403 lines
25 KiB
Plaintext
403 lines
25 KiB
Plaintext
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THE NATIONAL GUARDS
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by Donald Goldberg
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Taken from OMNI, May 1987, p45...
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typed in by Thomas Covenant, in preparation for the future.
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"...if you liked 1984, you're gonna love what
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the military has planned..."
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The mountains bend as the fjord and the sea beyond stretch out before the
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viewer's eyes. First over the water, then a sharp left turn, then a bank to
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the right between the peaks, and the secret naval base unfolds upon the screen.
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The scene is of a Soviet military installation on the Kola peninsula in the
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icy Barents Sea, a place usually off limits to the gaze of the Western world.
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It was captured by a small French satellite called SPOT Image, orbiting at an
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altitude of 517 miles above the hidden Russian outpost. On each of several
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passes -- made over a two week period last fall -- the satellite's high
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resolution lens took its pictures at a different angle; the images were then
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blended into a three dimensional, computer generated video. Buildings, docks,
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vessels, and details of the Arctic landscape are all clearly visible.
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Half a world away and thousands of feet under the sea, sparkling clear images
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are being made of the ocean floor. Using the latest bathymetric technology and
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state of the art systems known as Seam Beam and Hydrochart, researchers are for
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the first time assembling detailed underwater maps of the continental shelves
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and the depths of the world's oceans. These scenes of the sea are as sophisti-
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cated as the photographs taken from the satellite.
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From the three dimensional images taken far above the earth to the charts of
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the bottom of the oceans, these photographic systems have three things in
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common: They both rely on the latest technology to crate accurate pictures never
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dreamed of even 25 years ago; they are being made widely available by non-
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commercial, nongovernmental enterprises; and the Pentagon is trying desperately
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to keep them from the general public.
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In 1985 the Navy classified the underwater charts, making them available only
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to approved researchers whose needs are evaluated on a case by case basis. Under
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a 1984 law the military has been given a say in what cameras can be licensed to
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use on American satellites; and officials have already announced they plan to
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limit the quality and resolution of photos made available. The National Security
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Agency (NSA) -- the secret arm of the Pentagon in charge of gathering electronic
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intelligence as well as protecting sensitive U.S. communications -- has defeated
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a move to keep it away from civilian and commercial computers and databases.
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That attitude has outraged those concerned with the military's increasing
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efforts to keep information not only from the public but from industry experts,
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scientists, and even other government officials as well. "That's like
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classifying a road map for fear of invasionm" says Paul Wolff, assistant ad-
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ministrator for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, of the
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attempted restrictions.
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These attempts to keep unclassified data out of the hands of scientists,
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researchers, the news media, and the public at large are part of an alarming
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trend that has seen the military take an ever increasing role in controlling the
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flow of information and communications through American society, a role
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traditionally -- and almost exclusively -- left to civilians. Under the
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approving gaze of the Reagan administration, Department of Defense (DoD)
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officials have quietly implemented a number of policies, decisions, and orders
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that give the military unprecedented control over both the content and public
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use of data and communications. For example:
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o The Pentagon has created a new category of "sensitive" but unclassified
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information that allows it to keep from public access huge quantities of data
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that were once widely accessible.
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o Defense Department officials have attempted to rewrite key laws that spell
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out when the president can and cannot appropriate private communications
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facilities.
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o The Pentagon has installed a system that enables it to seize control of the
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nation's entire communications network -- the phone system, data transmissions,
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and satellite transmissions of all kinds -- in the event of what it deems a
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"national emergency". As yet there is no single, universally agreed upon
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definition of what constitutes such a state. Usually such an emergency is
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restricted to times of natural disaster, war, or when national security is
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specifically threatened. Now the military has attempted to redefine "emergency".
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The point man in the Pentagons onslaught on communications is Assistant
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Defense Secretary Donald C. Latham, a former NSA deputy chief. Latham now heads
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an interagency committee in charge of writing and implementing many of the
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policies that have put the military in charge of the flow of civilian
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information and communication. He is also the architect of National Security
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Decision Directive 145 (NSDD 145), signed by Defense Secretary Caspar Wein-
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berger in 1984, which sets out the national policy on telecommunications and
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computer systems security.
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First NSDD 145 set up a steering group of top level administration officials.
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Their job is to recommend ways to protect information that is unclassified but
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has been designated sensitive. Such information is held not only by government
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agencies but by private companies as well. And last October the steering group
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issued a memorandum that defined sensitive information and gave federal agencies
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broad new powers to keep it from the public.
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According to Latham, this new category includes such data as all medical
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records on government databases -- from the files of the National Cancer
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Institute to information on every veteran who has ever applied for medical aid
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from the Veterans Administration -- and all the information on corporate and
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personal taxpayers in the Internal Revenue Service's computers. Even agricul-
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tural statistics, he argues, can be used by a foreign power against the United
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States.
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In his oversize yet Spartan Pentagon office, Latham cuts anything but an
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intimidating figure. Articulate and friendly, he could pass for a network
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anchorman or a television game show host. When asked how the government's new
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definition of sensitive information will be used, he defends the necessity for
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it and tries to put to rest concerns about a new restrictiveness.
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"The debate that somehow the DoD or NSA are going to monitor or get into
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private databases isn't the case at all," Latham insists. "The definition is
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just a guideline, just an advisory. It does not give the DoD the right to go
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into private records."
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Yet the Defense Department invoked the NSDD 145 guidelines when it told the
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information industry it intends to restrict the sale of data that are now
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unclassified and publicly available from privately owned computer systems. The
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excuse it offered was that these data often include technical information that
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might be valulable to a foreign adversary like the Soviet Union.
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Mead Data Central -- which runs some of the nation's largest computer data-
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bases, such as Lexis and Nexis, and has nearly 200,000 users -- says it has
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already been approached by a team of agents from the Air Force and officials
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from the CIA and the FBI who asked for the names of subscribers and inquired
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what Mead officials might do if information restrictions were imposed. In
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response to government pressure, Mead Data Central in effect censored itself.
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It purged all unclassified government supplied technical data from its system
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and completely dropped the National Technical Information System from its
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database rather than risk a confrontation.
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Representative Jack Brooks, a Texas democrat who chairs the House Government
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Operations Committee, is an outspoken critic of the NSA's role in restricting
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civilian information. He notes that in 1985 the NSA -- under the authority
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granted by NSDD 145 -- investigated a computer program that was widely used in
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both local and federal elections in 1984. The computer system was used to count
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more than one third of all the votes cast in the United States. While probing
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the system's vulnerability to outside manipulation, the NSA obtained a detailed
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knowledge of that computer program. "In my view," Brooks says, "this is an un-
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precedented and ill advised expansion of the military's influence in our
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society."
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There are other NSA critics. "The computer systems used by counties to
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collect and process votes have nothing to do with national security, and I'm
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really concerned about the NSA's involvement," says democratic congressman Dan
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Glickman of Kansas, chairman of the House science and technology subcommittee
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concerned with computer security.
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Also, under NSDD 145 the Pentagon has issued an order, virtually unknown to
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all but a few industry executives, that affects commercial communications
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satellites. The policy was made official by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
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in June of 1985 and requires that all commercial satellite operators that carry
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such unclassified government data traffic as routine Pentagon supply information
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and payroll data (and that compete for lucrative government contracts) install
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costly protective systems on all satellites launched after 1990. The policy
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does not directly affect the data over satellite channels, but it does make the
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NSA privy to vital information about the essential signals needed to operate a
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satellite. With this information it could take control of any satellite it
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chooses.
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Latham insists this, too, is a voluntary procedure and that only companies
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that wish to install protection will have their systems evaluated by the NSA.
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He also says industry officials are wholly behind the move, and argues that
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the protective systems are necessary. With just a few thousand dollars' worth
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of equipment, a disgruntled employee could interfere with a satellite's control
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signals and disable or even wipe out a hundred million dollar satellite carrying
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government information.
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At best, his comments are misleading. First, the policy is not voluntary. The
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NSA can cut off lucrative government contracts to companies that do not comply
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with the plan. The Pentagon alone spent more than a billion dollars leasing
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commercial satellites last year; that's a powerful incentive for business to
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cooperate.
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Second, the industry's support is anything but total. According to the
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minutes of one closed door meeting between NSA officials -- along with represen-
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tatives of other federal agencies -- and executives from AT&T, Comsat, GTE
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Sprint, and MCI, the executives neither supported the move nor believed it was
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necessary. The NSA defended the policy by arguing that a satellite could be held
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for ransom if the command and control links weren't protected. But experts at
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the meeting were skeptical.
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"Why is the threat limited to accessing the satellite rather than destroying
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it with lasers or high powered signals?" one industry executive wanted to know.
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Most of the officials present objected to the high cost of protecting their
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satellites. According to a 1983 study made at the request of the Pentagon, the
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protection demanded by the NSA could add as much as $3 million to the price of
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a satellite and $1 million more to annual operating costs. Costs like these,
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they argue, could cripple a company competing against less expensive communi-
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cations networks.
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Americans get much of their information through forms of electronic communi-
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cations, from the telephone, television and radio, and information printed in
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many newspapers. Banks send important financial data, businesses their spread-
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sheets, and stockbrokers their investment portfolios, all over the same channels
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from satellite signals to computer hookups carried on long distance telephone
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lines. To make sure that the federal government helped promote and protect the
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efficient use of this advancing technology, Congress passed the massive
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Communications Act of 1934. It outlined the role and laws of the communications
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structure in the United States.
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The powers of the president are set out in Section 606 of that law; basically
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it states that he has the authority to take control of any communications
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facilities that he believes "essential to the national defense". In the language
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of the trade this is known as a 606 emergency.
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There have been a number of attempts in recent years by Defense Department
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officials to redefine what qualifies as a 606 emergency and make it easier for
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the military to take over national communications.
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In 1981 the Senate considered amendments to the 1934 act that would allow the
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president, on Defense Department recommendation, to require any communications
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company to provide services, facilities, or equipment "to promote the national
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defense and security or the emergency preparedness of the nation," even in
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peacetime and without a declared state of emergency. The general language had
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been drafted by Defense Department officials. (The bill failed to pass the
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House for unrelated reasons.)
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"I think it is quite clear that they have snuck in there some powers that
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are dangerous for us as a company and for the public at large," said MCI vice
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president Kenneth Cox before the Senate vote.
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Since president Reagan took office, the Pentagon has stepped up its efforts
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to rewrite the definition of national emergency and give the military expanded
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powers in the United States. "The declaration of 'emergency' has always been
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vague," says one former administration official who left the government in 1982
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after ten years in top policy posts. "Different presidents have invoked it
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differently. This administration would declare a convenient 'emergency'". In
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other words, what is a nuisance to one administration might qualify as a
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burgeoning crisis to another. For example, president Reagan administration might
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decide that a series of protests on or near military bases constituted a
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national emergency.
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Should the Pentagon ever be given the green light, its base for taking over
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the nation's communications system would be a nondescript yellow brick building
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within the maze of high rises, government buildings, and apartment complexes
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that make up the Washington suburb of Arlington, Virginia. Headquartered in a
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dusty and aging structure surrounded by a barbed wire fence is an obscure branch
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of the military known as the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). It does not
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have the spit and polish of the National Security Agency or the dozens of other
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government facilities that make up the nation's capital. But its lack of shine
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belies its critical mission: to make sure all of America's far flung military
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units can communicate with one another. It is in certain ways the nerve center
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of our nation's defense system.
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On the second floor of the DCA's four story headquarters is a new addition
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called the National Coordinating Center (NCC). Operated by the Pentagon, it is
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virtually unknown outside of a handful of industry and government officials. The
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NCC is staffed around the clock by representatives of a dozen of the nation's
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largest telecommunications companies -- the so called "common carriers" --
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including AT&T, MCI, GTE, Comsat, and ITT. Also on hand are officials from the
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State Department, the CIA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and a number of
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other federal agencies. During a 606 emergency the Pentagon can order the
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companies that make up the NCC to turn over their satellite, fiberoptic, and
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land line facilities to the government.
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On a long corridor in the front of the building is a series of offices, each
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outfitted with a private phone, a telex machine, and a combination safe. It's
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known as "logo row" because each office is occupied by an employee from one of
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the companies that staff the NCC and because their corporate logos hang on the
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wall outside. Each employee is on permanent standby, ready to activate his
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company's system should the Pentagon require it.
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The NCC's mission is as grand as its title is obscure: to make available to
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the Defense Department all the facilities of the civilian communications network
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in this country -- the phone lines, the long distance satellite hookups, the
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data transmission lines -- in times of national emergency. If war breaks out and
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communications to a key military base are cut, the Pentagon wants to make sure
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that an alternate link can be set up as fast as possible. Company employees
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assigned to the Center are on call 24 hours a day; they wear beepers outside the
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office, and when on vacation they must be replaced by qualified colleagues.
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The Center formally opened on New Year's Day, 1984, the same day Ma Bell's
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monopoly over the telephone network of the entire United States was finally
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broken. The timing was no coincidence. Pentagon officials had argued for years
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along with AT&T against the divestiture of Ma Bell, on grounds of national
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security. Defense Secretary Weinberger personally urged the attorney general
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to block the lawsuit that resulted in the breakup, as had his predecessor,
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Harold Brown. The reason was that rather than construct its own communications
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network, the Pentagon had come to rely extensively on the phone company. After
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the breakup the dependence continued. The Pentagon still used commercial
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companies to carry more than 90 percent of its communications within the
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continental United States.
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The 1984 divestiture put an end to AT&T's monopoly over the nation's tele-
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phone service and increased the Pentagon's obsession with having its own nerve
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center. Now the brass had to contend with several competing companies to acquire
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phone lines, and communications was more than a matter of running a line from
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one telephone to another. Satellites, microwave towers, fiberoptics, and other
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technological breakthroughs never dreamed of by Alexander Graham Bell were in
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extensive use, and not just for phone conversations. Digital data streams for
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computers flowed on the same networks.
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These facts were not lost on the Defense Department or the White House.
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According to documents obtained by OMNI, beginning on December 14, 1982, a
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number of secret meetings were held between high level administration officials
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and executives of the commercial communications companies whose employees would
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later staff the NCC. The meetings, which continued over the next three years,
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were held at the White House, the State Department, the Strategic Air Command
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(SAC) headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and at the North
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American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado Springs.
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The industry officials attending constituted the National Security Tele-
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communications Advisory Committee -- called NSTAC (pronounced N-stack) -- set
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up by President Reagan to address those same problems that worried the Pentagon.
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It was at these secret meetings, according to the minutes, that the idea of a
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communications watch center for national emergencies -- the NCC -- was born.
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Along with it came a whole set of plans that would allow the military to take
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over commercial communications "assets" -- everything from ground stations and
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satellite dishes to fiberoptic cables -- across the country.
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At a 1983 Federal Communications Commission meeting, a ranking Defense
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Department official offered the following explanation for the founding of the
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NCC: "We are looking at trying to make communications endurable for a protracted
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conflict." The phrase "protracted conflict" is a military euphemism for nuclear
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war.
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But could the NCC even survive the first volley in such a conflict?
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Not likely. It's located within a mile of the Pentagon, itself an obvious
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early target of a Soviet nuclear barrage (or a conventional strike, for that
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matter). And the Kremlin undoubtedly knows its locations and importance, and
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presumably has included it on its priority target list. In sum, according to
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one Pentagon official, "The NCC itself it not viewed as a survivable facility."
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Furthermore, the NCC's "Implementation Plan", obtained by OMNI, lists four
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phases of emergencies and how the center should respond to each. The first,
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Phase 0, is Peacetime, for which there would be little to do outside of a hand-
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full of routine tasks and exercises. Phase 1 is Pre Attack, in which alternate
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NCC sites are alerted. Phase 2 is Post Attack, in which other NCC locations are
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instructed to take over the Center's functions. Phase 3 is known as Last Ditch,
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and in this phase whatever facility survives becomes the de facto NCC.
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So far there is no alternate NCC to which officials could retreat to survive
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an attack. According to NCC deputy director William Belford, no physical sites
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have yet been chosen for a substitute NCC, and even whether the NCC itself will
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survive a nuclear attack is still under study.
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Of what use is a communications center that is not expected to outlast even
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the first shots of a war and has no backup?
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The answer appears to be that because of the Pentagon's concerns about the
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AT&T divestiture and the disruptive effects it might have on national security,
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the NCC was to serve as the military's peacetime communications center.
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The Center is a powerful and unprecedented tool to assume control over the
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nation's vast communications and information network. For years the Pentagon
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has been studying how to take over the common carriers' facilities. That
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research was prepared by NSTAC at the DoD's request and is contained in a series
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of internal Pentagon documents obtained by OMNI. Collectively this series is
|
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known as the Satellite Survivability Report. Completed in 1984, it is the only
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detailed analysis to date of the vulnerabilities of the commercial satellite
|
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|
network. It was begun as a way of examining how to protect the network of
|
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|
communications facilities from attack and how to keep it intact for the DoD.
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A major part of this report also contains an analysis of how to make commer-
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cial satellites "interoperable" with Defense Department systems. While the
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|
report notes that current technical differences such as varying frequencies
|
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|
make it difficult for the Pentagon to use commercial satellites, it recommends
|
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|
ways to resolve those problems. Much of the report is a veritable blueprint for
|
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|
the government on how to take over satellites in orbit above the United States.
|
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|
This information, plus NSDD 145's demand that satellite operators tell the NSA
|
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|
how their satellites are controlled, guarantees the military ample knowledge
|
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|
about operating commercial satellites.
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|
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|
The Pentagon now has an unprecedented access to the civilian communications
|
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|
network: commercial databases, computer networks, electronic links, telephone
|
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|
lines. All it needs is the legal authority to use them. Then it could totally
|
|||
|
dominate the flow of all information in the United States. As one high ranking
|
|||
|
White House communications official put it: "Whoever controls communications
|
|||
|
controls the country." His remark was made after our State Department could not
|
|||
|
communicate directly with our embassy in Manila during the anti-Marcos
|
|||
|
revolution last year. To get through, the State Department had to relay all its
|
|||
|
messages through the Philippine government.
|
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|
|
|||
|
Government officials have offered all kinds of scenarios to justify the NCC,
|
|||
|
the Satellite Survivability Report, new domains of authority for the Pentagon
|
|||
|
and the NSA, and the creation of top level government steering groups to think
|
|||
|
of even more policies for the military. Most can be reduced to the rationale
|
|||
|
that inspired NSDD 145: that our enemies (presumably the Soviets) have to be
|
|||
|
prevented from getting too much information from unclassified sources. And the
|
|||
|
only way to do that is to step in and take control of those sources.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Remarkably, the communications industry as a whole has not been concerned
|
|||
|
about the overall scope of the Pentagon's threat to its freedom of operation.
|
|||
|
Most protests have been to individual government actions. For example, a media
|
|||
|
coalition that includes the Radio-Television News Directors Association, the
|
|||
|
American Society of Newspaper Editors, and the Turner Broadasting System has
|
|||
|
been lobbying that before the government can restrict the use of satellites, it
|
|||
|
must demonstrate why such restrictions protect against a "threat to distinct
|
|||
|
and compelling national security and foreign policy interests". But the whole
|
|||
|
policy of restrictiveness has not been examined. That may change sometime this
|
|||
|
year, when the Office of Technology Assessment issues a report on how the
|
|||
|
Pentagon's policy will affect communications in the United States. In the mean-
|
|||
|
time the military keeps trying to encroach on national communications.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
While it seems unlikely that the Pentagon will ever get total control of our
|
|||
|
information and communications systems, the truth is that it can happen all too
|
|||
|
easily. The official mechanisms are in place; and few barriers remain to guaran-
|
|||
|
tee that what we hear, see, and read will come to us courtesy of our being mem-
|
|||
|
bers of a free and open society and not courtesy of the Pentagon.
|
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|
|
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