211 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
211 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
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Some Thoughts on the Development of Personal Computers
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by Duane Bristow, Computer Consultant
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The Helping Hand BBS (606) 387-4002
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Albany, Kentucky 42602
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June 14, 1991
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Personal Computers were first available on the mass market in
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1977. At that time there were basically three brands widely
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available, Apple, Tandy, and Commodore. I bought a TRS-80 model
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I in the fall of that year and began computer consulting the
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next spring. Things have changed a lot in the last 14 years.
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These are a few observations on some of the developments and
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trends.
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In the early 1980s a man would come to me and say, "I have a
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problem in my business. It concerns efficiency in office
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procedures. I am covered up in writing, bookkeeping, billing,
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paying, keeping track of customers, etc. They said you have
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been able to show other businesses how to use computers to solve
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these problems. Please show me."
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I would then analyse his business talking not only to him but
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primarily to his secretary and/or bookkeeper(s) to find just how
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his business ran, what the problems were, and what was unique
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about his business (something almost always was). I would plan
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hardware and develop software designed to work efficiently to
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solve his problems and to grow with his business for the next
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five or (wistfully) ten years. I would install the system,
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train his employees and support the system with further
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modifications, hardware and software maintenance, additional
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training, etc. as needed. This worked well and was always
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successful.
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Now a man comes to me and says, "I have a problem in my
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business. I heard computerizing would solve my problem, so I
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read the computer magazines, talked to the computer literacy
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instructor at the high school, talked to a number of computer
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salesmen, and asked a computer whiz I know who has three
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computers and unbelievable games on them (He has the highest
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score in town on "Shoot The Martians"). All these people told
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me that my problems would be solved if I got a 386 with 4 meg
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RAM, 40 meg. hard drive, VGA, laser printer, Windows, Lotus 123,
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Dbase and Wordperfect."
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"I bought all these, spent months reading the manuals and
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installing it all, and got the computer whiz to come by when
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school was out and show my employees how to use it all. And,
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you know, I still have the problem in my business. As a matter
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of fact my employees spend so much time using and learning the
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new computer system that I've had to hire an additional employee
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to make sure we get the billing out each month. Now, they say
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you have solved business problems for others with computers, so
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I am willing to pay you to show me how to use this stuff to
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solve my problems."
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I explain to this man that I was able to solve other's problems
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by an analysis of their business and by developing or installing
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software specifically for that purpose, that this will not use
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all the memory, Windows, 123, and Dbase that he has already
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installed, that I use cheaper hardware and charge more for
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systems analysis and custom programming and that therefore
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solving his problems will require an additional investment of
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$2,000 or more and that probably $2,000 of his original
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investment will be useless to him. He usually concludes at this
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point that I must not know much about computers. He ends up
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using parts of whatever of his software he can and decides that
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computers can't really do as much as he had been led to believe
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after all.
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This problem arises primarily because of the way the computer
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industry has marketed computers and software in the last 14
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years. In the first stage the industry said, "Buy a computer!"
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John Q. Public said, "Why?" and the industry said, "Because they
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can do anything you tell them." The problem was JQP didn't know
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what he wanted them to do and he didn't know how to tell them to
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do it anyway. So a couple of real smart guys wrote Visicalc,
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the first spreadsheet program for microcomputers. JQP found
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that for some things that he was already doing on paper
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spreadsheets, a computer with VC was much more efficient. If he
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knew how to design a spreadsheet on paper, he could do the same
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thing on the computer and increase productivity immensely. He
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was programming a computer but he didn't know that.
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The industry marketing men saw what had happened and changed
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their tactic. They now said, "Buy a computer so you can run
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VC." And a number of accountants and other number crunchers did
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just that. As a matter of fact some of the more savvy salesmen
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began giving away pirated copies of VC with each computer sale.
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Their profit was on hardware, not software. Many salesmen who
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had never used a paper spreadsheet much less VC told people that
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to do anything now they just needed a computer and VC. When
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asked what type of thing they might do the computer salesman
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replied that JQP could now balance his checkbook with a
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computer. Never mind that if JQP didn't know how to balance a
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checkbook the computer wasn't going to help and if he did he
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certainly didn't need a computer for that.
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The next development of interest was the discovery that if one
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knew how to type he could increase productivity immensely with a
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word processing program. This then developed much the same way
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as the VC phenomena.
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From the beginning the computer marketers and the media had
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envisioned a computer in every household. Problem was that, so
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far, computers were selling primarily to accountants and
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typists. Apple computer decided that the thing standing in the
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way of more computer sales was the fact that not enough people
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knew how to use a spreadsheet or to type. Hence the GUI
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(Graphical Computer Interface) and the mouse. Theoretically, we
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could throw away the keyboard now and everyone could own a
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computer. Of course, since this didn't teach one to do
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accounting or use a spreadsheet and since you couldn't write a
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document with a mouse there was no reason to buy a computer, but
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Apple overlooked that. As a matter of fact, after the
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introduction of the Macintosh, Apple probably would have gone
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out of business if not for one further development.
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Someone, (I don't know who but somebody does) came up with the
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idea of using the Macintosh for Desktop Publishing, a quantum
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extension of word processing which was ideally suited to a GUI
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and a mouse. (Course, it also required a keyboard but that was
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OK.) This sold so many Macs that Microsoft and IBM took notice
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and decided that a GUI must be the way to go.
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Others decided that part of the problem with computer sales was
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that computers require programs and JQP could not or was afraid
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to program. So they wrote applications that would help JQP to
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write his own programs but would not let him know that he was
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doing so. These took the form of Dbase type programs and a
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tremendous increase in the size and complexity of VC which by
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now was owned by Lotus and was called 123. The thing they
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didn't tell JQP was that by trying to force a computer to do
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something with such a general purpose tool as Dbase or 123, he
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was sacrificing efficiency and that if the application became
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very complex it could be programmed and would work much more
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efficiently and easily in a true programming language like
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pascal, or C, or compiled basic or whatever. They also didn't
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tell JQP that a complex application would be just as hard to
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program in Dbase or 123 as in a true language even though it
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would not work nearly as well. I knew a hospital controller who
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tried to run a hospital billing and accounting system with 123.
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You can drill a hole with a hammer and nails too, but a drill is
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so much more efficient.
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From the very beginning the problem was that computers could
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perform miracles in efficiency but only the systems analysts and
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the programmers knew how. The marketing planners and the
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salesmen didn't, so they misled JQP. Those who most need
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computers, mostly businessmen, are not analysts or programmers
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and should not be. There were never enough programmers and
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analysts to sell the number of computers the industry wanted to
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sell. Therefore, efficiency was sacrificed by use of general
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purpose programs. Although these usually did not do the job
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well (sometimes not at all), they were cheaper than efficient
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programs and they were available. The hoax was that JQP was
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never told that use of these programs required a sacrifice of
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efficiency but was simply led to believe that the inadequacies
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of these programs was intrinsic to computers.
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Another hoax occurred as the price of computer hardware and
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software fell. It is necessary to charge $3,000 to $5,000 for a
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computer system to justify enough profit to support the
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industry. At first, the price could be maintained by simply
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selling more powerful and faster hardware and software to JQP
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for the same price that he was used to paying. After a while
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though, it became evident that the hardware and software was
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already as fast as JQP could ever want to perform most
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applications. The solution was to change the operating system
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to OS2 and to GUIs such as Windows that were inefficient in
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speed and in use of memory. By convincing the public that these
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were necessary it became possible to sell even faster machines
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with increased memory, etc.
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These are my nominations for most significant developments in
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microcomputers over the last 14 years with my designation of
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each as a right turn or a wrong turn for the industry.
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The microcomputer Right turn
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Visicalc Right turn
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Lotus 123 Wrong turn
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Dbase Wrong turn
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Hard disk storage Right turn
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MSDOS Right turn but a UNIX based OS
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would have been better.
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Word processors Right turn
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GUI Wrong turn
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Color Monitor & VGA Right turn
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Hayes standard
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high speed modems Right turn
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communications software
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Compuserve and BBSes
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Quickbasic, C, Pascal Right turn
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The shareware concept Right turn
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Desktop publishing Right turn
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Laser printers Right turn
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Graphics applications
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scanners, and mouses Right turn
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Networking Right turn
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CDROM drives and applications Right turn
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Simulations Right turn
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Sound applications Right turn
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