal computer with nonremovable storage media
|
||
|
such as a hard disk).
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
stand-alone, single-user system
|
||
|
|
||
|
A system that is physically and electrically isolated from all other
|
||
|
systems, and is intended to be used by one person at a time, with no data
|
||
|
belonging to other users remaining in the system (e.g., a personal computer
|
||
|
with removable storage media such as a floppy disk).
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
star property
|
||
|
|
||
|
See *-property, page 2.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
State Delta Verification System
|
||
|
|
||
|
A system designed to give high confidence regarding microcode
|
||
|
performance by using formulae that represent isolated states of a computation
|
||
|
to check proofs concerning the course of that computation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
state variable
|
||
|
|
||
|
A variable that represents either the state of the system or the
|
||
|
state of some system resource.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
storage object
|
||
|
|
||
|
An object that supports both read and write accesses.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Subcommittee on Automated Information Systems Security (SAISS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
NSDD-145 authorizes and directs the establishment, under the NTISSC,
|
||
|
of a permanent Subcommittee on Automated Information Systems Security. The
|
||
|
SAISS is composed of one voting member from each organization represented on
|
||
|
the NTISSC.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Subcommittee on Telecommunications Security (STS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
NSDD-145 authorizes and directs the establishment, under the NTISSC,
|
||
|
of a permanent Subcommittee on Telecommunications Security. The STS is
|
||
|
composed of one voting member from each organization represented on the
|
||
|
NTISSC.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
subject
|
||
|
|
||
|
An active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, or
|
||
|
device, that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system
|
||
|
state. Technically, a process/domain pair.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
subject security level
|
||
|
|
||
|
A subjects security level is equal to the security level of the
|
||
|
objects to which it has both read and write access. A subjects security level
|
||
|
must always be dominated by the clearance of the user with which the subject
|
||
|
is associated.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
supervisor state
|
||
|
|
||
|
Synonymous with executive state.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
System Development Methodologies
|
||
|
|
||
|
Methodologies developed through software engineering to manage the
|
||
|
complexity of system development. Development methodologies include software
|
||
|
engineering aids and high-level design analysis tools.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
system high security mode
|
||
|
|
||
|
See modes of operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
system integrity
|
||
|
|
||
|
The quality that a system has when it performs its intended function
|
||
|
in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized
|
||
|
manipulation of the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
system low
|
||
|
|
||
|
The lowest security level supported by a system at a particular time
|
||
|
or in a particular environment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
System Security Officer (SSO)
|
||
|
|
||
|
See Information System Security Officer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Systems Security Steering Group
|
||
|
|
||
|
The senior government body established by NSDD-145 to provide
|
||
|
top-level review and policy guidance for the telecommunications security and
|
||
|
automated information systems security activities of the U.S. Government.
|
||
|
This group is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security
|
||
|
Affairs and consists of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, the
|
||
|
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of
|
||
|
Management and Budget, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-T-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
tampering
|
||
|
|
||
|
An unauthorized modification that alters the proper functioning of
|
||
|
an equipment or system in a manner that degrades the security or functionality
|
||
|
it provides.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
technical attack
|
||
|
|
||
|
An attack that can be perpetrated by circumventing or nullifying
|
||
|
hardware and software protection mechanisms, rather than by subverting system
|
||
|
personnel or other users.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
technical vulnerability
|
||
|
|
||
|
A hardware, firmware, communication, or software flaw that leaves a
|
||
|
computer processing system open for potential exploitation, either externally
|
||
|
or internally, thereby resulting in risk for the owner, user, or manager of
|
||
|
the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
TEMPEST
|
||
|
|
||
|
The study and control of spurious electronic signals emitted by
|
||
|
electrical equipment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
terminal identification
|
||
|
|
||
|
The means used to uniquely identify a terminal to a system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
threat
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to a
|
||
|
system in the form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or
|
||
|
denial of service.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
threat agent
|
||
|
|
||
|
A method used to exploit a vulnerability in a system, operation, or
|
||
|
facility.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
threat analysis
|
||
|
|
||
|
The examination of all actions and events that might adversely
|
||
|
affect a system or operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
threat monitoring
|
||
|
|
||
|
The analysis, assessment, and review of audit trails and other data
|
||
|
collected for the purpose of searching out system events that may constitute
|
||
|
violations or attempted violations of system security.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
ticket-oriented
|
||
|
|
||
|
A computer protection system in which each subject maintains a list
|
||
|
of unforgeable bit patterns, called tickets, one for each object the subject
|
||
|
is authorized to access. Compare list-oriented.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
time-dependent password
|
||
|
|
||
|
A password that is valid only at a certain time of day or during a
|
||
|
specified interval of time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
top-level specification
|
||
|
|
||
|
A nonprocedural description of system behavior at the most abstract
|
||
|
level; typically, a functional specification that omits all implementation
|
||
|
details.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
tranquility
|
||
|
|
||
|
A security model rule stating that the security level of an object
|
||
|
cannot change while the object is being processed by an AIS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
trap door
|
||
|
|
||
|
A hidden software or hardware mechanism that can be triggered to
|
||
|
permit system protection mechanisms to be circumvented. It is activated in
|
||
|
some innocent-appearing manner; e.g., a special "random" key sequence at a
|
||
|
terminal. Software developers often introduce trap doors in their code to
|
||
|
enable them to reenter the system and perform certain functions. Synonymous
|
||
|
with back door.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Trojan horse
|
||
|
|
||
|
A computer program with an apparently or actually useful function
|
||
|
that contains additional (hidden) functions that surreptitiously exploit the
|
||
|
legitimate authorizations of the invoking process to the detriment of security
|
||
|
or integrity.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
trusted computer system
|
||
|
|
||
|
A system that employs sufficient hardware and software assurance
|
||
|
measures to allow its use for simultaneous processing of a range of sensitive
|
||
|
or classified information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system,
|
||
|
including hardware, firmware, and software, the combination of which is
|
||
|
responsible for enforcing a security policy. A TCB consists of one or more
|
||
|
components that together enforce a unified security policy over a product or
|
||
|
system. The ability of a TCB to enforce correctly a unified security policy
|
||
|
depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB and on the correct input by
|
||
|
system administrative personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's clearance level)
|
||
|
related to the security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
trusted distribution
|
||
|
|
||
|
A trusted method for distributing the TCB hardware, software, and
|
||
|
firmware components, both originals and updates, that provides methods for
|
||
|
protecting the TCB from modification during distribution and for detection of
|
||
|
any changes to the TCB that may occur.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
trusted identification forwarding
|
||
|
|
||
|
An identification method used in networks whereby the sending host
|
||
|
can verify that an authorized user on its system is attempting a connection to
|
||
|
another host. The sending host transmits the required user authentication
|
||
|
information to the receiving host. The receiving host can then verify that
|
||
|
the user is validated for access to its system. This operation may be
|
||
|
transparent to the user.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
trusted path
|
||
|
|
||
|
A mechanism by which a person at a terminal can communicate
|
||
|
directly with the TCB. This mechanism can only be activated by the person or
|
||
|
the TCB and cannot be imitated by untrusted software.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
trusted process
|
||
|
|
||
|
A process whose incorrect or malicious execution is capable of
|
||
|
violating system security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
trusted software
|
||
|
|
||
|
The software portion of the TCB.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-U-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
untrusted process
|
||
|
|
||
|
A process that has not been evaluated or examined for adherence to
|
||
|
the secuity policy. It may include incorrect or malicious code that attempts
|
||
|
to circumvent the security mechanisms.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
user
|
||
|
|
||
|
Person or process accessing an AIS either by direct connections
|
||
|
(i.e., via terminals), or indirect connections (i.e., prepare input data or
|
||
|
receive output that is not reviewed for content or classification by a
|
||
|
responsible individual).
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
user ID
|
||
|
|
||
|
A unique symbol or character string that is used by a system to
|
||
|
identify a specific user.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
user profile
|
||
|
|
||
|
Patterns of a user's activity that can be used to detect changes in
|
||
|
normal routines.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-V-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
verification
|
||
|
|
||
|
The process of comparing two levels of system specification for
|
||
|
proper correspondence (e.g., security policy model with top-level
|
||
|
specification, top-level specification with source code, or source code with
|
||
|
object code). This process may or may not be automated.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
virus
|
||
|
|
||
|
A self-propagating Trojan horse, composed of a mission component, a
|
||
|
trigger component, and a self-propagating component.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
vulnerability
|
||
|
|
||
|
A weakness in system security procedures, system design,
|
||
|
implementation, internal controls, etc., that could be exploited to violate
|
||
|
system security policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
vulnerability analysis
|
||
|
|
||
|
The systematic examination of systems in order to determine the
|
||
|
adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, and provide
|
||
|
data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
vulnerability assessment
|
||
|
|
||
|
A measurement of vulnerability which includes the susceptibility of
|
||
|
a particular system to a specific attack and the opportunities available to a
|
||
|
threat agent to mount that attack.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-W-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
work factor
|
||
|
|
||
|
An estimate of the effort or time needed by a potential penetrator
|
||
|
with specified expertise and resources to overcome a protective measure.
|
||
|
|
||
|
write
|
||
|
|
||
|
A fundamental operation that results only in the flow of information
|
||
|
from a subject to an object.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
write access
|
||
|
|
||
|
Permission to write to an object.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-X,Y,Z-
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
This document contains no entries beginning with the letters X, Y, or Z.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|