380 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
380 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer Systems Laboratory Bulletin
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November 1991
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ADVANCED AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGY
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Introduction
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Computer systems and the information they store and process are
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valuable resources which need to be protected. With the current
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trend toward networking, compromise of one computer on a network
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can often affect a significant number of other machines connected
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to the network.
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The first step toward securing a computer system is the ability
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to verify the identity of users. The process of verifying a
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user's identity is typically referred to as user authentication.
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Passwords are the method used most often for authenticating
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computer users, but this approach has often proven
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inadequate in preventing unauthorized access to computer
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resources when used as the sole means of authentication. This
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bulletin describes advanced authentication technology which can
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be used to increase the security of computer systems and
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provides guidance in the selection and use of this technology.
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User Authentication
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Authentication technology provides the basis for access control
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in computer systems. If the identity of a user can be correctly
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verified, legitimate users can be granted access to system
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resources. Conversely, those attempting to gain access without
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proper authorization can be denied. As used in this bulletin,
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authentication is defined as the act of verifying the identity of
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a user. Once a user's identity is verified, access control
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techniques may be used to mediate the user's access to data. A
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variety of methods are available for performing user
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authentication.
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The traditional method for authenticating users has been to
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provide them with a secret password, which they must use when
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requesting access to a particular system. Password systems can
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be effective if managed properly (Federal Information Processing
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Standard [FIPS] 112), but they seldom are. Authentication which
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relies solely on passwords has often failed to provide adequate
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protection for computer systems for a number of reasons. If
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users are allowed to make up their own passwords, they tend to
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choose ones that are easy to remember and therefore easy to
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guess. If passwords are generated from a random combination of
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characters, users often write them down because they are
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difficult to remember.
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Where password-only authentication is not adequate for an
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application, a number of alternative methods can be used alone or
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in combination to increase the security of the authentication
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process. The three generally accepted methods for verifying the
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identity of a user are based on something the user knows, such as
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a password; something the user possesses, such as an
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authentication token; and some physical characteristic of the
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user, such as a fingerprint or voice pattern.
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Token-Based Authentication
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Token-based authentication schemes require the system user to
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produce a physical token which the system can recognize as
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belonging to a legitimate user. These tokens typically contain
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information which is physically, magnetically, or electrically
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coded in a form which can be recognized by a host system. The
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automatic teller machines used by the retail banking industry,
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which require the user to carry a magnetic stripe card, are one
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example of token-based authentication systems. The most
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sophisticated tokens contain one or more integrated circuits
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which can store and, in some cases, process information.
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Tokens which are manufactured in the form of a credit card with
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an onboard microprocessor and memory are commonly referred to as
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"smart" cards.
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Token-based systems reduce the threat from attackers who attempt
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to guess or steal passwords, because the attacker must either
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fabricate a counterfeit token or steal a valid token from a user
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in addition to knowing the user's password.
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Biometric Authentication
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Biometric authentication relies on a unique physical
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characteristic to verify the identity of system users. Common
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biometric identifiers include fingerprints, written signatures,
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voice patterns, typing patterns, retinal scans, and hand
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geometry. The unique pattern which identifies a user is formed
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during an enrollment process, producing a template for that user.
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When a user wishes to authenticate to the system, a physical
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measurement is made to obtain a current biometric pattern for the
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user. This pattern can then be compared against the enrollment
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template in order to verify the user's identity. Biometric
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authentication devices tend to cost more than password or token-
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based systems, because the hardware required to capture and
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analyze biometric patterns is more complicated. However,
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biometrics provide a very high level of security because the
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authentication is directly related to a unique physical
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characteristic of the user which is more difficult to
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counterfeit. Recent technological advances have also helped to
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reduce the cost of biometric authentication systems.
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Combination Methods
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Passwords, authentication tokens, and biometrics are subject to a
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variety of attacks. Passwords can be guessed, tokens can be
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stolen, and even biometrics are susceptible to certain attacks.
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These threats can be reduced by applying sound design principles
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and system management techniques during the development and
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operation of an authentication system.
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One method which can substantially increase the security of an
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authentication system is to use a combination of authentication
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techniques. For example, an authentication system might require
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users to present an authentication token and also enter a
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password. By stealing a user's token, an attacker would still be
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unable to gain access to the host system, because the system
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would require the user's password in addition to the token.
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Implementation Guidelines and Recommendations
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An organization must answer numerous questions when it decides to
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implement an advanced authentication system. The following
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guidelines will assist those responsible for evaluating,
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procuring, and integrating these systems.
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Risk Analysis - A thorough analysis should be done to
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determine what parts of the system in question are vulnerable to
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attack, and to prioritize these vulnerabilities in terms of
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severity and likelihood.
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Product Evaluation and Selection - Once the risks associated with
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a host system have been identified, this information can be used
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to select an authentication system which provides adequate
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protection against these risks. In addition, the authentication
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system will have to meet several other requirements in order to
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function effectively in a given environment. The organization
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responsible for selecting the authentication system should decide
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whether sufficient in-house expertise exists to evaluate the
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available options. In some cases, it is more cost-effective to
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hire a consultant who is familiar with the available technology.
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Whether the evaluation is done in-house or by a consultant, the
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following items should be considered:
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o Sources of information - A variety of sources should be used
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when evaluating authentication systems. Vendor product
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literature can be very helpful in describing specific
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details of product operation, and in understanding the range
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of products offered. There are several annual conferences
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devoted to computer security, network access control, and
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authentication technology. In addition to the papers
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presented at these conferences, there are usually large
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vendor exhibit halls and product forums. Many
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organizations, particularly those in the government sector,
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have published information on the selection and integration
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of advanced authentication technology. These publications
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are often the result of practical experience gained during
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the implementation of these systems, and so can be
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particularly useful.
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o Integration into existing environment - This factor is
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discussed further in the next section, but is an important
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consideration when selecting a product. All other features
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of an authentication system may be irrelevant if the product
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cannot be integrated into the customer's computing
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environment.
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o Custom design - Sometimes an organization's needs cannot be
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met by a commercially available product. In these cases,
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the organization may decide to do a custom design using
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in-house resources. This alternative is most practical for
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large organizations with experienced system design and
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support groups, or for smaller organizations with a high
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level of expertise in computer access control systems.
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Vendors are often willing to work with customers to modify
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existing products or design new products to meet custom
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requirements. An arrangement which often works well is for
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the customer and vendor to work together on the design of
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the system, and for the vendor to then manufacture the
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product.
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o Cost and performance - The relationship between cost and
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performance can be relatively complex for authentication
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technology. Similar products from different vendors may
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vary widely in cost, depending on the vendor's manufacturing
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and development techniques and marketing philosophies. In
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general, devices with a higher performance level will cost
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more, but individual cases should be evaluated carefully.
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The general approach should be to procure the authentication
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system which provides the required level of security and
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other performance factors at a minimum cost.
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o Accuracy - The accuracy of an authentication system refers
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to the ability of that system to correctly identify
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authorized system users while rejecting unauthorized users.
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Since this is the primary function of an authentication
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system, accuracy is directly related to the level of
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security provided by the system. Vendors may not be
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objective about producing and interpreting the results of
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tests which quantify the accuracy of the authentication
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process with regard to the vendor's particular products.
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For these reasons, an organization may wish to run
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independent tests to determine the accuracy of an
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authentication system in terms which are relevant to the
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environment in which the system will be used.
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o Reliability - An authentication system should be capable of
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operating in its intended environment for a reasonable
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period of time. During this time, the system is expected to
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perform at or above a level which ensures an appropriate
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amount of protection for the host system. If the
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authentication system fails, the chances for unauthorized
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access during the failure should be minimized.
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o Maintainability - All hardware and software systems require
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some form of maintenance. The components of an
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authentication system should be evaluated to determine the
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level of maintenance which the system will require. One
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goal in the design of an authentication system should be to
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minimize the maintenance requirements within the constraints
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of system cost, performance, and available technology.
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o Commercial availability - Large-scale networking of computer
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systems and distributed computing are relatively recent
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developments, and are the driving forces behind the need for
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more effective methods for authenticating system users.
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Unfortunately, the market for advanced authentication
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technology is not fully developed and is somewhat unstable.
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Many commercially available authentication systems have not
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yet been sold in quantity. An organization that is
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considering the use of this technology should evaluate the
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vendor's ability to produce systems that meet specific
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quality control standards and in sufficient quantity to meet
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the user's requirements. Contracts written to procure
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authentication systems should provide some form of
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protection for the customer in the event that the vendor is
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unable to produce systems in the quantities required.
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o Upgradeability - Because the technology of advanced
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authentication systems is continually developing, any
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authentication system should be able to accommodate the
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replacement of outdated components with new ones. A modular
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approach to the design of an authentication system, with
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clearly defined interfaces between the system components,
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facilitates the process of upgrading to new technology.
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o Interoperability - A wide variety of computing platforms and
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security architectures are in use today. Any authentication
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system should be designed to work with as many of these
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diverse platforms as possible, or at least to require a
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minimum of modifications to work in different environments.
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o Reputation of manufacturer - Obtaining satisfactory service
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during the selection, installation, and long-term operation
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of an authentication system can be difficult if the
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manufacturer is uncooperative. Customers can request a list
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of references from prospective vendors for products and
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services which have been provided to other customers in the
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past. In addition, the resumes of key individuals working
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on the vendor's staff can sometimes be examined to determine
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whether an adequate level of expertise is available.
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o Training programs - Some form of training is usually
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necessary for the people who will be using and maintaining
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an authentication system. An effective training program is
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of critical importance to the success of any new system.
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Vendors should offer training appropriate for everyday users
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of the system, and also for the system administrators who
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will be responsible for managing the system.
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System Integration - The integration of an authentication
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system into an existing computer environment can be very
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difficult. Most operating systems do not contain well-defined
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entry points for replacing the default authentication mechanism
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supplied with the operating system. This is partly because there
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is no widely accepted standard for the interface between an
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operating system and an authentication device. Until such a
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standard becomes available, there are three general options:
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o In some cases, the vendor who provides the authentication
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system may have already integrated it into certain operating
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systems. If the authentication system meets the
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requirements of the customer and the customer is using the
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specified operating system, then the system integration has
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already been accomplished.
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o Operating system vendors may select certain security
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architectures for incorporation into their systems. If
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these architectures include an authentication technology
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which the customer finds acceptable, then the operating
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system may be purchased with the appropriate authentication
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mechanism as part of the package.
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o It may be necessary to customize the authentication system
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and perhaps modify the host operating system so that the two
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can communicate. This will involve cooperation between the
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operating system vendor, the authentication system vendor,
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and the customer, unless the customer has sufficient
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expertise to perform the integration in-house. A
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prototyping approach is strongly recommended, due to the
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complexity of this type of project. Implementing such a
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system on a small scale first can be very helpful in
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determining what problems will be encountered in a
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full-scale implementation.
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System Maintenance - After an authentication system has
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been selected and installed, it must be maintained. Maintenance
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costs can easily exceed the initial acquisition cost if the
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system is to be in operation for a reasonable length of time. It
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is therefore important that long-term plans for system
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maintenance be developed by the customer or provided by the
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vendor in the initial stages of the procurement cycle.
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Provisions must be made for assigning responsibilities for system
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administration so that new users can be enrolled, inactive
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accounts deleted, and system malfunctions identified and
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corrected.
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The majority of network authentication systems employ some form
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of cryptography, which means that some form of cryptographic key
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management system will be necessary. The key management
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component may be provided by the authentication system vendor,
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but the process of maintaining and distributing keys usually
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requires active participation by the host system. Since the
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security of a cryptographic system is directly related to the
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level of protection provided for the cryptographic keys, it is
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essential for the vendor or customer to develop a system for
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managing these keys effectively. Also, the host computer system
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will probably evolve over time through the addition of new
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software and hardware, and these changes may require
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corresponding modifications or upgrades to the authentication
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system to maintain compatibility.
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Summary
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Password-based authentication is the most widely used method for
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verifying the identity of persons requesting access to computer
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resources. However, authentication based only on passwords often
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does not provide adequate protection. The use of authentication
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tokens, biometrics, and other alternative methods for verifying
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the identity of system users can substantially increase the
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security of an authentication system. The proliferation of
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networked computer systems and the corresponding increase in the
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potential for security violations makes it even more critical
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those who design and operate computer systems to understand and
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implement effective authentication schemes.
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References
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Guideline on User Authentication Techniques for Computer
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Network Access Control, National Institute of Standards and
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Technology (U.S.), Federal Information Processing Standards
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Publication 83, National Technical Information Service,
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Springfield, VA, September 1980.
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Computer Data Authentication, National Institute of Standards
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and Technology (U.S.), Federal Information Processing
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Standards Publication 113, National Technical Information
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Service, Springfield, VA, May 1985.
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Biometric Access Control Device Evaluation Criteria (Draft
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Report), DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee,
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Access Control Subcommittee, Community Headquarters Building,
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Washington, DC 20505, February 1991.
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Smart Card Technology: New Methods for Computer Access
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Control, National Institute of Standards and Technology
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(U.S.), NIST Special Publication 500-157, September 1988.
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Financial Institution Sign-On Authentication for Wholesale
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Financial Transactions, American National Standard X9.26,
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American National Standards Committee X9, American Bankers
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Association, May 1990.
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Password Usage, National Institute of Standards and
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Technology (U.S.), Federal Information Processing Standards
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Publication 112, National Technical Information Service,
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Springfield, VA, May 1985.
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For More Information
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For further information on NIST's ongoing work in advanced
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authentication technology, contact Jim Dray, Computer Security
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Division, Room A216, Technology Building, National Institute of
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Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, (301) 975-
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3356. |