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Computer underground Digest Wed Feb 4, 1998 Volume 10 : Issue 09
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
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Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
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CONTENTS, #10.09 (Wed, Feb 4, 1998)
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File 1--Air Force & an Incomptent prosecution of "hacker"?
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File 2--THREE MYTHS ABOUT GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND THE NET (fwd)
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File 3--"Growing Up Digital", Don Tapscott
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File 4--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 23:32:22 -0500
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From: "George Smith [CRYPTN]" <70743.1711@compuserve.com>
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Subject: File 1--Air Force & an Incomptent prosecution of "hacker"?
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Source - CRYPT NEWSLETTER 46 January 1998
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AIR FORCE INVESTIGATIVE OFFICE DEEMED INCOMPETENT DURING
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ROME LABS 'INFO-WAR' BREAK-IN
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"The cream of US military intelligence last week had their
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bungled attempt to prosecute a bedroom hacker thrown out by a British
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court," screamed the lead of a November 28, 1997 piece in the United
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Kingdom newspaper, The Guardian.
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Even as the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
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was spinning yet more scenarios of imminent techno-Gotterdammerung, the
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wheels were coming off one of the U.S. military's most extensive
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public relations campaigns. Aimed at creating the image of menacing
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hackers in the employ of foreign powers, U.S. Air Force claims fell
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apart in English court, out of sight of the U.S. newsmedia as the U.K.
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press looked on and smirked.
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Matthew Bevan, 23, a hacker known as Kuji, walked out of a south London
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Crown Court a free man as prosecutors confessed it wasn't worth trying
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him on the basis of flimsy claims made by the U.S. military. Further,
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he was deemed no threat to national computer security.
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Since 1994, the U.S. government has used Bevan, and a younger partner,
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Richard Pryce, in reports by the Air Force, the Government Accounting
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Office, the Pentagon's Defense Science Board report on information warfare
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and the recent Marsh Commission, on the dangers posed by international
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terrorists using the worldwide computer networks to attack the
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United States.
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". . . [the] story of the Bevan and Pryce cases shows [the Air Force's]
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forensic work to have been so poor it would have been unlikely to have
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stood up in court and convicted Bevan. The public portrayal of the two
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Britons as major threats to U.S. national security was pure hype," wrote
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Duncan Campbell for The Guardian.
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However, events really began in 1994, when the two young men broke
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into an Air Force installation known as Rome Labs, a facility at the now
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closed Griffiss Air Force Base, in New York. This break-in
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became the centerpiece of a Government Accounting Office report on network
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intrusions at the Department of Defense in 1996 and also constituted
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the meat of a report entitled "Security and Cyberspace" by Dan Gelber
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and Jim Christy, presented to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
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Investigations during hearings on hacker break-ins the same year.
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It is interesting to note that Christy, the Air Force Office of Special
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Investigations staffer/author of this report, was never at Rome while
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the break-ins were being monitored.
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Before delving into this in detail, it's interesting to read what
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a British newspaper published about Richard Pryce, known as Datastream
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Cowboy, then seventeen, about a year before he was made the poster boy
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by the GAO.
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In a brief article, blessedly so in contrast to the reams of propaganda
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published on the incident for Congress, the July 5, 1995 edition of The
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Independent wrote, "[Datastream Cowboy] appeared before Bow Street
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magistrates yesterday charged with unlawfully gaining access to a series
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of American defense computers. Richard Pryce, who was 16 at the time of
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the alleged offences, is accused of accessing key U.S. Air Force systems
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and a network owned by Lockheed, the missile and aircraft
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manufacturers."
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Pryce, a resident of a northwest suburb of London, was charged with 12
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separate offenses under the British Computer Misuse Act. He was arrested
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on May 12, 1994, by New Scotland Yard. The Times of London reported when
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police came for Pryce, they found him at his PC on the third floor of
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his family's house. Knowing he was about to be arrested, he "curled up
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on the floor and cried."
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The Air Force's tracking of Pryce, and to a lesser extent, Bevan,
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was recounted in an eight page appendix to Gelber's and Christy's
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"Security and Cyberspace," entitled "The Case Study: Rome Laboratory,
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Griffiss Air Force Base, NY Intrusion."
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Pryce's entry into Air Force computers was originally noticed on
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March 28, 1994, when personnel discovered a sniffer program he had
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installed on one of the Air Force systems in Rome. The Defense Information
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System Agency (DISA) was notified. DISA subsequently called the Air
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Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) at the Air Force
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Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) in San Antonio, Texas. AFIWC then
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sent a team to Rome to appraise the break-in, secure the system and
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trace those responsible. During the process, the AFIWC team
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of computer scientists -- not AFOSI investigators, a point not
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clearly made by the Air Force authors and one that becomes more important
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upon viewing the fallout and repercussions of the case -- discovered
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Datastream Cowboy had entered the Rome Air Force computers for the
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first time on March 25. Passwords had been compromised, electronic
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mail read and deleted and unclassified "battlefield simulation" data
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copied off the facility. The Rome network was also used as a staging
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area for penetration of other systems on the Internet.
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Air Force personnel initially traced the break-in back one step to
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the New York City provider, Mindvox. According to the Christy
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report, this put the NYC provider under suspicion because "newspaper
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articles" said Mindvox's computer security was furnished by two "former
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Legion of Doom members." "The Legion of Doom is a loose-knit computer
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hacker group which had several members convicted for intrusions into
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corporate telephone switches in 1990 and 1991," wrote Gelber and
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Christy.
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The Air Force then got permission to begin monitoring -- the
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equivalent of wiretapping -- all communications on the Rome Labs network.
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Limited observation of other Internet providers being used during the
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break-in was conducted from the Rome facilities. Monitoring told the
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investigators the handles of hackers involved in the break-in were
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Datastream Cowboy and Kuji.
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Since the monitoring was of limited value in determining the
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whereabouts of Datastream Cowboy and Kuji, investigators resorted to
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"their human intelligence network of informants, i.e., stool pigeons,
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that 'surf the Internet.' Gossip from one 'Net stoolie to Air Force
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investigators uncovered that Datastream Cowboy -- [Richard Pryce] -- was
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from Britain. The anonymous source said he had e-mail correspondence
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with Datastream Cowboy in which the hacker said
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he was a 16-year old living in England who enjoyed penetrating ".MIL"
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systems. Datastream Cowboy also apparently ran a bulletin board system
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and gave the telephone number to the AFOSI source.
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The Air Force team contacted New Scotland Yard and the British law
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enforcement agency identified the residence, the home of Richard
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Pryce, which corresponded to Datastream Cowboy's system phone number.
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English authorities began observing Pryce's phone calls and noticed
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he was making fraudulent use of British Telecom. In addition,
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whenever intrusions at the Air Force network in Rome occurred, Pryce's
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number was seen to be making illegal calls out of Britain.
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Pryce travelled everywhere on the Internet, going through South America,
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multiple countries in Europe and Mexico, occasionally entering the Rome
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network. From Air Force computers, he would enter systems at Jet
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Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, and the Goddard Space
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Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. Since Pryce was, according to
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Air Force investigators, capturing the logins
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and passwords of the networks in Rome Labs, he was then able to
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get into the home systems of Rome network users, defense contractors
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like Lockheed.
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By mid-April of 1994 the Air Force was monitoring other systems being
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used by the British hackers. On the 14th of the month, Kuji logged on
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to the Goddard Space Center from a system in Latvia and copied data
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from it to the Baltic country. According to Gelber's report, the
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Air Force observers assumed the worst, that it was a sign that someone
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in an eastern European country was making a grab for sensitive
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information. They broke the connection but not before Kuji had
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copied files off the Goddard system. As it turned out, the Latvian
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computer was just another system the British hackers were using as
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a stepping stone; Pryce had also used it to cover his tracks when
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penetrating networks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, via
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an intermediate system in Seattle, cyberspace.com.
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The next day, according to the AFOSI report, Kuji was again observed
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trying to probe various systems at NATO in Brussels and The Hague as
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well as Wright-Patterson. On the 19th, Datastream Cowboy successfully
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returned to NATO systems in The Hague through Mindvox. The point Gelber
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and Christy were laboriously trying to make was that Kuji -- Matthew
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Bevan -- a 21-year old, was coaching Pryce during some of his attacks
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on various systems.
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By this point, New Scotland Yard had a search warrant for Pryce
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with the plan being to swoop down on him the next time he accessed
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the Air Force network in Rome.
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In April, Datastream Cowboy penetrated a system on the Korean
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peninsula and copied material off a facility called the Korean Atomic
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Research Institute to an Air Force computer in Rome. At the time, the
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investigators had no idea whether the system was in North or South Korea.
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The impression created was one of hysteria and confusion at Rome. There
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was fear that the system, if in North Korea, would trigger an international
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incident, with the hack interpreted as an "aggressive act of war." The
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system turned out to be in South Korea.
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It's worth noting that while the story was portrayed as the work of
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an anonymous hacker, New Scotland Yard already had a suspect.
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Further, according to Gelber's and Christy's report, English authorities
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already had a search warrant for Pryce's house.
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On May 12, British authorities pounced. Pryce was arrested
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and his residence searched. He crumbled, according to the Times of
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London, and began to cry. Gelber and Christy write that Pryce promptly
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admitted to the Air Force break-ins as well as others. Pryce
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confessed he had copied a large program that used artificial intelligence
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to construct theoretical Air Orders of Battle from an Air Force computer
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to Mindvox and left it there because of its great size, 3-4 megabytes.
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Pryce paid for his Internet service with a fraudulent credit card number.
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At the time, the investigators were unable to find out the name and
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whereabouts of Kuji. A lead to an Australian underground bulletin board
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system yielded nothing.
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On June 23 of 1996, Reuters reported that Matthew Bevan had been
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arrested and also charged in connection with the 1994 Air Force break-ins
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in Rome.
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Bevan was found in the same low-tech manner as Pryce. His phone number
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was eventually lifted by Scotland Yard from Pryce's seized PC. "Had it not
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been for Scotland Yard, the relatively innocuous Pryce and Bevan would
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never have been found and the U.S. Senate would still be hearing about
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cyberterrorists from faraway lands," wrote the Guardian's reporter.
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Lacking much evidence for conspiratorial computer-waged
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campaigns of terror and chaos against the U.S., the makers of
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Congressional reports nevertheless resorted to telling the same story
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over and over in 1996, three times in the space of the hearings on the
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subject.
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As a result, Pryce and Bevan appeared in "Security in Cyberspace" and
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twice in Government Accounting Office reports AIMD-96-84 and T-AIMD96-92
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in 1996, which were essentially rewritten versions of the former with
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additional editorializing.
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Jack Brock, the author of these now famous GAO reports on hacker
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intrusions at the Department of Defense wrote, ". . . Air Force officials
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told us that at least one of the hackers [of Rome Labs] may have been
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working for a foreign country interested in obtaining military research
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data or areas in which the Air Force was conducting advanced
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research."
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This was not even close to the truth.
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[Alert Crypt Newsletter readers will recall Mr. Brock was a
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nominee in the 1996 Computer Virus Hysteria Awards.]
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But what were Bevan and Pryce really after?
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Not Air Force advanced research! Unless . . . you are one of those
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who are convinced the U.S. military is really hiding a flying saucer
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at Area 51 in Nevada. According to the Guardian account, Matthew
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Bevan was interested in little but gathering evidence confirming
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that Area 51 was a secret hangar for captured alien spacecraft.
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The Guardian news report was also extremely critical of Air Force
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computer scientist Kevin Ziese.
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Ziese, said the Guardian, "led a six-strong team [from San Antonio]
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whose members, or so he told Fortune magazine, slept under their desks
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for three weeks, hacking backwards until Pryce was arrested."
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"Since then, Ziese has hit the US lecture circuit and [privatized]
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his infowar business. As the WheelGroup corporation of San Antonio, he
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now sells friendly hacking services to top U.S. corporations," reported
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the Guardian.
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However, while the Guardian was accurate in its assessment of the
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trivial menace of Bevan and Pryce, it was off in its characterization
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of Ziese, missing the real target -- investigators from AFOSI and the
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authors of the Gelber/Christy report, according to information
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supplied in interviews with Ziese.
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Ziese commented to Crypt Newsletter that he "[had] not hit the lecture
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circuit." He added that he was amused by the content of the article in
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the Guardian and that "to date, no one has ever asked me even one question
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-- beyond my initial deposition to New Scotland Yard in 1996 --
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regarding the Rome Lab case!"
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Digging more deeply into the story, the evidence gathered on
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the Rome Labs break-in can be separated into two distinct classes.
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"The first," said Ziese," [was] the deposition I gave sometime in
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and about May of 1996 to New Scotland Yard." The second is the
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same shopworn story the "extremely incompetent criminal investigators
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had gathered originally," he added.
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It was the investigators from the Air Force Office of Special
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Investigations, not the group of computer scientists from the Air Force's
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Information Warfare Center in San Antonio -- which Ziese led --
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who peddled the Rome Labs break-in as evidence of international
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spying.
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"Unbeknownst to the public at large, we had a very complete set of
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tools [and a] chronology," said Ziese. "It was the criminal
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investigators who tied our hands, lost critical pieces of data and
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refused to allow us to testify/discuss the case. "They wanted to make
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a mountain out of a molehill."
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In this, they were successful.
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". . . it was incompetent criminal investigators who saw a spy under
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every rock," Ziese continued, "not the computer scientists I brought
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with me to Rome." AFOSI was responsible for the "hogwash that has been
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published to date about the Rome Lab attacks."
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By the English account, the evidence submitted by the U.S. military
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investigative team was almost worthless: "[E-mails] of edited files
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that had been relayed to Ziese and others."
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A desire for secrecy also backfired on the Air Force. In May
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of this year, the Air Force declined to allow Bevan's defense to look
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at the test programs they claimed to have used to monitor his
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intrusions and " . . . having set traps to catch hackers, [the Air Force]
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neglected to produce before and after file dumps of the target
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computers."
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The result was: "In the end, all the Americans handed over was patchy
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and circumstantial evidence that their computers had been hacked from
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Britain."
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In March of this year, Richard Pryce -- now 19 -- was fined 1,200 pounds
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for offenses related to unauthorized access in connection with the
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break-ins at Rome Labs.
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============================
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In sort of related news:
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About the same time the wheels were coming off the Rome Labs
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myth, a similar fate was being meted out to the hoary tale of
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electromagnetic pulse gun attacks on banks in the United
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Kingdom.
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Alert Crypt Newsletter readers already know the publication
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|
has dissed the legend of the non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse
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|
(HERF, microwave, radio frequency) gun as the chupacabras of
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cyberspace for the last two years.
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On December 4, a British journalist for TechWeb dubbed
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them the same.
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These stories are nonsense, said Michael Corcoran of Britain's
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Defense Evaluation and Research Agency, for TechWeb.
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"There are no radio-frequency weapons out there that anyone is in a
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position to use against banks." Corcoran then waffled for the
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publication and equivocated that they might be sometime in the
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future.
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=======================
|
||
|
|
||
|
Editor: George Smith, Ph.D.
|
||
|
INTERNET: 70743.1711@compuserve.com
|
||
|
crypt@sun.soci.niu.edu
|
||
|
http://www.soci.niu.edu/~crypt
|
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|
|
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|
Mail to:
|
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|
Crypt Newsletter
|
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|
1635 Wagner St.
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Pasadena, CA 91106
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||
|
ph: 626-568-1748
|
||
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|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
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|
||
|
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 1998 09:43:09 -0500
|
||
|
From: Paul Kneisel <tallpaul@nyct.net>
|
||
|
Subject: File 2--THREE MYTHS ABOUT GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND THE NET (fwd)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Since we've been talking about the proper role of the government in the IT
|
||
|
market, I thought I'd post a quickie critique I wrote of the Clinton
|
||
|
Admin's "Framework for Global Economic Commerce," which a number of issues
|
||
|
that have appeared in the discussion of Microsoft.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Anders Schneiderman
|
||
|
Progressive Communications
|
||
|
<aschneid@ix.netcom.com>
|
||
|
Wed, 21 Jan 1998
|
||
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|
||
|
----------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
THREE MYTHS ABOUT GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND THE NET:
|
||
|
A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS
|
||
|
FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
"A cutting-edge, history-making blueprint." That's what Newsweek columnist
|
||
|
Steven Levy calls the Clinton Administration's grand plan for the
|
||
|
Internet's future. "A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce" was
|
||
|
released on July 1 to a chorus of favorable reviews. Some commentators
|
||
|
fretted about its position on encryption and privacy, but overall, it
|
||
|
earned high marks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The reason for this praise? Because, as Levy says, "the report bluntly
|
||
|
asserts that the most important thing the govern can do about [the Net] is
|
||
|
_get the hell out of the way_." Let the free market work its magic.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Clinton Administration report is a perfect example of how far Newt
|
||
|
Gingrich and others have come in creating the myth of Government Bad, Free
|
||
|
Enterprise Good. If we patiently troll through this document's murky prose,
|
||
|
we can reveal glimpses of our society's confusion about how markets and
|
||
|
government work.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
MYTH #1: THE MARKET IS ALWAYS SMARTER THAN THE GOVERNMENT.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Clinton Administration's report is based on a simple principle: "the
|
||
|
private sector should lead." Why? Because "innovation, expanded
|
||
|
services, broader participation, and lower prices will arise in a
|
||
|
market-driven arena, not in an environment that operates as a regulated
|
||
|
industry."
|
||
|
|
||
|
This raises an obvious question. If the government is so incompetent, why
|
||
|
did the Internet come from Uncle Sam and not CompuServe or AOL? Why did
|
||
|
the private sector have to play catch-up with this stellar innovation?
|
||
|
|
||
|
The report knows this is a problem, so it tries to gloss over this
|
||
|
unpleasantness as quickly as possible. It says, "though government played a
|
||
|
role in financing the initial development of the Internet, its expansion
|
||
|
has been driven primarily by the private sector."
|
||
|
|
||
|
But the only reason the private sector is in the driver's seat is that
|
||
|
Uncle Sam handed over the keys. Netscape succeeded because it ripped off the
|
||
|
University of Illinois and U of I didn't fight back. More generally, the
|
||
|
Clinton Administration pulled the government out of the business of
|
||
|
developing the Net. You can argue whether or not this was a good
|
||
|
decision, but it's hard to see the Net's history as evidence that the
|
||
|
private sector _must_ lead.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Our myopia about the Net's history is a classic example of the trouble
|
||
|
Americans have acknowledging how government facilitates the economy.
|
||
|
Conservatives like to say, let's get back to the glory days of the 1950s,
|
||
|
when the government left the private sector alone. And they're right, it
|
||
|
did mostly stay out of the market. Except for the military, which nurtured
|
||
|
the electronics and computer industries. And the FHA and VA, which
|
||
|
underwrote half the houses in the 'burbs. And the massive highway building
|
||
|
programs that helped people commute between the 'burbs and the city and
|
||
|
expanded the auto market. And the GI Education Bill and government grants
|
||
|
that paid for the explosive growth of higher education. And the NIH, the
|
||
|
NSF. Medicare, and Medicaid programs that poured massive money into the
|
||
|
health care system. And the tax breaks that underwrote a new system of
|
||
|
pensions. And of course there's agriculture. And banking. But aside from
|
||
|
computers, electronics, housing, construction, cars, education, health
|
||
|
care, agriculture, and banking--and, indirectly, steel, plastic, and
|
||
|
concrete--government hasn't done a thing to help our economy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
MYTH #2: GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ARE BAD FOR MARKETS
|
||
|
|
||
|
Even if the government did a great job creating the Internet, maybe it's
|
||
|
time to turn it over to the free market. The Internet is moving so fast
|
||
|
that government bureaucrats may not be able to keep up. That's what the
|
||
|
Clinton Administration thinks. According to the Executive Summary, "The
|
||
|
Internet should develop as a market driven arena not a regulated industry."
|
||
|
|
||
|
But this bold statement isn't the whole story. The report also says that
|
||
|
"governments must adopt a non-regulatory, market-oriented approach to
|
||
|
electronic commerce, one that facilitates the emergence of a transparent
|
||
|
and predictable legal environment to support global business and
|
||
|
commerce." In other words, the government should butt out, except for
|
||
|
one, little, minor task. It must create a vast new infrastructure to make
|
||
|
Net commerce work.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The problem is simple. If the government really butts out, Internet
|
||
|
commerce will die. The day the report came out, Sun Microsystems director
|
||
|
Dennis Tsu complained to the press that the U.S. wasn't aggressive enough
|
||
|
about expanding intellectual property rights, patents, and copyright
|
||
|
protection. Net commerce depends on them. So if Net commerce is to
|
||
|
flourish, we need to radically change our legal system.
|
||
|
|
||
|
For example, in the next few years there will be a huge brawl over
|
||
|
copyright law. Right now, most Netizens ignore copyright rules. The Net
|
||
|
grew so rapidly because no one worried about whether they were violating
|
||
|
intellectual property law. "Information wants to be free!" was the Net's
|
||
|
motto. But now that there's money to be made, Sun and Microsoft and IBM
|
||
|
and Times-Warner and all the other players want a new set of rules that
|
||
|
make damn sure this attitude goes away. And they need the government to do
|
||
|
it for them.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The government is also needed to create online equivalents of money,
|
||
|
signatures (for signing contracts), and other fundamental features of Net
|
||
|
mass commerce. The industry can take the lead in developing these
|
||
|
standards, but none of it will work if the government doesn't enforce them,
|
||
|
because ultimately only the government can create legally-binding courts or
|
||
|
cash.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The report tries to get around this paradox by using one of the clever
|
||
|
shell games conservatives have adopted: we don't want 'government,' just
|
||
|
contracts and courts. When the government must intervene, the report says,
|
||
|
it "should establish a predictable and simple legal environment based on a
|
||
|
decentralized, contractual model of law rather than one based on top-down
|
||
|
regulation."
|
||
|
|
||
|
For those of you who have an infant, I have a piece of advice: tape that
|
||
|
sentence over their crib. It's the Corporate Lawyer Full Employment Act.
|
||
|
The computer world is already lawsuit-crazy, and if Clinton--a lawyer by
|
||
|
training--has his way, we'll be up to our eyebrows in 'em. This isn't less
|
||
|
government, it is more lawyers.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Far from decreasing the scope of regulation, this approach will increase
|
||
|
it. Nathan's column in this issue of E-Node tells the story of the ISPs
|
||
|
and AT&T, where attempts to get the government out of the market have led
|
||
|
to more government, not less.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This paradox is evident throughout the report. The report warns against
|
||
|
"potential areas of problematic regulation," one of which is "rate
|
||
|
regulation of [Internet] service providers." But while protecting us from
|
||
|
Internet service providers (ISPs) is bad, protecting ISPs from the phone
|
||
|
companies is good. The report warns that "monopolies or dominant telephone
|
||
|
companies often price interconnection well above cost, and refuse to
|
||
|
interconnect because of alleged concerns." In other words, if Clinton
|
||
|
really let competition loose, the phone companies would simply refuse to
|
||
|
let ISPs connect up to their customers: you want to serve 'em, you run
|
||
|
wires to their houses. So government should butt out--except where it must
|
||
|
butt in.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As a result of this sophistry, the report is littered with sentences like,
|
||
|
"genuine market opening will lead to increased competition, improved
|
||
|
telecommunications infrastructures, more customer choice, lower prices and
|
||
|
increased and improved services." Translation: every few years, we will
|
||
|
hold a fascinating philosophical debate over the proper definition of a
|
||
|
"genuine market." Federal courts and bureaucrats will hand out
|
||
|
billion-dollar prizes to the debate winners in the form of regulations and
|
||
|
court decisions, which spell out in excruciating detail how we will ensure
|
||
|
we have "genuine markets." This is less government?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Finally, as someone who loves the Internet, I'd argue that if some of the
|
||
|
anti-government fears are realized and the government does slow down the
|
||
|
pace of innovation a little, that might not be such a bad thing.
|
||
|
Today, companies scrambling to survive are forced to throw in new
|
||
|
features and create new toys without knowing whether they work well or are
|
||
|
even useful. To solve many serious Net problems, we need more
|
||
|
thoughtfulness, not more speed. Maybe a little sand in the wheels is a
|
||
|
good thing.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
MYTH #3: IF THE GOVERNMENT GETS OUT OF THE WAY, WE'LL ALL BENEFIT.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The last myth is that market competition is good for everybody. As noted
|
||
|
above, the report insists that "Innovation, expanded services, broader
|
||
|
participation, and lower prices will arise in a market-driven arena, not in
|
||
|
an environment that operates as a regulated industry." That's why "where
|
||
|
governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and
|
||
|
enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment
|
||
|
for commerce," and not, say, justice, fairness, or other bleeding-heart
|
||
|
concerns.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This approach makes cheery assumptions about the world that experience does
|
||
|
not bear out. In a recent issue of Salon Magazine, Andrew Leonard points
|
||
|
out one example that's already reared its ugly head: privacy. The
|
||
|
Administration wants the market to take the lead in developing standards
|
||
|
for protecting consumer privacy. But so far, says Leonard, the
|
||
|
market-driven Open Profiling Standard proposal has no means "for taking
|
||
|
care of the basic problem of whether or not information should be collected
|
||
|
in the first place." There's a good reason for that: "The desire for
|
||
|
online privacy runs directly at odds with one of the most attractive
|
||
|
aspects of doing business online -- the Net's capacity for helping target
|
||
|
marketing and advertising efforts directly at specific users." Consumer
|
||
|
choice ends where corporate needs begin.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Experience has also shown us that increased competition can have a
|
||
|
paradoxical effect: sometimes more competition means that fewer, not more,
|
||
|
people benefit. In a terrific article in Newsweek last year, Marc Levinson
|
||
|
showed that in the the financial world, banks don't _want_ to compete for
|
||
|
most of us. On average, "20 percent of households account for almost all
|
||
|
of consumer-banking profits, while three out of five customers are money
|
||
|
losers." That means that if there's more competition, the banks will
|
||
|
compete to attract the 20 percent who generate profits and they will
|
||
|
compete to dump the 60 percent who don't.
|
||
|
|
||
|
As Nathan demonstrated in his last two E-Node columns, we see similar
|
||
|
economics in electrical and telephone services. When competition kicks
|
||
|
into high gear in some markets, companies understandably focus on "cream
|
||
|
skimming" the customers who can turn a profit. If the same holds true for
|
||
|
Internet commerce in general, then far from leading to high-quality
|
||
|
universal access, more competition could leave a lot of us worse off.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The final example of the disconnect between who markets are supposed to
|
||
|
help and who they really do help is the tricky issue of taxes. Most
|
||
|
accounts of the report's conclusions about taxes make the same mistake that
|
||
|
Steven Levy makes. According to Levy, the report argues that "one thing
|
||
|
governments should most decidedly _not_ do is tax the Internet"--it should
|
||
|
be a "tariff-free zone." In other words, the government should not stifle
|
||
|
the Net's explosive growth with taxes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There's an obvious problem with this approach. If the Net is tax-free,
|
||
|
then anybody with any sense will move every sales transaction onto the Net
|
||
|
that they can. Even if Net commerce isn't more efficient--even if it's a
|
||
|
little less efficient--you'll save money. Needless to say, that would
|
||
|
strongly penalize many people who don't have access to the Net,
|
||
|
particularly poor folk. But the most devastating effect would be on state
|
||
|
and local government.
|
||
|
|
||
|
On June 24th, a few days before the report was due out, the U.S. Conference
|
||
|
of Mayors passed a resolution telling the Feds to butt out of the question
|
||
|
of how Net commerce should be taxed. That's because state and local
|
||
|
governments are terrified. Without revenue from sales taxes, local
|
||
|
services and the people that depend on them will be road kill (for more
|
||
|
details, see the report, "Prop 13 Meets the Internet," at
|
||
|
http://garnet.berkeley.edu:3333/).
|
||
|
|
||
|
And that's the reason why the Administration's report does _not_ advocate
|
||
|
making the Net tax-free. This is what the report says: "the United States
|
||
|
believes that no new taxes should be imposed on Internet commerce." No new
|
||
|
taxes, but what about the old ones? The report doesn't really say. Its
|
||
|
authors know that there is a problem. At one point, it proclaims that "no
|
||
|
tax system should discriminate among types of commerce, nor should it
|
||
|
create incentives that will change the nature or location of transactions."
|
||
|
But this is more of a wish than an answer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
So how does the Administration propose solving this problem, this
|
||
|
life-and-death issue that will determine the fate of all state and local
|
||
|
governments and the people who rely on them? Very simply: "No new taxes
|
||
|
should be applied to electronic commerce, and states should coordinate
|
||
|
their allocation of income derived from electronic commerce." Got it?
|
||
|
No "new" taxes. Just somehow, magically, we're going to collect the same
|
||
|
revenue local governments used to obtain from sales tax and we'll divvy it
|
||
|
up so it works out just like it used to.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Having dumped the readers into a very murky swamp, the report then pushes
|
||
|
us in further with its next sentence: "Of course, implementation of these
|
||
|
principles may differ at the [state and local] level where indirect
|
||
|
taxation plays a larger role." And in case our heads are still above water,
|
||
|
one more shove: "the system should be simple and transparent," "capable of
|
||
|
capturing the overwhelming majorities of appropriate revenues" while
|
||
|
"minimiz[ing] burdensome record keeping and costs for all parties."
|
||
|
|
||
|
This is a cutting-edge, history-making blueprint? This is more like one of
|
||
|
those challenges they give engineering students where they say, here's 20
|
||
|
boxes of toothpicks, 100 bowls of Lime Jello, and a magnifying glass, now
|
||
|
build us a working model of La Guardia Airport. This is a recipe for disaster.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
CONCLUSION
|
||
|
|
||
|
Economic markets are a wonder to behold. Like natural ecosystems, they can
|
||
|
produce marvels that are hard to imagine occurring any other way. And like
|
||
|
nature, ultimately they resist our control. Even with the best of
|
||
|
intentions, clumsy attempts to nurture or direct economic markets can turn
|
||
|
around and bite us. The experience of Europe's ham-handed attempts to
|
||
|
force the creation of a European computer industry was not so different
|
||
|
from the experience of people who live in flood plains, who learn the hard
|
||
|
way that Mother Nature respects no engineer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
But at the same time, we need to be careful that in respecting the power of
|
||
|
markets we don't blind ourselves to the crucial role played by our
|
||
|
government. Because when we do turn a blind eye, we stop debating an
|
||
|
important question: who benefits? Who will reap the harvest from our tax
|
||
|
dollars? Instead, those questions are settled in private, behind closed
|
||
|
doors. That's not right. If Uncle Sam must ask his family to help tend
|
||
|
the garden of the Internet, then all members of his family should partake
|
||
|
of its bounty.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 1998 07:54:42 -0800
|
||
|
From: "Rob Slade" <rslade@sprint.ca>
|
||
|
Subject: File 3--"Growing Up Digital", Don Tapscott
|
||
|
|
||
|
BKGRUPDI.RVW 971107
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Growing Up Digital", Don Tapscott, 1997, 0-07-063361-4,
|
||
|
U$22.95/C$32.95
|
||
|
%A Don Tapscott
|
||
|
%C 300 Water Street, Whitby, Ontario L1N 9B6
|
||
|
%D 1997
|
||
|
%G 0-07-063361-4
|
||
|
%I McGraw-Hill Ryerson/Osborne
|
||
|
%O U$22.95/C$32.95 800-565-5758 fax: 905-430-5020
|
||
|
%O lisah@McGrawHill.ca
|
||
|
%P 256
|
||
|
%T "Growing Up Digital: The Rise of the Net Generation"
|
||
|
|
||
|
Don Tapscott apparently gets a lot of mileage out of the story about
|
||
|
his kids being unimpressed by Tapscott's TV appearance that had him
|
||
|
demonstrating how to surf the Web. According to Tapscott, this proves
|
||
|
that his kids are N-Geners: yet another "generation", this one that
|
||
|
has grown up with, and is attuned to, the massive international
|
||
|
networks, and the technology behind them. Experienced network users
|
||
|
might take a different interpretation from the story. Web surfing is
|
||
|
a particularly pedestrian skill, if it is a skill at all, and
|
||
|
"demonstrating" the use of a graphical browser, with its point and
|
||
|
click interface, tends to be both pointless and rather boring for the
|
||
|
observer.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This book takes a rather dubious premise, and extends it as far as
|
||
|
possible, and probably considerably beyond. In the first chapter
|
||
|
Tapscott looks at demographics to chart the Baby Boom generation
|
||
|
(those born from 1946 to 1964), Douglas Coupland's Generation X (1964
|
||
|
to 1978), and N-Gen (1978 to 2000). However, a look at real
|
||
|
demographic statistics points out an unfortunate fact: while most of
|
||
|
those in the N-Gen group will have heard of the net, and a great
|
||
|
number might have had some experience on it, even among the singularly
|
||
|
fortunate population of North America only a minority elite have
|
||
|
regular and consistent access to it. The book itself appears to be
|
||
|
based on research conducted with a small sample of subjects culled
|
||
|
from a single site representing a ridiculously small number of
|
||
|
individuals in comparison to the population of the United States
|
||
|
alone. (A great deal of the book is based on self-reports from those
|
||
|
subjects.) The N-Gen may come, but it probably hasn't been born yet.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(The author does, rather frequently, admit that the presence of
|
||
|
technology "haves" and "have nots" is a problem, but he never really
|
||
|
analyzes the situation, the potential outcomes, or possible fixes.
|
||
|
While there is an entire chapter devoted to the topic, it tends to
|
||
|
recycle anecdotes rather than look seriously at the issue. In the
|
||
|
course of the review I burst out laughing, and had to explain the
|
||
|
guffaw to my wife by reading the sentence on page 266 that occasioned
|
||
|
it: "Homeless people online at the local library can log on to the
|
||
|
community information bulletin board to find beds in a shelter, a hot
|
||
|
shower, or even medical and counseling services." Her response was an
|
||
|
immediate and disbelieving "Yeah, right!" followed by the observation
|
||
|
that the statement was pathetically naive and unrealistic. I really
|
||
|
couldn't argue with her. I spend considerable time at our regional
|
||
|
libraries, and while we are blessed with access to Freenet through all
|
||
|
the card catalogue terminals, and have, in addition, a number of
|
||
|
graphical Web browsing terminals, I can't say that I've ever seen one
|
||
|
of the homeless looking up a shelter. The Vancouver CommunityNet and
|
||
|
Victoria TeleCommunity Net seem to agree with me: they don't even have
|
||
|
a listing for shelter for the homeless, although Vancouver does have
|
||
|
one for wildlife. I think Tapscott has been getting his information
|
||
|
from "Doonesbury.")
|
||
|
|
||
|
One of the great unchallenged assertions of our day is that children
|
||
|
feel more comfortable with technology, and learn it faster than
|
||
|
adults. Tapscott holds fast to this premise, and uses it frequently
|
||
|
in telling how our kids are going to be much different than we are, or
|
||
|
were. His most important assertion based upon this fact is the
|
||
|
Generation Lap, which he uses to mean that traditional teaching roles
|
||
|
are becoming reversed as children are becoming instructors of their
|
||
|
parents in regard to computers. There is only one problem: the
|
||
|
central statement is not true. Those under the age of eighteen do not
|
||
|
have any magical skill or empathy with technology. They are just as
|
||
|
confused and frightened about technology as anyone else. If they tend
|
||
|
to learn more than those around them, that has more to do with the
|
||
|
general lack of experience with computing in the population as a
|
||
|
whole. If I have dealt with many adults who couldn't remember that a
|
||
|
Window out of sight is not also necessarily out of memory, I have
|
||
|
equally taught children who were so afraid of computers that they
|
||
|
wouldn't input a program without typing on a typewriter first, and
|
||
|
others who had so much trouble with the concept of double clicking
|
||
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that they had to be taught to click and then hit return in order to
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invoke a program. Even if it were true, though, that children learn
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software applications by some sort of effortless osmosis, I fail to
|
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understand why that would automatically lead to an understanding of
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the fundamental technologies involved, as Tapscott implies when
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talking about education.
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The book does make some interesting observations. Those who use the
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net tend to accept diversity, to be more curious, and to be confident.
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|
However, these occasional insights tend to be buried in a mass of
|
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|
commentary that is either trivial and obvious (computers are fun!) or
|
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|
questionable (the Internet automatically teaches children how to
|
||
|
learn). Repeated statements about the "success" enjoyed by some of
|
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|
the young people contacted in the course of writing the book seem to
|
||
|
say much more about entrepreneurship than technology. A defence of
|
||
|
the violence of video games makes a weak nod toward the work of
|
||
|
Bandura, but unconvincingly states that it really isn't important.
|
||
|
(The makers of violent computer games, toys, and television programmes
|
||
|
will undoubtedly be relieved to hear it.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Some points in the book may well be true, but unhelpful. Tapscott's
|
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|
statement that mass education is a product of the industrial economy
|
||
|
falls into this category. "Individual" instruction probably *is*
|
||
|
better for the student. The text fails, however, to look at how such
|
||
|
education might realistically (and economically) be provided, and how
|
||
|
a free-for-all curriculum might result in some kind of graduation or
|
||
|
assessment that would convince potential employers as to the skills of
|
||
|
the products of this type of schooling. (OK, that statement is a
|
||
|
product of an industrial economy too. Generalize it, then: how are we
|
||
|
to know anything about the success of such an educational system?)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Other parts of the book are best described as pseudoprofound. There
|
||
|
are frequent quotes from the young participants that, on first glance,
|
||
|
seem to point out some kind of new age wisdom. Chapter ten has the N-
|
||
|
Gen focus group express surprise that adults would have trouble
|
||
|
sharing information: a relatively easy statement to make if you have
|
||
|
never put a lot of work into study and the development of information.
|
||
|
Given a moment's thought, though, the statements tend to demonstrate a
|
||
|
kind of naive ignorance. This is simply a result of lack of
|
||
|
experience and study of history on the part of the young. It is not
|
||
|
their fault, of course, and may provide a brief moment of amusement in
|
||
|
comparing their blind spots with our own.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Those who are experienced with the net will find that this book
|
||
|
doesn't say anything that isn't pretty widely known already. But I
|
||
|
dare say the knowledgeable user is not the target audience. For the
|
||
|
uninitiated, then, Tapscott provides a bewildering variety of new
|
||
|
insights. I use the word bewildering deliberately, since many of
|
||
|
these insights are either trivial or untrue, and it will be quite
|
||
|
difficult for the reader from the general public to sort the wheat
|
||
|
from the chaff.
|
||
|
|
||
|
copyright Robert M. Slade, 1997 BKGRUPDI.RVW 971107
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
|
||
|
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
|
||
|
Subject: File 4--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
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||
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically.
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CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
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Or, to subscribe, send post with this in the "Subject:: line:
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SUBSCRIBE CU-DIGEST
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Send the message to: cu-digest-request@weber.ucsd.edu
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DO NOT SEND SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE MODERATORS.
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6436), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the
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Cu Digest WWW site at:
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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------------------------------
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|
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|
End of Computer Underground Digest #10.09
|
||
|
************************************
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||
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