205 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
205 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
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350 BC
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ON PROPHESYING BY DREAMS
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by Aristotle
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translated by J. I. Beare
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1
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As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be
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based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt
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or give it implicit confidence. The fact that all persons, or many,
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suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire
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us with belief in it [such divination], as founded on the testimony of
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experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards
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some subjects, be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of
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reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting all
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other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no probable cause to
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account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust. For, in
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addition to its further unreasonableness, it is absurd to combine
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the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the fact
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that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but
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merely commonplace persons. If, however, we abstract from the
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causality of God, none of the other causes assigned appears
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probable. For that certain persons should have foresight in dreams
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concerning things destined to take place at the Pillars of Hercules,
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or on the banks of the Borysthenes, seems to be something to
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discover the explanation of which surpasses the wit of man. Well then,
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the dreams in question must be regarded either as causes, or as
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tokens, of the events, or else as coincidences; either as all, or
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some, of these, or as one only. I use the word 'cause' in the sense in
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which the moon is [the cause] of an eclipse of the sun, or in which
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fatigue is [a cause] of fever; 'token' [in the sense in which] the
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entrance of a star [into the shadow] is a token of the eclipse, or [in
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which] roughness of the tongue [is a token] of fever; while by
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'coincidence' I mean, for example, the occurrence of an eclipse of the
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sun while some one is taking a walk; for the walking is neither a
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token nor a cause of the eclipse, nor the eclipse [a cause or token]
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of the walking. For this reason no coincidence takes place according
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to a universal or general rule. Are we then to say that some dreams
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are causes, others tokens, e.g. of events taking place in the bodily
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organism? At all events, even scientific physicians tell us that one
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should pay diligent attention to dreams, and to hold this view is
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reasonable also for those who are not practitioners, but speculative
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philosophers. For the movements which occur in the daytime [within the
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body] are, unless very great and violent, lost sight of in contrast
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with the waking movements, which are more impressive. In sleep the
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opposite takes place, for then even trifling movements seem
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considerable. This is plain in what often happens during sleep; for
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example, dreamers fancy that they are affected by thunder and
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lightning, when in fact there are only faint ringings in their ears;
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or that they are enjoying honey or other sweet savours, when only a
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tiny drop of phlegm is flowing down [the oesophagus]; or that they are
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walking through fire, and feeling intense heat, when there is only a
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slight warmth affecting certain parts of the body. When they are
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awakened, these things appear to them in this their true character.
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But since the beginnings of all events are small, so, it is clear, are
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those also of the diseases or other affections about to occur in our
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bodies. In conclusion, it is manifest that these beginnings must be
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more evident in sleeping than in waking moments.
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Nay, indeed, it is not improbable that some of the presentations
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which come before the mind in sleep may even be causes of the
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actions cognate to each of them. For as when we are about to act [in
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waking hours], or are engaged in any course of action, or have already
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performed certain actions, we often find ourselves concerned with
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these actions, or performing them, in a vivid dream; the cause whereof
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is that the dream-movement has had a way paved for it from the
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original movements set up in the daytime; exactly so, but
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conversely, it must happen that the movements set up first in sleep
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should also prove to be starting-points of actions to be performed
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in the daytime, since the recurrence by day of the thought of these
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actions also has had its way paved for it in the images before the
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mind at night. Thus then it is quite conceivable that some dreams
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may be tokens and causes [of future events].
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Most [so-called prophetic] dreams are, however, to be classed as
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mere coincidences, especially all such as are extravagant, and those
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in the fulfilment of which the dreamers have no initiative, such as in
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the case of a sea-fight, or of things taking place far away. As
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regards these it is natural that the fact should stand as it does
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whenever a person, on mentioning something, finds the very thing
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mentioned come to pass. Why, indeed, should this not happen also in
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sleep? The probability is, rather, that many such things should
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happen. As, then, one's mentioning a particular person is neither
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token nor cause of this person's presenting himself, so, in the
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parallel instance, the dream is, to him who has seen it, neither token
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nor cause of its [so-called] fulfilment, but a mere coincidence. Hence
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the fact that many dreams have no 'fulfilment', for coincidence do not
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occur according to any universal or general law.
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2
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On the whole, forasmuch as certain of the lower animals also
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dream, it may be concluded that dreams are not sent by God, nor are
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they designed for this purpose [to reveal the future]. They have a
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divine aspect, however, for Nature [their cause] is divinely
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planned, though not itself divine. A special proof [of their not being
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sent by God] is this: the power of foreseeing the future and of having
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vivid dreams is found in persons of inferior type, which implies
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that God does not send their dreams; but merely that all those whose
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physical temperament is, as it were, garrulous and excitable, see
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sights of all descriptions; for, inasmuch as they experience many
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movements of every kind, they just chance to have visions resembling
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objective facts, their luck in these matters being merely like that of
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persons who play at even and odd. For the principle which is expressed
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in the gambler's maxim: 'If you make many throws your luck must
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change,' holds in their case also.
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That many dreams have no fulfilment is not strange, for it is so too
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with many bodily toms and weather-signs, e.g. those of train or
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wind. For if another movement occurs more influential than that from
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which, while [the event to which it pointed was] still future, the
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given token was derived, the event [to which such token pointed]
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does not take place. So, of the things which ought to be
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accomplished by human agency, many, though well-planned are by the
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operation of other principles more powerful [than man's agency]
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brought to nought. For, speaking generally, that which was about to
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happen is not in every case what now is happening, nor is that which
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shall hereafter he identical with that which is now going to be.
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Still, however, we must hold that the beginnings from which, as we
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said, no consummation follows, are real beginnings, and these
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constitute natural tokens of certain events, even though the events do
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not come to pass.
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As for [prophetic] dreams which involve not such beginnings [sc.
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of future events] as we have here described, but such as are
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extravagant in times, or places, or magnitudes; or those involving
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beginnings which are not extravagant in any of these respects, while
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yet the persons who see the dream hold not in their own hands the
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beginnings [of the event to which it points]: unless the foresight
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which such dreams give is the result of pure coincidence, the
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following would be a better explanation of it than that proposed by
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Democritus, who alleges 'images' and 'emanations' as its cause. As,
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when something has caused motion in water or air, this [the portion of
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water or air], and, though the cause has ceased to operate, such
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motion propagates itself to a certain point, though there the prime
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movement is not present; just so it may well be that a movement and
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a consequent sense-perception should reach sleeping souls from the
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objects from which Democritus represents 'images' and 'emanations'
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coming; that such movements, in whatever way they arrive, should be
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more perceptible at night [than by day], because when proceeding
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thus in the daytime they are more liable to dissolution (since at
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night the air is less disturbed, there being then less wind); and that
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they shall be perceived within the body owing to sleep, since
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persons are more sensitive even to slight sensory movements when
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asleep than when awake. It is these movements then that cause
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'presentations', as a result of which sleepers foresee the future even
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relatively to such events as those referred to above. These
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considerations also explain why this experience befalls commonplace
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persons and not the most intelligent. For it would have regularly
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occurred both in the daytime and to the wise had it been God who
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sent it; but, as we have explained the matter, it is quite natural
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that commonplace persons should be those who have foresight [in
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dreams]. For the mind of such persons is not given to thinking, but,
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as it were, derelict, or totally vacant, and, when once set moving, is
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borne passively on in the direction taken by that which moves it. With
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regard to the fact that some persons who are liable to derangement
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have this foresight, its explanation is that their normal mental
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movements do not impede [the alien movements], but are beaten off by
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the latter. Therefore it is that they have an especially keen
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perception of the alien movements.
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That certain persons in particular should have vivid dreams, e.g.
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that familiar friends should thus have foresight in a special degree
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respecting one another, is due to the fact that such friends are
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most solicitous on one another's behalf. For as acquaintances in
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particular recognize and perceive one another a long way off, so
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also they do as regards the sensory movements respecting one
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another; for sensory movements which refer to persons familiarly known
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are themselves more familiar. Atrabilious persons, owing to their
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impetuosity, are, when they, as it were, shoot from a distance, expert
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at hitting; while, owing to their mutability, the series of
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movements deploys quickly before their minds. For even as the insane
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recite, or con over in thought, the poems of Philaegides, e.g. the
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Aphrodite, whose parts succeed in order of similitude, just so do they
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[the 'atrabilious'] go on and on stringing sensory movements together.
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Moreover, owing to their aforesaid impetuosity, one movement within
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them is not liable to be knocked out of its course by some other
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movement.
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The most skilful interpreter of dreams is he who has the faculty
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of observing resemblances. Any one may interpret dreams which are
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vivid and plain. But, speaking of 'resemblances', I mean that dream
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presentations are analogous to the forms reflected in water, as indeed
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we have already stated. In the latter case, if the motion in the water
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be great, the reflexion has no resemblance to its original, nor do the
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forms resemble the real objects. Skilful, indeed, would he be in
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interpreting such reflexions who could rapidly discern, and at a
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glance comprehend, the scattered and distorted fragments of such
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forms, so as to perceive that one of them represents a man, or a
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horse, Or anything whatever. Accordingly, in the other case also, in a
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similar way, some such thing as this [blurred image] is all that a
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dream amounts to; for the internal movement effaces the clearness of
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the dream.
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The questions, therefore, which we proposed as to the nature of
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sleep and the dream, and the cause to which each of them is due, and
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also as to divination as a result of dreams, in every form of it, have
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now been discussed.
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-THE END-
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