124 lines
6.6 KiB
Plaintext
124 lines
6.6 KiB
Plaintext
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LEGALLY, LITHUANIA'S CASE IS OPEN AND SHUT
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By Vytautas Landsbergis
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President of Lithuania
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There is no shortage of advice for solving the Lithuanian
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question these days. But to solve the problem, one has to
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understand it. The latest trend, in both Soviet and western
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circles, is to urge "a fair and objective" way out of the stalemate
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for all parties concerned -- the Soviet Union, Lithuania and the
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western governments, who are under public pressure to support our
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drive for independence. However some of the offered solutions are
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neither fair nor objective.
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Soviet spokesmen argue that the unruly Lithuanians should
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respect and follow orderly Soviet constitutional procedures. They
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concede that the Lithuanians are entitled to independence if they
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want it. But as a "constituent part of the Soviet Union," the
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LIthuanians must abide by the procedures of Soviet law that could
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make their independence possible.
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The basic flaw in this argument is that Lithuania is not
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seeking to establish independence, it is working to restore an
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independent state that was illegally suppressed by a foreign power
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and its army. It is not calling for secession from the Soviet
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Union, because it never legally joined it. This is not just a
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legal nicety, but the basic and nonnegotiable premise of our March
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11 declaration of independence.
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When Soviet spokesmen speak of the right to secession, this
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right does not apply to Lithuania: it is not legally tenable. The
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Baltic countries, Lithuania included, have always maintained, and
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the world recognizes, that they were illegally incorporated into
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the Soviet Union. The Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet
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Union last December itself declared illegal the document that gave
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birth to the Soviet occupation: the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
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Under Soviet law, Gorbachev says that Lithuania's right to
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self-determination can be realized only through the mechanism he
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approves and provides. After all, we are told, he is not denying
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our right to self-rule, he is merely contesting the pace of
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secession. We don't believe he has any intention of letting
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Lithuania or the Baltic states secede - legally or otherwise. The
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law gives the Congress of People's Deputies - to which,it must be
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recalled, Gorbachev appointed himself and 99 of his Communist
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colleagues -- the right to veto secession by any Soviet republic,
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even if two thirds of its registered voters express their desire
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for independence.
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Though we are not bound by any Soviet constitution, our
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actions of March 11 were fully consistent with a constitutional
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provision that provides each Soviet republic's legislature with the
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right to secede. Moreover the Soviet constitution states that the
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USSR is a voluntary union of states.
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If the USSR enjoyed a system of checks and balances similar
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to the U.S. system, along with an independent Supreme Court that
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could rule on the legality of decisions by the Soviet legislature
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and executive, then a "Soviet SUpreme Court" would approve the
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restoration of independence in the Baltic states because their
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forcible incorporation contradicts the "voluntary union" clause of
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the Soviet constitution; and not permit the retroactive
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application of punitive law.
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But that -retroactive application of a punitive law - is
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precisely what the Congress of People's Deputies has tried to do
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by declaring our March 11 vote invalid because it contradicted a
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secession law that did not even exist on March 11.
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The April 5 secession legislation adopted by the USSR's
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Supreme SOviet requires that, to secede, a republic must conduct
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a referendum. Since no referendum was held in 1940 to determine
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whether we wished to nullify our independence and to join the USSR,
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why is a referendum needed now to determine whether this forcible
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incorporation should be ended?
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We have no illusions about our economic dependence on and
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interrelationship with Moscow, but we find it hard to understand
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why in this day and age, a master-slave relationship should
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continue or even be encouraged as a solution to the problem,
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surprisingly enough, by some western friends.
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Our elections of February 24 were democratic and legitimate.
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Pro-independence candidates proposed by the Sajudis party swept the
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elections under the campaign slogan of democracy and independence
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for Lithuania. Sajudis' political platform differed from its main
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opponent, the breakaway Lithuanian Communist Party, in that it
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advocated complete political independence as soon as possible with
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normal, diplomatic relations with Moscow on equal footing, whereas
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the LCP leadership still spoke in indeterminate terms of Lithuanian
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sovereignty "within the USSR."
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In addition to elections, the will of the Lithuanian people
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has been expressed many times at mass demonstrations and it at
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least two major petition drives: In 1988, 1.8 million out of a
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population of 3.5 million rejected Soviet constitutional amendments
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that restricted the republic's sovereign rights. And last year,
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1.6 million called for the renunciation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
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pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania. In light
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of these political realities, how can we possibly plan and decide
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our destiny by Moscow's rules and Moscow's terms? We cannot brush
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off our political mandate.
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Moscow has expressed its displeasure in recent weeks with a
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barrage of verbal and physical threats, blockades and other acts
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of force against our people. If the Soviet Union continues to use
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force to crush and smother Lithuanian independence, if Gorbachev
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attempts to keep Lithuania in the Soviet fold as a hostile captive,
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we will all lose. He will prove that perestroika is a collection
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of failed policies and not a genuine transition to democracy.
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But if Gorbachev extends democracy to his own backyard and
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recognizes the democratically elected government of neighboring
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Lithuania, if he presides over the peaceful dissolution of the last
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living empire on this earth, if he deals with us as equal, friendly
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partners, we will all benefit. And he would take his place as a
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great man in history.
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The real problem is not Lithuanian independence, but how
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Moscow views itself. Our vote for freedom is forcing Moscow to
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take a stand - for democracy or for preservation of the "holy"
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Soviet empire. Instead of facing the issue head on, the Soviet
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Union is focusing on a little antagonist, which was never an
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antagonist to begin with. In this pitifully unequal battle, Moscow
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is its own worst enemy.
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Translated by Ginte Damusis.
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Printed in New York Newsday.
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April 27, 1990.
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