419 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
419 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
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From ucdavis!ucbvax!RED.RUTGERS.EDU!AWalker Fri Nov 13 18:33:17 PST 1987
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Article 136 of misc.security:
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Path: ucdavis!ucbvax!RED.RUTGERS.EDU!AWalker
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>From: AWalker@RED.RUTGERS.EDU (*Hobbit*)
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Newsgroups: misc.security
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Subject: Yet more about SS numbers
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Message-ID: <12349698929.28.AWALKER@RED.RUTGERS.EDU>
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Date: 11 Nov 87 08:42:20 GMT
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Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
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Distribution: world
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Organization: The ARPA Internet
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Lines: 402
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Approved: security@rutgers.edu
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Hopefully this is the last of it... _H*
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-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
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Subject: Another no SSN reason
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Date: Fri, 02 Oct 87 22:38:30 -0400
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>From: new@udel.edu
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Nark Mason writes about Social Security Numbers:
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>I still haven't seen anyone give a good reason *why* to keep it [your
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>SSN] secure. ... What horrible ded can be done with it that makes it not
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>worth giving it out and the hassle that might follow?
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Well, here's a story that happened to a good friend of mine that I
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wouldn't want to worry about. She sent in her tax returns, and got a
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letter saying she still owed $6000 for the money that she inherited,
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plus fines and interrest and a possible jail sentence. It turns out that
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someone, somewhere had inherited money and made up an SSN at random
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to avoid the taxes. After about six months of "hassle" (to say the least)
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she finally convinced the IRS that she did not inherit anything.
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She was able to do this only because the name did not match the SSN,
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and the address was in New York instead of her actual address near Phila.
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Now, I have been fighting institutions that use my SSN as a key primarily
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because most of these insist on printing it on the mailing label along
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with my name and address. They claim this is so that when mail comes
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back (mail that most people would consider "junk mail" anyway), they
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can remove the name easily from the mailing list. Can you imagine
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the "hassles" I could have if the clerk at the institution plans ahead
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for a successful trip to Atlantic City or Vegas, taking a few names,
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addresses, and SSNs along? How about the postal clerks that get to
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read my SSNs? My main complaint is not with the institution that uses my
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SSN as a key, but rather the uses other than as a key to which it is put.
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Incidently, does anyone use a database package that can handle sufficient
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volume that names cause too many clashes, yet that does not have a
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mechanism for generating unique keys? Why must I supply my own key?
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Not only am I reduced to a "mere number," but I must reduce MYSELF to
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a number.
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Regarding Government agencies requirements, what about Federally funded
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institutions? Can universities that are federally assisted demand
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my SSN?
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- Darren New
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University of Delaware
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new@dewey.udel.edu
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Date: Mon, 5 Oct 87 09:33:45 cdt
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>From: Jonathan Harris <harris%go-han@go-han.UChicago.EDU>
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Subject: SSN's why get so upset about it.
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After all this talk of people not giving out social security numbers
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to utilities and such, I have yet to hear anyone explain what is the harm in
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giving it out and why it is worth all of this fuss. True, the social security
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number is really meant for social security and tax administration, but what
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harm can someone do if he finds your SSN. Apparently nothing; that is unless
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you are a deadbeat intending to skip down and refuse to pay your phone/electric
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bill.
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Date: Mon, 5 Oct 87 21:51:27 EDT
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>From: Douglas Humphrey <deh@eneevax.umd.edu>
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Subject: Re: ssn's
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>So the real question is this:
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> How many databases list my MIT 888 number as my SSN
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I would hope that most peoples data bases have some sort of validity
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check on SSNs, since you can call the SSA and get a definition of the
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SSN from them, and it does mention at least some of the field values
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that are 'not right'. I saw a spec for this stuff about 5 years ago
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perhaps in a Government RFP or something. Maybe a call to the SSA
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would answer this?
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-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
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Date: Tue, 06 Oct 87 08:53:04 EDT
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>From: "A. Harry Williams" <HARRY%MARIST.BITNET@wiscvm.wisc.edu>
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Subject: Re: Digest of SSN responses
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I find the response to both SSN and phone numbers as "If you don't have
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anything to hide, why not give it out". That is the same argument as
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if the defendant doesn't take the stand in a criminal trial, he must be
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guilty.
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Also, I'm not sure that US SSN have a checksum. My sisters and I
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have consecutive SSNs.
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-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
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Date: Tue, 6 Oct 87 12:20:01 EDT
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>From: Larry Hunter <hunter-larry@yale.arpa>
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Subject: Re: Why Protect SSNs?
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Well, the practical reasons to associate your SSN with as few records
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about you as possible have to do with the fact that large, powerful
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entities (like the IRS and large consumer products companies) use
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techniques like block modelling and record matching to exert unpleasant
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power over individuals. For example, the IRS uses social security numbers
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to look up credit ratings and self-described income data associated with
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consumer purchases (those little warrantee registration cards...)
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to audit people it thinks may be under-reporting income. Big credit
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and insurance concerns use SSNs to find records that can penalize you
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by denying you credit or insurance on the basis of information that
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you rarely see and never know how they get. Other uses include
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targeting the marketing consumer products and matching government
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records against each other or commercial records.
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Those large tax, law enforcement and marketing data analyses are more
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difficult to do on someone who witholds SSN. Unfortunately, the cause
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of most of the trouble is invisible to the people who get screwed. Nobody
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says "we decided to audit you (investigate you, use this ad on you) because
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of information we could analyse based on your SSN." It is quite difficult
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to track down the explicit uses of SSNs within specific organizations;
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they are not interested in baring their data analysis techniques to
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outsiders at all. So for illustrative purposes, let me show how with
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your social security number and a little motivation someone can learn
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all of the intimate details of your life, ruin your credit rating and
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get warrants issued for your arrest:
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Your enemy gets your social security number. He goes to the local
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department of motor vehicles and get a driver's license in your name
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by telling them he lost it and giving them your SSN. Knowing your driver's
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license number (SSN in many states) is usually sufficient ID for getting
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a replacement license. He takes the driver's license to the social
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security office, tells them the appropriate SSN and asks for "his" payment
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record. They tell him your employer, your income, any interest bearing
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bank accounts you have and any securities you have bought or sold in
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the last 3 years and some odd months. He can find out the medical
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insurance company used by your employer and get your medical records
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from them in a similar way. He can also use the employment information
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along with your SSN to get credit cards in your name (credit
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card grantors use SSNs to access your credit records, and want little
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information on you other than SSN, employer and bank accounts). After
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buying a fast new car on your credit, he gets a lot of speeding tickets
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on your license. The criminal warrants that show up when he doesn't
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pay the tickets are attached to your social security number. If he really
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wants to get you in trouble, he gets busted for drunk driving or hit
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and run on your license, makes bail and throws the license away. You
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now have a mountain of bad debt and a felony arrest warrant, not to mention
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an enemy who knows every penny you have, what your credit record is like
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and all of your medical history. He got it all by just knowing your SSN.
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Paranoid? Sure. I don't think this sort of thing happens very often,
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but it provides an idea of the power in those 9 digits. I personally
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believe that the institutional (mis)use of SSNs is by far a worse problem
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than the kind of criminal behavior I just described, but I find the latter
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is more persuasive to people who are cavalier about having "nothing to
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hide".
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Try reading David Burnham's "The Rise of the Computer State" or his
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upcoming book on the IRS, or Robert Ellis Smith's "Privacy: How to Protect
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What's Left of It" for more detailed discussions.
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Larry Hunter
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-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
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Date: 6 OCT 1987 22:51:13 EDT
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>From: "Bryan, Jerry" <VM0A61%WVNVM.BITNET@wiscvm.wisc.edu>
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Subject: Digest of SSN responses
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The Privacy Act of 1974 does *not* mention universities by name. I quote
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as follows:
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"Sec. 7.(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State
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or local agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit,
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or privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal
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to disclose his social security account number."
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That all sounds well and good, except for the following little
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"gottcha's".
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1 -- The original Privacy Act included the following exception:
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"(2) the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection
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shall not apply with respect to
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(A) and disclosure which is required by Federal statute"
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Note that "disclosures which are required by Federal statute"
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are legion. For example, open a bank account, register for
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the draft, etc.
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2 -- the privacy act is grandfathered, so that anybody doing it
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before January 1, 1975 can keep doing it
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3 -- Congress has passed many, many exemptions and exceptions to
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the original Privacy Act, the worst of which is specifically
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authorizing states to use SSN's for driver's licenses and
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vehicle registration (Tax Reform Act of 1979).
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4 -- The clause in the original law making it apply to "any right,
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benefit, or privilege provided by law" is a pretty stiff test,
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according to lawyers who handled a SSN refusal case for me.
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It is pretty hard to convince a judge that attendance at a
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university is a "right, benefit, or privilege provided by law".
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And even if you did, the laws establishing universities in most
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states are ones which have been exempted from the Privacy Act
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by subsequent legislation (the Tax Reform Act of 1979).
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5 -- The original Privacy Act contained no penalty for violation.
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Again, according to my lawyers, a law with no penalty is essentially
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unenforcable. What is needed is something like a $1000 fine for
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every violation. Can you imagine how quickly a university would
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straighten up if it had to pay $1000 for every student for which
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it used an SSN as a student ID?
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As an example of how tangled these webs can become, both the folks giving
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ACT tests and SAT tests key the results off of SSN's, and these are
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private organizations utterly uncovered by any privacy legislation.
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Most (all?) universities that receive ACT and/or SAT scores match them
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up with their students via SSN's. Thus, universities have a valid,
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practically mandatory reason for having the SSN for all students on file,
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even if they do not use SSN for student ID. Furthermore, if the
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university is involved at all in the disbursement of federal money to
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students (various student loans, etc.), the feds will *require* SSN's
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for all the students involved. What's the poor university to do?
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Finally, grant applications to such agencies as National Institute of
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Health and National Science Foundation require the SSN's of all
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professors and students who will use the money? Again, what is the
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university to do? It really is too late, folks. Big Brother is
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already here, alive and well. And even Mr. Reagan with all his
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"get the government off the back of the people" rhetoric has
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greatly expanded Big Brother, provided only that it is in support of
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his declared social goals -- catching welfare cheats and such.
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The ends do justify the means, you know, as long as it is your own
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ends you are after.
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>From: mtune!mtgzy!norm@RUTGERS.EDU (n.e.andrews)
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Subject: Re: ssn's
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Date: 7 Oct 87 15:29:29 GMT
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> Why bother? What horrible deed can be done with it that makes it worth
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> not giving it out and the hassle that might follow?
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False income tax returns could be filed against someone's social
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security number. I suspect the consequences of that could
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qualify as a hassle...
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There must be other bad things that could be done using people's
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social security numbers, all of which could cause the real owner
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a lot of unnecessary trouble.
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I never did like the idea of tying the unlimited power of the
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State so intimately to everyone's personal business...
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-Norm Andrews, speaking for himself
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>From: matt@oddjob.uchicago.edu (Godfather to putty-tats)
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Subject: Re: ssn's
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Date: 9 Oct 87 21:28:58 GMT
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Guess who asked for my SSN this week. The Phone Company.
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I was ordering new service preperatory to moving and they
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first asked for employment information. I said "You don't
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really need that, do you? I'm a current customer and you
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know I pay my bills." The clerk said "Just a moment", then
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read me my employer's name and my (previous) title!
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Then she asked for my SSN to "complete their records". I
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hollered quietly and she said, "Actually, you can decline."
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Matt Crawford
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>From: mcb@lll-tis.arpa (Michael C. Berch)
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Subject: Re: ssn's
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Date: 8 Oct 87 23:06:48 GMT
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To: <security@rutgers.edu>
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This came up before in a Usenet newsgroup and is worth reiterating
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here. Look: I don't care what your feelings about giving out SSNs
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are, or what effect it has on your privacy, or how the country is
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going to hell in a handbasket because of the pervasive use of SSNs.
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Just DON'T, under any circumstances, just "make up a number" and give
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it out. The odds that it is already assigned are substantial.
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(And don't weasel around about how the 900's aren't used for SSNs;
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they're used by the IRS as "Taxpayer Identification Numbers" (TINs)
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and belong to people/corporations, too.)
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If I got tangled up in a bureaucratic mess about some purchase or
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payment or tax matter because some pinhead "made up a number" and it
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happened to be mine, I would be massively (and justifiably) pissed off.
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"Making up a number" is an anti-social, offensive thing to do,
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and one that (even given my laissez-faire, anti-authoritarian point of
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view) I would not hesitate to report to criminal authorities if I
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discovered it.
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Michael C. Berch
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ARPA: mcb@lll-tis.arpa
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UUCP: {ames,ihnp4,lll-crg,lll-lcc,mordor}!lll-tis!mcb
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Date: Sun, 11 Oct 87 23:06:51 EDT
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>From: lear@aramis.rutgers.edu (eliot lear)
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Subject: Re: ssn's
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Hi Curios,
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If someone wants to do a credit check on you, generally they need only
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your ssn and your permission. If they don't have the latter, they
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shouldn't have the former.
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Eliot
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Date: Mon, 12 Oct 87 08:31-0700
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>From: The Bandit <WIZARD@rita.ACS.WASHINGTON.EDU>
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Subject: moron social security numbers.
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I have seen numerous messages fly by these past few weeks regarding the
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sense (or nonsense) of keeping one's ssn private. All too often people
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declare that ssn's are unique. Would that this were true, but, unfortunately,
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it is not. Because uniqueness is not guaranteed, I prefer not to give out
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my ssn. I certainly wouldn't want someone's tainted credit rating affecting
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my rating, nor would I wish to demolish someone else's -- were such dire
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things to occur.
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Derek Haining
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Academic Computing Services
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University of Washington
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Seattle, Washington
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(206) 543-5852
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DEREK@UWARITA.BITNET
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-or-
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DEREK@RITA.ACS.WASHINGTON.EDU
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-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
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Date: Fri, 16 Oct 87 11:02:00 EDT
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>From: "Una R. Smith" <Q2813%PUCC.BITNET@wiscvm.wisc.edu>
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Subject: SSN
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Yes, it's much easier for people to manipulate information about you in
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a computer when they have your SSN, since it's a variable that can be
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matched so easily.
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But the flip side of that coin is what worries me. Think how easy, with
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a NINE digit number, it is for data coders to make keystroke errors. Of
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course this can happen with your name, but names have familiar patterns,
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or are very unfamiliar. Either way, the rate of error should be lower
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for coding names. But even if it isn't, that's ok, because few (if any)
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organizations with information about you will ever even attempt to merge
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data by your name. If 2 files are being combined, and your name is the
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common variable, and there is an error in 1 name record, there is no
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match. But if the SSN is used, and a coding error has occurred, there
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is the chance that SOMEONE ELSE'S history will be appended to your name,
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either under your SSN, or under theirs, depending on the coding error.
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Now, if you are a bad customer or whatever, you don't really care if this
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happens, because the chances are your history will only be improved. But
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if you are one of those sterling types who always pay on time, etc. and
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you "have nothing to hide, so why not give the SSN without a fuss", you
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might be burned badly. And even if the error isn't terrible, getting the
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problem fixed can take a long time. Just try telling someone that thier
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records on you are WRONG, especially if they have them on a computer.
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The chances are high that you will only get to talk to someone who either
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1) believes computers don't make mistakes, or 2) is afraid of the computer,
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or 3) doesn't know how to correct the records on you, since they are hidden
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in the computer, and doesn't want to bother finding out, or 4) CAN NOT change
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the data in the computer because someone down the line never imagined that
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changes would be necessary.
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If you think any of the 4 cases above is unrealistic, let me assure you that
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I know of instances of all 4 cases occuring. My mother is still fighting
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the property tax administrator in her city after 2 years because the records
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she got out of his computer database, thanks to a naive underling, do not
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|
agree with the tax assessments people in her neighborhood have been paying.
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|
The difference, she has discovered, amounts to nearly a million dollars
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|
annually coming out of single family residences instead of appartment
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|
complexes. The tax administrator's office has been stonewalling for over
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2 years because they won't admit that there is no way, currently, for them
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to get to the actual data; they insist "the printout is wrong." This is
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|
clearly an example of case 4 above, with maybe a little old-fashioned
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|
corruption thrown in for good measure.
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Recently someone said he hadn't withheld his SSN in the past, so there
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is no point to beginning now. I strongly disagree. No one is going to
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make any great effort to match SSN's to data about you by hand, and it's
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unlikely that if they do have your SSN that they also have a way of
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looking at your name and address via computer. After all, the SSN is
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so handy just because it lets merchants, etc. treat your name as just the
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first line of your address. The format is often free-form, and it is
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difficult to extract your name in program-driven databases.
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They certainly won't get any help from the SS Administration.
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-------
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