418 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
418 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
|
EYESIGHT STANDARDS:
|
|||
|
CORRECTING MYTHS
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Richard N. Holden, Ph.D.
|
|||
|
Chairman
|
|||
|
Criminal Justice Department
|
|||
|
Central Missouri State University
|
|||
|
Warrensburg, Missouri
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For decades, law enforcement agencies required applicants
|
|||
|
to satisfy certain eyesight requirements before being considered
|
|||
|
for employment. Few would challenge the belief that public
|
|||
|
safety officers need good eyesight. What many do challenge,
|
|||
|
with some success, is the idea that applicants must possess
|
|||
|
perfect uncorrected vision. A basic question emerges: Should
|
|||
|
police recruits be allowed to compensate for imperfect vision
|
|||
|
with corrective lenses? If the answer is "yes," then how much
|
|||
|
variation should agencies allow?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Several factors converge to make this a timely issue for
|
|||
|
law enforcement managers to consider. With a dwindling pool of
|
|||
|
suitable applicants from which to fulfill future personnel
|
|||
|
needs, some argue that unnecessary selection requirements
|
|||
|
undermine law enforcement's recruiting efforts.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In addition, the recent enactment of the Americans with
|
|||
|
Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employment discrimination on
|
|||
|
the basis of physical disabilities, if a person is able to
|
|||
|
perform the essential functions of the job. Because visual
|
|||
|
impairment could constitute a protected disability, agencies
|
|||
|
that cannot defend their vision standards leave themselves open
|
|||
|
to litigation under this new act.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Finally, advancements in medical science need to be
|
|||
|
considered. Present-day optical technology renders obsolete
|
|||
|
many of the age-old arguments in favor of vision requirements.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This article explores the issues involved in vision
|
|||
|
standards. It goes on to discuss these issues as they relate to
|
|||
|
the experiences and sentiments expressed in a recent survey of
|
|||
|
law enforcement officers concerning eyesight requirements.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The necessity for good vision in law enforcement--corrected
|
|||
|
or otherwise--rests in the visual nature of police work. Law
|
|||
|
enforcement officers spend a good portion of their working hours
|
|||
|
observing people and events and then reporting what they see.
|
|||
|
Additionally, officers must respond quickly to events taking
|
|||
|
place around them. They must interpret and react to the actions
|
|||
|
of others.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One basic tenant of vision standards is that a significant
|
|||
|
impairment translates into an equally impaired ability to
|
|||
|
interpret events and react appropriately. Moreover, evidence of
|
|||
|
poor vision might make officers vulnerable in court. If an
|
|||
|
officer's vision becomes open to judgment, so too may the
|
|||
|
evidence offered based on the officer's observations.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The argument for strict uncorrected vision standards rests
|
|||
|
on the belief that an officer may have lenses forcibly removed.
|
|||
|
Should this occur, the argument is that the officer would be
|
|||
|
unable to function adequately. That is to say, the officer
|
|||
|
would not be able to fire a weapon accurately, discern if a
|
|||
|
suspect was armed, or operate a police vehicle. This would
|
|||
|
place the officer in a physically dangerous situation that could
|
|||
|
possibly jeopardize others.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Although these arguments constitute the underpinning for
|
|||
|
vision requirements, police administrators are clearly not in
|
|||
|
agreement over the necessity for uncorrected vision standards.
|
|||
|
A 1984 study found that while a majority of the 323 police
|
|||
|
agencies surveyed required some minimum uncorrected standard, 26
|
|||
|
percent of the responding departments required only that vision
|
|||
|
be correctable to 20/20. Another 22 percent allowed uncorrected
|
|||
|
vision of 20/100. (1)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Further, differing vision standards exist in otherwise
|
|||
|
similar agencies. Some large police departments, including New
|
|||
|
York City, Los Angeles, and Dallas, apply restrictive standards.
|
|||
|
Other large departments--such as Chicago, Detroit, Newark, and
|
|||
|
Tulsa--have no uncorrected vision standards.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The academic community also fails to reach a consensus on
|
|||
|
the subject. Some argue for a strict standard. (2) Others,
|
|||
|
however, question strict uncorrected vision requirements,
|
|||
|
especially in light of evolving vision technology, such as
|
|||
|
shatterproof plastic and soft contact lenses. (3)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
And, even before passage of the ADA, the controversy over
|
|||
|
uncorrected vision standards attracted the attention of the
|
|||
|
courts. Although some courts upheld individual agency vision
|
|||
|
requirements in the past, this congruence may be coming to an
|
|||
|
end. In 1985, a Wisconsin court ruled that an uncorrected
|
|||
|
vision standard violated a State law prohibiting discrimination
|
|||
|
against the handicapped. (4)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In addition to these issues, several other factors fuel the
|
|||
|
argument over vision requirements. Few law enforcement agencies
|
|||
|
require incumbent officers to maintain the vision standard
|
|||
|
required for recruits. This means that many police agencies,
|
|||
|
even those with strict uncorrected vision standards for
|
|||
|
recruits, employ numerous veteran officers who now need to wear
|
|||
|
corrective lenses in order to perform their duties. Still,
|
|||
|
despite this fact, little concrete data exists concerning the
|
|||
|
relationship between corrective lenses and police performance.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
BASIC ISSUES
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Three basic issues emerge as arguments for a restrictive
|
|||
|
uncorrected vision standard. First, an officer who loses
|
|||
|
corrective lenses becomes visually impaired and vulnerable to
|
|||
|
physical assault. Second, the officer will not be able to see
|
|||
|
sufficiently to aim a service weapon, and as a result, may
|
|||
|
become vulnerable to an armed suspect. Third, the officer's
|
|||
|
vision will be too impaired to operate a police vehicle, and
|
|||
|
therefore, the officer could not pursue a fleeing suspect. In
|
|||
|
addition, a corollary to these issues emerges. If an officer's
|
|||
|
ability to perform becomes hampered, then other officers will be
|
|||
|
placed at a similar risk due to the loss of support of the
|
|||
|
vision-impaired officer.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Many observers both within and outside law enforcement
|
|||
|
offer these beliefs in sincerity. However, some dissenting
|
|||
|
opinions exist. With regard to the first issue, it could be
|
|||
|
argued that an officer engaged in hand-to-hand combat does not
|
|||
|
need eyeglasses to identify an assailant. At that range, the
|
|||
|
officer would have to be nearly blind to be incapacitated. An
|
|||
|
individual's uncorrected vision is not likely to be that bad if
|
|||
|
it is correctable to 20/20.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Second, the vast majority of shoot-outs with handguns occur
|
|||
|
at very close range. Of the 735 officers killed by firearms
|
|||
|
between 1980 and 1989, for example, 652 (89 percent) were shot
|
|||
|
from 20 feet or less. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of the
|
|||
|
fatalities resulted from shootouts of 5 feet or less. (5) At
|
|||
|
this range, officers point their firearms, rather than aim them.
|
|||
|
Therefore, officers with less-than-perfect vision suffer from no
|
|||
|
significant disadvantage. As the range increases, vision
|
|||
|
capabilities become more important, but handgun accuracy
|
|||
|
diminishes drastically as the distance increases beyond 20 feet,
|
|||
|
regardless of the officer's vision.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Last, with regard to the issue of visual impairment and the
|
|||
|
inability to pursue fleeing suspects, few issues currently
|
|||
|
generate as much debate among police administrators as vehicle
|
|||
|
pursuits. Several departments now prohibit pursuits in all but
|
|||
|
the most extreme circumstances, and few departments possess the
|
|||
|
facilities to teach effective pursuit procedures. In addition,
|
|||
|
police vehicles are notoriously subject to poor maintenance.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These factors cloud arguments concerning vision
|
|||
|
capabilities. Should perfect vision be required when proper
|
|||
|
training and equipment are not. Those who question the need for
|
|||
|
strict uncorrected vision requirements frame the question in
|
|||
|
simple terms. If an officer feels inadequate to initiate a
|
|||
|
vehicle pursuit, for whatever reason, the pursuit should not
|
|||
|
occur. This remains true for any situation involving the
|
|||
|
potential for pursuit and currently represents standard policy
|
|||
|
in the majority of police agencies.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Finally, it may be argued that officers who lose their
|
|||
|
corrective lenses in a duty-related incident are no more
|
|||
|
impaired than officers with perfect vision who get foreign
|
|||
|
objects in their eyes, such as chemical mace, fingers, or sand.
|
|||
|
In some cases, an officer with corrective eyewear may actually
|
|||
|
be better protected than those without eye covering.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
RESEARCH STUDY
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The lack of quantifiable data regarding the correlation
|
|||
|
between corrective lenses and police performance hampers any
|
|||
|
productive discussion of the subject. For this reason, a
|
|||
|
research study was recently conducted in an attempt to clarify
|
|||
|
the issue and provide sufficient baseline information so that
|
|||
|
future debate might center upon fact rather than supposition.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Method
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The survey method emerged as the logical means to determine
|
|||
|
the association between vision requirements and police
|
|||
|
performance. Unfortunately, no police agency contacted kept
|
|||
|
relevant records in this area.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There may be several reasons for this lack of information.
|
|||
|
One may be that officers who wear corrective lenses do not wish
|
|||
|
to be perceived as weaker than those with perfect vision.
|
|||
|
Therefore, they do not include information relating to any
|
|||
|
vision-related incapacitation in police reports. Or, law
|
|||
|
enforcement agencies may simply not perceive loss of corrective
|
|||
|
lenses in a physical confrontation as a problem worth studying.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For whatever reason, agencies do not routinely record such
|
|||
|
information in police databases. The only information available
|
|||
|
appeared to be the cost to agencies for replacement of damaged
|
|||
|
lenses. However, this information failed to address the issue
|
|||
|
of police performance immediately after loss of the lenses.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Failing to obtain agency data relating to vision and
|
|||
|
performance required that the research effort concentrate on
|
|||
|
officers' experiences. While this method yielded primarily
|
|||
|
anecdotal information, it remained the only viable way of
|
|||
|
establishing some quantifiable data regarding this issue.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In order to gauge the relationship between vision and
|
|||
|
policing effectively, the project focused on police managers
|
|||
|
from a wide variety of agencies. The survey population
|
|||
|
consisted of 92 police executives from across the United States,
|
|||
|
England, Australia, and Canada attending a conference at the FBI
|
|||
|
Academy in Quantico, Virginia. (6) The combined length of service
|
|||
|
for the survey population totaled 1,714 years, for an average of
|
|||
|
18.6 years per respondent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Participants were asked if they knew of cases where
|
|||
|
officers lost their corrective lenses in duty-related incidents.
|
|||
|
If respondents answered yes, they were asked if the loss of the
|
|||
|
corrective lenses resulted in injury to the officer or to
|
|||
|
others.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Further, researchers asked if the loss of corrective lenses
|
|||
|
prevented the officer from completing the activity being
|
|||
|
attempted at the time of loss. Then, respondents were asked to
|
|||
|
report any incidents in which impaired vision presented a
|
|||
|
problem, regardless of corrective lenses. Finally, researchers
|
|||
|
asked respondents to offer comments about police vision
|
|||
|
standards and to provide phone numbers for further contact.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Results
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Of the 92 participants, 48 (52 percent) said they knew of
|
|||
|
incidents where officers lost their corrective lenses in the
|
|||
|
course of duty. Forty-four (48 percent) knew of no such
|
|||
|
incidents. Twelve respondents (13 percent) recalled incidents
|
|||
|
where officers sustained injuries related to the loss of
|
|||
|
corrective lenses. Five (5 percent) reported incidents in which
|
|||
|
loss of corrective lenses impaired an officer's performance, and
|
|||
|
12 (13 percent) recalled incidents where impaired vision
|
|||
|
unrelated to corrective lenses created a problem.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
While the data appear fairly straightforward and easy to
|
|||
|
interpret, several factors actually make it more complex.
|
|||
|
Analysis of comments and followup telephone interviews revealed
|
|||
|
misinterpretation in several responses to the questionnaire.
|
|||
|
For example, a number of respondents understood the question
|
|||
|
regarding injuries to mean wounds suffered during the specific
|
|||
|
incident in which officers lost corrective lenses. In fact, the
|
|||
|
intent of the question was to determine if respondents knew of
|
|||
|
incidents where loss of lenses directly led to an ensuing
|
|||
|
injury. The same confusion occurred with regard to the question
|
|||
|
of performance. These misinterpretations led to a slightly
|
|||
|
inflated representation of the number of cases with injuries.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By analyzing the comments on the survey instruments and
|
|||
|
conducting followup telephone interviews, a slightly different
|
|||
|
picture emerged. In nine of the cases where respondents
|
|||
|
reported injuries, the wounds were not due to lost corrective
|
|||
|
lenses and presumably would have occurred anyway. The injuries
|
|||
|
happened during the same struggle that caused the officers to
|
|||
|
lose their lenses. In one case, a subject struck an officer
|
|||
|
with sufficient force to render him unconscious. The force of
|
|||
|
the blow also broke the officer's glasses. Similarly, two of
|
|||
|
the incidents initially reported as failures to perform
|
|||
|
adequately due to lost eyewear were physical confrontations in
|
|||
|
which the officers lost corrective lenses but still controlled
|
|||
|
the subjects and the situations.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In these cases, loss of lenses inconvenienced the officers,
|
|||
|
but did not impair their performance. Likewise, in several
|
|||
|
instances, an officer's failure to complete an assignment
|
|||
|
actually resulted from an accompanying injury, rather than lens
|
|||
|
loss.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Additionally, several anomalies bear mention. One
|
|||
|
respondent initially reported that he sustained injury when he
|
|||
|
lost his corrective lenses. A followup interview determined
|
|||
|
that vision impairment did not lead to the injury. Rather, when
|
|||
|
a subject knocked a pair of expensive eyeglasses from his face,
|
|||
|
the officer instinctively reached for them. When he did so, the
|
|||
|
subject grabbed and twisted his arm. Although sustaining an
|
|||
|
injury to his arm, the officer did regain control of the
|
|||
|
subject.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Another respondent reported that an officer who lost his
|
|||
|
lenses could not read the license number of an escaping
|
|||
|
suspect's vehicle. However, his partner did manage to record
|
|||
|
the number, leading to an eventual arrest.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In addition, several respondents reported instances where
|
|||
|
officers' eyeglasses became temporarily fogged as they exited
|
|||
|
air conditioned vehicles. One respondent also reported that
|
|||
|
exposure to sand and wind required officers with contact lenses
|
|||
|
to take periodic breaks for lens cleaning.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Ultimately, only three of the reported cases of injury or
|
|||
|
failure to perform satisfied the intended perimeters of the
|
|||
|
survey questionnaire. This represents 3 percent of the survey
|
|||
|
sample. When accounting for the number of service years
|
|||
|
represented by the respondents, the number equates to 1 case per
|
|||
|
every 571 years. Of these, only one incident could be verified.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The sole verified case involved a major shootout between
|
|||
|
several FBI agents and two heavily armed suspects. After the
|
|||
|
exchange of gunfire, two of the agents and both suspects lay
|
|||
|
dead, and five other agents sustained serious wounds.
|
|||
|
Immediately prior to the shootout, one of the agents lost his
|
|||
|
glasses when he brought his automobile to an abrupt halt just
|
|||
|
feet from the suspects' vehicle. He was fatally wounded during
|
|||
|
the ensuing gunfight, and his fellow agents speculate that the
|
|||
|
loss of his glasses significantly affected his ability to
|
|||
|
observe the movements of the gunmen. If that assessment is
|
|||
|
accurate, then the loss of eyewear may be cited as a
|
|||
|
contributing factor in the agent's death.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The experiences of the officers surveyed indicated that
|
|||
|
officers wearing corrective lenses do encounter situations in
|
|||
|
which they momentarily lose their corrective lenses or have them
|
|||
|
forcibly removed. However, the vast majority of these cases
|
|||
|
occur in arrest situations or within detention facilities.
|
|||
|
These face-to-face confrontations rarely involve weapons. In
|
|||
|
most of these cases, the loss of lenses produced no negative
|
|||
|
results either for the officer or the eventual outcome of the
|
|||
|
situation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In their personal commentaries, respondents expressed
|
|||
|
uniform opposition to uncorrected vision standards. Several
|
|||
|
noted that their agencies lost a number of well-qualified
|
|||
|
applicants, who later gained employment in other agencies. The
|
|||
|
following comment offered by a lieutenant in charge of training
|
|||
|
and personnel for his department typifies the observations:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
"I think this is one of the most meaningless fitness
|
|||
|
standards remaining to bar qualified people from police
|
|||
|
service. While I am sure that somewhere at some time some
|
|||
|
officer was seriously hurt and maybe died because of an
|
|||
|
eyesight issue--lost glasses, etc.--officers have not been
|
|||
|
fired, dismissed, or even had assignments changed because
|
|||
|
of diminished sight capacity after the hiring process.
|
|||
|
This standard only serves to eliminate otherwise qualified
|
|||
|
and acceptable candidates."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In addition, several officers offered personal accounts.
|
|||
|
They acknowledged their own vision problems and argued that
|
|||
|
their performance remained unhindered. Several reported that
|
|||
|
their agencies changed their standards due to lawsuits. Other
|
|||
|
respondents reported that their agencies were reevaluating their
|
|||
|
standards because they felt the current requirements barred too
|
|||
|
many qualified candidates.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
CONCLUSION
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Does this mean that law enforcement agencies should
|
|||
|
immediately eliminate their policies concerning standards for
|
|||
|
uncorrected vision? Not necessarily. This study is neither
|
|||
|
sufficiently comprehensive nor scientifically representative
|
|||
|
enough to draw such a sweeping conclusion.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
However, surveys of this type do provide a starting point
|
|||
|
for meaningful discussion. The arguments upon which agencies
|
|||
|
base uncorrected vision requirements offer little in the way
|
|||
|
of empirical support. They remain based on largely hypothetical
|
|||
|
arguments. Nowhere has any agency documented such situations
|
|||
|
and studied the data concerning this issue.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This points to the underlying problem. Police vision
|
|||
|
standards, as well as other areas, should be based on proven
|
|||
|
capabilities necessary to fulfill the terms of employment.
|
|||
|
Instead, the reverse often happens.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Lacking supporting data, law enforcement agencies adopt
|
|||
|
standards based on "what if" scenarios. In the process, they
|
|||
|
lose qualified applicants and perpetuate myth-based standards
|
|||
|
with questionable relationships to police performance or agency
|
|||
|
needs. Perhaps this survey and future studies can help to
|
|||
|
counter these myths and lead to a more productive approach in
|
|||
|
establishing vision standards for today's law enforcement
|
|||
|
agencies.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
ENDNOTES
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(1) Richard N. Holden, "Vision Standards for Law
|
|||
|
Enforcement: A Descriptive Study," Journal of Police Science and
|
|||
|
Administration, 12, 1984, 125-129.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(2) O.W. Wilson, Police Administration (New York:
|
|||
|
McGraw-Hill Co., 1961); James E. Sheedy, Jeffrey T. Keller,
|
|||
|
Donald Pitts, Gerald Lowther, and Stephen C. Miller,
|
|||
|
"Recommended Vision Standards for Police Officers," Journal of
|
|||
|
the American Optometric Association, 54, October 1983, 925-928;
|
|||
|
Gregory W. Good and Arol R. Augsburger, "Uncorrected Visual
|
|||
|
Acuity Standards for Police Applicants," Journal of Police
|
|||
|
Science and Administration, 12, 1987, 18-23; C.J. Forkiotis,
|
|||
|
"Vision Requirements and the Police Officer Selection Process,"
|
|||
|
Police Chief, November 1981, 56-59.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(3) Michael A. Sciales and Leonard Territo, "Eyesight
|
|||
|
Standards for Police Applicants," Police Chief, February 1983;
|
|||
|
James E. Sheedy, "Contact Lenses for Police Officers," Journal
|
|||
|
of the American Optometric Association, 57, 1986, 658-660; Terry
|
|||
|
Cox, Annis Crabtree, Daniel Joslin, and Adrienne Millet, "A
|
|||
|
Theoretical Examination of Police Entry-Level Uncorrected Visual
|
|||
|
Acuity Standards," American Journal of Criminal Justice, 11,
|
|||
|
1987, 199-208.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(4) Brown County v. LIRC, 124 Wis. 2d. 560, 397 N.W. 2d.
|
|||
|
735 (1985).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(5) Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, U.S.
|
|||
|
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1989,
|
|||
|
Washington, DC.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
(6) The First International Symposium on the Future of Law
|
|||
|
Enforcement, FBI National Academy, Quantico, Virginia, April
|
|||
|
1-5, 1991.
|
|||
|
|