567 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
567 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
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Drug Wars and Drug Laws
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"Deep Cover," a $5.95 pocketbook, by Dell, written by a former DEA group
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supervisor and international undercover agent, gives the inside (true)
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story of how DEA infighting, incompetence, and subterfuge lost the biggest
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battle of the drug war. If there was a textbook on undercover work, Michael
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Levine would have written it. For 25 years he was an insider in the DEA -
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their top undercover cop. A man with a proven record of arrests -
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personally accounting for more than 3,000 criminals serving 15,000 years in
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jail. A man who now calls America's war on drugs "the biggest, costliest,
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most dangerous failure of American policy since Vietnam. In his book "Deep
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Cover" he takes you on one of the most dramatic, ambitious cases ever
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mounted - an operation in which the drug kingpins of three countries were
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caught red-handed... and tells you why they were never brought to justice.
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The result is an explosive expose of why we're losing the war on drugs -
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told in the words of an American who has devoted his life to winning it."
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The above description was taken from the covers of his book. If you're the
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least bit interested in doing something about the drug war farce, read this
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book. It may come as a bit of a shock to learn that (on page 64, for
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example,) DEA's Staff coordinator, Art Egbert said, "They are making so
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much cocaine down there (in Bolivia) that just seizing another 10, 20, or
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30 thousand kilos isn't going to make any difference whatsoever. There are
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probably 150 or 200 guys like Roman down there. It's just not worth making
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a buy."
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Michael Levine's thoughts at that time were, "I wanted to scream. "Why the
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fuck have two DEA undercover agents died this year after going after ounces
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of cocaine? Was it for nothing? And why are you sending agents into the
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jungles like an invading army, like Vietnam? For nothing?" The words were
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on the tip of my tongue. Only the realization that it would have meant an
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instant end to Trifecta (code name for the operation) silenced me -- but
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not completely."
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And it didn't. His book, "Deep Cover," written after his retirement, blows
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the lid off political ambitions and bureaucratic bungling and the shameful
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waste of lives and billions of dollars on the biggest con of all - DEA's
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operation "Snowcap."
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The essence of the Michael's story, besides shocking revelations that will
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make you both angry and dismayed, mentions a viable alternative that may
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not be politically expedient, but could be the most effective way to fight
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the drug war.
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On page 227 he says "Over the next week, from March 24th to March 29th,
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night after night, Group 22 (his group) kept locking up buyers. Most of
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them flipped (gave evidence against the pusher who sold them the dope),
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signed statements, and blubbered that they would never do it again. The one
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thing that seemed apparent to me was that most of them never would have
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been buying drugs in the first place if they'd believed there was a chance
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they'd be busted. WHEN WILL WE EVER LEARN!" (Mike's emphasis.)
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Another pocketbook, "Cocaine Wars," by Paul Eddy with Hugo Sabogal and Sara
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Waden, Bantam Books, 1988, makes similar remarks and has come to the same
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conclusion:
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" ...When the task force began work in 1982, one kilo of cocaine of any
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purity cost $47,000 to $60,000 in Miami. In late 1987 one kilo cost between
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$9,000 and $14,000 in Miami, and there were places in the city where at
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night cocaine was more easily and openly available than cigarettes.
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What went wrong? "We win battles while they win the war," said Special
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Agent William Yout, a blunt Boston Irishman who until 1987 was the DEA's
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exceptionally forthright spokesman in Miami. In Yout's view -- a view
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widely shared in law enforcement and by the other side -- the task force
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failed, and continues to fail, because its strategy is flawed, because it
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fights on the wrong front, and because for all the hoopla and all the
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political rhetoric, there is in Washington neither the understanding nor
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the political will to win."
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Another book of Michael Levine's exploits, "Undercover," written by Donald
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Goddard (Dell) and available in paperback ($5) contains a series of
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"seminars" that Levine uses to teach law enforcement agents how to go
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undercover. In the book, the gist of his seminars are told, along with the
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background information in story form on how he made the busts. It's
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fascinating to read, and in a way, is a training manual for CrimeFighters.
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It explains what going undercover is really like and exactly how to do it!
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Levine reiterates (in Chapter 9 of "Undercover") "We can win, if you want
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to". In this Chapter, Mike is talking to a PTA group and explains why the
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war on drugs is already lost, and what can and should be done about it. He
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emphatically repeats the claim that all the big busts have damn little
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effect and never will. It's only when users of illegal drugs are hounded,
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harried, and harassed out of existence will the drug wars be won. As long
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as the demand is there, drug dealers will be able to make a lot of money
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meeting the demand. Taking out dealers, who are replaced immediately by
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another group who are waiting in line to move up the ladder, is not the way
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to fight the war on drugs. Going after the users is the only effective way
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to eliminate drug use. When no one (or hardly anyone) uses drugs anymore,
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there'll be no dealers.
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What Levine recommends is not going to be a popular remedy supported by the
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public or police departments. First, it means making arrests in record
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numbers that won't be currently practical. Wholesale arrests would tie up
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the entire judicial system. Most of these arrests will be considered as
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"nuisance" arrests as far as the courts are concerned. Second, most of
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these lawbreakers are almost immediately released with a slap on the wrist
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-- plea bargained down to a petty offense or misdemeanor and a small fine
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or a few days in jail. For the cops on the street, it's just not worth the
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time and hassle when they have too many other things to do. So they don't
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bother. They can't. There are too many users and not enough police.
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Prosecutors are already overworked, court calendars too crowded, and jails
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are overflowing. That's the problem. (But, CrimeFighters could provide a
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simple solution. More on that coming up.)
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Drug Wars: Just a GAME?
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Both "Deep Cover" and "Cocaine Wars," about different narc agents, draw
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similar but separate conclusions that sum up their opinion of the War on
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Drugs:
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In" Cocaine Wars," Ex-Lieutenant Raul Diaz (homicide, with nine years of
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service), said that in the War on Drugs, he had lost sight of that, and
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gone for overall victory, and, consequently, he had lost. He was, he said,
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no longer naive: "the whole thing's a game. It's all a fucking game."
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Michael Levine, in "Deep Cover," says "I listened to Hooper talk and
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realized I was no better than he, or any of the other DEA agents who
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realize that the whole drug war is nothing more than a game -- a dangerous
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game, but a game nonetheless -- and continue to play, risking their lives
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but afraid to risk their jobs. I was as afraid as any of them -- afraid of
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a truth I had refused to see ever since the nightmare of the Roberta Suarez
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case."
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* * * * * *
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Another book, "Drug Agent, U.S.A.," written by Richard F. Radford and Jack
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Crowley, published by St. Martin's Paperbacks is another "true detective
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story" of the street war on drugs as experienced by undercover drug agents.
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This one, beside relating fascinating stories, provides clear insight in
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the drug scene and the jobs of undercover cops. It also sheds additional
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light on the reason for failure of the war on drugs!
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The authors of "Drug Agent U.S.A." mention something generally overlooked
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by the public as well as politicians:
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"...fully half the drugs OD's that get reported in this country derive from
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prescription drugs. That's not to say they've all been negligently
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prescribed: there are as many methods of illegal diversion as there are
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criminals. Drugs get stolen, prescriptions get forged, some people
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deliberately overdose.
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"As a supervisor for the DEA, my first concern is about the sheer size of
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the problem. From an enforcement point of view, the numbers are staggering.
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There are approximately 800,000 registrants in the United States -- that
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is, over three-quarters of a million legally registered pharmacists,
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doctors, manufacturers, distributors and others who handle, somewhere along
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the line, drugs listed under the Controlled Substances Act. All of these
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registrants are potential diverters, people who divert legal drugs to an
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illegal end, so the logistics of tracking down a crooked handler are mind-
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boggling.
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"Add to the problem of this number the fact there are several thousand
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different drugs listed under the Controlled Substances Act. Those several
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thousand items factor out to about 20 million dosage units of drugs that
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can, as the DEA says, "have a substantial and detrimental effect on the
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health and welfare of the American people.
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"Obviously, not all the drugs are ending up where they're supposed to. Of
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the 20 billion legally produced dosage units, estimates range from a low
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250 million to a high of 650 million dosage units diverted into the illicit
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market annually. That's a lot of pills."
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Chapter 2 of "Drug Agent U.S.A." reveals that generally speaking, if the
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case isn't profitable moneywise, won't advance legal careers, or won't
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enhance their political aspirations, most prosecutors tend to ignore,
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stonewall, discourage, and sidestep the little cases. They're just not
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interested.
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It seems logical that prosecutors don't want to waste their time on the
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little busts because, if they win the cases, there's no glory or big
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reputations to be made. On the other hand, if they lose too many, it could
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ruin their reputation, derail their careers, and hinder political ambitions
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for higher office. From a business point of view, It's smarter to play the
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odds when their in your favor. I'd do the same thing, and so would most
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people if they were ambitious lawyers who want to climb the ladder to
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higher office. But, that's part of the problem -- politics!
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Perhaps politicians and bureaucrats at the top are also knowingly "playing
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the game" -- to hang on to their big-paying jobs with billions of dollars
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worth of assets at their disposal, plus large expense accounts. If the Drug
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War is won, they'll be out of a job. Maybe that's what Yout meant when he
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said, "there is in Washington neither the understanding nor the political
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will to win." I believe both.
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End result: Everybody claims to want to stop the plague of drugs and drug
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addiction, but no one wants to make the little busts if there's no money or
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glory to be made. And the drug use continues to spread without being
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stopped or controlled. Obviously, we need a new strategy.
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Conclusion
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1. Federal agents aren't effective in stopping or slowing the drugs from
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coming into the country. Many other people, like Levine who know enough to
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make factual comments, say that the amount of drugs seized amount to only
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about 10% of the total volume. Even if the percentage was increased to 50%
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or more, it would only mean that the price would go up slightly. That would
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spur the manufacture of drugs already being made within the United States -
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- and make it even more difficult to control.
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2. The production of crack and increasing cultivation of marijuana, for
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example, is made in the United States. Spending billions in bribes (by
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various names) to South America can't and won't do anything to solve the
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home-grown problem that is rapidly taking over. Added to that is the
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diversion of thousands of other drugs (besides marijuana, crack, cocaine,
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and heroin) that are all but overlooked by politicians at higher levels,
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and by the media. The little busts are so common, they just aren't worth
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mentioning.
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3. The "war" on Panama to capture Manuel Noriega didn't solve the
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Panamanian or Bolivian problem. A recent TV program mentioned that when
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Noriega controlled Panama he also controlled drug distribution. Now that
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he's in prison (at what cost?) there are about a dozen more relatively
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unknown and uncontrolled dealers who have quickly and eagerly stepped into
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his place -- and taken over.
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South American drug manufacturers are like mushrooms. When you step on a
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mushroom it releases spores that create hundreds more. Stamping on the big
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ones only creates hundreds of smaller ones who sprout up overnight and take
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their place. Ditto with drug dealers. Nailing Noriega didn't solve the
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problem. When he was operational they knew who it was and could take some
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action. Now, they don't know who's in charge, who the dealers are, where
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the drugs are coming from or going to, or what to do about it. The problem
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now is worse than ever!
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4. District Attorneys are reluctant to prosecute ("waste their time") on
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small cases. Ditto with Police Departments. That's why there are millions
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of buyers who make it profitable for dealers to accept the risks of jail.
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If we can't stop the source, why not try a different tactic as Michael
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Levine's book suggests -- hit the users to reduce the demand!
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The history of Drug Wars indicates it's another quagmire like Vietnam.
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We'll never win it by fighting the war like a standard, organized military
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operation. It's time to try guerrilla warfare; by sniping at recreational
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drug users with an all-out war against them!
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Drug Wars - CrimeFighter Style
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After working the DDT Patrol for a few weeks or months, you'll probably see
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or hear about drug use and sources of supply. If you have experience in
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playing an undercover role, and have mastered your camcorder and other
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electronic equipment, you may be ready to join the CrimeFighter NARC squad.
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If you haven't worked the DDT Patrol for a few weeks or months you might
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not have any inside information on drug users and drug dealers. If not,
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there's another way to obtain leads: advertise for them.
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Buy and distribute "reward brochures" from We-Tip that offers to pay "up to
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$1,000" for information concerning illegal drug use. Put your phone number
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(rented from an answering service) as the person to contact. Payment of the
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reward to a tipster is contingent on conviction. When you collect a larger
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reward, you pay the tipster his $100 to $200 according to Crime Stopper's
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formula. Or, when suitably dressed for the role, ask street people to
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locate a drug dealer's place of business such as a crack house. Sooner or
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later you'll get leads.
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If you read the book "Undercover," you'll learn how to flip users to get
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names and addresses of other users and their dealers. You'll find out one
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lead often becomes two or more, and it becomes a pyramid of leads.
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Stakeouts
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If you know of, or learn where a dealer lives and operates, stake out the
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place of business or stash house. Make camcorder movies of the drug traffic
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and license plate numbers of about a dozen cars or more that make pit
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stops. When possible, use the 12:1 zoom feature of a camcorder to get
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close-ups of buyer's faces and license plates. After getting the evidence
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on tape: (a) Contact the FBI and negotiate for a suitable reward for the
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bust of the dealer. When an agreement is reached, and in writing, give them
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the information they need, including a copy of the videotapes showing many
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buyers going in and out of the place of suspected drug-related business.
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The videotapes of suspects making pit stops at the buyer's place of
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business will provide them with probable cause to get a warrant for a
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search of the premises.
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Let the FBI make the arrests. But be aware they may want to flip the dealer
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to nail his suppliers. They may let him off the hook (and even stay in
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business) in exchange for additional information. Your negotiations for a
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reward should allow for plea bargaining to a lesser charge, dismissals,
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errors and omissions of police, and indifferent prosecutors. Nail down a
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specific minimum reward amount plus 50% of all fines and forfeitures so
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that no matter what happens to the case afterwards, you know you'll get
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paid an agreed-upon amount. And get it in writing from an FBI agent.
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If negotiations for a reward isn't possible because there was no time to
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negotiate, or if the agency doesn't want to pay a "decent" reward, assert
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your right to be prosecutor (that's what Qui Tam is for). Plea bargain with
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the defendant for lesser charges in exchange for a suitable lawsuit award.
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Use RICO civil suit for prosecution in addition to or in lieu of criminal
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charges -- where you get 50% of the fines and forfeitures when there are
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significant amounts involved and include the fruits of criminal activity.
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The FBI will obtain names and addresses of suspected users from the DMV via
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the license plate numbers shown on your videotapes. Search and arrest
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warrants would be obtained based on probable cause. Immediately after the
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dealer is busted the warrants would be served on the users. It's a good
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possibility that arresting officers would find incriminating evidence of
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drugs or other contraband on the premises or in their vehicles. That's all
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they need to make an arrest.
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Negotiate the same deal for drug users, or when necessary, use Qui Tam to
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prosecute them to get federal rewards plus 50% of fines and forfeitures,
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when applicable. The FBI probably won't be interested in the small fry
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anyway. If so, you can take over as prosecutor via Qui Tam law. Use civil
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suits to extract payment for your undercover time. The concurrent criminal
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charge will provide leverage to get an friendly settlement of your civil
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suit in exchange for downgrading or dismissing the pending drug charges.
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Under 3059, you qualify for a reward and have the legal right to be the
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prosecutor. If you have the experience, you won't need a lawyer for plea
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bargaining. Very few will want a trial if you're willing to let them buy
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their way out of jail. When they insist on their innocence, turn them over
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to the regular prosecutor and apply for federal rewards. When and if
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they're convicted or change their mind and plead guilty, initiate a civil
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suit to be paid for your undercover time.
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When they can afford it, users will gladly accept the chance to settle the
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problem out of court for just $1,000 in exchange for a suspended sentence
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or reduced charges from a felony to a misdemeanor. If they insist on a
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trial, they'll probably wind up paying more than $1,000 in lawyer's fees
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anyway, and might lose the case and face jail time and a criminal record --
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if they don't already have one.
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You can recommend Probation without Adjudication for first-time offenders.
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That means, if there are no repeat violations during a 12 month period, the
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charges will be dropped and no criminal sentence is on their record.
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If the FBI wants to prosecute all users, to get official credit for their
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bureau, a suitable reward of $1,000 per user should be negotiated in lieu
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of the rewards under 3059 and 886.
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If you make the arrest or provide the information that leads to the arrest
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and there are rewards pending (3059 and 886), you have the right to be the
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prosecutor. If the FBI (or others) wants to prosecute, they have to get
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your permission. That gives you leverage to negotiate a suitable reward.
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When you get a few leads and informants working for you, you should be able
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to snare at least 10 drug users per month who pay you $1,000 or more, each.
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That's how you can make $100,000 a year. (Plus bonuses of rewards from
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dealer busts and your 50% share of resultant fines and forfeitures.)
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Part II - Reward Laws
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In addition to the catch-all reward law for any felony anywhere (18: 3059),
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there's another reward law that concerns Drug Abuse Prevention:
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Title 21, Section 886
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Payment and Advances
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"(a) Payment to informers. The Attorney General is authorized to pay any
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person, from funds appropriated for the Drug Enforcement Administration,
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for information concerning a violation of this title, such sum or sums of
|
||
|
money as he may deem appropriate, without reference to any moieties or
|
||
|
rewards to which such person may otherwise be entitled by law."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unofficial interpretation: If, for example, a CrimeFighter were to provide
|
||
|
information leading to the arrest of a drug dealer, he or she would be
|
||
|
first entitled up to $25,000 as a reward under section 3059, plus an
|
||
|
additional amount under section 886. The reward amount under section 886
|
||
|
isn't specific. It's under the discretion of the DEA (and FBI). But, this
|
||
|
reward can be paid even though the tipster receives a reward from another
|
||
|
source. (Most reward laws prohibit "double-dipping," but this one
|
||
|
intentionally provides a bonus reward when directly related drug activity
|
||
|
is involved.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Reimbursement for purchase of controlled substances. Moneys expended from
|
||
|
appropriations of the Drug Enforcement Administration for purchases of
|
||
|
controlled substances and subsequently recovered shall be reimbursed to the
|
||
|
current appropriation for the Bureau."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unofficial interpretation: When and if money used to make purchases in
|
||
|
sting operations is recovered, it is to be put back where it came from.
|
||
|
Sometimes the sting operation isn't successful and the money is "lost," or
|
||
|
stolen!
|
||
|
|
||
|
"Advance of funds for enforcement purposes. The Attorney General is
|
||
|
authorized to direct the advance of funds by the Treasury Department in
|
||
|
connection with the enforcement of this title."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Unofficial interpretation: Authorizes general funding for the DEA and
|
||
|
would, it seems, cover the cost of miscellaneous items and expenses to set
|
||
|
up a sting operation. It might also authorize the FBI to pay an alternate
|
||
|
form of compensation to a CrimeFighter to provide a "cover" in setting up
|
||
|
a sting operation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Incidentally, David Wheeler, a DEA informant and convicted drug dealer, is
|
||
|
reported to have been paid $285,000 for services rendered to the DEA. The
|
||
|
pocketbook "Deep Cover," mentioned later on, gives the full story.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
A former law enforcement agent, Mr. X (who prefers to be anonymous) who
|
||
|
worked drug details, now retired, claims has recently collected hundreds of
|
||
|
thousands of dollars in the last year alone and said that 21 USCS 886
|
||
|
allows the FBI to award 25% of all fines and forfeitures, up to $150,000
|
||
|
per case.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Mr. X also mentioned, "I have found the FBI to be very trustworthy in
|
||
|
paying this money." (Note: The FBI took over control of DEA in 1980.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
You can deal either with the DEA or FBI for a reward to be paid under 21
|
||
|
USCS 886. After reading the book "Deep Cover," you may lean towards the FBI
|
||
|
as more reliable and trustworthy. But, it might depend more on the agent
|
||
|
you deal with.
|
||
|
"Original Information"
|
||
|
|
||
|
The wording "original information" means that once you have disclosed the
|
||
|
details to any law enforcement agency it is no longer original information.
|
||
|
You might collect a reward from the first party, but no one else if the
|
||
|
wording of their law specifies "original information." Look for that
|
||
|
phrase. If you give the information to Crime Stoppers, for example, and
|
||
|
later try to sell it to Customs, the information is no longer original
|
||
|
information and you would lose the larger Customs reward.
|
||
|
|
||
|
State Rewards
|
||
|
|
||
|
Most states have provisions to pay rewards for information on drug
|
||
|
violations but they may be buried in forfeiture laws.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Example: Arizona's forfeiture law, 13-4315, has a provision for: "Payment
|
||
|
of awards for information or assistance leading to a civil or criminal
|
||
|
proceeding under this (drug law) title."
|
||
|
|
||
|
When such provisions are available in state forfeiture laws, it may be
|
||
|
possible to obtain 50% of the forfeitures and fines from lawbreakers as
|
||
|
well as obtain rewards under federal laws.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The 13-4315 law also says that "Fines that are not suspended constitute a
|
||
|
lien until paid." If a large fine can't be paid right away, it remains in
|
||
|
force as a lien on the lawbreaker's future assets.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Drug-Related Fines and Penalties
|
||
|
|
||
|
For an example, I extracted the essence of Arizona drug laws and itemized
|
||
|
them in abbreviated form for your reference. Each state law will vary
|
||
|
slightly. Some may impose harsher or lenient penalties. In most cases,
|
||
|
assume all violations of drug laws are felonies unless stated otherwise in
|
||
|
your own state's Revised Statutes.
|
||
|
|
||
|
An analysis of Arizona drug laws reveals: 99% of violations are felonies;
|
||
|
that the minimum fine (range) is $750 and up to $2,000 or three times the
|
||
|
value of drugs found, involved in or giving rise to the charge, but not
|
||
|
more than $150,000; Fines for violations involving "hard" drugs (cocaine,
|
||
|
heroin, etc) increase to a maximum of $250,000; One of the provisions of
|
||
|
most fines under drug laws includes the statement "A judge shall not
|
||
|
suspend any part or all of the imposition of any fine required by this
|
||
|
section."
|
||
|
|
||
|
Felonies are rated by classes, with class 1 being the most serious and
|
||
|
class 2 through 6 being decreasingly less serious. Penalties, fines, and
|
||
|
forfeitures are adjusted according to the many factors involved in each
|
||
|
case. It's not possible to state a specific fine and penalty for each class
|
||
|
of felony.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here's a table to estimate your rewards (50% of the fines and forfeitures,
|
||
|
plus other rewards from USCS 3059 and 886.) To calculate your approximate
|
||
|
rewards, assume the fine is the minimum stated in the law: $750 for
|
||
|
marijuana use, to $100,000 for Class 1 drug violations.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Class 1 from $100,000 to $150,000
|
||
|
Class 2 from $50,000 to $100,000
|
||
|
Class 3 from $25,000 to 50,000
|
||
|
Class 4 from $10,000 to $25,000
|
||
|
Class 5 from $5,000 to $10,000
|
||
|
Class 6 from $750 to $2,000
|
||
|
|
||
|
(Remember, in most cases you can convert these fines to lawsuit awards.)
|
||
|
|
||
|
Abbreviated drug laws - penalties
|
||
|
|
||
|
Marijuana
|
||
|
Possession
|
||
|
less than 1# = class 6 felony
|
||
|
between 1# but less than 8 # = class 5 felony
|
||
|
more than 8# = class 4 felony.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Selling
|
||
|
less than 1# = class 4 felony
|
||
|
more than 1# = class 3 felony
|
||
|
|
||
|
Growing
|
||
|
less than 1# = class 5 felony
|
||
|
more than 1# = class 3 felony
|
||
|
|
||
|
Transporting
|
||
|
less than 1# = class 3 felony
|
||
|
more than 1# = class 2 felony.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Minimum fine $750, maximum $150,000.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Prescription Drugs
|
||
|
|
||
|
Possession or use = class 1 misdemeanor - Fines: up to a maximum of $2,500
|
||
|
|
||
|
Sells or transports = class 6 felony - Fines: up to a maximum of $250,000
|
||
|
|
||
|
Dangerous Drugs - Cocaine, Heroin, etc.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Possess or use = class 4 felony
|
||
|
sell = class 3 felony
|
||
|
Possess equipment to manufacture = class 4 felony
|
||
|
Manufacture = class 3 felony
|
||
|
Administer drugs to others = class 2 felony
|
||
|
Obtain by fraudulent means = class 3 felony
|
||
|
transport for sale = class 2 felony
|
||
|
|
||
|
Drugs to Minors
|
||
|
|
||
|
No person shall employee any minor in any capacity involving any part of
|
||
|
the selling or distribution of drugs
|
||
|
|
||
|
Employ any minor = class 2 felony
|
||
|
sell or transfer to any minor = class 2 felony
|
||
|
|
||
|
Drugs on School Grounds
|
||
|
|
||
|
It is prohibited for any person to be present with one or more persons,
|
||
|
within 300 feet of a school;
|
||
|
|
||
|
to possess, use, or sell marijuana. = class 2 felony
|
||
|
to possess, use, or sell hard drugs = class 2 felony
|
||
|
|
||
|
* * * * * *
|
||
|
|
||
|
Conclusion: Anyone selling or dealing in illegal drugs would be prosecuted
|
||
|
under RICO laws. Drug users who don't sell it (and make a profit) wouldn't
|
||
|
come under RICO, but CrimeFighters would be eligible for basic felony
|
||
|
rewards under 3059 and 886, plus a CrimeFighter civil suit award.
|
||
|
|
||
|
CrimeFighter should negotiate for Federal rewards under 3059 and 886 for a
|
||
|
minimum reward of $500 + $500 for users, depending on the kind of drugs,
|
||
|
and $5,000 to $50,000 for dealers depending on the quantity and value of
|
||
|
drugs seized.
|
||
|
|
||
|
In addition, any cash found in the drug dealer's place of business would be
|
||
|
confiscated as drug proceeds, and the CrimeFighter could get half of the
|
||
|
amount -- often a few thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars!
|
||
|
|
||
|
If a CrimeFighter videotaped about a dozen or so buyer's license plates, he
|
||
|
or she could make about $600 per buyer (15 - 20 buyers?) or about $20,000
|
||
|
for one week's stake-out and movie-making effort, plus an extra reward of
|
||
|
$5,000 to $25,000 for the dealer. A full time Narc CrimeFighter, working
|
||
|
with the FBI, could make $200,000 a year. A hustler, like Michael Levine,
|
||
|
could make a million! After you read his books, I'm sure you'll agree.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Recommended reading for Narc CrimeFighters
|
||
|
|
||
|
Five pocket books: "Undercover," "Deep Cover," "Drug Agent U.S.A.,"
|
||
|
"Cocaine Wars," and "Rough Justice," Total is about $25. They're listed in
|
||
|
CRIMCAT. They're educational, and fascinating reading.
|
||
|
|
||
|
F9 for next Chapter
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|