87 lines
5.9 KiB
Plaintext
87 lines
5.9 KiB
Plaintext
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THE MONROE DOCTRINE
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The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe's seventh annual
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message to Congress, December 2, 1823.
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...At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister
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of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been trans-
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mitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by
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amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on
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the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His
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Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been
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acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this
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friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably
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attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the
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best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this
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interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the
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occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the
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rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American
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continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and
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maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future coloniza-
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tion by any European powers...
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It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was
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then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of
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those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary
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moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very
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different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the
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globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our
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origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of
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the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty
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and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of
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the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any
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part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights
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are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for
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our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more
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immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened
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and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essential-
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ly different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from
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that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our
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own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and
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matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we
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have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it,
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therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United
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States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their
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part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to
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our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European
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power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments
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who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we
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have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not
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view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any
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other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the
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manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war
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between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time
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of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere,
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provided no change shall occur which, in the judgement of the competent author-
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ities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of
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the United States indispensable to their security.
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The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of
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this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers
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should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to
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have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such
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interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all
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independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even
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those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our
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policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars
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which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the
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same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers;
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to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to
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cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a
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frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every
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power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents
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circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that
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the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either
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continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe
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that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own
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accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such inter-
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position in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength
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and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each
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other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true
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policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that
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other powers will pursue the same course...
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Prepared by Gerald Murphy (The Cleveland Free-Net - aa300)
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