894 lines
40 KiB
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894 lines
40 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sun Feb 13, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 15
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe (Improving each day)
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Acting Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Cowpie Editor: Buffy A. Lowe
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CONTENTS, #6.15 (Feb 13, 1994)
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File 1--"Internet users get a warning"
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File 2--Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy!
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File 3--CPSR ANNOUNCES CAMPAIGN TO OPPOSE CLIPPER PROPOSAL
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File 4--EFF Wants You (to add your voice to the crypto fight!)
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File 5--Text of Cantwell Bill (HR 3627)
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File 6--Austrialian Federal Regulation ofBBSes
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File 7--Regulation of BBSes in Canada
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File 8--Pessimism in CuD (Response to Technological Disasters)
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File 9--Response to "Technological Disasters"
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File 10--How to avoid Postal Entrapment (Re: CuD #6.11)
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File 11--CNS-Internet (Internet access service)
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically.
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To subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
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Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
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and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
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1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
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AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
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EUROPE: ftp.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
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UNITED STATES:
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aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud
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etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/cud
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ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD
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halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in mirror2/cud
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
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KOREA: ftp: cair.kaist.ac.kr in /doc/eff/cud
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: 09 Feb 94 13:49:16 EST
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From: Lou Poppler <71231.2724@COMPUSERVE.COM>
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Subject: File 1--"Internet users get a warning"
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((MODERATORS' COMMENT: We've seen a number of media blurbs in the
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past few weeks with headlines such as "HACKERS BREAK INTO THE
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INTERNET." To readers (or politicians) with little understanding
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of the Nets, the headlines and accompanying stories suggest images
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of roving gangs lurking beneath every PC. The following comes from
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the Lansing State Journal)).
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WASHINGTON -- Users of the international computer network Internet are
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being advised to change their passwords because of a rash of break-ins
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to the system.
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Computer break-ins occur when an unauthorized user finds a way
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to connect to a computer system, often using a stolen password. Once
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connected, they can read private information or change or eliminate
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data belonging to others.
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"Intruders have already captured access information for tens of
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thousands of systems across the Internet," said an advisory late
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Thursday by the Computer Emergency Response Team, a federally funded
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panel that helps coordinate interconnections among computer systems.
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In the short term, the advisory panel urged users to change
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passwords. But it said this is not a permanent solution and said that
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the long-term solution lies in finding a way to eliminate reusable
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passwords on the Internet.
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 18:54:59 -0500 (EST)
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From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
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Subject: File 2--Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy!
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National Information Infrastructure Advisory Committee met today in
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Washington at the Old Executive Office Building. In comments made
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after a question and answer period, Vice President Al Gore said that
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key escrow policy announced last Friday (2/4/94) had serious flaws and
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that he hope the issue of who holds the keys and under what terms
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would be given more serious, careful consideration.
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Gore made it clear that some amount of control of cryptography
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technology was necessary for national security. However, the key
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escrow policies announced by the Departments of Justice, Commerce &
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State, and the NSA, were "low level decisions" that got out before
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thorough analysis. In a conversation with Mitchell Kapor, Esther
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Dyson, and Mike Nelson (of the White House Staff), Gore said that he
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would prefer that the keys be held by some part of the Judiciary
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branch, or perhaps even by trusted, private escrow agents. He made it
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clear that he believed that the escrow agents named in last Friday's
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announcement (National Institute of Standards & Technology and the
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Treasure Department) were no appropriate key holders. Mike Nelson
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also indicated that there was real interest in a software-based escrow
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system instead of the hardware-based SKIPJACK standard
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Those of us who heard Gore were quite surprised. His remarks suggest
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that the key escrow policies to date do not have full support of the
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White House.
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Still, Gore was quite firm in asserting that some control of
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encryption technology is essential to national security. "Encryption
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and codebreaking have determined the outcome of world wars. He stated
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(incorrectly) that most our industrialized allies place must stricter
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controls in encryption that the US does. In fact, almost all COCOM
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countries allow the export of DES-based products, though some do not
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allow DES to be imported.
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The whole question of encryption was raised when Mitchell Kapor told
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the Vice President that over half of the Advisory Council members had
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serious reservations about the current Clipper/Skipjack policies.
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Gore and Kapor agreed that the Advisory Council should be used to have
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a serious dialogue about encryption policy. Given Gore's departure
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from the current Clipper proposals, there might actually be something
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to talk about.
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==========
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NOTE: This DOES NOT mean that Clipper is going away. Part of stopping
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Clipper is to lift export controls on encryption and enable US
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companies to start producing products that enable all of us to protect
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our privacy with strong encryption.
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I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
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Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body
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of your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF
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will deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong
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showing of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her
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colleagues on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry
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concern, but also a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I
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support HR 3627" in your Subject header.*
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P.S. If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
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e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write
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membership@eff.org. For introductory info about EFF, send any message
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to info@eff.org.
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The text of the Cantwell bill can be found on the Internet with the
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any of the following URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):
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ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
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http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
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gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill
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**************************************************************************
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Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a
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peeping tom to install your window blinds. - John Perry Barlow, EFF
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co-founder
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation is working to protect your
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privacy. To help stop Clipper and eliminate export controls on
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cryptography, support a bill introduced in the House of
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Representatives, HR 3627. To support the bill, send email to
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<cantwell@eff.org>.
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------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 13:41:30 -0800
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From: Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
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Subject: File 3--CPSR ANNOUNCES CAMPAIGN TO OPPOSE CLIPPER PROPOSAL
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Campaign Against Clipper
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CPSR ANNOUNCES CAMPAIGN TO OPPOSE CLIPPER PROPOSAL
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Embargoed until 2 pm, Monday, February 7, 1994
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contact: rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org (202 544 9240)
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Washington, DC -- Following the White House decision on Friday to
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endorse a secret surveillance standard for the information highway,
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Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) today announced
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a national campaign to oppose the government plan.
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The Clipper proposal, developed in secret by the National Security
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Agency, is a technical standard that will make it easier for government
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agents to wiretap the emerging data highway.
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Industry groups, professional associations and civil liberties
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organizations have expressed almost unanimous opposition to the plan
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since it was first proposed in April 1993.
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According to Marc Rotenberg, CPSR Washington director, the
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Administration made a major blunder with Clipper. "The public does not
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like Clipper and will not accept it. This proposal is fatally flawed."
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CPSR cited several problems with the Clipper plan:
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o The technical standard is subject to misuse and compromise. It would
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provide government agents with copies of the keys that protect
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electronic communications. "It is a nightmare for computer security,"
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said CPSR Policy Analyst Dave Banisar.
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o The underlying technology was developed in secret by the NSA, an
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intelligence agency responsible for electronic eavesdropping, not
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privacy protection. Congressional investigations in the 1970s disclosed
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widespread NSA abuses, including the illegal interception of millions of
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cables sent by American citizens.
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o Computer security experts question the integrity of the technology.
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Clipper was developed in secret and its specifications are classified.
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CPSR has sued the government seeking public disclosure of the Clipper
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scheme.
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o NSA overstepped its legal authority in developing the standard. A
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1987 law explicitly limits the intelligence agency's power to set
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standards for the nation's communications network.
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o There is no evidence to support law enforcement's claims that new
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technologies are hampering criminal investigations. CPSR recently forced
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the release of FBI documents that show no such problems.
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o The Administration ignored the overwhelming opposition of the general
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public. When the Commerce Department solicited public comments on the
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proposal last fall, hundreds of people opposed the plan while only a few
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expressed support.
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CPSR today announced four goals for its campaign to oppose the Clipper
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initiative:
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o First, to educate the public about the implications of the Clipper
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proposal.
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o Second, to encourage people to express their views on the Clipper
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proposal, particularly through the computer network.
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Toward that goal, CPSR has already begun an electronic petition on the
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Internet computer network urging the President to withdraw the Clipper
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proposal. In less than one week, the CPSR campaign has drawn thousands
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of electronic mail messages expressing concern about Clipper. To sign
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on, email clipper.petition@cpsr.org with the message "I oppose clipper"
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in the body of the text.
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o Third, to pursue litigation to force the public disclosure of
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documents concerning the Clipper proposal and to test the legality of
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the Department of Commerce's decision to endorse the plan.
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o Fourth, to examine alternative approaches to Clipper.
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Mr. Rotenberg said "We want the public to understand the full
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implications of this plan. Today it is only a few experts and industry
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groups that understand the proposal. But the consequences of Clipper
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will touch everyone. It will affect medical payments, cable television
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service, and everything in between.
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CPSR is a membership-based public interest organization. For more
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information about CPSR, send email to cpsr@cpsr.org or call 415 322
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3778. For more information about Clipper, check the CPSR Internet
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library CPSR.ORG. FTP/WAIS/Gopher and listserv access are available.
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 18:32:26 -0500 (EST)
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From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
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Subject: File 4--EFF Wants You (to add your voice to the crypto fight!)
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation needs your help to ensure privacy rights!
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* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY *
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Monday, February 7th, 1994
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From: Jerry Berman, Executive Director of EFF
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jberman@eff.org
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Dear Friends on the Electronic Frontier,
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I'm writing a personal letter to you because the time has now come for
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action. On Friday, February 4, 1994, the Administration announced that it
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plans to proceed on every front to make the Clipper Chip encryption scheme
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a national standard, and to discourage the development and sale of
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alternative powerful encryption technologies. If the government succeeds
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in this effort, the resulting blow to individual freedom and privacy could
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be immeasurable.
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As you know, over the last three years, we at EFF have worked to ensure
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freedom and privacy on the Net. Now I'm writing to let you know about
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something *you* can do to support freedom and privacy. *Please take a
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moment to send e-mail to U.S. Rep. Maria Cantwell (cantwell@eff.org) to
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show your support of H.R. 3627, her bill to liberalize export controls on
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encryption software.* I believe this bill is critical to empowering
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ordinary citizens to use strong encryption, as well as to ensuring that
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the U.S. software industry remains competitive in world markets.
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Here are some facts about the bill:
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Rep. Cantwell introduced H.R. 3627 in the House of Representatives on
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November 22, 1993. H.R. 3627 would amend the Export Control Act to move
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authority over the export of nonmilitary software with encryption
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capabilities from the Secretary of State (where the intelligence community
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traditionally has stalled such exports) to the Secretary of Commerce. The
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bill would also invalidate the current license requirements for
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nonmilitary software containing encryption capablities, unless there is
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substantial evidence that the software will be diverted, modified or
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re-exported to a military or terroristic end-use.
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If this bill is passed, it will greatly increase the availability of
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secure software for ordinary citizens. Currently, software developers do
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not include strong encryption capabilities in their products, because the
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State Department refuses to license for export any encryption technology
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that the NSA can't decipher. Developing two products, one with less secure
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exportable encryption, would lead to costly duplication of effort, so even
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software developed for sale in this country doesn't offer maximum
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security. There is also a legitimate concern that software companies will
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simply set up branches outside of this country to avoid the export
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restrictions, costing American jobs.
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The lack of widespread commercial encryption products means that it will
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be very easy for the federal government to set its own standard--the
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Clipper Chip standard. As you may know, the government's Clipper Chip
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initiative is designed to set an encryption standard where the government
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holds the keys to our private conversations. Together with the Digital
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Telephony bill, which is aimed at making our telephone and computer
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networks "wiretap-friendly," the Clipper Chip marks a dramatic new effort
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on the part of the government to prevent us from being able to engage in
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truly private conversations.
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We've been fighting Clipper Chip and Digital Telephony in the policy arena
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and will continue to do so. But there's another way to fight those
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initiatives, and that's to make sure that powerful alternative encryption
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technologies are in the hands of any citizen who wants to use them. The
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government hopes that, by pushing the Clipper Chip in every way short of
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explicitly banning alternative technologies, it can limit your choices for
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secure communications.
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Here's what you can do:
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I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
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Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body of
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your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF will
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deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong showing
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|
of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her colleagues
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on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry concern, but also
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a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I support HR 3627" in your
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Subject header.*
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This is the first step in a larger campaign to counter the efforts of
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those who would restrict our ability to speak freely and with privacy.
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Please stay tuned--we'll continue to inform you of things you can do to
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promote the removal of restrictions on encryption.
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In the meantime, you can make your voice heard--it's as easy as e-mail.
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Write to cantwell@eff.org today.
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Sincerely,
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Jerry Berman
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Executive Director, EFF
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jberman@eff.org
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
P.S. If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
|
||
|
e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write membership@eff.org.
|
||
|
For introductory info about EFF, send any message to info@eff.org.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The text of the Cantwell bill can be found on the Internet with the any of
|
||
|
the following URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):
|
||
|
|
||
|
ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
|
||
|
http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
|
||
|
gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill
|
||
|
|
||
|
It will be available on AOL (keyword EFF) and CIS (go EFFSIG) soon.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: 09 Feb 94 13:33:32 EST
|
||
|
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
|
||
|
Subject: File 5--Text of Cantwell Bill (HR 3627)
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
|
||
|
|
||
|
MS. CANTWELL (for herself and ___) introduced the following bill which
|
||
|
was referred to the Committee on __________.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
---------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
A BILL
|
||
|
|
||
|
To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 with
|
||
|
respect to the control of computers and related equipment.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
|
||
|
tives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled,
|
||
|
SECTION 1. GENERALLY AVAILABLE SOFTWARE
|
||
|
Section 17 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
|
||
|
(50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended by adding at the end
|
||
|
thereof the following new subsection:
|
||
|
``(g) COMPUTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT.---
|
||
|
``(1) GENERAL RULE.---Subject to paragraphs
|
||
|
(2) and (3), the Secretary shall have exclusive au-
|
||
|
thority to control exports of all computer hardware,
|
||
|
software and technology for information security
|
||
|
(including encryption), except that which is specifi-
|
||
|
cally designed or modified for military use, including
|
||
|
command, control and intelligence applications.
|
||
|
``(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES.---
|
||
|
No validated license may be required, except pursuant
|
||
|
to the Trading With The Enemy Act or the Inter-
|
||
|
national Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only
|
||
|
to the extent that the authority of such act is not
|
||
|
exercised to extend controls imposed under this act),
|
||
|
for the export or reexport of---
|
||
|
``(A) any software, including software with
|
||
|
encryption capabilities, that is---
|
||
|
``(i) generally available, as is, and is
|
||
|
designed for installation by the purchaser; or
|
||
|
``(ii) in the public domain or publicly
|
||
|
available because it is generally accessible
|
||
|
to the interested public in any form; or
|
||
|
``(B) any computing device soley because
|
||
|
it incorporates or employs in any form software
|
||
|
(including software with encryption capabilities)
|
||
|
exempted from any requirement for a validated
|
||
|
license under subparagraph (A).
|
||
|
``(3) SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES.
|
||
|
--- The Secretary shall authorize the export or
|
||
|
reexport of software with encryption capabilities for
|
||
|
nonmilitary end-uses in any country to which ex-
|
||
|
ports of software of similar capability are permitted
|
||
|
for use by financial institutions not controlled in fact
|
||
|
by United States persons, unless there is substantial
|
||
|
evidence that such software will be---
|
||
|
``(A) diverted to a military end-use or an
|
||
|
end-use supporting international terrorism;
|
||
|
``(B) modified for military or terrorist end-
|
||
|
use; or
|
||
|
``(C) reexported without requisite United
|
||
|
States authorization.
|
||
|
``(4) DEFINITIONS.---As used in this subsection---
|
||
|
``(A) the term `generally available' means,
|
||
|
in the case of software (including software with
|
||
|
encryption capabilities), software that is offered
|
||
|
for sale, license, or transfer to any person with-
|
||
|
out restriction through any commercial means,
|
||
|
including, but not limited to, over-the-counter
|
||
|
retail sales, mail order transactions, phone
|
||
|
order transactions, electronic distribution, or
|
||
|
sale on approval;
|
||
|
``(B) the term `as is' means, in the case of
|
||
|
software (including software with encryption ca-
|
||
|
pabilities), a software program that is not de-
|
||
|
signed, developed, or tailored by the software
|
||
|
company for specific purchasers, except that
|
||
|
such purchasers may supply certain installation
|
||
|
parameters needed by the software program to
|
||
|
function properly with the purchaser's system
|
||
|
and may customize the software program by
|
||
|
choosing among options contained in the soft-
|
||
|
ware program;
|
||
|
``(C) the term `is designed for installation
|
||
|
by the purchaser' means, in the case of soft-
|
||
|
ware (including software with encryption capa-
|
||
|
bilities)---
|
||
|
``(i) the software company intends for
|
||
|
the purchaser (including any licensee or
|
||
|
transferee), who may not be the actual
|
||
|
program user, to install the software pro-
|
||
|
gram on a computing device and has sup-
|
||
|
plied the necessary instructions to do so,
|
||
|
except that the company may also provide
|
||
|
telephone help line services for software in-
|
||
|
stallation, electronic transmission, or basic
|
||
|
operations; and---
|
||
|
``(ii) that the software program is de-
|
||
|
signed for installation by the purchaser
|
||
|
without further substantial support by the
|
||
|
supplier;
|
||
|
``(D) the term `computing device' means a
|
||
|
device which incorporates one or more
|
||
|
microprocessor-based central processing units
|
||
|
that can accept, store, process or provide out-
|
||
|
put of data; and
|
||
|
``(E) the term `computer hardware', when
|
||
|
used in conjunction with information security,
|
||
|
includes, but is not limited to, computer sys-
|
||
|
tems, equipment, application-specific assem-
|
||
|
blies, modules and integrated circuits.''
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 16:21:45 +0800 (WST)
|
||
|
From: hardone <hardguy@GARION.IT.COM.AU>
|
||
|
Subject: File 6--Austrialian Federal Regulation ofBBSes
|
||
|
|
||
|
Federal check on computer bulletin boards.
|
||
|
Financial Rev. Feb 4th Page 4
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mounting evidence that computer bulletin boards were being used by
|
||
|
criminals, neo-Nazis and paedophiles has prompted a federal
|
||
|
investigation into their use.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Attorney-General, Mr. Lavarch, said he and the Minister for
|
||
|
communications, Mr. Lee, had agreed to set up a joint task force to
|
||
|
consider ways of regulating the use of computer bulletin boards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mr. Lavarch said he was concerned that the bulletin boards - which
|
||
|
anyone with a home computer and modem could access - were being used
|
||
|
to disseminate "extremely offensive and often illegal material".
|
||
|
|
||
|
"There is ample evidence that bulletin boards are being used to
|
||
|
distribute banned publications, including child pornography," he said
|
||
|
in a statement released yesterday.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Although the Government has no idea how many Australians were
|
||
|
tapping into bulletin boards, according to industry submissions to the
|
||
|
Office of Film and Literature Classification, Australia was the
|
||
|
second-largest user after the US where an estimated 40,000 people
|
||
|
regularly used the boards.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mar Lavarch said in Amercia, paedophiles have been detected using
|
||
|
bulletin boards to contact each other and their victims.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Other examples of misuse include neo-Nazi propaganda dissemination,
|
||
|
|
||
|
unauthorized copying of software and other protected materials, sale
|
||
|
of stolen credit card numbers and the spread of other defamatory
|
||
|
information."
|
||
|
|
||
|
He said it was time to look at ways to curb the growing misuse of
|
||
|
technology.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"We are in an era where children operate computers as easily as
|
||
|
their parents rode bicycles.
|
||
|
|
||
|
"We cannot allow advances in technology to overtake the legal and
|
||
|
law
|
||
|
|
||
|
enforcement measure designed to protect them, in particular, from
|
||
|
undesirable material."
|
||
|
|
||
|
He said the issue of bulletin boards was on the agenda for the next
|
||
|
meeting of Federal, State and Territory censorship ministers in
|
||
|
Canberra on February 17 where the proposed new classification system
|
||
|
for over-the-counter video and computer games would be finalised.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Wed, 09 Feb 94 16:09:08 EST
|
||
|
From: pcalarco <FPCA@MUSICB.MCGILL.CA>
|
||
|
Subject: File 7--Regulation of BBSes in Canada
|
||
|
|
||
|
The CRTC (Canadian Radio & Television Comission) is the most
|
||
|
powerful government organization in Canada regarding radio,television,
|
||
|
telephone, and telecommunications service. Recently, there have been
|
||
|
unconfirmed rumours abounding across Fidonet and some mailing lists
|
||
|
that the CRTC is looking at regulating computer bulletin boards as well.
|
||
|
A recent story on BBSes on one of our national television networks (CTV,
|
||
|
5/2/94) focused on the proliferation of 'pornographic BBSes' in Canada
|
||
|
in recent years, and the question naturally came up, "Should we regulate
|
||
|
computer BBSes?" To the general public watching this, the response
|
||
|
probably would be "Yes!" after seeing the very great danger to the
|
||
|
moral fibre of this nation's youth <har!>. An interview with the new
|
||
|
Minister of Communications, Mr. Jon Gerrard, on CBC Radio the same even-
|
||
|
ing did not discount the idea. Mr. Gerrard evaded the pointed questions
|
||
|
quite nicely, and gave no answer one way or the other as to whether
|
||
|
regulation of BBSes was being considered. As Minister of Communications
|
||
|
Mr. Gerrard is directly responsible for policy input into the CRTC, and
|
||
|
can direct the CRTC to new areas. The recently-passed Telecommunication
|
||
|
Act of June, 1993 does not include computer networks (and BBSes specific
|
||
|
-ally) in its mandate, but their are clauses in the document that leave
|
||
|
regulation of areas not specified by the legislation to fall under
|
||
|
regulation at any future point, at the discretion of the CRTC. As
|
||
|
to whether this is some nasty rumour or covert fact, none of us who
|
||
|
have been investigating the issue can find out. Mr. Gerrard, however,
|
||
|
did release his e-mail address on the Saturday night CBC program, and
|
||
|
invited inputs from Canadians on this specific issue. I would venture
|
||
|
to say that Americans should take interest in this issue as well. With
|
||
|
the II initiative in the U.S. heating up, escrow still remaining very
|
||
|
much a probabability in the Clinton administration, and the prolifera-
|
||
|
tion of BBSes and Freenets in both countries, the issue of increased
|
||
|
regulation of computer networks, especially at the more grassroots
|
||
|
level, is a very real possibility. Along with regulation of the
|
||
|
medium, we can see a number of consequences here in Canada: 1) a
|
||
|
licensing fee of some kind, which hobbists presently running BBSes
|
||
|
may or may not be able to afford; 2) a definite limit as to what is
|
||
|
and what is not permissable to archive/disseminate/discuss on these
|
||
|
licensed boards; 3) those not adhering to licensing, would become, in
|
||
|
effect, 'pirate' boards, due to their non-registration, regardless of
|
||
|
content; 4) a general homongenization of the BBS scene: the rules
|
||
|
would be in favour of larger, more established (re: commercial) boards,
|
||
|
killing off small hobby boards, and limiting all BBSes content.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I urge all Canadians and Americans to please respond to Mr. Gerrard.
|
||
|
Tell him from your perspective what you think the effects of regulation
|
||
|
of our media would be. The more pressure we can place at earlier stages
|
||
|
of policy development, the more effect we can have on any policy. Mr.
|
||
|
Gerrard's Internet e-mail address is
|
||
|
|
||
|
Gerrard.jon@istc.ca
|
||
|
|
||
|
Please be polite and respectful. Coming off as boorish and juvenile
|
||
|
will get this effort nowhere. I am also archiving any files & info
|
||
|
that I can on the subject on my BBS, RadioCityZen, here in Montreal.
|
||
|
All new users will have full access to all the file bases, and there
|
||
|
are no download ratios. The files are contained in file SIG #27:
|
||
|
CRTC & BBS licensing. Thanx for your time! Anybody with new info
|
||
|
as things develop, please post to can.legal or alt.bbs.allsysop.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 09:16:08 -0500
|
||
|
From: gbs@PANIX.COM(Eric Braun)
|
||
|
Subject: File 8--Pessimism in CuD (Response to Technological Disasters)
|
||
|
|
||
|
The anti-hype of your "A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS TO COME" in
|
||
|
CuD 6.13 is refreshing and much appreciated, but unfortunately your
|
||
|
pessimistic future is presented as a forgone conclusion rather than a
|
||
|
possible endpoint. Perhaps that was rhetorically necessary, but there
|
||
|
are a couple things to keep in mind:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1) Numerous on-line commercial ventures were set up hoping to spoon
|
||
|
feed their customers with home-shopping and entertainment services,
|
||
|
but found that the inter-personal communication services that had been
|
||
|
tacked on as an afterthought were what people really wanted. This
|
||
|
paints a different picture from your gloomy one of the slobby American
|
||
|
couch potato.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2) Changes in form can be accompanied by changes in content, in fact,
|
||
|
the _best_ time to change the structure of content, its quality
|
||
|
control and the incentives systems that produce it, is when form is
|
||
|
changing as well. You might say that every political revolution is
|
||
|
doomed to failure because "the mediums may change but the content will
|
||
|
remain the same," but clearly this is not true. Occasionally when an
|
||
|
old regime is overthrown the new form of government, enables an
|
||
|
entirely new kind of nation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It is up to us to seize the day.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 94 03:16:02 -0500 (EST)
|
||
|
From: Gray Watson <gray@ANTAIRE.COM>
|
||
|
Subject: File 9--Response to "Technological Disasters"
|
||
|
|
||
|
In Cu Digest #6.13, A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS TO COME,
|
||
|
Kohntark (ktark@src4src.linet.org) says that the multimedia products
|
||
|
of the future, like the television of the present, will contain "the
|
||
|
usual fare of idiocy, sex and violence" and will be another way for
|
||
|
the corporate world and the government to "spoon-feed its citizens with
|
||
|
mindless, easy entertainment".
|
||
|
|
||
|
Goodness. What cynically narrow view of the future. Might as well
|
||
|
log off now.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Before we go, let's take a second to not lose sight of the trees from
|
||
|
the forest. New technology will give us access to information we did
|
||
|
not have before. Period. Let's not worry about the emphasis being on
|
||
|
the entertainment side of the coin. Talking about 500 channels and
|
||
|
on-demand movie rental is the only way business can sell multimedia to
|
||
|
its investors, stock holders, and to us the market.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Sure, there will always be tripe entertainment -- the "People"
|
||
|
magazine of the air-waves or fiber-lines. Why? Because there will
|
||
|
always be those of us who read/watch it. The [entertainment] media is
|
||
|
not to blame. You might say that they are being morally reprehensible
|
||
|
by *serving* the junk, but you can't say they are dictating it. They
|
||
|
are just responding to the market. We should not blame the
|
||
|
supermarket owner who provides donuts for the obese.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In the midst of all the crap -- maybe on the 475th channel -- next to
|
||
|
the 24hr/day Harding/Bobbit station -- there is going to be something
|
||
|
truly exciting -- truly educational. A multimedia Discovery Channel
|
||
|
if you will.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I'm not going to comment on the ease-of-use problems possibly inherent
|
||
|
in future entertainment systems, except to point out that if they
|
||
|
*are* too complicated, no one will buy them. This is a powerful
|
||
|
signal to the companies that will be making the stuff, don't you
|
||
|
think?
|
||
|
|
||
|
Also, let's not point the finger at big business and government like
|
||
|
they are some sort of *active* evil process. They are not. They both
|
||
|
are just responding (or trying to respond) to our wants and needs --
|
||
|
whether voiced or not.
|
||
|
|
||
|
And I'm not going to TOUCH what I think the root of our social
|
||
|
problems are and what the warning signs Kohntark mentioned really
|
||
|
indicate.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I will say that we must continually encourage all forms of new
|
||
|
technology -- entertainment or otherwise. Because it just may be the
|
||
|
500 channel, on demand, 'Geraldo' episode super-vision system that
|
||
|
brings the $2/month, 100mb/sec digital fiber Internet line to our
|
||
|
doorsteps.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 15:04:27 PST
|
||
|
From: pamsmith%pamsmith@INFOSERV.COM(Pamela Smith)
|
||
|
Subject: File 10--How to avoid Postal Entrapment (Re: CuD #6.11)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Several issues ago, you had an article about how to avoid getting caught
|
||
|
in a Post Office child porn trap. I found the suggestions of the
|
||
|
writer valid, but unneccessarily risky. I am an attorney who has done
|
||
|
some criminal defense work.
|
||
|
|
||
|
There is no way most of us are going to be careful enough to not open
|
||
|
a package that comes to us. So--you have opened a package that
|
||
|
contains child porn, and you can feel the knock on the door coming any
|
||
|
minute. I think you should immediately call 911 or the local
|
||
|
equivilant. Tell the dispacher what you have, who it is from, and
|
||
|
request that the police come get it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This does several things. The most important is that you now have a
|
||
|
recording of your voice, telling the authorities about your horror at
|
||
|
having recieved such dreck. Second, the locals might give the US Post
|
||
|
Office a hard time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If you wait even an hour to call 911, then you risk the Feds picking
|
||
|
you up, leaving you with no record of how you were really trying to
|
||
|
take it back to the Post Office.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Do not worry about whether or not the package contains material which
|
||
|
is illegal locally. You want to be ON RECORD as not wanting the
|
||
|
package, and you want this to happen as soon as possible. The time
|
||
|
spent returning the package to the Post Office, or trying to get your
|
||
|
attorney on the phone, is time the Post Office can use to execute
|
||
|
their warrant.
|
||
|
|
||
|
I know this advice might tie up an emmergency line, but you have no
|
||
|
choice. The police do not always tape record their other calls. So
|
||
|
make your call short, and be sure to mention the package contents, and
|
||
|
the sender's name. Be sure your roommates who may open your packages
|
||
|
are also told what to do.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Hope this advice saves an innocent (if anyone is truely an innocent
|
||
|
these days.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Pamela Smith, Attorney at Law
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 94 23:20:21 MST
|
||
|
From: info@CSCNS.COM(CNS Information)
|
||
|
Subject: File 11--CNS-Internet (Internet access service)
|
||
|
|
||
|
CNS is an affiliation of Telephone Express, a long distance carrier.
|
||
|
Internet service through CNS is approved for commercial purposes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
CNS provides full INTERNET access through dial-in lines in Colorado
|
||
|
Springs (719-520-1700), in Denver (303-758-2656), and through a
|
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|
national 800 service. CNS is connected to the Internet via a T1 (1.544
|
||
|
Megabyte/sec), and runs on a network of SUN SPARC 10 platforms.
|
||
|
|
||
|
CNS provides dial-in, uucp, and slip services. CNS also provides dedicated
|
||
|
56K and T1 circuits throughout the United States. Please call our customer
|
||
|
support at 1-800-748-1200 if you have any questions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
CNS- A FULL INTERNET PROVIDER
|
||
|
Provided at full T1 speeds are:
|
||
|
|
||
|
email (mail and elm readers supported)
|
||
|
ftp (File Transfer Protocol at 1.544 Meg/sec)
|
||
|
telnet (Live Connection to Remote sites)
|
||
|
newsgroups (All newsgroups, including ClariNet)
|
||
|
irc (Internet Relay Chat- Networked Live Teleconference)
|
||
|
4m (A new emerging chat system)
|
||
|
gopher (menu driven INTERNET information system)
|
||
|
wais (Wide Area Information System)
|
||
|
uucp (newsfeeds available)
|
||
|
slip (newsfeeds and POP mail supported)
|
||
|
full UNIX shell (csh, ksh, all UNIX commands, on line man pages)
|
||
|
editors (vi, pico, and jove are supported)
|
||
|
xwindows (supports xgopher, xmosiac, xachie, and more)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Service is provided through easy-to-use menus which require no experience
|
||
|
to use, or a full UNIX shell.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
BUSINESS SERVICES
|
||
|
CNS also offers several business services, including electronic access to
|
||
|
the COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY, USA TODAY decision line, ClariNet news feed,
|
||
|
and a number of services of interest to businesses local to the greater
|
||
|
Denver and Colorado Springs area (such as city & county RFP, City, BBB,
|
||
|
and Chamber of Commerce Press Releases, Events Calendars, SBDC Business
|
||
|
Programs, etc). Part of the business services includes helping businesses
|
||
|
use the Internet to their maximum benefit.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
CNS-BBS
|
||
|
The CNS-INTERNET system is connected to a MajorBBS Galacticomm
|
||
|
entertainment system. This BBS has primarily a social purpose. Access to
|
||
|
this system is provided at no additional charge to CNS-INTERNET customers.
|
||
|
You may also access this system through telnet (telnet bbs.cscns.com).
|
||
|
|
||
|
CUSTOMER SERVICE
|
||
|
Most importantly, CNS provides friendly and professional customer service.
|
||
|
If you have special needs, or special information to carry, we would be
|
||
|
delighted to customize your needs. Call customer service at 719-592-1240,
|
||
|
or toll-free at 800-748-1200.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
RATES
|
||
|
There are two plans to choose from:
|
||
|
|
||
|
OPTION 1: $10 per month minimum
|
||
|
4.5 cents per minute for Colo Springs/Denver access
|
||
|
13.0 cents per minute for 800 access
|
||
|
|
||
|
OPTION 2: $29.95 per month minmum
|
||
|
2.0 cents per minute for Colo Springs/Denver Access
|
||
|
13.0 cents per minute for 800 access
|
||
|
|
||
|
Notice that our 800 service includes your long distance and your internet
|
||
|
access charges for a price lower than the average long distance phone call!
|
||
|
Local (Colo Springs or Denver) access charges are capped at $250 per
|
||
|
month.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In both options, there is a $35 one time set up fee. The first 1 Meg of disk
|
||
|
space is free. Beyond the first 1 Meg there is a monthly fee of $2.50.
|
||
|
Charges can be paid via credit card (Visa, Master Charge, American
|
||
|
Express, or Discover) or by monthly invoice.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The rate structure described above applies to UUCP, SLIP, or PPP
|
||
|
connections as well with one exception: the setup fee for uucp is $45, and
|
||
|
for slip/ppp is $75.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Please write to service@cscns.com for quotes on 56K and T1 access.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
TO SIGN UP
|
||
|
The following sign-up methods are available:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1) Call customer service at 1-800-748-1200.
|
||
|
2) Telnet to cscns.com. Log in as "new", password "newsuser".
|
||
|
|
||
|
During business hours, your account is set up within 1 hour.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Write to service@cscns.com or call us at 1-800-748-1200 if you have any
|
||
|
questions! We would be delighted to help you.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Important Phone Numbers:
|
||
|
CNS-INTERNET 719-520-1700 Colorado Springs
|
||
|
303-758-2656
|
||
|
800 modem number given to subscribers only
|
||
|
|
||
|
FAX 719-592-1201
|
||
|
|
||
|
VOICE 719-592-1240
|
||
|
SUPPORT 800-748-1200
|
||
|
|
||
|
You may write questions to service@cscns.com.
|
||
|
Please do not hestitate to write if you have further questions.
|
||
|
|
||
|
------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.15
|
||
|
************************************
|
||
|
|