2464 lines
119 KiB
Plaintext
2464 lines
119 KiB
Plaintext
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### #### ### ### ### ####
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########## ### ### ##########
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### ###
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Underground eXperts United
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Presents...
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## ## ####### ####### # # ####### ####### #######
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[ uXu Follow-Up #1 - Dr. Ripco & Ripco BBS ] [ By The Chief ]
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____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
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*** SPECIAL ISSUE ***
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uXu Follow-Up #1 - Dr. Ripco and Ripco BBS
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NOTE: Excerpts from various sources like CuD (Computer Underground Digest),
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Dr. Ripco, Bulletins and messages are in their genuine state. No changes
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or alterations of the material has been made. However, various sections
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that did not cover Dr. Ripco, Ripco BBS or Operation Sun Devil have been
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edited out and are marked with <ed> for your comfort and understanding.
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Also note that the views presented are individual, and do not necessarily
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represent the views of uXu, or the Computer Underground as a whole.
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This special issue starts with an in-depth view of Operation Sun Devil,
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to get you, the reader, to understand what really happened, and to explain
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the following special section about Ripco BBS and Dr. Ripco's views on
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what happened to him.
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Introduction
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As you might know, Dr. Ripco, the SysOp of ex-BBS Ripco (now Ripco ][)
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was a victim of the (still running?) Operation Sun Devil, conducted by the FBI
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which the 8th of May 1990 raged through the United States of America. Briefly,
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the Moderators of Computer Underground Digest described the initiation of the
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operation like this;
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<taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.1, Issue #09 May 16, 1990>
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----------------------------------start here-----------------------------------
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File 1: Moderators' Corner
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----------
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Operation Sun Devil
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-----------
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Operation Sun Devil, another phase in the crackdown against the computer
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underground, was begun May 8 (See this issue, Files 3 and 4). At least 28
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search warrants were served, and a number of arrests have resulted,
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although not all directly related to the May 8 operation. Judging from
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comments we have received, people are either quite angry about it or highly
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supportive of it. <ed>
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------------------------------------end here-----------------------------------
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Computer Underground Digest is (known to me) the best source available
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when it comes to the CU and legal issues. News are presented from people
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around the world, and becomes very interesting discussion topics. Many
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people, ranging from attorneys to normal computer users express their views,
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discuss various subjects, and if possible, explain things hard to understand.
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CuD covered (and cover) Operation Sun Devil very thoroughly with press-
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releases from the papers as well as the Secret Service when it all started;
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<taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.1, Issue #09 May 16, 1990>
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---------------------------------start here------------------------------------
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U.S. Department of Justice
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United States Attorney
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District of Arizona
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
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4000 United States Courthouse
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Phoenix, Arizona 82505
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602-379-3011 /FTS/261-3011
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PRESS RELEASE
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: CONTACT: Wendy Harnagel
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Wednesday, May 9, 1990 United States Attorney's Office
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(602) 379-3011
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PHOENIX--Stephen M. McNamee, United States Attorney for the District of
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Arizona, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General for the state of Arizona, and
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Henry R. Potosky, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the United States
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Secret Service Office in Phoenix, today announced that approximately
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twenty-seven search warrants were executed on Monday and Tuesday, May 7 and
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8, 1990, in various cities across the nation by 150 Secret Service agents
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along with state and local law enforcement officials. The warrants were
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issued as a part of Operation Sundevil, which was a two year investigation
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into alleged illegal computer hacking activities.
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The United States Secret Service, in cooperation with the United States
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Attorney's Office, and the Attorney General for the State of Arizona,
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established an operation utilizing sophisticated investigative techniques,
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targeting computer hackers who were alleged to have trafficked in and abuse
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stolen credit card numbers, unauthorized long distance dialing codes, and
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who conduct unauthorized access and damage to computers. While the total
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amount of losses cannot be calculated at this time, it is
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(MORE)
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estimated that the losses may run into the millions of dollars. For
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example, the unauthorized accessing of long distance telephone cards have
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resulted in uncollectible charges. The same is true of the use of stolen
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credit card numbers. Individuals are able to utilize the charge accounts to
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purchase items for which no payment is made.
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Federal search warrants were executed in the following cities:
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Chicago, IL
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Cincinnati, OH
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Detroit, MI
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Los Angeles, CA
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Miami, FL
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Newark, NJ
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New York, NY
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Phoenix, AZ
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Pittsburgh, PA
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Plano, TX
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Richmond, VA
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San Diego, CA
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San Jose, CA
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Unlawful computer hacking imperils the health and welfare of individuals,
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corporations and government agencies in the United States who rely on
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computers and telephones to communicate.
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Technical and expert assistance was provided to the United States Secret
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Service by telecommunication companies including Pac Bel, AT&T, Bellcore,
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Bell South, MCI, U.S. Sprint, Mid-American, Southwestern Bell, NYNEX, U.S.
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West, and by the many corporate victims. All are to be commended for their
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efforts in researching intrusions and documenting losses.
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McNamee and Corbin expressed concern that the improper and alleged illegal
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use of computers may become the White Collar crime of the
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(MORE)
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1990's. McNamee and Corbin reiterated that the state and federal government
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will vigorously pursue criminal violations of statutes under their
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jurisdiction. Three individuals were arrested yesterday in other
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jurisdictions on collateral or independent state charges. The
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investigations surrounding the activities of Operation Sundevil are
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continuing.
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The investigations are being conducted by agents of the United States
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Secret Service and Assistant United States Attorney Tim Holtzen, District
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of Arizona, and Assistant Arizona Attorney General Gail Thackery.
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END STORY
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------------------------secret service press release---------------------------
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Assistant Director Garry M. Jenkins' Prepared Remarks
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Operation Sun Devil
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Today, the Secret Service is sending a clear message to those computer
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hackers who have decided to violate the laws of this nation in the mistaken
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belief that they can successfully avoid detection by hiding behind the
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relative anonymity of their computer terminals.
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In 1984, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which
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prohibits, among other things, credit card fraud and computer fraud. Since
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1984, the Secret Service has been aggressively enforcing these laws and has
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made over 9,000 arrests nationwide.
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Recently we have witnessed an alarming number of young people who, for a
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variety of sociological and psychological reasons, have become attached to
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their computers and are exploiting thier potential in a criminal manner.
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Often, a progression of criminal activity occurs which involves
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telecommunications fraud (free long distance phone calls), unauthorized
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access to other computers (whether for profit, fascination, ego, or the
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intellectual challenge), credit card fraud (cash advances and unauthorized
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purchases of goods), and then move on to other destructive activities like
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computer viruses.
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Some computer abusers form close associations with other people having
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similar interests. Underground groups have been formed for the purpose of
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exchanging information relevant to their criminal activities. These groups
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often communicate with each other through message systems between computers
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called "bulletin boards."
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Operation Sun Devil was an investigation of potential computer fraud
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conducted over a two-year period with the use of sophisticated
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investigative techniques.
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This investigation exemplifies the commitment and extensive cooperation
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between federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and private
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governmental industries which have been targeted by computer criminals.
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While state and local law enforcement agencies successfully investigate and
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prosecute technological crimes in specific geographical locations, federal
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intervention is clearly called for when the nature of these crimes becomes
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interstate and international.
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(PAGE 1)
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On May 8, 1990, over 150 Special Agents of the United States Secret
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Service, teamed with numerous local and state law enforcement agencies,
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served over two dozen search warrants in approximately fifteen (15) cities
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across this nation.
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Several arrests and searches were made during the investigation to protect
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the public from impending dangers. In one situation, computer equipment
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was seized after unauthorized invasion into a hospital computer.
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Our experience shows that many computer hacker suspects are no longer
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misguide teenagers mischievously playing games with their computers in
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their bedrooms. Some are now high tech computer operators using computers
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to engage in unlawful conduct.
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The losses to the american public in this case are expected to be
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significant. The Secret Service takes computer crime very seriously, and
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we will continue to investigate aggressively those crimes which threaten
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our nation's businesses and government services.
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------------------------------------end here-----------------------------------
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To compare these two releases in the search for information about the
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operation shows how much information the SS holds back. The paper release
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is (strangely enough) very informational, gives the locations, who
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participated, and even tried to explain WHY while The SS release is just the
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basic "it threatened our nation.." + a little history and also an attempt
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to class hackers as "misguided teenagers" or "high tech computer operators
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using computers to engage in unlawful conduct." I believe very little would
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have been said about this operation if it hadn't been for CuD and it's
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readers, as well as Dr. Ripco because he stood up and told his story (for
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the complete story on what happened, see 'Dr. Ripco Speaks Out' later on
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in this file). CuD published this information shortly after the "bust";
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<taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.1, Issue #09 May 16, 1990>
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-----------------------------------start here----------------------------------
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-- Dr. Ripco's Final Words
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-------------
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RIPCO
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-------------
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Ripco was one of the boards that went down on May 8. It was probably the
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longest running decent board in the country. Judging from our knowledge of
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the users and the content of the logs, less than 3 percent of the callers
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claimed to be identified in illegal activity, and of those, we'd guess that
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at least half were faking it. Given the nature of undercover operations,
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which include "infiltrating" boards, we also assume some were law
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enforcement agents. Ripco had a number of message sections, all of which
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were lively, generally intelligent, and invariably interesting. Raiding
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Ripco seems to be throwing the baby out with the bath water by intimidating
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sysops willing to allow provocative discussions. We repeat: THE BULK OF
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RIPCO'S USERS WERE NOT IN ANY WAY INVOLVED IN *ANY* ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, but
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now names are in the hands of agents. We have seen from past experience
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what can happen when they start generating "lists." We can see some
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aggressive hot-shot prosecutor now, about to seek political office: "I HAVE
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IN MY HAND A LIST OF 200 SUBVERSIVE HACKER SCUM....!" In our view, this is
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no long a computer underground issue, but one of First Amendment
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protections.
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We reprint Dr. Ripco's final message left to his users:
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******************************************************************
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This is 528-5020.
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As you are probably aware, on May 8, the Secret Service conducted a series
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of raids across the country. Early news reports indicate these raids
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involved people and computers that could be connected with credit card and
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long distance toll fraud. Although no arrests or charges were made, Ripco
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BBS was confiscated on that morning. It's involvement at this time is
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unknown. Since it is unlikely that the system will ever return, I'd just l
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say goodbye, and thanks for your support for the last six and a half years.
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It's been interesting, to say the least.
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Talk to ya later.
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%Dr. Ricpo%
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*** END OF VOICE MESSAGE ***
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------------------------------------end here-----------------------------------
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This was the start of many discussions around "hot" topics as the First
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Amendment rights, which hackers had been involved in this "claimed to be"
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credit card fraud/long distance code fraud operation. A lot of people raised
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well-founded questions like;
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<taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.1, Issue #14 June 14, 1990>
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-----------------------------------start here----------------------------------
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-------------------
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The following is an anonymous submission.
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-------------------
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Can someone answer the following?
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Operation Sun Devil is a two year investigation. If I'm counting right,
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including the number of federal and state officers involved in serving
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search warrants, at least 300 were involved in some capacity.
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Also, if I'm counting right, there have been only 9 arrests:
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1) One guy in California who was arrested during a search on
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an unrelated charge (weapon's possession)(Doc Ripco?)
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2) One guy in Chicago who was arrested during the search on an
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unrelated charge (weapons)
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3) A woman in Pittsburgh (Electra?)
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4) Terminus in New Jersey
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5) Anthony Nusall in Tucson
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6) Craig Neidorf (for publishing phrack)
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7) Robert Riggs (for E911 documents)
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8) Adam Grant (Atlanta)
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9) Frank Darden (Atlanata)
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The first four were busted in January, and the last four in the last month.
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So, of the 9, only 7 were busted on computer-related charges. Of the 7,
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the charges seem bogus at best, such as Craig Neidorf's, if the information
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I've read is even half accurate.
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Now, here's my question: If warrants are supposed to indicate a crime has
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been committed, shouldn't there be more arrests if there is such a crime
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wave out there? After all that time, all that investigation, all that
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hype---where's all the crooks??
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I suppose the cops could say it takes time to collect evidence. But aren't
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they supposed to have evidence when they get the search warrants? How long
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can it possibly take to acquire evidence if the groundwork has already been
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laid and if cops supposedly know what they're looking for?? Am I missing
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something? Will other charges be like those reported against Craig--for
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publishing? If I havae phrack 24 and the E911 file, does that make me a
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crook? If I uploaded it to a board. Can that board be busted for receiving
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stolen information?
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Maybe I'm missing something, but is there something wrong here?
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Where is this giant conspiracy? Where is all the harm that's going on? I
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guess the cops would say they can't talk while an investigation is going
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on, but hasn't it been going on for years? Shouldn't they have something
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they can convey other than general notions of threats to national security,
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huge losses, major conspiracies, and the rest of their babble?
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Is there something wrong with this picture??
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<je>
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------------------------------------end here-----------------------------------
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This is just one of the, perhaps hundreds of questions, but I feel it
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covers the most interesting facts. Nothing major seemed to turn up from this
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major operation (for starters at least, we now know that it wasn't the end
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of it, like when this piece of news hit the 'net';
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----------------------------------start here-----------------------------------
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[Message]: 1 of 5
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[When ]: 5/16/91 at 11:20 am
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[Subject]: Op Sundevil
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[To ]: All
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[From ]: XXXXXXXXXXXX (name withheld)
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From The Houston Chronicle -- 3/30/91
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Operation Sun Devil
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An accuse computer hacker known as "Doc Savage" was arrested
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by Arizona authorities Friday [3/28/91] and charged with
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making unauthorized credit card purchases and stealing long
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distance telephone service, partly with the help of his
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computer.
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The arrest is the first in the 3 year old government
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crackdown on computer crime dubbed Operation Sun Devil.
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Baron Monroe Majette was arrested on three felony counts of
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fraudulent schemes and artifices and three counts of
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conspiracy, said Bill Fitzgerald, spokesman for the county
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attorney Mariscopa County Ariz.
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Majette faces a maximum sentance of 14 years on each charge
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if found guilty. He will appear in court April 5.
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The indictment described Majette as a "computer hacker" (a
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person who uses or accesses computer and communications
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services without authorization)" and said he used the online
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pseudonyms of Doc Savage and Samuel Savage. Majette was
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being held in lieu of $4,900 bail in the Maricopa County
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Jail, Fitzgerald said.
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The indictment charged that Majette and unnamed others:
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@ Placed long-distance conference calls on March 27 and
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March 28, 1990, running up bills totaling more than $4,000
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on each call and charging them without permission to a
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Phoenix retail store. The calls included participants in
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Arizona, California, Texas, Nevada, Connecticut, Missouri,
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Georgia, New York, and North Carolina, the indictment
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charged.
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@ Obtained more than %50,000 in credit card purchases
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between Aug. 1, 1990 and May 9, 1990, by gaining
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||
|
unauthorized access to a credit record database, using the
|
||
|
information there to obtain fraudulent credit cards and then
|
||
|
making charges on the cards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
@ Obtained more than $10,000 in credit card purchases
|
||
|
between Oct 1,1990, and Oct. 26, 1990, by stealing credit
|
||
|
cards and account information from mailboxes, and then
|
||
|
billing charges to the cards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Operation Sun Devil is the code name for a nationwide group
|
||
|
of investigations by the U.S. Secret Service and various
|
||
|
state authorities. In March 1990, the Secret Service siezed
|
||
|
50,000 computer disks and dozens of computers in 28 raids.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Critics of the operation have complained that some of the
|
||
|
raids violated civil liberties, noting that (until
|
||
|
Friday[3/28/91]) nooo charges had been filed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This viewpoint, along with law enforcement response, was at
|
||
|
the center of the discussion this week in San Francisco at
|
||
|
the First Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy,
|
||
|
which addressed the issue of civil rights in the information
|
||
|
age.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------------------------end here------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Doc Savage was the first to be charged as a result of Operation Sun Devil,
|
||
|
almost three years after it's initiation. Probably, this had very little to
|
||
|
do with what happened in May 1990. I believe the Secret Service and the FBI
|
||
|
had to show some results, and chose Doc Savage as the person they could get
|
||
|
the most out of. I don't know if that is the case, but it sure seems like it
|
||
|
(to me).
|
||
|
|
||
|
But that is not what this file is about. Let's return to Dr. Ripco and
|
||
|
Ripco BBS, with some comments on the bust.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.1, Issue #11 May 29, 1990>
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------start here------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
File 4: Comment on Sun Devil Press Release and other related
|
||
|
related views (numerous authors)
|
||
|
|
||
|
<ed>
|
||
|
Let's take an example. RipCo, a Chicago computer underground board, had
|
||
|
606 users when it was raided. A scan of RipCo's message logs over a six
|
||
|
month period indicates that, at most, barely three percent of the callers
|
||
|
could even remotely be classified as "illegal users," as defined by the
|
||
|
posting of codez or other information of a questionable nature. Of these,
|
||
|
about half of the message content was clearly erroneous or fraudulent,
|
||
|
suggesting that the caller either made up the information or posted
|
||
|
information so old as to be irrelevant. It is also possible that some of
|
||
|
the postings were by law enforcement agents attempting to insinuate
|
||
|
themselves into build credibility for themselves. On no-longer operative
|
||
|
"hard-core" elite p/h boards, we have found that even on the higher access
|
||
|
levels, a surprisingly small number of participants actually engaged in
|
||
|
significant criminal activity of the type that would warrant an investigation.
|
||
|
Yes, some CU types do commit illegal acts. And five years ago, perhaps
|
||
|
more did. If the SS confined itself to prosecuting substantive crimes, we
|
||
|
would not complain much. Currently, however, they are sweeping up
|
||
|
the innocent by closing down boards, intimidating sysops of legitimate boards,
|
||
|
creating a chilling effect for speech, and confiscating equipment of those
|
||
|
unfortunate enough to be in the way. <ed>
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------------end here-----------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
This message packs the problems together pretty well. It shows the
|
||
|
mistakes people often make when speaking of the CU. There IS a need for
|
||
|
people to "show" that they know this and that, and prove it too, but mostly
|
||
|
what's posted is made up, or no longer working. Maybe five years ago, this
|
||
|
operation would have been called for, but not after the CU cleaned itself up
|
||
|
which it has today. There aren't boards where you find credit cards, calling-
|
||
|
cards and other various illegalities anymore, or if there are, they are
|
||
|
Very very VERY hard to find. I can say honestly that during my last Five
|
||
|
years in the CU scene, I have yet to find such a board. Today, most CU boards
|
||
|
only (as stated above) contain very intelligent discussions, files, mostly
|
||
|
textfiles with news, laws and whatever the CU think people should know about.
|
||
|
Today, such an operation is a major mistake.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Note: I do *NOT* Include Pirate BBSs in the term 'CU')
|
||
|
|
||
|
We continue with an Update on the Ripco Case from CuD;
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.1, Issue #26 Aug 2, 1990>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
----------------------------------start here-----------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Mon, 30 Jul 90 22:54 CDT
|
||
|
From: Moderators (TK0JUT1.cs.niu.edu)
|
||
|
Subject: Update on RIPCO BBS and Dr. Ripco
|
||
|
|
||
|
One forgotten victim in the Sundevil sweeps has been Dr. Ripco, sysop of
|
||
|
RIPCO bbs, which was considered one of the top CU hangouts and text file
|
||
|
boards in the country. Dr. Ripco's equipment, including numerous disks,
|
||
|
several computers, and telecom equipment, was confiscated by Secret Service
|
||
|
agents with a seizure warrant on May 8. Although no computer-related
|
||
|
charges have been filed, no equipment has been returned.
|
||
|
|
||
|
When we caught up with DR a few days ago, he explained that local (Chicago)
|
||
|
police who accompanied federal agents on the seizures found several pistols
|
||
|
in the storage building where the computer equipment was located. Under a
|
||
|
Chicago ordinance, possession of weapons is a misdemeanor, and DR was cited
|
||
|
for failure to register the weapons. The guns were new, never fired, and
|
||
|
still in their box. If we caught the details correctly, he entered a
|
||
|
guilty plea, they took away the guns, and he was given six months
|
||
|
supervision and will not have a record.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Doc indicated that he himself did not participate much in the modem
|
||
|
world, and one reason he has been silent is because he isn't fully aware of
|
||
|
all the digests and e-mail connections that exist, and depends for his news
|
||
|
on local media (good luck on that one, DR) and word-of-mouth from friends.
|
||
|
He has not yet retained an attorney to re-acquire his equipment, because he
|
||
|
believed it would be given back relatively soon. Now, nearly three months
|
||
|
after the seizure, he is concerned.
|
||
|
|
||
|
DR indicated that, unlike the experience of others, the SS was relatively
|
||
|
polite, if ignorant about technical matters. Although wearing bullet proof
|
||
|
vests, their guns were not drawn and they did not attempt to hassle him
|
||
|
(despite some snide comments by one agent). He emphatically indicated that
|
||
|
the searches and confiscations were not necessary, because if they had
|
||
|
contacted him, he would have cooperated fully.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Doc claimed that, to his knowledge, little illegal activity occured on
|
||
|
the board. He thought that perhaps some of his files might be considered
|
||
|
"bad taste," but they were not in his judgment illegal. Public message
|
||
|
logs from mid-1988 to May 7, 1990, support his claim. Despite some
|
||
|
posturing, few of the over 600 users abused the board.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In many ways, the situation is like that of Steve Jackson, whose equipment
|
||
|
was confiscated and board shut down because of some vague notion of
|
||
|
"possible wrong-doing." RIPCO seems to have been targeted in part because
|
||
|
of its longevity and in part because it had one of the better text file
|
||
|
collection in country. It was a gathering point for many of the most active
|
||
|
computer underground types, and the number was reportedly blocked by at
|
||
|
least one telecom LD server because of phreaks calling.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If we are correct in our reasons for why RIPCO was shut down, it further
|
||
|
indicates the chilling effect of Sundevil. Providing textfiles as a
|
||
|
resource is not illegal, nor, to date, has the government claimed that Dr.
|
||
|
Ripco in fact did anything illegal. Yet, his equipment is gone and the
|
||
|
modem world lost a fine board.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The moderators emphasize to those who think that RIPCO was nothing more
|
||
|
than a phreak/hacker board that it provided some of the best chat we have
|
||
|
seen. Discussions ranged from current events to sophisticated philosophical
|
||
|
issues. Despite the usual number of dolts one might expect in a community
|
||
|
of over 600, the users were generally well-informed, articulate, and
|
||
|
stimulating.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The closing of RIPCO is symbolic for two reasons. First, as one of the
|
||
|
longest running CU boards, it served as a cultural meeting place. The CU
|
||
|
community is transitory, with participants coming and going as their
|
||
|
interest fades and is rekindled. RIPCO served as place to reunite old
|
||
|
friends and meet new ones. Although most of the "elite" CU didn't frequent
|
||
|
RIPCO regularly, they would often "stop in" just to check their e-mail or
|
||
|
see what the latest text files were. Thus, RIPCO was functional for
|
||
|
entering and maintaining contact with the CU community as a whole.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It is also interesting to note that RIPCO had long suffered under a sort of
|
||
|
"common knowledge" that it was highly "infested" with law enforcement
|
||
|
agents. This assumption was fed both by it's longevity and openess to the
|
||
|
public. When it was closed down, the general CU reaction was one of sorrow
|
||
|
(because it was such a familiar part of the community) and confusion
|
||
|
(because of its reputation for being legal and above board). There was
|
||
|
also some question as to why the "feds" would shut down what was assumed to
|
||
|
be a source of information they were using to obtain leads into the
|
||
|
activity of the CU.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is a chance that Dr. Ripco might resume the board, and we encourage
|
||
|
him to do so. RIPCO was an asset to the modem world and many of us miss it.
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco's account of his experience will appear in CuD 1.27.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-------------------------------------end here----------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Moderators of CuD go more in depth here, and explain the asset Ripco
|
||
|
was to the CU and gives us an update on the case. I was only on Ripco for
|
||
|
a couple of weeks before it was "busted", so I can not tell you how good/bad
|
||
|
it was or confirm what they write about the board, but I CAN say that from
|
||
|
what I saw, the board seemed to be full of interesting discussions, not the
|
||
|
basic discussions you see on every board today, but Intelligent, in-depth,
|
||
|
learning discussions, and it was very popular too. I remember you had to
|
||
|
set your modem to auto-dial, and if you were lucky, one hour later you would
|
||
|
maybe be so lucky to actually get through. But it wasn't because it was known
|
||
|
as an "illegal" board, no, it was because of the good discussions! For me,
|
||
|
it was a place to learn, to understand things I wasn't very good at, or
|
||
|
had no knowledge of, and I believe most people felt the same way. It came as
|
||
|
a complete surprise to me, to hear that it had been busted.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here below, Dr. Ripco tells the complete story, on what happened that
|
||
|
day, the 8th of May 1990;
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.1, Issue #27 Aug 9, 1990>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------------------------start here----------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 7 August, 1990
|
||
|
From: . Ripco (Bruce ?)
|
||
|
Subject: Dr. Ripco Speaks Out
|
||
|
|
||
|
This document is being written to state my involvement with Operation
|
||
|
Sundevil and the events that passed on May 8th of 1990. My name is Bruce
|
||
|
Esquibel but most people in the modem world would know me better as Dr.
|
||
|
Ripco, the sysop of the Ripco Bulletin Board in Chicago.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ripco operated since the winter of 1983 and preformed what I believe to be
|
||
|
a good public service to the telecommunications world. Its label as a
|
||
|
'phreak and hacker' board was an incorrect statement which I lived with
|
||
|
most of the time. Some content of the system was in fact dealing with that
|
||
|
subject but I have always felt most of the information especially in the
|
||
|
form of general files was nothing more than second hand news, traveling
|
||
|
board to board. Neither the board or myself ever supported or was
|
||
|
associated with formed hacker groups like the LOD or TKOS. In the years
|
||
|
Ripco operated there were members from these groups at one time or another
|
||
|
but only to establish accounts and rarely touched base or communicated with
|
||
|
other users.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The system was quite popular with it peaking at 701 users and averaging
|
||
|
around 600 active at any one time. Daily it took in about 50 calls with
|
||
|
this figure waxing and waning with the social seasonal changes of school
|
||
|
schedules and holidays. The majority enjoyed the freedom of expression the
|
||
|
system provided, not to figure out how to make a free phone call. Most of
|
||
|
the activity was on the main message board which could be accessed by
|
||
|
anyone, even those without validated accounts. The rest of the message
|
||
|
bases Ripco had were more specialized in their subject matter but not too
|
||
|
much more than what is found on other boards. Ripco's greatest claim to
|
||
|
fame in my opinion was the general files. It seemed to attract new users
|
||
|
like flies to honey. I don't think the reason for this was quality but in
|
||
|
fact quantity. There was over 2500 of them, divided into 23 sections. Like
|
||
|
the message bases only a minority of the files could be put into the
|
||
|
hack/phreak class.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ripco operated with a bit of mystery to it. My personal involvement on the
|
||
|
board was next to nill. Unlike other operators who rule their boards like a
|
||
|
god, I decided long ago to let the people do what they wanted without
|
||
|
getting in the way and give them the freedom to stand on their own two
|
||
|
feet. This didn't mean the system was total anarchy, in fact many
|
||
|
complimented on how well the system was structured. This unusual concept
|
||
|
let some to believe the whole system was a setup and I was accused on
|
||
|
several occasions of being a FBI sting board or associated with some kind
|
||
|
of law enforcement. Adding to this was some argument over where the bbs
|
||
|
was actually located. A few adventurous individuals attempted to track it
|
||
|
down through the CNA bureau and ended up at a vacant storefront. The real
|
||
|
explanation is a long story but it comes down to multiple screw-ups by
|
||
|
Illinois Bell more than any deceptive practices on my part. This of course
|
||
|
doesn't happen in real life thus the only people that can get a phone
|
||
|
number for a fictitious address are 'feds'.
|
||
|
|
||
|
At least now I can put that rumor to rest. On May 8th I was awakened at my
|
||
|
home at 6:30a m by several Secret Service agents with a warrant for
|
||
|
computers and telecommunications equipment. They also had a second warrant
|
||
|
issued to the address where Ripco operated out of. Although there are
|
||
|
better ways to start the day, this did not come as a real surprise to me.
|
||
|
Since 1987 when Shadow Hawk made the papers with his $2.3 million software
|
||
|
theft charges it occured to me that as more and more people are caught, if
|
||
|
they even were remotly connected to Ripco, eventually something would turn
|
||
|
up on my end. This could be considered the reasoning of a mad man but I
|
||
|
have always felt that there was no illegal activity going on within the
|
||
|
system and could defend it no matter how petty it was taken apart. To put
|
||
|
it another way, Ripco's bark had a hell of a reputation but no bite.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This was probably and still is true depending how you look at it. The
|
||
|
warrants issued were only (!?!) seizure warrants issued to the addresses.
|
||
|
There were no names on them and I was not arrested or charged by the Secret
|
||
|
Service. This provided me some relief but since I didn't get to sleep till
|
||
|
4am that morning it was probably a lack of reasoning on my part.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There were at least 5 agents that came to the house, but I think they had a
|
||
|
few more around back in case of an escape attempt. Three of them stayed
|
||
|
while two others drove me to the other location. The only question they
|
||
|
asked before I left was it would be easier if I gave the location of any
|
||
|
computers I had there to which the reply was 'none.' This later proved true
|
||
|
since no items were taken, but they did spend about an hour looking through
|
||
|
everything.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I wish to point out that this was not a scene that would make good
|
||
|
television. They didn't break down any doors, no one I observed had a gun
|
||
|
drawn and overall they were pleasant in their mannerisms. This is not being
|
||
|
said in defense of them but I always have been curious about the stories
|
||
|
passed around where swat teams come down on a 16 year old for running a few
|
||
|
MCI numbers. One interesting side note to you electronic phreaks out there
|
||
|
is their radios, which probably use Motorolas digital voice protection
|
||
|
circuitry trip every car alarm in the neighborhood when keyed. Several of
|
||
|
the agents said this was normal and wished they didn't have this side
|
||
|
effect.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As I traveled with the agents to the other location I started to think what
|
||
|
they were about to see and if anything was there that needed a fast
|
||
|
explanation. The only thing that occured to me was three handguns I kept
|
||
|
for personal protection. I informed the driver of this fact and he radioed
|
||
|
ahead to let them know. He said matters like that isn't their concern but
|
||
|
added they have to check with local law enforcement to see if I was in
|
||
|
violation of city or state laws.
|
||
|
|
||
|
When we arrived there was a sizable crowd waiting. Besides 5 or 6 more SS
|
||
|
agents, there were a few others in suit and tie (the SS dresses casual) and
|
||
|
at least one Chicago police car with a couple officers. The agents that
|
||
|
escorted me there led me to a woman probably in her mid or late 20's. She
|
||
|
apparently was the one in charge and gave me instructions on how we were
|
||
|
going to enter the building. Before unlocking the front door she asked
|
||
|
several times if any boobytraps were set either for them or the computers.
|
||
|
I found this questioning amusing but was the only one smiling of the group.
|
||
|
Unlocking the front door led to questions about where the guns were located
|
||
|
and instructions on how to find them. I brought up the fact the alarm
|
||
|
system had to be turned off and after a few attempts she managed to
|
||
|
deactivate it. A different agent was sent in and recovered the weapons.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As we entered the main room I was told not to touch anything but to point
|
||
|
out the computer the board was run off of, which I did. The woman then
|
||
|
introduced herself as Barbara and informed me of what I already knew, they
|
||
|
were there to carry out a warrant and that it would probably take a while.
|
||
|
She handed me a piece of paper which was the actual warrant and as I looked
|
||
|
it over, a paragraph stated it was issued based on an attached affidavit,
|
||
|
specifically pages 26-39 by a special agent Lawson. Asking where the
|
||
|
attached affidavit was brought the reply "it was a closed document, I
|
||
|
didn't have any rights to see it" and added 'its an on-going
|
||
|
investigation'. I was then informed by her that I was not under arrest nor
|
||
|
charged but they had to read the Miranda rights to me since any questions I
|
||
|
answered could be used against me. Another agent said they did have
|
||
|
questions but I did not have to answer them, could answer them with a
|
||
|
lawyer present or even have a lawyer present and not answer them. He also
|
||
|
pointed out that I could stop answering the questions at any time so I
|
||
|
figured I'd agree to answer them since there wasn't all that much to hide
|
||
|
anyway.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Although an attempt was made to get comfortable within the building, the
|
||
|
main area is full of junk collected over the years and the limited seating
|
||
|
made things a bit crowded. We eventually ended up out back outside where
|
||
|
the questioning took place. From this point on Barbara made few other
|
||
|
comments and the bulk of the questions were handled by another young agent
|
||
|
named Tim.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The questions started with an apology by Tim saying there was someone who
|
||
|
requested specific questions to be asked for a case study or something
|
||
|
along those lines. He said they were fairly simple but was required to ask
|
||
|
them. These questions were general in nature and read off a xerox sheet,
|
||
|
mostly a list of phrases that were looking for definitions. What is a
|
||
|
phreaker, hacker, know what a virus is, have you ever written or
|
||
|
distributed one, etc.
|
||
|
|
||
|
After this opening round of Q & A, he announced we were going on to more
|
||
|
specific questions involving myself and the bulletin board. I don't really
|
||
|
remember most of the questions but the subject dealt with my awareness that
|
||
|
both credit card and long distance access codes were being passed through
|
||
|
the system and what was on the hidden boards that normally wasn't part of
|
||
|
standard access, and who had access to them. My answer to these led into
|
||
|
the system maintenance and how I handled it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As far as the question about the codes went, I replied no I was not aware
|
||
|
of that and he point out they had printouts proving they were. Of course it
|
||
|
crossed my mind that if they already had soild proof, why bother to ask the
|
||
|
questions. I wish to publicly state that this type of information was
|
||
|
posted from time to time but I did not lie to the question. Regular users
|
||
|
of the board were aware that long ago I made clear the system policy on
|
||
|
this matter. Long distance codes along with credit card information was not
|
||
|
allowed to exist on the system. I felt that any specific information left
|
||
|
that could lead to direct fraud was not welcome and would be removed and
|
||
|
persons who repeated violating this themselves would be removed from the
|
||
|
system also.
|
||
|
|
||
|
To clarify the phrase 'specific information' to the readers of this file I
|
||
|
wish to explain my position on how I considered board policy on messages.
|
||
|
It is no secret that many of the posts of board 5 (fone phun) either
|
||
|
solicited for the need of or said they had and would share such
|
||
|
information. I never considered this wrongful for a number of reasons. The
|
||
|
primary one would be most people on there were blowing smoke as far as
|
||
|
really knowing anything either fraudulent or important. Few people outside
|
||
|
the bbs community realize that in many areas both status and ego are
|
||
|
wrongfully important factors to others within the modem society. Many
|
||
|
people who wish to raise their status will often come up with outlandish
|
||
|
claims in an attempt to convince others he or she is an expert on one
|
||
|
matter or another.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any attempt to suppress this act I felt would of damaged Ripco's open door
|
||
|
policy since people do have to start somewhere and eventually learn their
|
||
|
peers will catch on fast if someone is pulling a bluff. Thus this type of
|
||
|
activity was tolerated but the line was crossed if anyone attempted to
|
||
|
really do it. For example if a message contained something like 'just dial
|
||
|
1-800-555-1212 and punch in 123456 at the tone', the entire message was
|
||
|
removed or in more cases re-edited especially if other parts were about
|
||
|
non-related matters.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Returning to the questioning, the above was explained as such but not as a
|
||
|
whole. If in fact they did have printouts of such activity, I suggested an
|
||
|
explanation which covered the maintenance aspect of the board. Basically
|
||
|
Ripco operated itself with my chores limited to validating new users and
|
||
|
updating the general files. Once every morning the messages left since my
|
||
|
last check-in were read. The removal/re-edit if needed was applied at this
|
||
|
time. Considering this occured daily around noon, a message posted let's
|
||
|
say at 3:00pm the preceding day was in existence for nearly 21 hours
|
||
|
before it got my approval or disapproval. Thus I pointed out that in theory
|
||
|
they could have a printout of something but if checked the following day,
|
||
|
it should have been removed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This was not second questioned by them and they seemed content with it. As
|
||
|
far as the hidden boards went, there were two as most of the system users
|
||
|
knew but were not really active. Board 9 to the best memory serves me was
|
||
|
completely non-existant. Although it was used in the past for various
|
||
|
things, after one of many hard drives crashes it bit the big one and was
|
||
|
not in service. The message file required to use it was not there and I
|
||
|
believe there was even a line in the program that reset the security bit of
|
||
|
people that did have access in the past so they couldn't accidently enter
|
||
|
causing a 'file not found' error. Board 10 was active but fewer than 6
|
||
|
people could claim to access it. Originally it was set up when an attempt
|
||
|
was made on my part to collect a few bucks to keep the system running back
|
||
|
in 1985. It contained few messages and would only gain 5 or 6 more a year.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Questioning from this point on was more broad in nature, jumping from
|
||
|
subject to subject. Items like the anarchy files which were made up in part
|
||
|
of bomb construction articles were deemed 'wrong' by them and I defended by
|
||
|
saying such information could be gathered from numerous public sources.
|
||
|
They still insisted it was 'wrong' and shouldn't have been made available.
|
||
|
|
||
|
One fact that arose well into our chat is that it became obvious that
|
||
|
besides Tim who seemed to know little besides a few buzzwords, none of
|
||
|
those here really had an understanding of computers or much else as far as
|
||
|
a technical background went. Another agent even admitted later that they
|
||
|
were only here to serve the warrant, as far as what was really going on
|
||
|
with the investigation and who or what was involved, they didn't know. Any
|
||
|
questions I attempted to ask them were generally not answered and the
|
||
|
ultimate question of 'why me?' was given the reply 'catch the evening news,
|
||
|
this is happening right now all over the country, should make some good
|
||
|
headlines.'
|
||
|
|
||
|
Even the simple question of what's next, where does the stuff end up needed
|
||
|
a short conference among them and they decided on the following: after its
|
||
|
boxed up downtown, it's shipped to Washington to a department called
|
||
|
'diagnostics'. Tim appeared to be the only one with knowledge of this
|
||
|
because one of the other agents asked him 'who runs that?'. Tim explained
|
||
|
to him that it was part of the SS and was started a couple years ago. The
|
||
|
other agent just shrugged his shoulders.
|
||
|
|
||
|
To put some people fears to rest, there wasn't much else going on. I
|
||
|
expected they were going to ask me about certain individuals or if I knew
|
||
|
anything else going on, but they didn't. Even subjects like PHRACK and the
|
||
|
LOD were only touched upon, no specific questions were asked or answered.
|
||
|
They seemed pleased to find a catalog printout of the general file section
|
||
|
with the PHRACK issues but considering anyone with a valid account had
|
||
|
access to the actual files, this didn't seem to make sense to me.
|
||
|
|
||
|
After a couple hours of this with many lulls in the questioning they asked
|
||
|
if I would sign a statement saying basically everything I said was true and
|
||
|
I did because it was. The only other thing they wanted in the statement was
|
||
|
that I was in fact the operator and did make an attempt to keep the board
|
||
|
clean on a daily basis. Makes me wonder now what that could be twisted into
|
||
|
later down the line.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In all they were here for about 6 hours. In that time I learned little on
|
||
|
what was going on. One of the agents said there were 2 representatives from
|
||
|
AT&T present but didn't know why, saying they just had instructions to pick
|
||
|
them up this morning before they came and got me. My gut feeling was the
|
||
|
code/credit card numbers that much of the conversation was based on.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Drawing to the end they informed me the warrant was completed, led me back
|
||
|
inside after taking a few snapshots of your truly and handed me a receipt
|
||
|
of what they took. Annoying in the first place them being there, the first
|
||
|
thing that caught my eye was both my personal Macintoshes were on the list
|
||
|
along with the related hardware including a 940 meg worm drive and laser
|
||
|
printer. Laser printer? Maybe if you could pick it up and throw it at
|
||
|
someone it could be considered a lethal weapon but what else? Ripco
|
||
|
operated on an Apple //e and had no connections to the macs besides being
|
||
|
near them which apparently is the way they determined what stayed and what
|
||
|
went.
|
||
|
|
||
|
My guess is that after examining the rats nest of wiring that existed around
|
||
|
the 3 computers, they figured anything plugged into the power strip must have
|
||
|
been tied in with each other somehow. An IBM 386 clone and an Apple //gs
|
||
|
sat on the floor only a couple feet away but were untouched. Other
|
||
|
items taken included a 1955 Western Electric model D500 phone, any personal
|
||
|
phone books including a copy of the Chicago White Pages and several
|
||
|
pictures and cartoons I had hanging on the wall. This also included a
|
||
|
picture of a hooker spread eagle from a bachelor party and a picture of
|
||
|
Charles Manson clipped from some tabloid because it bore a resemblance to
|
||
|
me. All disks if not in a sealed box (probably around 3000) were also
|
||
|
taken along with paperwork found in various areas. These items were only
|
||
|
listed as 'misc.' and not broken down on the receipt.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I was cut loose only momentarily since an officer from the Chicago Police
|
||
|
Department replaced the many people running in and out during the morning
|
||
|
hours. He asked if the guns turned over to him were registered with the
|
||
|
city, which they weren't because you can't, so I was charged with a
|
||
|
misdemeanor, failure to register a firearm. A slight explanation about
|
||
|
this: back when Jane Byrne was mayor, she wanted to outlaw handguns
|
||
|
altogether. Some suburbs of Chicago tried this and met with resistance from
|
||
|
the NRA and feared long court battles. So they offered an a grace period
|
||
|
to get people who already had them to register them, but at a cut off date,
|
||
|
handguns could no longer be registered. Thus anyone getting caught with a
|
||
|
handgun after this did not face an illegal weapons charge, only the failure
|
||
|
to register even though someone who registered prior is safe. It ends up
|
||
|
going to court, having the weapons destroyed and getting 6 months
|
||
|
supervision with no conviction on the books. This was the outcome of that
|
||
|
situation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
At least that story had an ending. As far as what is going between me
|
||
|
and the Secret Service, I don't really know or have a clue. At this writing
|
||
|
it has been nearly 3 months and I haven't heard a word from them. Everything
|
||
|
is just speculation on my part since it seems the matter is being kept
|
||
|
under wraps. Even the names of the others involved on that day were not
|
||
|
released. I don't know if those other people were system operators or
|
||
|
users. One agent said you'll probably hear from us in 6-8 months while
|
||
|
another was not so optimistic and said it would probably take years adding
|
||
|
later that it's a good chance I'll be in my 50's, married with children
|
||
|
before I knew what happened.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the time shortly after the seizure I talked to several lawyers to at
|
||
|
least get some opinions on what to do next. Without being charged it seems
|
||
|
very little can be done. My only options are 1) sit back and relax, wait
|
||
|
till they do something or 2) file a lawsuit to get the stuff back. All the
|
||
|
attorneys brought up the suit idea but only one suggested it wasn't really
|
||
|
a good way to go. Based on what they took as far as value goes, the
|
||
|
preliminary costs would be about half with it approaching double if it has
|
||
|
to go to court and heard in front of a jury. It appears the best outcome is
|
||
|
to get the stuff back, you can't claim damages or get your court fees back
|
||
|
when it comes to the federal government.
|
||
|
|
||
|
One point I want to make clear is under a seizure warrant, all material
|
||
|
taken is forfeited to the government. It doesn't seem like a situation
|
||
|
where they have to give it back after examination. They have according to
|
||
|
what little I could find on the subject, 5 years from the date of the
|
||
|
warrant to set up an indictment. Even if no indictment is made, they don't
|
||
|
necessarily have to return it. It can either be used for internal use or
|
||
|
put up at auction. There was an article in Unix Today where an agent seemed
|
||
|
to indicate the material is returned but I haven't found any support of
|
||
|
this policy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
My opinion on all of this is basic. The government came in, took my
|
||
|
personal property to determine if there was any wrong doing somewhere. It
|
||
|
seems like a case of being guilty and proving yourself innocent. Or in
|
||
|
another light, them thinking there was wrong doing and getting the stuff to
|
||
|
make sure. Either way its just not right. Although I have no desire to
|
||
|
battle this in court on my own, it seems to be there should have been a
|
||
|
charge for something, even if it was minor, with other stuff being added
|
||
|
later if needed. At least it would beat this nazi/gestapo tactic of
|
||
|
secrecy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Is Ripco's involvement with credit cards and access codes the real basis?
|
||
|
Does the distribution of PHRACK play a part in it? What if they were
|
||
|
investigating someone on the board and felt there was information that
|
||
|
would help them? Did they ever think of knocking on the door first? If it
|
||
|
was someone else they were after, should I be the one getting penalized?
|
||
|
Does the first amendment come into play at all? Even though I am free to
|
||
|
open another board at this time if I choose, why isn't a newspapers
|
||
|
printing press taken when a reporter refuses to name his sources about a
|
||
|
sensitive story?
|
||
|
|
||
|
I don't have the answer to any of these questions. Even if I did, they
|
||
|
might be the wrong questions in the first place. One opinion put forth by
|
||
|
several people is that putting the board out of business could be all they
|
||
|
wanted. Its possible if any one piece of information contained within
|
||
|
Ripco was used in assisting someone to commit a crime, it could be all they
|
||
|
needed. Maybe they looked at Ripco as a pain in the ass since the beginning
|
||
|
but couldn't get rid of it any other way.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In closing I'd like to point out that this is not a black and white issue
|
||
|
reguardless of anyone's opinion. There were many who hated the board,
|
||
|
thought it was trash and would of liked to see it removed for good. Well
|
||
|
they got their wish but consider the circumstances of what happened. No
|
||
|
reason given, none to offer. Think about that next time you sign on to your
|
||
|
favorite system and see a message about someone selling a used computer or
|
||
|
hard drive. If that item is by chance stolen merchandise, can the operator
|
||
|
lose his computer because it aided someone to fence?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Based on what happened to me up to this point, its only one step away. I am
|
||
|
not a hacker, phreaker, have anything to do with credit cards or
|
||
|
manufactured explosives. Until the weapons charge I never had been arrested
|
||
|
and even my driving record has been clean since 1978.
|
||
|
|
||
|
1984 arrived a bit late but there is no doubt to me its here. Thanks again
|
||
|
to everyone that supported the board and there is always the possibility
|
||
|
another Ripco will appear.
|
||
|
|
||
|
You just never know.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-------------------------------------end here----------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
A long and complicated story, or perhaps, a complete file on how the feds
|
||
|
worked on this case. I don't think I have anything to add to what Dr. Ripco
|
||
|
wrote. It is accurate, and well written. It also gives all the facts you
|
||
|
might want from the bust.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here's the next update on the Ripco Case from CuD;
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.2 Issue #00 aug 25, 1990>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------------start here---------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: August 24, 1990
|
||
|
From: Moderators
|
||
|
Subject: Moderators' Corner
|
||
|
|
||
|
LEN ROSE/DR. RIPCO UPDATES
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
Len Rose / Dr. Ripco Updates
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
Progress is often slow, and there is little to report about the Len Rose
|
||
|
and Dr. Ripco situations. Although the cases are unrelated, both raise
|
||
|
similar issues about law enforcement handling of alleged computer abuse.
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco still remains uncharged, his equipment remains unreturned. Len
|
||
|
Rose still faces trial in February. But, the EFF is currently looking into
|
||
|
both cases to see what legal issues they raise.
|
||
|
|
||
|
--------------------------------------end here---------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Not much to say, only state that it is sad to see that Dr. Ripco still
|
||
|
hadn't got his equipment back, and perhaps a light with EFF looking into the
|
||
|
case.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suddenly Dr. Ripco started Ripco ][, and CuD reported about the event;
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.2, Issue #02 Sept 9, 1990>
|
||
|
|
||
|
-------------------------------------start here--------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: September 8, 1990
|
||
|
From: Moderators
|
||
|
Subject: RIPCO BBS Back on-Line
|
||
|
|
||
|
Good news for computerists: **RIPCO BBS IS BACK UP**!! Ripco went down on
|
||
|
May 8 in the Sun Devil raids, and Dr. Ripco's equipment, software, logs,
|
||
|
and even manuals for his software, were seized. He was apparently the only
|
||
|
victim of a "seizure warrant," *not just a search warrant*, which is
|
||
|
usually served *after* an arrest or indictment. Perhaps a lawyer could send
|
||
|
us the distinction and clarify the significance. Dr. Ripco has not been
|
||
|
indicted, and to our knowledge there is no evidence that he knowingly
|
||
|
participated in any illegal act on his board. It is still unclear why his
|
||
|
board was targeted. Perhaps it was longevity (over six years), perhaps
|
||
|
because some of the users were nationally well known, or perhaps because of
|
||
|
the text file collection, which to our knowledge were all public
|
||
|
information.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Doc met with representatives from EFF in late August and early
|
||
|
September. The meetings were informational and centered on the type of
|
||
|
files users posted, the nature of the messages, and other general
|
||
|
information to determine whether there are sufficient Constitutional issues
|
||
|
to warrant further steps.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ripco's number is the same--(312)528-2020, and he is hoping that previous
|
||
|
users can upload the numerous g-philes lost in the confiscation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-------------------------------------end here----------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ripco ][ is a fact. It can not, today, be compared with the old Ripco,
|
||
|
but it is growing strong, and the "busy" messages from my modem is more
|
||
|
frequent every day. The discussions also grows, but I believe, never to the
|
||
|
standard which the old board had. Today there are more BBSs in the world
|
||
|
than there are people calling them. Most of them are the standard board,
|
||
|
which means you can call your local board to get the same messages, files
|
||
|
or whatever you're after, as on a board in another country, but Ripco ][
|
||
|
is not one of them.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I am calling from Sweden (yes, legally) to a few boards around the
|
||
|
world, boards that are different than the average, boards that stand out
|
||
|
in the crowd. I wouldn't waste time or money on calling boards in other
|
||
|
countries that I can find within a few miles from here. Ripco ][ is special,
|
||
|
it has the "feeling" and you can't forget that This board and it's SysOp
|
||
|
have been through a great deal. The feeling I notice the most about Ripco ][
|
||
|
on other boards, is that it is (still the same rumors) crowded with Feds,
|
||
|
the line is traced, Dr. Ripco is not just a SysOp, there are informants
|
||
|
on it, and so on. People can not forget that it was "busted" once. The FBI
|
||
|
have, with what they did, ruined the reputation of the board, and it's SysOp
|
||
|
and they still haven't returned his equipment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The confiscation of the equipment and that the board was taken down
|
||
|
was a great loss to the CU, maybe a greater loss than people imagine. The
|
||
|
CU also lost a steady ground to stand upon, and with it, a lot of the ethics
|
||
|
that went with it. What people don't realize, is that the Serious CU people
|
||
|
have ethics, they have rules, and they don't break them, no matter what. The
|
||
|
CU had very strong ethics from the beginning, they didn't crash systems, they
|
||
|
didn't steal information and they didn't spread viruses and trojan horses.
|
||
|
Today, as stated above, there are but a few serious and true ones left, that
|
||
|
still regard these ethics to be true and follow them, and they have to keep
|
||
|
a low profile because of the rest, the ones without ethics or rules, those
|
||
|
who crash, steal and destroy. I'm not blaming the whole "fall" of the serious
|
||
|
CU on the confiscation of Ripco, but it did contribute to it. If the CU had
|
||
|
had the reputation it had a couple of years ago today, there would be less
|
||
|
people without rules or ethics.
|
||
|
|
||
|
During the time Ripco was gone from the BBS world, numerous of other
|
||
|
"claimed to be" CU boards popped up, and with them, those without ethics
|
||
|
or the knowledge, maybe experience, about the CU. People that had begun
|
||
|
to learn on boards like Ripco had to find new boards to call when the old
|
||
|
had been busted, taken away, or confiscated. They mixed with those without
|
||
|
any experience at all, and I believe, we all know the result of this today.
|
||
|
Hackers have a very bad reputation. Hackers steal, hackers crash and hackers
|
||
|
spread viruses they say. Those who had the knowledge and experience went
|
||
|
back into their "known" circles, and left the unexperienced unexperienced.
|
||
|
Operation SunDevil took away its basic foundations and schools.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It was boards like Ripco that kept the CU keeping its rules, ethics,
|
||
|
and taught its users to follow them and how the CU worked. Here's an easy
|
||
|
question for you: What happens to society if you take away its schools?
|
||
|
Anarchy is the answer, people without education.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Lets take a look at what other people have said about Ripco and its Sysop.
|
||
|
Here's an example;
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.2, Issue #18 Dec 28, 1990>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------start here------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
From file - Trade Secrets: When are they bad? by The Dark Adept
|
||
|
|
||
|
<ed>
|
||
|
|
||
|
I would also like to thank Dr. Ripco since it was his BBS that first
|
||
|
connected me to Underground when I was a mere pup of 15, 6 years ago.
|
||
|
I have yet to see a BBS that compares in quality in all my years down here.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<ed>
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------------------------end here------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
I would have included more excerpts if I had been clever enough to capture
|
||
|
them when reading them, but I think this one is a good example, and I think it
|
||
|
speaks for itself. Ripco was one of the best (if not The best) underground
|
||
|
board, not just for its files, discussions or its SysOp, but for its
|
||
|
atmosphere. It was really a special board to its users.
|
||
|
|
||
|
But what or who brought all of this upon Dr. Ripco and the BBS? The answer
|
||
|
came as a surprise to many (if not all) of us; an informant. From what I know,
|
||
|
this is the only known case where an informant have been used by the FBI in a
|
||
|
hacker/CU operation. The informant, 'The Dictator' was a sysop of an 'claimed-
|
||
|
to-be' underground BBS called 'The Dark Side' in Phoenix, Arizona. The BBS was
|
||
|
a FBI Sting board, but The Dictator also called other underground boards,
|
||
|
captured messages and gave to the FBI.
|
||
|
|
||
|
CuD devoted a complete issue about the informant, showing captured
|
||
|
messages from The Dictator, how he tried to frame his users by asking
|
||
|
questions about illegal things. It is very interesting, so here's the
|
||
|
complete CuD issue;
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.3, Issue #02 Jan 16, 1991>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------------start here---------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
In Liam O'Flaherty's 1925 novel "The Informer," Gypo Nolan betrays a friend
|
||
|
to the police for 20 pounds. Few of the characters are particularly noble
|
||
|
or sympathetic, but O'Flaherty manages to show the complexity of human
|
||
|
frailty, moral quandry, brutality and compassion, as Gypo ultimately dies a
|
||
|
pathetic death seeking redemption for his betrayal.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Only with sadness do we present this first of several special issues on
|
||
|
federally created and rewarded betrayal, deceit, and informants in the CU.
|
||
|
We draw here from several public documents, including the seizure warrant
|
||
|
served on RIPCO BBS. We also use phone logs that we and others have
|
||
|
collected, copies of telephone bills and logs that corroborate certain
|
||
|
numbers, eye witness accounts, interviews, and other information that
|
||
|
establishes beyond doubt that the U.S. Secret Service, in cooperation with
|
||
|
the Arizona State's Attorney's Office, used a PAID INFORMANT to establish a
|
||
|
sting board and to capture message logs from a variety of BBSs and turn
|
||
|
them over to state and federal agents.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The primary hard evidence for establishing both the existence and the
|
||
|
identity of the informant was obtained by Glen Roberts, the publisher of
|
||
|
FULL DISCLOSURE, an interesting hard-copy magazine, and Bill Vajk, a
|
||
|
freelance writer and researcher who is active on the nets.
|
||
|
The full text should be on the CuD archive/ftp sites in a few
|
||
|
weeks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As those who have been following the Dr. RIPCO saga recall, the warrant
|
||
|
authorizing the search and seizure of his equipment was sealed, and the
|
||
|
best efforts of attorneys and others failed to obtain a copy by requesting
|
||
|
it through official channels. Delays, denials, confusion, and apparent
|
||
|
misinformation seemed to stymie all formal requests. So, Bill and Glen took
|
||
|
the case number (90-M-187), trucked on down to the federal court on S.
|
||
|
Dearborn in Chicago, and went to work. They requested several case files
|
||
|
adjacent to the desired one (90-M-186, 90-M-188, etc) on the assumption
|
||
|
that the precise one they sought was likely to be among them. It was. So,
|
||
|
they plunked their coins into the zerox machine, duplicated the documents,
|
||
|
and shared them with the world.
|
||
|
|
||
|
For those who have not yet seen it, FULL DISCLOSURE is a newspaper that
|
||
|
covers topics that are not regularly covered in detail in the general
|
||
|
media. A significant focus is on privacy, electronic surveillance, and
|
||
|
related topics. Articles include coverage of the National Technical
|
||
|
Investigators Association annual conference, the latest in video
|
||
|
surveillance equipment, the JBR tape recorder and much more.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A sample issue is available free, or subscriptions are $18 for 12 issues.
|
||
|
FULL DISCLOSURE, Box 903-C, Libertyville, Illinois 60048.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In coming issues, FULL DISCLOSURE will include stories on the government's
|
||
|
paranoia in the RIPCO case, as reflect in the seizure warrant (available
|
||
|
ftp in about 7-10 days). CuD will focus primarily on the ethical,
|
||
|
ideological, and other implications of creating a paid informant class for
|
||
|
crimes that, while unacceptable, are arguably far "cleaner" than officially
|
||
|
purchased deception.
|
||
|
|
||
|
***************************************************************
|
||
|
** TRACING THE STINGBOARD: THE DICTATOR AND THE DARK SIDE **
|
||
|
************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
In piecing the public information available on the Secret Service documents
|
||
|
together with other sources, the Secret Service STING BBS, if the number
|
||
|
they provide is correct, accessed THE DARK SIDE in Phoenix, Arizona. A
|
||
|
self-proclaimed "hacker" known as THE DICTATOR identified himself publicly
|
||
|
as the sysop of the Dark Side. The Dictator introduced himself to others as
|
||
|
%name deleted% or as "%deleted%," and responded to "%deleted%" in various
|
||
|
forms of Electronic mail. The search affidavit signed by Special Agent G.
|
||
|
Kirt Lawson of the Secret Service (header indicating Maricopa County)
|
||
|
acknowledges several facts:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. The U.S. Secret Service, in response to complaints of telephone
|
||
|
fraud, initiated an investigation into access abuses. The investigation
|
||
|
described in this document specified the rationale for searching/seizing
|
||
|
RIPCO BBS. The raid occured on May 8, 1990 in concert with other raids
|
||
|
across the country. The Secret Service announced to the media through
|
||
|
press conferences and releases that it was OPERATION SUN DEVIL.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. The Secret Service, working out of Phoenix, established an undercover
|
||
|
BBS in Sept., 1988. The sysop was a "VOLUNTEER PAID CONFIDENTIAL
|
||
|
INFORMANT."
|
||
|
|
||
|
3. The informant was providing information *BOTH* to the Secret Service and
|
||
|
the Arizona Attorney General's office at least in 1989 and 1990, and the
|
||
|
Secret Service participated in STATE searchs.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4. The code number and address of the informant is provided, and he is
|
||
|
linked directly to the number of the BBS identified in the document as the
|
||
|
undercover sting board.
|
||
|
|
||
|
5. The Informant provided information taken from logs, conversations, and
|
||
|
other sources to the Secret Service.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The following sections of the affidavit detail this more fully: The CuD
|
||
|
crew did not type in this version of the documents, and there may be
|
||
|
typographical or other minor errors. We reproduce it here as we received
|
||
|
it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++BEGIN SECTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
BACKGROUND OF THE INVESTIGATION
|
||
|
|
||
|
14. Over the past several years, the U.S. Secret Service has received
|
||
|
and increasing number of complaints from long distance carriers, credit
|
||
|
card companies, credit reporting bureaus, and other victims of crimes
|
||
|
committed by computer hackers, phone phreaks, and computer bulletin board
|
||
|
users and operators (see Definitions section), which have resulted in
|
||
|
substantial financial losses and business disruption to the victims.
|
||
|
Because the persons committing these crimes use aliases or "handles", mail
|
||
|
drops under false names, and other means to disguise themselves, they have
|
||
|
been extremely difficult to catch. They also conspire with many others to
|
||
|
exchange information such as stolen long distance carrier authorization
|
||
|
codes, credit card numbers, and technical information relating to the
|
||
|
unauthorized invasion of computer systems and voice mail messaging
|
||
|
computers, often across state or national borders, making the
|
||
|
investigation of a typical conspiracy extremely complex. Many of these
|
||
|
persons are juveniles or young adults, associate electronically only with
|
||
|
others they trust or who have "proven" themselves by committing crimes in
|
||
|
order to gain the trust of the group, and use characteristic "hacker
|
||
|
jargon." By storing and trading information through a network of BBS's,
|
||
|
the hackers increase the number of individuals attacking or defrauding a
|
||
|
particular victim, and therefore increase the financial loss suffered by
|
||
|
the victim.
|
||
|
|
||
|
15. For all of the above reasons, the U.S. Secret Service established
|
||
|
a computer crime investigation project in the Phoenix field office,
|
||
|
utilizing an undercover computer bulletin board. The purpose of the
|
||
|
undercover BBS was to provide a medium of communication for persons
|
||
|
engaged in criminal offenses to exchange information with each other and
|
||
|
with the sysop (CI 404-235) about their criminal activities. The bulletin
|
||
|
board began operating on September 1, 1988 at 11:11 p.p., Mountain
|
||
|
Standard Time, was located at 11459 No. 28th Drive, Apt. 2131, Phoenix,
|
||
|
Arizona, and was accessed through telephone number (602) 789-9269. It was
|
||
|
originally installed on a Commodore personal computer, but on January 13,
|
||
|
1989 was reconfigured to operate on an Amiga 2000 personal computer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
16. The system was operated by CI 404-235, a volunteer paid
|
||
|
confidential informant to the U.S. Secret Service. CI 404-235 was facing
|
||
|
no criminal charges. Over the past eighteen months, information by CI
|
||
|
404-235 (see paragraph 16) has consistently proved to be accurate and
|
||
|
reliable. The Arizona Attorney General's office executed six search
|
||
|
warrants related to affiant's investigation in 1989 and 1990 (affiant
|
||
|
participated in three of these). Evidence obtained in those searches
|
||
|
corroborated information previously given to affiant or to George Mehnert,
|
||
|
Special Agent of the Arizona Attorney General's office by CI 404-235. In
|
||
|
over a dozen instances, CI 404-235's information was verified through
|
||
|
other independent sources, or in interviews with suspects, or by means of
|
||
|
a dialed number recorder (pen register). One arrest in New York has been
|
||
|
made as a result of CI 404-235's warning of planned burglary which did
|
||
|
occur at a NYNEX (New York regional Bell operating company) office.
|
||
|
Throughout this investigation, CI 404-235 has documented the information
|
||
|
provided to the affiant by means of computer printouts obtained from the
|
||
|
undercover BBS and from suspect systems, and consensual tape recordings of
|
||
|
voice conversations or voice-mail messages.
|
||
|
|
||
|
17. Because many of the criminal bulletin board systems require that
|
||
|
a new person seeking access to the telephone code or credit card sections
|
||
|
contribute stolen card information to demonstrate "good faith," when asked
|
||
|
to do so, CI 404-235 has "posted," (left on the system in a message)
|
||
|
Sprint, MidAmerican or ComSystems authorization codes given to affiant by
|
||
|
investigators at these companies for that purpose.
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++END SECTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT+++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
Drawing from the above information, the following suggests that The Dark
|
||
|
Side, The Dictator, and a person identifying as %name deleted% are the sting
|
||
|
board, the sysop, and the informant, respectively.
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. We have obtained telephone billings and computer telephone logs for
|
||
|
December, 1988 and through mid-1989 indicating that when one called (602)
|
||
|
789-9269, The Dark Side BBS was accessed. This suggests that the sting number
|
||
|
and The Dark Side were one and the same.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2. A person identifying himself as "The Dictator" called a number
|
||
|
of boards in 1988-1990 (among them The Central Office, The
|
||
|
Phoenix Project, Hackers' Den, Ripco, and others) and through 1990
|
||
|
continued to call such boards as Atlantis, Ripco, Face-to-Face,
|
||
|
BlitzKrieg, and others. In public and private messages on these
|
||
|
boards, The Dictator would typically include in his signature
|
||
|
both his name and his association with The Dark Side BBS:
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++ BEGIN EXAMPLE HERE +++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
From ->THE DICTATOR (#156)
|
||
|
Date ->01/12/90 11:08:00 PM
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hey %name deleted%...whats up?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ask KL to give me a call and let me in on the details, (602-225-8581), or he
|
||
|
can leave me mail on Jolnet. I'd rather him call me, instead of having that
|
||
|
message pass through the Jolnet system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any ways... Ifits in Louie again this year, Im sure I can make it...let him
|
||
|
know..thanks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Dictator
|
||
|
The Dark Side BBS
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++End Example ++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
The reference to "Louie" is to summercon.
|
||
|
The telephone number listed above was left on a public BBS (in a different
|
||
|
message) in the general message section by The Dictator in a public request
|
||
|
for another user to call him. It is also the number that others have given
|
||
|
us independently as one he gave them for voice contact. Hence, the number
|
||
|
appears directly and unequivocally linked to The Dictator. Attempts to
|
||
|
contact him through that number, however, reach a machine, and the person
|
||
|
who responds to that machine has, for several months, refused to return
|
||
|
calls collect or otherwise.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Even after allegations of his apparent role in the video tapes of Summercon
|
||
|
'88 surfaced, the dictator made no effort to hide his connection to The
|
||
|
Dark Side. He left the following in response to several callers bickering
|
||
|
among themselves over a Chicago BBS also known as "The Dark Side." He makes
|
||
|
it clear the two are separate entities:
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++ BEGIN EXAMPLE HERE +++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
%logged circa Sept 25, 1990%
|
||
|
|
||
|
From: THE DICTATOR Read: 27 times [1 Reply]
|
||
|
|
||
|
Subject: The Dark Side
|
||
|
|
||
|
What area code is "The Dark Side BBS" that you two are refering to? That
|
||
|
isnt the old "Dark Side Of The Moon" BBS is it? Just curious. I used to
|
||
|
run The Dark Side in 602, and its just a bit odd seeing the name pop up
|
||
|
with someone else as the SYSOP.. heheh
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Dictator
|
||
|
/s
|
||
|
shit
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++End Example ++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Dictator of The Dark Side and the above messages as also linked to the
|
||
|
Secret Service informant by the nature of the logs he provided to them. We
|
||
|
will continue to provide details of the substance of the documents in
|
||
|
coming issues. However, messages printed in the Secret Service document
|
||
|
allude to private e-mail sent to "CI 404-235," and these can be traced to
|
||
|
The Dictator as the recipient by examining existing e-mail logs retained or
|
||
|
acquired by others.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Craig Neidorf trial led to the revelation that the Secret Service had
|
||
|
video-taped parts of Summercon '88 in St. Louis surrepticiously. One
|
||
|
participant at Summercon who also viewed the tapes indicated that the tape
|
||
|
captured the events in The Dictator's room from an adjoining room. If
|
||
|
true, it indicated that advance cooperation and preparation were necessary
|
||
|
between the participant-informant and the tapers.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Why is it necessary to reveal the identity of the informant? We value
|
||
|
privacy and we have no wish to embarrass those who may be coerced into
|
||
|
performing unnatural acts for the government. However, if the Secret
|
||
|
Service are correct, their informant was a willing volunteer who was paid
|
||
|
for his services. Those who find betraying alike the innocent and guilty
|
||
|
indiscriminantly for monetary gain are as ethically bankrupt as those who
|
||
|
buy the service. Our abridged dictionary doesn't contain the term for those
|
||
|
who get paid for performing unnatural acts, but it will come to us
|
||
|
eventually.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The informant was on a number of boards, and because he reported *FOR
|
||
|
MONETARY GAIN*, we cannot be sure how many innocent people had their logs
|
||
|
passed on, how these logs may have been edited or interpreted by law
|
||
|
enforcement, or what uses were made of the information once acquired. The
|
||
|
strangely creative interpretations and cavalier disregard of "reality" by
|
||
|
federal prosecutors and some Secret Service agents are too troublesome to
|
||
|
allow presumption of good-faith use. We STRONGLY URGE all persons who have
|
||
|
been or currently are on a board with The Dictator to search their logs and
|
||
|
consider filing a Freedom of Information Act request (see concluding file).
|
||
|
|
||
|
********************************************************************
|
||
|
** THE DARK SIDE BBS: A SNAPSHOT **
|
||
|
********************************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
For those who wonder what kind of board The Dark Side was, it appears from
|
||
|
reports and logs and other sources that it was not well maintained, had 8
|
||
|
message bases with few messages, and the discussion was fairly general:
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
From: <deleted>
|
||
|
Subject: The Dark Side BBS Log-In Screen
|
||
|
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 91 14:19:25 EST
|
||
|
|
||
|
Is this helpful? It was captured in March of '89. I think there were 8
|
||
|
message sections, but the only ones of any interest were 1 (general), 2
|
||
|
(security) and 3 (Da Elites). There were a couple of funny things about the
|
||
|
board. It seemed to be up and down a lot, and the sysop never seemed to
|
||
|
know how to run it. He was always having problems with the simplest things.
|
||
|
He was defensive and always seemed worried about narcs. He didn't have many
|
||
|
elite users and the ones listed didn't contribute. There weren't many new
|
||
|
messages whenever I checked, and from the logs I'm sending, I only counted
|
||
|
less than 10 posters over a two week period. Really lame. Guess the rest of
|
||
|
us just logged on and logged off. There was a rumor he was busted in
|
||
|
Arizona and turned informant and that he was living next to the
|
||
|
secret service in summercon '88. Oh. I didn't edit anything out, so please
|
||
|
take out the names if you use this. To make it official, I got this off The
|
||
|
Dark Side BBS at telephone number 602-789-9269 in March of 1989.
|
||
|
I swear it's all true and virgin and blah blah blah.
|
||
|
|
||
|
----begin Dark Side capture---
|
||
|
|
||
|
** 300/1200/2400 Baud **
|
||
|
|
||
|
You are now connected to
|
||
|
The Dark Side BBS
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Information Capital Of
|
||
|
The World!
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
SYSOP - The Dictator
|
||
|
|
||
|
Disclaimer :
|
||
|
Any unauthorized access attempts may constitute a
|
||
|
violation of 1986 federal computer crime laws,
|
||
|
punishable by both civil and criminal remedies.
|
||
|
The information made available on this BBS is
|
||
|
for informational and educational uses only. I
|
||
|
am not responsible for any misuse or criminal acts
|
||
|
from this information. It is the responsibility
|
||
|
solely by the user and we assume no liability for
|
||
|
any actions of the user.
|
||
|
With use of system password you hereby agree to
|
||
|
the terms of this contract and shall be held liable
|
||
|
for any misuse of said contained information and may
|
||
|
expose you to both civil and criminal penalties under
|
||
|
law.
|
||
|
Any unauthorized or misuse of valid logon and
|
||
|
passwords constitute both civil and criminal violations,
|
||
|
punishable under law.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Your name: xxxxxx
|
||
|
Password: #####
|
||
|
|
||
|
You are caller #xxx
|
||
|
Logged at xx:xx xx on xx-Mar-89
|
||
|
|
||
|
Last call : xx-xx-89
|
||
|
Access : xxxxxxxxxxxxx
|
||
|
Privilege : 10
|
||
|
Time limit: 60
|
||
|
D/U ratio : Disabled
|
||
|
High msg : xxx
|
||
|
Calls : xx
|
||
|
Messages : xx
|
||
|
Downloads : x
|
||
|
Uploads : xx
|
||
|
|
||
|
Checking for messages...
|
||
|
|
||
|
(identifying msgs deleted)
|
||
|
|
||
|
These message(s) have been
|
||
|
marked for your retrieval
|
||
|
|
||
|
System contains xxx msgs (1-2xx)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Remember:
|
||
|
That the SYSOP, (Thats me), has the right to review everything on
|
||
|
this system! I like the idea of covering my butt in all cases...
|
||
|
If you dont agree with the idea of my reviewing everything then
|
||
|
you should hang up now. If you do agree with this, then at the
|
||
|
next prompt, type 'Y'.
|
||
|
N:No; Hang up
|
||
|
Y:I agree with the terms
|
||
|
|
||
|
Do You Agree With The Terms Of The Disclaimer? <Y/N> y
|
||
|
|
||
|
13-Mar-89 02:01 AM
|
||
|
Subj: PAY ATTENTION!
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: All
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ok guys and gals...listen up..
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ive been informed that there is a strong possiblility that The Sorcer (sp) who
|
||
|
runs the code line is a narc. This has not been confirmed, but it has not
|
||
|
been denied. Please beaware of it and be careful.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There have been a few busts recently, so be aware of your surroundings and be
|
||
|
careful of everything your doing..ok, guys? Perhaps you will respect my
|
||
|
security measures here on the system. Id like to think that we can all trust
|
||
|
each other here..if you have any questions, suggestions, comments, ect...let
|
||
|
me know.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thanks guys. Take care. Let me know what you know so we can stay one step
|
||
|
ahead of the competition. (grin)
|
||
|
(REply Quit ?):
|
||
|
|
||
|
---End of intro to DARK SIDE BBS---
|
||
|
|
||
|
%moderators' comment: We agree there is a style to the sysop's
|
||
|
participation that seems probing. It is always possible that his
|
||
|
supervisors provided him with questions or other strategies to begin
|
||
|
various types of discussions or to lead topics in a particular direction.
|
||
|
As we obtain more logs, we will look for patterns.
|
||
|
|
||
|
******************************************************************
|
||
|
** A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE SECRET SERVICE "STING BOARD" CLAIMS **
|
||
|
******************************************************************
|
||
|
In CuD 1.18 (file 5), we reprinted the response from the Secret Service,
|
||
|
signed by John R. Simpson, Director, to Rep. Don Edwards (Chair of the
|
||
|
House Subcommitee on Civil and Constitutional Rights), dated April 30,
|
||
|
1990. Mr. Edwards submitted a list of questions to the SS asking about
|
||
|
surveillance of BBSs. Parts of it seem especially relevant to the issue of
|
||
|
informants.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
|
||
|
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
|
||
|
WASHINGTON, DC 20223
|
||
|
APR 30 1990
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Honorable Don Edwards
|
||
|
Chairman
|
||
|
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
|
||
|
Committee on the Judiciary
|
||
|
House of Representatives
|
||
|
Washington, D.C. 20515
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dear Mr. Chairman:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thank you for your letter of April 3, 1990, concerning your
|
||
|
committee's interest in computer fraud. We welcome the
|
||
|
opportunity to discuss this issue with your committee and I
|
||
|
hope the following responses adequately answer your
|
||
|
questions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
%First question and response omitted--see CuD 1.18 File #5%
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question 2:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Has the Secret Service ever monitored any computer bulletin
|
||
|
boards or networks? Please describe the procedures for
|
||
|
initiating such monitoring, and list those computer bulletin
|
||
|
boards or networks monitored by the Secret Service since
|
||
|
January 1988.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Response:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Yes, we have occasionally monitored computer bulletin boards.
|
||
|
The monitoring occurred after we received complaints
|
||
|
concerning criminal activity on a particular computer bulletin
|
||
|
board. The computer bulletin boards were monitored as part of
|
||
|
an official investigation and in accordance with the directives
|
||
|
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (Title
|
||
|
18 USC 2510)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The procedures used to monitor computer bulletin boards
|
||
|
during an official investigation have involved either the use of
|
||
|
an informant (under the direct supervision of the investigating
|
||
|
agent) or an agent operating in an undercover capacity. In
|
||
|
either case, the informant or agent had received authorization
|
||
|
from the computer bulletin board's owner/operator to access
|
||
|
the system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
We do not keep records of the bulletin boards which we have
|
||
|
monitored but can provide information concerning a particular
|
||
|
board if we are given the name of the board.
|
||
|
|
||
|
%Question 3 omitted%
|
||
|
Question 4:
|
||
|
|
||
|
Has the Secret Service or someone acting under its direction
|
||
|
ever created a computer bulletin board or network that was
|
||
|
offered to the public? Please describe any such bulletin board
|
||
|
or networks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Response:
|
||
|
|
||
|
No, the U. S. Secret Service has not created a computer bulletin
|
||
|
board nor a network which was offered to members of the
|
||
|
public. We have created an undercover bulletin board which
|
||
|
was offered to a select number of individuals who had
|
||
|
demonstrated an interest in conducting criminal activities.
|
||
|
This was done with the guidance of the U.S. Attorney's office
|
||
|
and was consistent with the Electronic Communications
|
||
|
Privacy Act.
|
||
|
|
||
|
%Question 5 omitted%
|
||
|
|
||
|
(end Secret Service Response)
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
The SS response refers to only a single sting/undercover board, and because
|
||
|
the identify of the Dark Side was revealed as a sting board by the SS, we
|
||
|
conclude that the board referred to below and The Dark Side are the same.
|
||
|
We also suggest that this response is less than forthcoming, perhaps even
|
||
|
deceptive, for at least two reasons:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1. Prosecutors can nitpick over legal nuances of the meaning of the
|
||
|
following:
|
||
|
|
||
|
"The procedures used to monitor computer bulletin boards during
|
||
|
an official investigation have involved either the use of an
|
||
|
informant (under the direct supervision of the investigating
|
||
|
agent) or an agent operating in an undercover capacity. In
|
||
|
either case, the informant or agent had received authorization
|
||
|
from the computer bulletin board's owner/operator to access the
|
||
|
system."
|
||
|
|
||
|
To mere layfolk unlettered in law, the language implies that the sysop of a
|
||
|
surveilled system allowed access with knowledge that the surveillor was an
|
||
|
agent or informant. If a sysop does not know that he/she has given access
|
||
|
to a potential agitator or provocateur, then the spirit of the law seems
|
||
|
compromised. According to Dr Ripco, some users in the past did identify
|
||
|
themselves as affiliated with law enforcement. The Dictator was not one of
|
||
|
these.
|
||
|
|
||
|
A second claim in the SS response is less ambiguous. The Director writes:
|
||
|
|
||
|
"No, the U. S. Secret Service has not created a computer bulletin
|
||
|
board nor a network which was offered to members of the public.
|
||
|
We have created an undercover bulletin board which was offered
|
||
|
to a select number of individuals who had demonstrated an
|
||
|
interest in conducting criminal activities. This was done with
|
||
|
the guidance of the U.S. Attorney's office and was consistent
|
||
|
with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Now, we could quibble about what constitutes the "general public." But this
|
||
|
statement by The Director of the Secret Service does not correspond to
|
||
|
several facts. First, and most offensive, is the claim that The Dark Side
|
||
|
"AS OFFERED TO A SELECT GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD DEMONSTRATED AN
|
||
|
INTEREST IN CONDUCTING CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES." This is simply not true! The
|
||
|
Dark Side was explicitly advertised on other quasi-public boards, including
|
||
|
The Central Office, and was found in the BBS lists of other boards. In
|
||
|
PHRACK #20 (file 12), there is a two line advertisement reading: "The
|
||
|
Dictator is looking for users to call his bulletin board," and it provides
|
||
|
the number as (602) 789-9269. The Dictator also left the following message
|
||
|
on The Phoenix Project (which, despite it's reputation was open and readily
|
||
|
accessible):
|
||
|
|
||
|
--Begin Phoenix Project Message---
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
>13/100: the dark side
|
||
|
>Name: The Dictator #115
|
||
|
>Date: 10:42 pm Fri Nov 04, 1988
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
>attention:
|
||
|
> the dark side bbs is up and running...any user that wishes to become
|
||
|
>a part of history...please call..this is yet another hard working system
|
||
|
>that wishes to make its mark in computer history.
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
> give us a call..
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
> the dictator
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
>dark side bbs 602-789-9864
|
||
|
>
|
||
|
>summer con '88 members given imddiate access
|
||
|
|
||
|
The number given is different from the one later identified in SS
|
||
|
documents as the sting board number. Perhaps it was typo, or perhaps
|
||
|
it was and it was presumably changed shortly after this message was
|
||
|
left. An anonymous sysop of a board in the Midwest told CuD that the
|
||
|
Dictator personally left the number of The Dark Side on the BBS, and
|
||
|
recalls at least one public message in which The Dictator left a
|
||
|
public message requesting people call it. This BBS in question was a
|
||
|
quasi-open board in that--as most boards, including public ones--after
|
||
|
a preliminary log-in, virtually everybody who seemed "non-loony" was
|
||
|
validated. The point is that The Dictator was ACTIVELY SOLICITING
|
||
|
CALLERS OPENLY, and not simply inviting a "select few" to call the
|
||
|
board who "demonstrated an interest in conducting criminal
|
||
|
activities." One user who documents participation on The Dark Side
|
||
|
from shortly after it's inception states that The Dictator encouraged
|
||
|
him to tell his friends to call The Dark Side and, at one time shortly
|
||
|
after it "went up after being down" actually "seemed desperate for new
|
||
|
users."
|
||
|
|
||
|
According to information from several DARK SIDE users and logs they have
|
||
|
provided from The Dictator on his own system and on others, The Dictator
|
||
|
took an active role in generating message topics. According to one source,
|
||
|
The Dictator would rarely provide information, but would attempt to generate
|
||
|
seemingly innocent topics that might, in retrospect, provide the kind of
|
||
|
"documentary evidence" (especially if take out of context) that could lead
|
||
|
to suspicion or to searches. The following were provided as examples of
|
||
|
"typical" ways that a discussion topic might be generated. We observed
|
||
|
from the responses to these notes (that we deleted), that the innocent
|
||
|
question would elicit a technical or potentially incriminating answer of
|
||
|
the type used prejudicially in the sentencing memorandum of the Atlanta
|
||
|
Three, or of the type used to justify the raid on Steve Jackson Games. The
|
||
|
lesson we take from the following is that the Secret Service, through the
|
||
|
use of an informant, seems to have *ELICITED* statements that could be used
|
||
|
as evidence.
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++ BEGIN SELECTED SYSOP QUOTES FROM 1989 +++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #192 Sec: 7 - Security
|
||
|
24-Feb-89 10:13 PM
|
||
|
Subj: ATTENTION
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: All
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ok guys...heres the scoop...
|
||
|
|
||
|
Since the incarsaration of one AZ KID, The Dark Side BBS has engaged PARANIOA
|
||
|
MODE..
|
||
|
|
||
|
If you didnt read in the previous post, the AZ KID was served with a search
|
||
|
warrent a few days ago for some local and otherwise federal phreaking.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This board will remain in paranioa mode until the developments of the AZ KID
|
||
|
come into play. Lets just say that there are a few things that the AZ KID
|
||
|
could suggest that would/could be hazardous to this boards health. SO, please
|
||
|
keep the posts to a .... ahem .... legal sence.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thank you...
|
||
|
|
||
|
As updates to this situation come into play, you will be updated. For those
|
||
|
of you who may have experience in these circumstances, please leave me
|
||
|
mail...as much info that I can gather in this pressing situation the more I
|
||
|
can help my upcoming ulcer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thanks
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Grin>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #251 Sec: 1 - General
|
||
|
09-Mar-89 02:06 AM
|
||
|
Subj: Ok Now what
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: All
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ok people...
|
||
|
|
||
|
Suggestion time. Im looking for a few trustworthy people that want to help me
|
||
|
out with the system to help it grow... I need as many suggestions as possible.
|
||
|
We have really been growing in the past couple of weeks, and I am gaing
|
||
|
multiple sources of info to boost the integrity of this system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Help me out here people, I cant do it on my own...Leave me E-Mail
|
||
|
|
||
|
TD
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #248 Sec: 8 - Da Elites
|
||
|
09-Mar-89 01:53 AM
|
||
|
Subj: #243 - divertors
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: (Name Deleted)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Interesting concept!
|
||
|
However, I am not too familair with divertors...There are a lot of concepts
|
||
|
I understand and what not, however...lemme see if I can put this into words...
|
||
|
|
||
|
What about open divertors? It is true that divertors work like call
|
||
|
forwarding, however, is it theoridcally (sp) possible to find an open divertor
|
||
|
and have it dial your line?
|
||
|
|
||
|
In high school just for the fun of it, we bought a DTMF chip from our
|
||
|
local Rat Shack store and basically built a call forwarding system that we
|
||
|
could attach to any ones line (if need be) to then have the DTMF chip call to
|
||
|
any number needed.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It worked well...primitive, but well...
|
||
|
|
||
|
TD
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #247 Sec: 1 - General
|
||
|
09-Mar-89 01:48 AM
|
||
|
Subj: #244 - alala
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: (Name deleted)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Who makes the most popular PBX system?
|
||
|
|
||
|
The reason for asking is for curiosity sake. There are a lot of different
|
||
|
features within a PBX.....
|
||
|
, TD
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #235 Sec: 8 - Da Elites
|
||
|
06-Mar-89 05:18 PM
|
||
|
Subj: Radius's (R)
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: all
|
||
|
|
||
|
What can anyone tell us about radius's? This is a subject area that I admitt
|
||
|
I am no good at!
|
||
|
|
||
|
TD
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #234 Sec: 8 - Da Elites
|
||
|
06-Mar-89 05:17 PM
|
||
|
Subj: divertors (R)
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: all
|
||
|
|
||
|
What can any one tell us about diverters??
|
||
|
|
||
|
Discussion time!
|
||
|
|
||
|
Reply(s) #243
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #228 Sec: 7 - Security
|
||
|
06-Mar-89 12:36 AM
|
||
|
Subj: Ummmmm
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: All
|
||
|
|
||
|
Ok guys...lemme ask a general question here that seems to have me a bit
|
||
|
confused...
|
||
|
|
||
|
About a week or so ago, AZ KID had a search warrent served on his house, and
|
||
|
they took in possession several tapes, tape player, ect, ect.. However, he
|
||
|
has not been arrested or charged with ANY kind of a crime. He still does not
|
||
|
have his confiscated equipment back, so I am thinking that they think they
|
||
|
have something on him...
|
||
|
|
||
|
My question is, should he be charged by now?? Its got me a bit concerned. I
|
||
|
thought usually they would have charged him with a crime, or let it go by
|
||
|
now....Unless of course he "plea bargined"...
|
||
|
I dont know..Ive talked to him, but he "doesnt know whats going on"
|
||
|
|
||
|
So...What do you guys think,eh??
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #227 Sec: 7 - Security
|
||
|
05-Mar-89 01:38 AM
|
||
|
Subj: CNA (R)
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: All
|
||
|
|
||
|
We all know that CNA gives you the Customer Name and Address if you have the
|
||
|
number, is there a department that has the Number if you have the Name, or
|
||
|
address, or something of that sort???
|
||
|
|
||
|
TD
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Msg: #225 Sec: 1 - General
|
||
|
05-Mar-89 01:34 AM
|
||
|
Subj: #211 - Text files
|
||
|
From: Sysop
|
||
|
To: (Name deleted)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Any kind of text file that you see fit to better this system. Its the users
|
||
|
that make the system. This BBS will work on a diplomatic system. (And Ill
|
||
|
have thelast word..har har har)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Once youve been voice validated, Im sure youll understand what text files will
|
||
|
be benificail to this system
|
||
|
|
||
|
TD
|
||
|
|
||
|
+++ END SYSOP QUOTES +++
|
||
|
|
||
|
The tenor and content of these and other messages by the sysop suggest that
|
||
|
the SS's operative was not passive or particularly selective, and may have
|
||
|
generated the kinds of evidence for which he was being paid by his leading
|
||
|
questions. If The Dictator was indeed operating under the "direct
|
||
|
supervision" of a field investigator, then it would seem that the SS knew
|
||
|
full well that the information it supplied to Rep. Edwards was, at best,
|
||
|
misleading: Recruiting users was for The Dark Side was hardly "selective,"
|
||
|
but quite open, and those who called stood a chance of being drawn into
|
||
|
discussion initiated by the sysop, a paid informant of the secret service,
|
||
|
who turned the logged files over to them.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It would seem that either the SS has little control over its operatives
|
||
|
(which suggests incompetency) or that it knows full well what its
|
||
|
operatives do and choses to redefine reality in self-serving ways. Either
|
||
|
way, the responses by the SS to Rep. Edwards should be re-examined and
|
||
|
those who were involved in the undercover investigation held accountable.
|
||
|
|
||
|
********************************************************
|
||
|
** WHAT'S THE POINT? **
|
||
|
********************************************************
|
||
|
|
||
|
When the federal government uses *paid* informants, nobody wins.
|
||
|
Officially sanctioned deception and betrayal, as Gary Marx argued in his
|
||
|
book "Undercover: Police Surveillance in America," is generally far more
|
||
|
detrimental to public order in the long run than whatever "crimes" the
|
||
|
deception targets.
|
||
|
|
||
|
When federal agencies set up sting boards and use informants to gather,
|
||
|
even generate, diverse information that is in turn given to agents as
|
||
|
potential "evidence" of wrong doing, there can be problems. In the 1960s
|
||
|
and 1970s, we have seen through various class action suits, congressional
|
||
|
hearings, FOIA requests, and other inquiries, how abuse of information by
|
||
|
those who collected it resulted in lost employment opportunities and other
|
||
|
uncool consequences. In the past year, we have also seen the misuse of
|
||
|
information in indictments, sentencing memorandums, and especially in
|
||
|
several search affidavits and seizure warrants.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Most of us are concerned if agencies collect information on us against our
|
||
|
knowledge, because the potential for harm can be subtle. Many readers of
|
||
|
CuD have called a variety of bulletin boards considerated to be
|
||
|
"underground." When an agency such as the Secret Service sets up a STING
|
||
|
board and PAYS an informant to capture logs, those of us who call these
|
||
|
boards have reason to be concerned with how our **LEGAL, LEGITIMATE** posts
|
||
|
may be interpreted and used by agents. When we recall that one sysop was
|
||
|
liked to a fraud conspiracy because of a two line comment that kermit is a
|
||
|
7-bit protocol used primarily on mainframes, our confidence in agents'
|
||
|
interpretive competence diminishes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Our intent has not been to embarrass The Dictator. If it were, we would
|
||
|
include the name he uses when socializing with others.
|
||
|
|
||
|
IT WOULD ALSO BE TOTALLY REPREHENSIBLE IF OTHERS WERE TO ENGAGE IN
|
||
|
HARASSMENT OR OTHER RESPONSE AGAINST HIM! The CU has increasingly been
|
||
|
united by principles of justice, and to engage in unjust acts because we
|
||
|
feel others have done the same to us violates those principles we are
|
||
|
working toward.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Calls to the "voice number" The Dictator has left on at least one public
|
||
|
post on a public board, and given to others, have gone not received a
|
||
|
response. Messages left to him on BBSs have also not generated contact. We
|
||
|
continue to invite him to contact us and give his side of the story. There
|
||
|
are generally shades of grey in even the darkest images, and if he contacts
|
||
|
us we promise either a fair and impartial story, or, he can write his own
|
||
|
version and we will publish it unedited.
|
||
|
|
||
|
We also remind readers that the issue IS NOT an individual. At stake in
|
||
|
all this is the issue of privacy and police power as we enter the 21st
|
||
|
century. When laws cannot keep up with technology, the consequences may be
|
||
|
ill-considered strategies for monitoring and punishing alleged wrong-doers.
|
||
|
As Gary Marx reminds us in his book "Undercover" (p. 233):
|
||
|
|
||
|
In a democratic society, covert police tactics, along
|
||
|
with many of the other surveillance techniques, offer us a
|
||
|
queasy ethical and moral paradox. The choice between anarchy
|
||
|
and repression is not a happy one, wherever the balance is
|
||
|
struck. We are caught on the horns of a moral dilemma. In
|
||
|
Machiavelli's words: %Never% let any state ever believe that
|
||
|
it can always adopt safe policies...we never try to escape
|
||
|
one difficulty without running into another; but prudence
|
||
|
consists in knowing how to recognize the nature of the
|
||
|
difficulties and how to choose the least bad as good."
|
||
|
Sometimes undercover tactics will be the least bad. Used
|
||
|
with great care, they may be a necessary evil. The
|
||
|
challenge is to prevent them from becoming an intolerable
|
||
|
one.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------------------------end here------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
We reprint the complete issue, because it is too important to be omitted
|
||
|
and by not "cutting" out sections, or editing out 'non-Ripco' parts, you get
|
||
|
the complete story, compact and complete. A CuD Classic.
|
||
|
|
||
|
After this issue, many questions were asked about using an informant,
|
||
|
how legal it is, and what to do about it, but it thinned out when nothing
|
||
|
really happened. Dr. Ripco still hadn't gotten his equipment back, and
|
||
|
Ripco ][ was up and running. Small requests from readers of CuD about updates
|
||
|
on the case and answers from the Moderators was all that could be said/read.
|
||
|
|
||
|
<Taken from Computer Underground Digest Vol.3, Issue #11 Apr 4, 1991>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
----------------------------------start here-----------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
++++++++++++
|
||
|
Case Updates
|
||
|
++++++++++++
|
||
|
|
||
|
>>RIPCO: The Ripco case has not been forgotten. Counsel for Dr. Ripco
|
||
|
is holding strategies close to the vest, and because the seizure of
|
||
|
the BBS is alleged by the Secret Service to be part of an on-going
|
||
|
investigation, things move even more slowly. CuD filed an FOIA
|
||
|
request to the Secret Service for information on Ripco, and the
|
||
|
response was:
|
||
|
|
||
|
With regard to Ripco, we regret to inform you that we cannot
|
||
|
comply. according to the Freedom of Information Act, there
|
||
|
are no records or documents available to you.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Persuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (7) (A), this file is being
|
||
|
exempted since disclosure could reasonably be expected to
|
||
|
interfere with enforcement proceedings. The citation of the
|
||
|
above exemption is not to be construed as the only exemption
|
||
|
which may be available under the Freedom of Information Act.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The original search affidavit for the search on May 7, 1990, cites "CI
|
||
|
404-235," a "volunteer, paid" Secret Service informant, as the primary
|
||
|
source of the goverment's information. "CI 404-235" was also the
|
||
|
informant responsible for providing information that led to the raid
|
||
|
on RIPCO. In CuD 3.02, we reported that the Secret Service indicated
|
||
|
that this informant ran a sting board that we identified as THE DARK
|
||
|
SIDE (run by a sysop known as THE DICTATOR who continues to call
|
||
|
boards around the country.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------------------------end here------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
The last we heard about Ripco BBS and Dr. Ripco from CuD was in Vol.3,
|
||
|
Issue #14 April 26, 1991 which said that "...no charges have been filed
|
||
|
against him[Dr. Ripco]." and that "He remains in limbo, his equipment has
|
||
|
not been returned, and he still does not know why."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Until now, nothing more has been said about this case, and that's how
|
||
|
we got the idea to make a compillation about Ripco from the beginning to
|
||
|
this date (December 1991) with this following extra update. This information
|
||
|
was written to me [The Chief] during an E-Mail discussion by Dr. Ripco. He
|
||
|
also gave me permission to use the information to write this file.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco 'Interview' November 1991 Reprinted with permission
|
||
|
----------------------------------- Edited parts marked with <ed>
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : Do you think the Secret Service is monitoring your board?
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : <ed> ...no there hasn't been anymore digging by the s.s. since
|
||
|
the original bust as far as i can tell. right now i'm pretty sure
|
||
|
they don't know what to do next with this matter. everything seems
|
||
|
stalled as far as i can tell.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : Are you worried about having been investigated by them[The SS]?
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : i'm not sure if there is anything to really worry about as far
|
||
|
as being investigated by them. from the copies of the legal papers
|
||
|
we turned up they only used the informant for all the
|
||
|
investigations. no taps, DNR's or surveillance. the only things
|
||
|
they looked into (as far as i was concerned) was the phone records
|
||
|
as far as proving i owned the line and a request to have them
|
||
|
turned off the day of the seizure. there is no indication they did
|
||
|
a mud report which would of listed everyone i was calling nor was
|
||
|
there anything to show the building or myself was being watched.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : How about getting your equipment back?
|
||
|
--------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : i'm pretty sure they put all their eggs in one basket and relied
|
||
|
on the reports the informant was passing along, which is the big
|
||
|
mistake overall. i'm pretty confident now this matter would be weak
|
||
|
for them to bring to court or set up an indictment. the big
|
||
|
question is if the stuff will ever be returned at all or at least
|
||
|
before it becomes obsolete.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : What can we do to prevent this from happening again?
|
||
|
----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : all we can do is keep showing the stupidity of the government in
|
||
|
this matter and hope it doesn't happen again on that scale.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
[Here we compare the confiscation of Ripco BBS with a similar case in Sweden]
|
||
|
[where the equipment of an Underground BBS was confiscated, but the SysOp ]
|
||
|
[wasn't charged for anything or arrested. The equipment is still confiscated]
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : About different levels of punishment for different hacker-"crimes"
|
||
|
Today there's only one level and no difference between a normal
|
||
|
hacker and someone who crash systems.
|
||
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : well i guess both the governments[Swedish and U.S.] are on the
|
||
|
wrong track. i agree with you that the degree of the crime should
|
||
|
have some bearing on what should be done. i don't know much about
|
||
|
sweden but its seems it has the same odd quirks as here. <ed>
|
||
|
...its almost that they don't think about what is really going on,
|
||
|
just pass the panic along.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : How did it start over there[In the U.S.]?
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : the mess here was started by two u.s. assistant attorneys who came
|
||
|
up with the abstract of computer crime. the picture they painted is
|
||
|
completely wrong but the damage is already done. there has already
|
||
|
occurred what should of been minor events turn into major actions
|
||
|
which really screws up peoples lives.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : About the legalities and computer crime[In the U.S.].
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : although any type of computer crime is still a crime, around here
|
||
|
they automatically add in the rico stuff and try to make it look
|
||
|
like a conspiracy and a variation of racketeering. thus for what
|
||
|
is usually a minor offense turns into a felony case that drains
|
||
|
the subject just trying to defend himself on charges that shouldn't
|
||
|
of been brought up in the first place.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : Can Ripco ][ reach the same level as Ripco once did?
|
||
|
----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : well all i can do is keep plugging away, the original ripco was
|
||
|
made out to be a cornerstone in the "computer underground" but
|
||
|
naturally no one around here thinks that. if anything, the way
|
||
|
things are now here isn't all that different than the seized one.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : What about the EFF trying to change things and help?
|
||
|
----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : i really don't know if anything can be done either to change
|
||
|
things. the legal groups set up here are doing their best but
|
||
|
i really get the feeling it isn't going to go anywhere. its not
|
||
|
that they aren't trying their best, its the odds against the whole
|
||
|
thing thats the problem.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : Can we do something to change the public's view of hackers/the CU?
|
||
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : the feds in charge here (although they have seem to be disappearing
|
||
|
lately) constantly feed the public at large misleading and
|
||
|
incorrect information to sway things to their side and justify the
|
||
|
actions. the woman who used to be in charge of the mess i'm
|
||
|
involved in stated something like an estimate $3 billion is lost to
|
||
|
computer fraud in the u.s. every year. even if that figure is true,
|
||
|
most of the real people involved with computers said that probably
|
||
|
70 to 80% of that is internal losses not hacking.
|
||
|
|
||
|
but naturally the feds downplay that and put ye old hackers as the
|
||
|
cause of the entire loss. even that d.e.a. watts line that was
|
||
|
broken into was overblown. the estimated losses based on what mci
|
||
|
or whoever the provider was indicates the line must of been used 24
|
||
|
hours a day, 7 days a week for 2 years to even come close to the
|
||
|
figure.
|
||
|
|
||
|
i think the point i'm trying to make is that everyone on the
|
||
|
"inside" (us i suppose) knows that there is a degree to everything
|
||
|
that goes on in the telecom world but how is that explained to john
|
||
|
q. public against these numbers they keep tossing around? they are
|
||
|
the authoritive powers that are expected to know what going on and
|
||
|
although the public has less and less trust in what the government
|
||
|
says, this matter is kinda closed knit only having a effect on a
|
||
|
minority of the overall public.
|
||
|
|
||
|
so trying to convince a public that isn't really interested in the
|
||
|
subject is where i think it isn't going to go anywhere for the mean
|
||
|
time based on what the government keeps saying what THEY think is
|
||
|
going on.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : So what can we do when we can't get through to the general public?
|
||
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : i guess winning the little legal battles, one at a time might have
|
||
|
a pay off sooner or later so i just don't see a good clean cut
|
||
|
right now at solving this problem in one swoop.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : I think it will be better in a few years, now that we have EFF
|
||
|
and other organizations working to help us[hackers]. How about you?
|
||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : i'd say you are looking on the bright side of things if in fact
|
||
|
what you say about things being better in a couple years is true. i think the
|
||
|
actions here in the u.s. by the feds damaged things that'll never go back to
|
||
|
normal. sort of losing your virginity if ya know what i mean.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : About this interview not being interesting.
|
||
|
-------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : <ed> ...there just isn't much to say about it overall. see
|
||
|
technically, i wasn't arrested, charged, indicted or anything else
|
||
|
like that. the original ripco bbs along with other non-related
|
||
|
items were simply seized by the u.s. secret service for reasons
|
||
|
that are still not clear.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : But don't you think people are interested?
|
||
|
------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : since nothing happened to me personally, i'm really no different
|
||
|
than anyone else right now, i can run this board, move, leave the
|
||
|
country or do anything else as i please. this is where my beef is
|
||
|
rather than an accused man really being innocent pleading his case.
|
||
|
it's one thing for the government to conduct an investigation to
|
||
|
find/locate/arrest criminals. it's another thing to go on a witch
|
||
|
hunt, sweep a possible trouble spot, grab everything and hope
|
||
|
enough turns up to make a case.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : But why do you think they confiscated your equipment and not
|
||
|
charge you with anything?
|
||
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : logically reasoning things out comes to two possible conclusions
|
||
|
(others may apply but these are the best guess)...
|
||
|
|
||
|
#1: they thought or had reason to think i was some sort of computer
|
||
|
criminal and by seizing my computers would provide the missing
|
||
|
link (if any) to formally charge me.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-or-
|
||
|
|
||
|
#2: they may have known that i in fact had no criminal actions but
|
||
|
the bbs could provide them with worthwhile information since it
|
||
|
was veiwed as a nest, breeding hackers to the outside world.
|
||
|
gaining full access to it would give them some kind of door to
|
||
|
the "underground".
|
||
|
|
||
|
i really don't know on either. #1 doesn't make a whole lot of sense
|
||
|
because after talking upon hours with people who are knowledgeable
|
||
|
in seizures, the makeup, the actions, etc. it appears i should of
|
||
|
been arrested and charged within days of the seizure. more normal
|
||
|
is to seize the possible evidence, arrest to "hold" the subject for
|
||
|
72 hours while the evidence was examined, then file the proper
|
||
|
charges.
|
||
|
|
||
|
#2 seems to apply more because i AM clean, always have been. kinda
|
||
|
stupid to operate a menace to society (their view, not mine) if the
|
||
|
operator is a big time card, phreak and hacker all rolled into one.
|
||
|
wouldn't you agree? the actions behind #2 is what pisses me off.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : But how could they confiscate your equipment if #2 is the truth?
|
||
|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : here we have a situation where a bbs and freedom of speech come
|
||
|
head to head. the bbs itself does not commit illegal actions, we
|
||
|
didn't even have codes posted in years. the operator is just that,
|
||
|
an operator, no outside activities to link what he does in his free
|
||
|
time to what activities goes on with the board. now enters the
|
||
|
secret service with a profile, a written document which describes
|
||
|
the makeup of a hacker bbs, how things are hidden or altered from
|
||
|
the public in an attempt to deceive the "real" activity going on
|
||
|
beneath the surface. they conclude ripco fits the profile and
|
||
|
voila, ripco gets seized.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : What can you do about it?
|
||
|
-------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : i don't have any recourse. i'm not an accused man who has his day
|
||
|
in court coming. i can't do anything to challenge this. all i can
|
||
|
do is file a suit against the government to have the stuff
|
||
|
returned. estimated cost? at least 3 to 4 times the value of the
|
||
|
equipment taken. get reimbursed for the legal fees? can't do that.
|
||
|
will following through and winning the suit help in the scheme of
|
||
|
things? no... winning will be that only, a win, does not set a
|
||
|
precedent because the suit would be on the actions of the
|
||
|
investigation, not the merits of the investigation itself.
|
||
|
|
||
|
so where does that leave me? sitting here. like the attorneys said,
|
||
|
sit and wait. either they'll (the feds) attempt an indictment and
|
||
|
we can fight then or the statue of limitations will run out and we
|
||
|
win(?) by default. by then the hardware will be so out of date the
|
||
|
only value of it will be to collectors of ancient computers. its
|
||
|
almost unbelievable to think i would be better off being charged
|
||
|
with something from the start.
|
||
|
|
||
|
i know this is getting a bit long but one more fact that was
|
||
|
presented to me is they could charge me with something else non-
|
||
|
related to what they were after in the first place. they took 3
|
||
|
computer systems and somewhere between 2 and 3 thousand disks i
|
||
|
accumulated over the last 10-11 years. anything they find on those
|
||
|
disks that could lead to a conclusion that a crime was committed,
|
||
|
could in fact be presented as evidence to other charges.
|
||
|
|
||
|
another words as an example, they come in expecting to catch a
|
||
|
carder, hacker or phreak but all that surfaces is a couple poison
|
||
|
pen letters threating the president or some other public official.
|
||
|
justify the investigation... no problem. go for it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : What's the bottom line here?
|
||
|
----------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : the bottom line is to get people to imagine wherever they are
|
||
|
sitting, in their home or apartment, the government acting in the
|
||
|
welfare of the public kicks your door down and takes everything
|
||
|
you own only because you are under suspicion of doing something
|
||
|
wrong, they don't know exactly but after everything is seized,
|
||
|
they'll figure something out. can anyone really be 100% clean?
|
||
|
isn't judgement day supposed to happen when you get to the pearly
|
||
|
gates?
|
||
|
|
||
|
i don't care where you live, that isn't right and shouldn't be done
|
||
|
but that's where i'm at and welcome to it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : Then it is the legal system that has to be changed.
|
||
|
---------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : <ed> ...my complaint isn't with the why's of the investigation but
|
||
|
the how's of it. if the government showed anything to reenforce the
|
||
|
idea that a proper investigation has taken place, i'd probably be
|
||
|
sitting waving a flag and say i'm glad i was part of something that
|
||
|
will bring criminals to justice. the problem is as i see it, the
|
||
|
government, the people doing the supposed investigation and the
|
||
|
means they are using are the real crime. we involved are the ones
|
||
|
that are going to take the fall to cover themselves up.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : Is it ok to use this information in an upcoming file from uXu
|
||
|
about you[Dr. Ripco] and Ripco BBS?
|
||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : yeah, no problem. if there's something about the feds fishing
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expedition that might be of interest, by all means pass the
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|
story around. keep in mind i'm not the only one either, according
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|
to the press release the s.s. gave out after the sweep there was
|
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|
27 warrants issued that day in 13 u.s. cities. i'm not really
|
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|
sure if that means there are 26 other people besides me because i
|
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|
was actually served with 2 seizure warrants.
|
||
|
|
||
|
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|
Question : So what's the deal with the 26 other people?
|
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|
--------------------------------------------------------
|
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|
Dr. Ripco : i can safely say the others are probably in the same boat although
|
||
|
we have no idea who they are. up to this point i'm the only one to
|
||
|
come forward publicly and requests to the government for just the
|
||
|
names have been turned down. actually the government has turned
|
||
|
down all the requests which is part of the matter that pisses me
|
||
|
off. i have a feeling if the others were able to be contacted, you
|
||
|
would probably find similar stories to mine. this to me is logical,
|
||
|
if i'm the only one kicking and screaming it doesn't carry very
|
||
|
far, if were able to become a collective group it might cause them
|
||
|
some real grief. the feds keeping us apart from each other is in
|
||
|
their best interest.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : What do you think of the informant, The Dictator?
|
||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : <ed> ...personally i think the informant (who is still calling
|
||
|
here) didn't just inform as his job should of been. it seemed
|
||
|
to me from his activities it comes closer to what we call
|
||
|
entrapment. but that's just my opinion fer now.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Question : How about legal issues? Can this file be used as "evidence"
|
||
|
against you in any way, or help the Feds?
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
Dr. Ripco : my attorney [though] asked that i shouldn't pass along some things
|
||
|
which favor our legal side so i can't really go into what things
|
||
|
we turned up and the contents but keeping the general nature of it
|
||
|
is no problem. as he put it, another thing that favors the feds in
|
||
|
this case is the fact that no arrest or charge has been brought
|
||
|
forth yet. this leaves the end open to them and me screaming
|
||
|
bloodly murder/anti government retoric might push them to do
|
||
|
something just to bust my balls.
|
||
|
|
||
|
--------------------
|
||
|
[End Of "Interview"]
|
||
|
--------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
So, this is how it is today with Dr. Ripco, and the confiscated equipment.
|
||
|
If something happens, either way, we will write about it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Many thanks to Dr. Ripco for letting me use the information, and being
|
||
|
helpful in every way possible, showing me where to find useful things to make
|
||
|
this file and for putting up with a lot of dumb questions. Without his help,
|
||
|
this update wouldn't been possible.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Thanks also to CuD, The best source for news in the Computer Underground.
|
||
|
(Thank god you're FTP-able! :-)) It would have been a tough job, gathering
|
||
|
information about Operation SunDevil and updates on Ripco BBS without it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-----------------
|
||
|
[CuD Information]
|
||
|
-----------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Moderators: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
|
||
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|
||
|
Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet alt.society.cu-digest news
|
||
|
group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG,
|
||
|
and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414)
|
||
|
789-4210, and by anonymous ftp from ftp.cs.widener.edu (147.31.254.20),
|
||
|
chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu, and dagon.acc.stolaf.edu. To use the U. of
|
||
|
Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the
|
||
|
quotes) to archive-server@chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu.
|
||
|
|
||
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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||
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||
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source
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||
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||
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||
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||
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||
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
||
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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||
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|
||
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