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Computer underground Digest Sun, Nov 30, 1991 Volume 3 : Issue 42
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Moderators: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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CONTENTS, #3.42 ( November 30, 1991)
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File 1-- Moderators' Corner
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File 2-- CPSR FOIAs Secret Service
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File 3-- Responses to CPSR's FOIA Requests
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File 4-- Why Covert Surveillance is Wrong
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Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet alt.society.cu-digest news
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group, on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG,
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and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM, on Genie, on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414)
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789-4210, and by anonymous ftp from ftp.cs.widener.edu (147.31.254.132),
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chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu, and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au. To use the U. of
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Chicago email server, send mail with the subject "help" (without the
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quotes) to archive-server@chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu.
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source
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is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and they should
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be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal
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mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified.
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Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to the
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Computer Underground. Articles are preferred to short responses.
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Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 30 Nov 91 9:39:58 EST
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From: Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
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Subject: File 1-- Moderators' Corner
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We promised Sheldon Zenner's response to Bill Cook's opening statement
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in the Phrack/Knight Lightning trial, but a backlog of material will
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delay it for about two issues. This issue is devoted to the revelation
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of Secret Service covert surveillance of legal public activity
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announced by CPSR (see Craig Neidorf's file below). A lively
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discussion appeared in Telecom Digest (to subscribe via e-mail,
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contact moderator Pat Townson at: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu), which we
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reprint for the many readers who lack Usenet access.
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From information slowly emerging from FOIA requests by CPSR, Glen
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Roberts (publisher of _Full Disclosure_), and CuD, it appears that the
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Secret Service clearly overstepped its bounds. Gordon Meyer, co-editor
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of CuD, was investigated as a "hacker" on the basis of his association
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with "suspected hackers" when collecting information for his M.A.
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thesis. It is clear from released files that Secret Service
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investigators had little understanding of what the information they
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obtained, and this led to exaggerated interpretations and demonizing
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of activity that was otherwise legal.
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Because cyberspace is a new frontier in which the norms and laws
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governing it are still emerging, it is crucial that the limits
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establishing what law enforcement may or may not do in the new frontier
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be examined and debated. For those who feel that Constitutional
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protections should extent into computer-mediated communication, the
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Secret Service actions are of special concern.
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------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 22 Nov 1991 16:51:43 -0500
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From: Craig Neidorf <knight@EFF.ORG>
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Subject: File 2-- CPSR FOIAs Secret Service
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*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
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Craig Neidorf - Washington Intern
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Electronic Frontier Foundation
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666 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE
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Suite 303
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Washington, D.C. 20003
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(202)544-9237 Voice
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(202)547-5481 FAX
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*** Attribute no comment contained in this message to the ***
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*** Electronic Frontier Foundation unless explicited stated! ***
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The Secret Service's response to Computer Professionals for Social
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Responsibility's (CPSR) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request has
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raised new questions about the scope and conduct of the agency's
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"computer crime" investigations. The documents disclosed to CPSR
|
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reveal that the Secret Service monitored communications sent across
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the Internet. The materials released through the FOIA include copies
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of many electronic newsletters, digests, and Usenet groups including
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"comp.org.eff.talk," "comp.sys.att," "Computer Underground Digest"
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(alt.cud.cu-digest)," "Effector Online," "Legion of Doom Technical
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Journals," "Phrack Newsletter," and "Telecom Digest (comp.dcom.
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telecom)". Currently, there is no clear policy for the monitoring of
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network communications by law enforcement agents. A 1982 internal FBI
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memorandum indicated that the Bureau would consider monitoring on a
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case by case basis. That document was released as a result of a
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separate CPSR lawsuit against the FBI.
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Additionally, we have found papers that show Bell Labs in New Jersey
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passed copies of Telecom Digest to the Secret Service.
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The material (approximately 2500 pages) also suggests that the Secret
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Service's seizure of computer bulletin boards and other systems may
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have violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and
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the Privacy Protection Act of 1980.
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Two sets of logs from a computer bulletin board in Virginia show that
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the Secret Service obtained messages in the Spring of 1989 by use of
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the system administrator's account. It is unclear how the Secret
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Service obtained system administrator access. It is possible that the
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Secret Service accessed this system without authorization. The more
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likely explanation is that the agency obtained the cooperation of the
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system administrator. Another possibility is that this may have been
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a bulletin board set up by the Secret Service for a sting operation.
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Such a bulletin board was established for an undercover investigation
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involving pedophiles.
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The documents we received also include references to the video taping
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of SummerCon, a computer hackers conference that took place in St.
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Louis in 1988. The Secret Service employed an informant to attend the
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conference and placed hidden cameras to tape the participants. The
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documents also show that the Secret Service established a computer
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database to keep track of suspected computer hackers. This database
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contains records of names, aliases, addresses, phone numbers, known
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associates, a list of activities, and various articles associated with
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each individual.
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CPSR is continuing its efforts to obtain government documentation
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concerning computer crime investigations conducted by the Secret
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Service. These efforts include the litigation of several FOIA
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lawsuits and attempts to locate individuals targeted by federal
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agencies in the course of such investigations.
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For additional information, contact:
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dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org (David Sobel)
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 30 Nov 91 10:44: 41 CST
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From: Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
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Subject: File 3--Responses to CPSR (Reprinted from Telecom Digest)
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((Moderators' note: The following responses to the CPSR FOIA notice
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appeared in Telecom Digest. The posts raise crucial issues of
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monitoring public behavior in the grey area of legitimate
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investigation and unacceptable law enforcement behavior).
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Date: Sat, 23 Nov 1991 15:43:39 -0600
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From: TELECOM Moderator <telecom>
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Subject: Re: CPSR FOIAs U.S. Secret Service
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In TELECOM Digest V11 #953, Craig Neidorf <knight@eff.org> tells of
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efforts by the Computer Professionals For Social Responsibility to
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seek out evidence of U.S. Secret Service activity relating to
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investigations that agency has undertaken. TELECOM Digest was
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mentioned as one electronic journal apparently examined as part of one
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or more investigations. Perhaps Craig thought that seeing this journal
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in the agency's files would somehow excite (or incite?) me to action.
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Well, he is right. I was motivated to write this response.
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> The Secret Service's response to Computer Professionals for Social
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> Responsibility's (CPSR) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request has
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> raised new questions about the scope and conduct of the agency's
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> "computer crime" investigations. The documents disclosed to CPSR
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> reveal that the Secret Service monitored communications sent across the
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> Internet.
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Since the Internet is a government-owned and managed resource in
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cooperation with numerous publicly funded institutions and others, it
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is fair game for anyone who wishes to 'monitor' its traffic, provided
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that traffic is intended for public consumption and display, as are
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the various e-journals and newsgroups.
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Anyone is free -- even members of CPSR -- to interconnect with this
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network and read the newsgroups or subscribe to the various
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e-journals. Craig makes it sound, in his context, like the Secret
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Service did something wrong. In this instance, they did not.
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> The materials released through the FOIA include copies of
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> many electronic newsletters, digests, and Usenet groups including
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> "comp.org.eff.talk," "comp.sys.att," "Computer Underground Digest"
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> (alt.cud.cu-digest)," "Effector Online," "Legion of Doom Technical
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> Journals," "Phrack Newsletter," and "TELECOM Digest (comp.dcom.
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> telecom)".
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Well I don't know about those other guys mentioned here, but I have no
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problem with TELECOM Digest being in anyone's files.
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> Currently, there is no clear policy for the monitoring
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> of network communications by law enforcement agents. A 1982 internal
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> FBI memorandum indicated that the Bureau would consider monitoring on a
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> case by case basis.
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Well, why should there be a 'clear policy'? That which is available
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to the public is available to anyone, including employees of
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government agencies. If I can read it, take offense to it and (feeling
|
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it might be a criminal action) report it to authorities, then why
|
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|
can't an employee of the Secret Service read something here, feel the
|
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|
same way and report the matter? Or conversely, why can't any member
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of the public read something here, be disinterested in it or bored by
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it and forget the matter.
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> Additionally, we have found papers that show Bell Labs in New
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> Jersey passed copies of TELECOM Digest to the Secret Service.
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FYI, I have numerous names on the mailing matrix for TELECOM Digest of
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people associated with various government agencies, including the
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Secret Service, the IRS and many others. I ask for one thing from
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people who wish to subscribe: an interest in telecommunications policy
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|
and practice; and an enthusiasm for understanding telecommunications
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in an intellectually and ethically honest way. I specifically forbid
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and repudiate copyright of TELECOM Digest in the hopes people will
|
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share their understanding and ideas with others.
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If Craig's implication here is that there was something sneaky about
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the passing of the Digest to the Secret Service, then he is entitled
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to think that way; my answer is that had I known someone at Bell Labs
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was going to all that trouble (passing along issues of the Digest) I
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would have added the names of the interested parties to the matrix
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here, or started yet another expansion mailing list (there are
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currently over 100 such expansion mailing lists serviced from the main
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list here).
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> Another possibility is that this may have been a bulletin board set
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> up by the Secret Service for a sting operation. Such a bulletin board
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> was established for an undercover investigation involving pedophiles.
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I think that's an admirable goal ... investigating pedophiles.
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> The documents we received also include references to the video
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> taping of SummerCon, a computer hackers conference that took place in
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> St. Louis in 1988. The Secret Service employed an informant to attend
|
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> the conference and placed hidden cameras to tape the participants.
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Well again, a public event is a public event. It was advertised widely
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and people were invited to attend. That which can be seen with the
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eyes does not become forbidden to view later through the lens of a
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camera for strictly that reason alone.
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> The documents also show that the Secret Service established a computer
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> database to keep track of suspected computer hackers. This database
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> contains records of names, aliases, addresses, phone numbers, known
|
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> associates, a list of activities, and various articles associated with
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> each individual.
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Not that you would ever keep any computer database of people with
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interests like your own ....:)
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> CPSR is continuing its efforts to obtain government documentation
|
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|
> concerning computer crime investigations conducted by the Secret
|
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> Service. These efforts include the litigation of several FOIA lawsuits
|
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|
> and attempts to locate individuals targeted by federal agencies in the
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> course of such investigations.
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Fine ... you do your thing. But let me make it perfectly clear you do
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not speak for Patrick Townson and/or TELECOM Digest, although you may
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speak for various readers of the Digest who have asked you to
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represent them or speak for them. I have no problem whatsoever with
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the Secret Service or any other government agency reading what I
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publish here. They don't have to sneak around reading it.
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> For additional information, contact:
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> dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org (David Sobel)
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By all means, dear readers, contact CPSR if you want more information,
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but as for myself, I support government efforts to crack down on
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computer crime, and electronic invasion of computers by unauthorized
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users. I do not support organizations which would deny the government
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the right to participate in any public forum.
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Email is a whole different matter ... notice I have not mentioned it
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once today. I am talking about newsgroups and public mailing lists.
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Patrick Townson
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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Date: Sat, 23 Nov 1991 21:09 EST
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From: Paul Coen <PCOEN@drew.drew.edu>
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Subject: Re: CPSR FOIAs U.S. Secret Service
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Sorry, Pat. While I often agree with what you say, I'm going to have
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to disagree on a few points here.
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> Since the Internet is a government-owned and managed resource in
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> cooperation with numerous publicly funded institutions and others, it
|
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> is fair game for anyone who wishes to 'monitor' its traffic, provided
|
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|
> that traffic is intended for public consumption and display, as are
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> the various e-journals and newsgroups.
|
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That's a matter of perception. My description is that the Internet
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started as a DARPA project, and quickly grew. Now, only a portion of
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it is under government control. The international sites certainly
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aren't. While I agree that the federal government has a vested
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interest in what's on the .mil and .gov sites, or what is going over
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lines that the federal government is paying for, that's not a whole
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lot of the net these days. I'd certainly stop short of saying that it
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is "government owned."
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|
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|
> Anyone is free -- even members of CPSR -- to interconnect with this
|
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> network and read the newsgroups or subscribe to the various
|
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|
> e-journals. Craig makes it sound, in his context, like the Secret
|
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|
> Service did something wrong. In this instance, they did not.
|
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|
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You're right -- anyone is free, including the Secret Service. More on
|
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this later, as this actually raises questions about the Secret
|
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Service's behavior.
|
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|
|
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|
> Well I don't know about those other guys mentioned here, but I have no
|
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> problem with TELECOM Digest being in anyone's files.
|
|||
|
|
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|
Yes, but did all of the people who made contributions realize that it
|
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|
could end up in a file pertaining to a Secret Service investigation?
|
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|
|
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|
> Well, why should there be a 'clear policy'? That which is available
|
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|
> to the public is available to anyone, including employees of
|
|||
|
> government agencies. If I can read it, take offense to it and (feeling
|
|||
|
> it might be a criminal action) report it to authorities, then why
|
|||
|
> can't an employee of the Secret Service read something here, feel the
|
|||
|
> same way and report the matter? Or conversely, why can't any member
|
|||
|
> of the public read something here, be disinterested in it or bored by
|
|||
|
> it and forget the matter.
|
|||
|
|
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|
This is a tough issue -- if the net is considered "public behavior,"
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and statements made here are not criminal in nature (none in TELECOM
|
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|
Digest have been to date -- ie, no credit card numbers :), then why
|
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should it end up in a Secret Service file? Doesn't it then become
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government monitoring legal public activities/statements by citizens?
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Sorry, that's a bit too much like a police state for my liking, in
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flavor if not degree.
|
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|
|
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|
> FYI, I have numerous names on the mailing matrix for TELECOM Digest of
|
|||
|
> people associated with various government agencies, including the
|
|||
|
> Secret Service, the IRS and many others. I ask for one thing from
|
|||
|
> people who wish to subscribe: an interest in telecommunications policy
|
|||
|
> and practice; and an enthusiasm for understanding telecommunications
|
|||
|
> in an intellectually and ethically honest way. I specifically forbid
|
|||
|
> and repudiate copyright of TELECOM Digest in the hopes people will
|
|||
|
> share their understanding and ideas with others.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Do you really think the people who placed those excerpts in the files
|
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|
were interested in telecom issues? Or in who was saying what? Not
|
|||
|
the people who passed them on, but the "investigators." (Using the
|
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term loosely -- Foley certainly wasn't much of an investigator IMO.)
|
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|
|
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|
> Not that you would ever keep any computer database of people with
|
|||
|
> interests like your own ....:)
|
|||
|
|
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|
Of course, who knows how many people are in that database that
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shouldn't be -- considering that the Secret Service seemed to think
|
|||
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that the statement that Kermit is a file transfer protocol used on
|
|||
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mainframes was so serious. I'm surprised that they haven't busted
|
|||
|
Digital Press and confiscated the MS-Kermit User's Guide :).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> By all means, dear readers, contact CPSR if you want more information,
|
|||
|
> but as for myself, I support government efforts to crack down on
|
|||
|
> computer crime, and electronic invasion of computers by unauthorized
|
|||
|
> users. I do not support organizations which would deny the government
|
|||
|
> the right to participate in any public forum.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The problem is that you are dealing with two different entities here.
|
|||
|
On the one hand, you have the individual government employee, who has
|
|||
|
a right to participate in a public forum, and on the other, you have a
|
|||
|
governmental investigation agency, represented by that individual.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Unless it clearly relates to the commission of a crime, or it falls
|
|||
|
under the heading of "expert opinion," relating to an issue under
|
|||
|
investigation (and no copyrights are violated), the government should
|
|||
|
not be placing legal, public statements in the record of a criminal
|
|||
|
investigation is out of line. Sure, they can read it -- but to place
|
|||
|
it in that file implies that there is something wrong with the
|
|||
|
statement. Considering law-enforcement infiltration of legal lobbying
|
|||
|
groups who disagree with policy, and other abuses, you really have to
|
|||
|
wonder who is more paranoid -- extreme privacy advocates who would
|
|||
|
deny the government any role, or the agents of the government. These
|
|||
|
folks really seem to feel that anyone is a potential threat. And
|
|||
|
winding up, even by accident or chance, in one of their files is not a
|
|||
|
trivial matter. It can cost you security clearance, it can cost you a
|
|||
|
job, a promotion, or an appointment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It's very easy for a paper-pusher to get the idea that "it's all
|
|||
|
criminals on these here groups," based on the appearance of excerpts
|
|||
|
in files (why else would they be there -- remember Ed Meese's
|
|||
|
"innocent people aren't accused of crimes" comment?) -- so anyone who
|
|||
|
posts must not be trustworthy. The government understanding of the
|
|||
|
net is not yet mature enough to assume that they're not going to react
|
|||
|
that way. So far, they've been pretty predictable.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Paul Coen, pcoen@drew.drew.edu, pcoen@drew.bitnet
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Date: Sun, 24 Nov 91 01:09 PST
|
|||
|
From: john@zygot.ati.com (John Higdon)
|
|||
|
Subject: Re: CPSR FOIAs U.S. Secret Service
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
On Nov 23 at 16:46, TELECOM Moderator writes:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> I have no problem whatsoever with
|
|||
|
> the Secret Service or any other government agency reading what I
|
|||
|
> publish here. They don't have to sneak around reading it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
They why do they behave in this manner? The fact is they DO sneak
|
|||
|
around when indeed getting a subscription would be no problem at all.
|
|||
|
After dealing with FBI and telco security types for the past couple of
|
|||
|
years, I have come to believe that they would figure out a complex and
|
|||
|
covert way to glean some information even if it was painted in
|
|||
|
ten-foot high letters on Shasta Dam.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The fact of the matter is that many of these gum shoes are in way over
|
|||
|
their heads on a lot of this computer stuff and it is a full time job
|
|||
|
to keep from looking like the horse's ass. And most of the time they
|
|||
|
are not successful. Secret Service and FBI types have no idea what is
|
|||
|
"sensitive" and what is garbage. I have seen agents pore over
|
|||
|
documents in a case that I would not even fish out of the trash. Most
|
|||
|
amusing was watching a telco security person fawn over a box of
|
|||
|
"evidence" that was filled with stuff supposedly "stolen" from
|
|||
|
Pac*Bell that I would pay you to remove from my garage. It was garbage
|
|||
|
that even Pac*Bell has not used in any way for over thirty years.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Unlike Patrick, I have little or no faith and confidence in law
|
|||
|
enforcement when it comes to "hackers". Even the "experts" I have met
|
|||
|
on that side of the fence tend to drool a bit and would have not a
|
|||
|
clue concerning who and what was "dangerous" or not. For all the
|
|||
|
seizures and raids that have occurred we have seen precious little in
|
|||
|
terms of court action and that which actually has landed in court has
|
|||
|
proven my point.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It is unfortunate that more enlightenment has not managed to find its
|
|||
|
way into government's enforcement arm in the form of knowledgeable
|
|||
|
personnel. But what can you expect when even the laws dealing with
|
|||
|
these "crimes" are confusing and inadequate. You have policemen
|
|||
|
enforcing laws they do not understand, serving warrants issued by
|
|||
|
judges who have not a clue, and occasionally, courts dispensing
|
|||
|
justice in the dark.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Until you have personally witnessed the wheels of enforcement and
|
|||
|
justice grind away on the field of computers and telecommunications,
|
|||
|
you cannot grasp the pitiful nature of these processes, nor comprehend
|
|||
|
the damage that is being done to rights and protections that we all
|
|||
|
used to take for granted. I cannot believe that Patrick would be so
|
|||
|
gung-ho on this matter if he could see the reality of what he
|
|||
|
euphemistically refers to as "enforcement" and "justice". It could not
|
|||
|
be a bigger joke.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> By all means, dear readers, contact CPSR if you want more information,
|
|||
|
> but as for myself, I support government efforts to crack down on
|
|||
|
> computer crime, and electronic invasion of computers by unauthorized
|
|||
|
> users.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Surely you cannot be referring to any of the efforts to date. I have
|
|||
|
personally looked into many of these efforts, some in great detail,
|
|||
|
and am horrified at what misguided efforts these are. To be honest,
|
|||
|
these efforts are also as ineffective as they are unnecessarily harsh.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> I do not support organizations which would deny the government
|
|||
|
> the right to participate in any public forum.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Since when is sneaking around obtaining covert copies of a forum's
|
|||
|
output "participation"? I support organizations that strive to ensure
|
|||
|
that the government operate within the framework of laws and the
|
|||
|
constitution, regardless of how "important" and "urgent" the matters
|
|||
|
under investigation may be represented by that government.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> Email is a whole different matter ... notice I have not mentioned it
|
|||
|
> once today. I am talking about newsgroups and public mailing lists.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A thin line, to be sure. A line that most (if not all) enforcement
|
|||
|
agencies have no problem crossing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Date: Sun, 24 Nov 1991 10:22:27 -0500 (EST)
|
|||
|
From: NIEBUHR@BNLCL6.BNL.GOV (Dave Niebuhr, BNL CCD, 516-282-3093)
|
|||
|
Subject: Re: CPSR FOIAs U.S. Secret Service
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Pat's rebuttal to Craig Neidorf's article fits my perspective 100%
|
|||
|
when it comes to using a public access media such as Usenet. I feel
|
|||
|
that if I put something onto it, then I'm willing to have anyone read
|
|||
|
what I want to say.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Conversely, if I don't want anyone to see it, then I don't post it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Good show, Pat.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
|
|||
|
Subject: Re: CPSR FOIAs U.S. Secret Service
|
|||
|
Date: Sun, 24 Nov 91 11:52:16 EST
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Pat writes:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> By all means, dear readers, contact CPSR if you want more
|
|||
|
> information, but as for myself, I support government efforts to
|
|||
|
> crack down on computer crime, and electronic invasion of computers by
|
|||
|
> unauthorized users. I do not support organizations which would deny
|
|||
|
> the government the right to participate in any public forum.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It should be noted that the Electronic Frontier Foundation has never
|
|||
|
argued that there is a principled rationale for denying the government
|
|||
|
access to public forums. Moreover, both EFF and CPSR have hosted
|
|||
|
public forums on computer crime, civil liberties, and privacy matters
|
|||
|
at which government representatives have been informative and
|
|||
|
enthusiastic participants.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> But let me make it perfectly clear you do not speak for Patrick
|
|||
|
> Townson and/or TELECOM Digest, although you may speak for various
|
|||
|
> readers of the Digest who have asked you to represent them or speak
|
|||
|
> for them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This seems to me to be an odd comment. I don't know of anyone,
|
|||
|
including Craig Neidorf, who has claimed to "speak for" TELECOM Digest
|
|||
|
or Pat Townson.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
You seem to be expressing opposition to CPSR's efforts to find out the
|
|||
|
contours of the government's efforts to fight computer crime. This
|
|||
|
surprises me, since I'd have thought that anyone in a democratic
|
|||
|
society would be interested in knowing how the government is spending
|
|||
|
our tax money -- not to mention whether some of its efforts might affect
|
|||
|
the exercise of the Constitutional right to free speech in a public
|
|||
|
forum.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
[Telecom Moderator's Note: Readers who are interested in more information
|
|||
|
about the Electronic Frontier Foundation and/or membership should
|
|||
|
contact Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>. PAT]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
From: mcovingt@athena.cs.uga.edu (Michael A. Covington)
|
|||
|
Subject: Re: CPSR FOIAs U.S. Secret Service
|
|||
|
Date: Sun, 24 Nov 91 19:08:46 GMT
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In article <telecom11.953.4@eecs.nwu.edu> knight@eff.org (Craig
|
|||
|
Neidorf) writes:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> The Secret Service's response to Computer Professionals for
|
|||
|
> Social Responsibility's (CPSR) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
|
|||
|
> request has raised new questions about the scope and conduct of the
|
|||
|
> agency's "computer crime" investigations. The documents disclosed to
|
|||
|
> CPSR reveal that the Secret Service monitored communications sent
|
|||
|
> across the Internet. The materials released through the FOIA include
|
|||
|
> copies of many electronic newsletters, digests, and Usenet groups
|
|||
|
> including "comp.org.eff.talk," "comp.sys.att," "Computer Underground
|
|||
|
> Digest" (alt.cud.cu-digest)," "Effector Online," "Legion of Doom
|
|||
|
> Technical Journals," "Phrack Newsletter," and "TELECOM Digest
|
|||
|
> (comp.dcom.telecom)". Currently, there is no clear policy for the
|
|||
|
> monitoring of network communications by law enforcement agents.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Two of these are unfamiliar to me, but all the rest are forums which
|
|||
|
everyone is welcome to read. You might as well complain that the
|
|||
|
Secret Service reads your local newspaper.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Seriously, I am concerned about possible violations of people's rights
|
|||
|
by over-zealous agents. But reading comp.dcom.telecom hardly counts
|
|||
|
as snooping!
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In article <telecom11.959.1@eecs.nwu.edu> PCOEN@drew.drew.edu (Paul
|
|||
|
Coen) writes:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> Anyone is free -- even members of CPSR -- to interconnect with this
|
|||
|
>> network and read the newsgroups or subscribe to the various
|
|||
|
>> e-journals. Craig makes it sound, in his context, like the Secret
|
|||
|
>> Service did something wrong. In this instance, they did not.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> Well I don't know about those other guys mentioned here, but I have no
|
|||
|
>> problem with TELECOM Digest being in anyone's files.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> Yes, but did all of the people who made contributions realize that it
|
|||
|
> could end up in a file pertaining to a Secret Service investigation?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is something we have had a hard time hammering into the heads of
|
|||
|
the users here at the University of Georgia. A newsgroup is a public
|
|||
|
forum. Posting something in a newsgroup is like publishing it in a
|
|||
|
major newspaper. The person posting it should expect that it will be
|
|||
|
read by practically anybody anywhere.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"I've just posted this for 100,000 people, but don't tell anybody!" is
|
|||
|
unfortunately a common attitude. People seem to think that the
|
|||
|
newsgroups are some kind of underground society where everyone is
|
|||
|
sworn to secrecy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
From: fulk@cs.rochester.edu (Mark Fulk)
|
|||
|
Subject: Re: CPSR FOIAs U.S. Secret Service
|
|||
|
Date: Sun, 24 Nov 1991 21:27:49 GMT
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In article <telecom11.954.6@eecs.nwu.edu> telecom (TELECOM Moderator)
|
|||
|
writes:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> In TELECOM Digest V11 #953, Craig Neidorf <knight@eff.org> tells of
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
...Long inclusion deleted, consult the previous articles...
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
I think Pat is attacking a straw man here. Craig Neidorf's posting
|
|||
|
offered no evaluation of the purpose, danger, or legality of the
|
|||
|
included material; Pat only assumed that CPSR/CN/EFF object to the
|
|||
|
government keeping such files. A more appropriate response would be
|
|||
|
"why should this matter?", since no reason for caring was offered.
|
|||
|
I'll offer two reasons I care:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1) Further evidence that the government investigators are operating in
|
|||
|
the dark.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2) The use by demagogues of "presence in a file" as evidence for
|
|||
|
guilt. "Ah, yes, Mr. Townson, but we have seen your name in the FBI's
|
|||
|
computer crimes file. Now stop telling us you don't know any credit
|
|||
|
card thiefs." This tactic is the reason the John Birch society used
|
|||
|
to send out postcards accusing people of being communists. The
|
|||
|
postcards were sometimes used by HUAC as evidence of guilt. Among the
|
|||
|
people who were the subject of such postcards were John Kenneth
|
|||
|
Galbraith and Amitai Etzioni (they weren't investigated by HUAC).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> was established for an undercover investigation involving pedophiles.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> I think that's an admirable goal ... investigating pedophiles.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
On the surface. I must admit that I know next to nothing about
|
|||
|
pedophilia. However, I'm fairly certain that it is a condition
|
|||
|
requiring treatment more than a crime requiring punishment. And it
|
|||
|
seems likely to me that the Secret Service's bulletin board would very
|
|||
|
likely be an entrapment; would very likely result in the arrest of
|
|||
|
people who never touch a child despite their condition; and almost
|
|||
|
certainly will do nothing whatsoever to contribute to the safety of
|
|||
|
children. On the other hand, an investigation of the Diocese of
|
|||
|
Chicago would, it seems, be of great value. For some reason, that
|
|||
|
investigation has not yet begun.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> The documents we received also include references to the video
|
|||
|
>> taping of SummerCon, a computer hackers conference that took place in
|
|||
|
>> St. Louis in 1988. The Secret Service employed an informant to attend
|
|||
|
>> the conference and placed hidden cameras to tape the participants.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> Well again, a public event is a public event. It was advertised widely
|
|||
|
> and people were invited to attend. That which can be seen with the
|
|||
|
> eyes does not become forbidden to view later through the lens of a
|
|||
|
> camera for strictly that reason alone.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Not all events at a conference are public. Most of the interesting
|
|||
|
work goes on in private meeting rooms and bedrooms. People have a
|
|||
|
right to privacy where they might reasonably expect it; if a meeting
|
|||
|
room is labelled private, taping there would violate privacy. Taping
|
|||
|
in anyone's hotel room would certainly be a violation of privacy,
|
|||
|
lacking the permission of the people present. It has been a long time
|
|||
|
since Summercon '88 was a current topic, but I recall that the taping
|
|||
|
occurred in someone's hotel room.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> The documents also show that the Secret Service established a computer
|
|||
|
>> database to keep track of suspected computer hackers. This database
|
|||
|
>> contains records of names, aliases, addresses, phone numbers, known
|
|||
|
>> associates, a list of activities, and various articles associated with
|
|||
|
>> each individual.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> Not that you would ever keep any computer database of people with
|
|||
|
> interests like your own ....:)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Again, no evaluation of the data was offered, Pat. You're barking at
|
|||
|
the mailman. The point was to give a clear idea of the amount of effort
|
|||
|
the Secret Service has expended. I would expect them to construct
|
|||
|
such a database. What concerns me is the quality of information in
|
|||
|
the database.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
I think CPSR's efforts are clearly worthwhile.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
>> CPSR is continuing its efforts to obtain government documentation
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> Fine ... you do your thing. But let me make it perfectly clear you do
|
|||
|
> not speak for Patrick Townson and/or TELECOM Digest, although you may
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
> By all means, dear readers, contact CPSR if you want more information,
|
|||
|
> but as for myself, I support government efforts to crack down on
|
|||
|
> computer crime, and electronic invasion of computers by unauthorized
|
|||
|
> users. I do not support organizations which would deny the government
|
|||
|
>the right to participate in any public forum.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The straw is flying now!
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Of course the government has a right to participate in c.d.t, and to
|
|||
|
record articles. Of course it should crack down on computer crime,
|
|||
|
provided that in so doing it respects the Constitution and the law,
|
|||
|
and provided (1) that the crackdown is directed at substantial crimes,
|
|||
|
not at teenage pranks that should be dealt with by parents and
|
|||
|
relevant local authorities, and (2) that the crackdown has some chance
|
|||
|
of success.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The problem with Secret Service efforts is that they SEEM to be a
|
|||
|
bunch of Keystone Kops. Since they are apparently unable to approach
|
|||
|
the real problems, they are spending time collecting massive
|
|||
|
quantities of irrelevant material to pad their files. I suspect that
|
|||
|
they are also padding their suspect lists, which makes the matter of
|
|||
|
their database of suspected hackers AND ASSOCIATES a bit of a worry.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One might ask, "How SHOULD the SS proceed?" My prescription: for
|
|||
|
decades there have been persistent rumors of computer thefts by
|
|||
|
insiders. The perpetrators, once caught by their employers, would be
|
|||
|
let go for minimal restitution and silence. The SS should track some
|
|||
|
of those rumors down, and if any turn up correct, prosecute. The
|
|||
|
effort, of course, would be substantial. The probability of success
|
|||
|
is not 100%. But, by all accounts known to me, this is the best way
|
|||
|
to get at the real bulk of computer crime.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
[Telecom Moderator's Note: One glaring inaccuracy in your response was your
|
|||
|
comment that 'an investigation of (pedophilia in) the Archdiocese of
|
|||
|
Chicago would be of great value and it has not begun.' The truth here
|
|||
|
is that following several detailed articles in the %Chicago Sun Times%,
|
|||
|
the %Chicago Reader%, a couple articles by myself in misc.legal which
|
|||
|
drew considerable attention, and several news reports on television,
|
|||
|
the 'pedophilia problem' in the Archdiocese of Chicago WAS investigated
|
|||
|
at the church level and IS being investigated by the Cook County State's
|
|||
|
Attorney now. During the past two weeks, six priests have been removed
|
|||
|
from their positions, and more are expected to be removed soon. PAT]
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 91 01:20 CST
|
|||
|
From: TK0JUT1@NIU.BITNET
|
|||
|
Subject: File 4-- Why Covert Surveillance is Wrong
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Criticism of Craig Neidorf's report of CPSR's investigation into
|
|||
|
Secret Service covert surveillance of net-media, use of informants,
|
|||
|
and other intrusive observations justifies law enforcement actions on
|
|||
|
several grounds, including:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1) Anything public is fair game for covert surveillance.
|
|||
|
2) People with nothing to hide shouldn't worry about what they say in
|
|||
|
public.
|
|||
|
3) Computer crime isn't cool, and the government has both the right
|
|||
|
and the responsibility to target evil-doers. Therefore, law
|
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enforcement need not have clear policies circumscribing the limits
|
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|
of covert intrusion.
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|
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|
First, it is categorically false that *anything* done in public is
|
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|
fair game for covert surveillance. As anybody from the Chicago area
|
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|
should know, Judge Getzendammer (US District Court, Northern District)
|
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|
made it quite clear in several rulings against the Chicago police in
|
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|
political surveillance cases that covert surveillance of lawful
|
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|
activity in public is not to be tolerated in a free society. Further,
|
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|
anybody with even a high school civics knowledge of covert
|
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|
surveillance in the US understands the distinction between legitimate
|
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|
participation in a public event and participating in that event for
|
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|
the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and storing information on
|
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|
law-abiding citizens.
|
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|
|
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|
Scrounging through Usenet traffic to compile dossiers on people not
|
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|
under investigation for wrongdoing is as reprehensible as targeting
|
|||
|
license plate numbers from cars in a parking lot at an anti-nukes
|
|||
|
rally as a way of creating a list of possible "subversives." Frank
|
|||
|
Donner's _Protectors of Privilege_ lays out the the historical
|
|||
|
consequences of and responses to covert law enforcement surveillance.
|
|||
|
Blanket intrusion by agents into Constitutionally protected realms
|
|||
|
that include freedom of speech, privacy, and assembly, are not only a
|
|||
|
demonstrable threat to democracy -- they are not generally tolerated
|
|||
|
by the courts.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Second, while law enforcement agents have every right to read whatever
|
|||
|
public document they wish, this misses the point. It is not that
|
|||
|
agents subscribe to and/or read documents. The point is what they do
|
|||
|
with what they read. A 1977 class action suit against the Michigan
|
|||
|
State Police learned, through FOIA requests, that state and federal
|
|||
|
agents would peruse letters to the editor of newspapers and collect
|
|||
|
clippings of those whose politics they did not like. These news
|
|||
|
clippings became the basis of files on those persons that found there
|
|||
|
way into the hands of other agencies and employers. The preliminary
|
|||
|
CPSR information suggests that the Secret Service is conducting their
|
|||
|
investigation in an analogous manner. This has a chilling effect on
|
|||
|
free speech that is arguably (judging from court cases) not only
|
|||
|
illegal, but dangerous. As somebody wrote in CuD recently:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The basis of a democratic society rests on the ability of
|
|||
|
citizens to openly discuss competing ideas, challenge political
|
|||
|
power and assemble freely with others. These fundamental First
|
|||
|
Amendment rights are subverted when, through neglect, the state
|
|||
|
fails to protect them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Covert collection of information, whether from TELECOM Digest, CuD, or
|
|||
|
newspaper editorials, and the subsequent compilation of secret
|
|||
|
dossiers moves us from a democracy to a police state. The issue isn't
|
|||
|
whether any specific person has something to hide, but rather whether
|
|||
|
somebody might, because of secret information gathering, wish they had
|
|||
|
hidden what they had previously said. We shouldn't have to worry
|
|||
|
about whether what we say pleases law enforcement lest we become
|
|||
|
entries in some database of undesireables.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Finally, few people disagree with the claim that computer crime is
|
|||
|
wrong. But, because a given behavior is wrong hardly justifies carte
|
|||
|
blanche to investigate that behavior. The government should have clear
|
|||
|
policies about the scope of surveillance because it protects *all*
|
|||
|
citizens from the dangers of intrusion by law enforcement into
|
|||
|
Constitutionally protected behavior. Like gravity, specific
|
|||
|
limitations on covert intrusion by law enforcement into our lives
|
|||
|
isn't just a good idea, it's the law.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Computer-mediated communication is relatively new, and the law has not
|
|||
|
caught up with changing technology. CPSR should be commended for its
|
|||
|
efforts to track what appear to be clear violations of existing laws
|
|||
|
and policies in investigation of "computer crime." There is nothing
|
|||
|
noble in acquiescing to the erosion of Constitutionally protected
|
|||
|
activity as those who defend the Secret Service actions seem willing
|
|||
|
to do.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
------------------------------
|
|||
|
|
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|
End of Computer Underground Digest #3.42
|
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|
************************************
|
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|
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